

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2019

MEASURING THE IMPACT
OF TERRORISM



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NATIONAL CONSORTIUM FOR THE
STUDY OF TERRORISM AND RESPONSES TO TERRORISM

A CENTER OF EXCELLENCE
OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
LED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND

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Executive Summary

This is the seventh edition of the Global Terrorism Index (GTI). The report provides a comprehensive summary of the key global trends and patterns in terrorism over the last 50 years, covering the period from the beginning of 1970 to the end of 2018, and placing a special emphasis on trends since 2014, which corresponds with the start of the fall of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

The GTI report is produced by the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) using data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and other sources. Data for the GTD is collected and collated by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland. The GTD contains over 170,000 terrorist incidents for the period 1970 to 2017.

Deaths from terrorism fell for the fourth consecutive year, after peaking in 2014. The decline in deaths corresponds with the military successes against ISIL and Boko Haram, with the total number of deaths falling by 15.2 per cent between 2017 and 2018 to 15,952. The largest fall occurred in Iraq, which recorded 3,217 fewer deaths from terrorism in 2018, a 75 per cent decrease from the prior year. For the first time since 2003, Iraq is no longer the country most impacted by terrorism.

ISIL's decline continued for the second successive year. Deaths attributed to the group declined 69 per cent, with attacks declining 63 per cent in 2018. ISIL now has an estimated 18,000 fighters left in Iraq and Syria, down from over 70,000 in 2014.

Somalia recorded the second largest reduction in deaths for the second year in a row, with 824 fewer deaths recorded than in 2017. Attacks by Al-Shabaab declined by 24 per cent following an increase in United States-led airstrikes targeting the group.

Total deaths from terrorism are now down over 52 per cent from their peak in 2014.

The fall in the total number of deaths from terrorism was mirrored by a reduction in the impact of terrorism around the world, with 98 countries recording an improvement on their GTI score, compared to 40 that recorded a deterioration.

Although the intensity of terrorism has diminished its breadth has not, with 103 countries recording at least one terrorist incident in 2018, and 71 countries suffering at least one fatality in the same year. This is the second worst year on record for the number of countries suffering at least one death, and highlights the need for continued assertive international action to combat terrorism.

Conflict remains the primary driver of terrorism, with over 95 per cent of deaths from terrorism occurring in countries already in conflict. When combined with countries with high levels of political terror the number jumps to over 99 per cent. Political terror involves extra-judicial killings, torture and imprisonment without trial. The ten countries with the highest

impact of terrorism are all engaged in at least one armed conflict.

Afghanistan has replaced Iraq as the country most affected by terrorism, recording a 59 per cent increase in terrorism deaths to 7,379 in 2018. The increase is closely aligned with the increasing intensity of the civil war. There has been a constant increase in both terrorism and battlefield deaths over the past decade as the security situation continues to deteriorate. Total deaths from terrorism in Afghanistan have increased by 631 per cent since 2008.

Other than Afghanistan only three other countries recorded a substantial increase in deaths from terrorism in 2018: Nigeria, Mali, and Mozambique. Each of these countries recorded more than 100 additional deaths.

The rise in terrorist activity in Afghanistan, coupled with the winding down of the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, meant that the Taliban overtook ISIL as the world's deadliest terrorist group in 2018. The number of deaths attributed to the Taliban rose by just under 71 per cent, to 6,103. In contrast, deaths attributed to ISIL fell globally by just under 70 per cent, falling from 4,350 in 2017, to 1,328 in 2018. This marks the first time since 2014 that ISIL was not the single deadliest terrorist group. However, some ISIL affiliate groups have recorded increased levels of terrorist activity. The Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State was the fourth deadliest terrorist group in 2018, with over a thousand recorded deaths, with the majority of these deaths occurring in Afghanistan. In total, there were 13 groups or movements who were responsible for more than a hundred deaths in 2018.

The increase in deaths from terrorism in Afghanistan meant that South Asia remains the region most impacted by terrorism. This is the first year since 2012 that South Asia recorded more deaths than any other region. Sub-Saharan Africa recorded the second highest number of deaths from terrorism, overtaking the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), which is now ranked third. This marks the first year since the inception of the index that sub-Saharan Africa recorded more deaths than its neighbouring region. The primary driver of the increase in terrorism in the region was a rise in terrorist activity in Nigeria, which was attributed to Fulani extremists. Of the 13 groups or movements that recorded more than 100 deaths, six are primarily active within sub-Saharan Africa.

Europe and MENA were the two regions that recorded the biggest improvement in the impact of terrorism, with the number of deaths falling by 70 per cent and 65 per cent respectively. The biggest fall in absolute numbers occurred in MENA, with over 4,400 fewer deaths than in 2017. Only three

countries in the MENA region recorded an increase in deaths: Iran, Morocco, and Jordan. By contrast, 12 countries recorded reductions. The number of deaths from terrorism in the region is now over 83 per cent lower than at its peak in 2014.


In Europe, the number of deaths from terrorism fell for the second successive year, from over two hundred in 2017 to 62 in 2018. Only two attacks killed five or more people, compared to 11 in 2015, which was the peak year for terrorist activity in the region in the last decade. The total number of terrorist incidents also fell by 40 per cent, to 245 in 2018. Western Europe recorded its lowest number of incidents since 2012, with 183 incidents recorded. The number of countries in Western Europe recording a death in 2018 fell from nine to five countries, highlighting the strength of the improvement. The collapse of ISIL in Syria and Iraq was also reflected in Europe, with no deaths attributed to the group in 2018, although 16 deaths were attributed to 'Jihadi-inspired extremists'. However, there are reports of ISIL prisoners escaping in the wake of the United States (US) withdrawal from Syria and the Turkish incursion into Northern Syria. This combined with the lack of security in the area, increases the risk of a re-escalation of conflict in the region, with a possible increase in ISIL affiliates returning to Europe. Despite the decline of ISIL, in the coming years it is likely that much of global terrorist activity will still come from a small number of regionally based Islamist/jihadist militant movements that control territory.

Although the total number of deaths from terrorism has fallen, the impact of terrorism remains widespread. In 2018, 71 countries experienced at least one death from terrorism, which is the second highest number of countries recording one or more deaths in the past twenty years, and a slight increase from 2017, when 69 countries recorded at least one death. Only three countries recorded more than a thousand, the lowest number since 2011.

The global economic impact of terrorism was US\$33 billion in 2018, 38 per cent lower than in 2017. Compared to other forms of violence such as homicide, armed conflict, and military expenditure, terrorism is a small percentage of the total global cost of violence, which was equal to 14.1 trillion dollars in purchasing power parity (PPP) in 2018. It should be noted that the figures for terrorism are conservative as they do not account for the indirect impacts on business, investment and the costs associated with security agencies in countering terrorism. Terrorism also has wide-ranging economic consequences that have the potential to spread quickly through the global economy with significant social ramifications.

One of the more worrying trends is the surge in far-right political terrorism over the past five years, although the absolute number of far-right attacks remains low when compared to other forms of terrorism. In North America, Western Europe, and Oceania, far-right attacks increased by 320 per cent over the past five years. This trend has continued into 2019, with 77 deaths attributed to far-right terrorists to September 2019. The number of arrests linked to right-wing terrorism in Europe in 2019 increased for the third year in a row. However, the level of political terrorism in the West was much higher in the past. In the past ten years there have been 322 terrorist attacks classified as either far-left or far-right, compared to 1,677 attacks between 1970 and 1980.

Far-right terrorism is also more likely to be carried out by individuals unaffiliated with a specific terrorist group. Nearly 60 per cent of far-right attacks from 1970 to 2018 were carried



out by unaffiliated individuals, compared to under ten per cent for both far-left and separatist terrorist groups.

The rise in politically motivated attacks by unaffiliated individuals comes at a time when Positive Peace is declining across the West. The US had one of the largest deteriorations in Positive Peace, with its score deteriorating by 6.7 per cent over the past decade. Declines in Positive Peace are usually associated with higher levels of social disorder.

The research also found that armed conflicts with high levels of terrorism tend to last longer and be more deadly. In conflicts where the primary rebel or insurgent group started as a terrorist group, the average length of the conflict was 33 years, compared to 17 years for conflicts where the insurgents did not start as terrorists. There is also a strong correlation between battle deaths and the number of terrorist attacks where the two increased or decreased in tandem. Terrorist attacks in conflict countries are also three times as lethal as terrorist attacks outside of conflict, and are much more likely to target police and the military. By contrast, terrorist attacks in non-conflict countries disproportionately target tourists, business, and the media.

There has been a growing trend of increased female participation in terrorism, although still a small percentage of all attacks. Between 1985 and 2018 there were 300 suicide attacks involving at least one female. These attacks killed over 3,000 people. The trend has intensified over the past five years, with the number of female suicide attacks increasing 450 per cent between 2013 and 2018. By contrast, male suicide attacks fell 47 per cent over the same period.

Most of this increase can be attributed to Boko Haram, with nearly 80 per cent of all female suicide attacks in the last five years being carried out by the group. This tactic initially led to more lethal attacks, as female suicide bombers were able to evade detection by security forces more easily than male suicide bombers. However, security forces have adapted to this tactic, and as a result female suicide attacks are now less deadly than attacks carried out by their male counterparts.

Key Findings

1

Results

- › The total number of deaths from terrorism declined for the fourth consecutive year in 2018, falling by 15.2 per cent to 15,952 deaths.
- › Nine of the ten countries most impacted by terrorism improved.
- › Despite the fall in total deaths, the number of countries affected by terrorism remains high. 71 countries recorded at least one death from terrorism in 2018, the second highest number of countries since 2002.
- › Afghanistan had the largest deterioration, recording 7,379 deaths from terrorism, an increase of 59 per cent from the prior year, and is now at the bottom of the index.
- › For the first time since 2003, Iraq was not the country most impacted by terrorism.
- › The impact of terrorism improved in 98 countries, compared to 40 that deteriorated in the past year. However, the overall impact of terrorism was still higher in 80 countries when compared to five years ago.
- › Iraq and Somalia experienced the largest falls in deaths from terrorism, owing mainly to less activity from ISIL and Al-Shabaab respectively.
- › ISIL's decline continued for the second successive year. Deaths attributed to the group declined by 69 per cent, and attacks declined 63 per cent.
- › The global economic impact of terrorism in 2018 amounted to \$33 billion in constant PPP terms, a decline of 38 per cent from its 2017 level.

2

Trends

- › Deaths from terrorism are now 52 per cent lower than their peak in 2014. The fall in deaths has been largest in Iraq, Syria, and Nigeria.
- › Bombings and armed assaults have been the most common type of terrorist attack over the past two decades.
- › Between 2002 and 2018, South Asia, MENA and sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 93 per cent of all deaths from terrorism. The largest number was recorded in MENA, with more than 93,700 fatalities.
- › The average country score in the MENA region improved for the third year in the row.
- › South Asia has had the highest impact from terrorism since 2002, while Central America and the Caribbean region has had the lowest impact.

Far-right Terrorism

- › Incidents of far-right terrorism have been increasing in the West, particularly in Western Europe, North America, and Oceania. The total number of incidents have increased by 320 per cent over the past five years.
- › In 2018, total deaths attributed to far-right groups increased by 52 per cent to 26 deaths. To the end of September in 2019, 77 deaths have been attributed to far-right groups.
- › Deaths have been increasing year on year for the past three years, from 11 deaths in 2017, 26 deaths in 2018, to 77 deaths by the end of September 2019.
- › However, far-right terrorism remains a small fraction of total terrorism worldwide. Even in the West, historically nationalist or separatist, Islamist, and far-left terrorism has been much more common.

- The three largest politically motivated terrorist attacks in the West in the last 50 years have been perpetrated by far-right extremists.
- Far-right terrorism in the last ten years has become increasingly associated with individuals with broad ideological allegiances rather than specific terrorist groups.
- In the last decade, one in three mass shootings have been classified as a terrorist attack, compared to one in five over the last 40 years.
- The US has had one of the largest deteriorations in Positive Peace, deteriorating by 6.7 per cent.
- The fall in Positive Peace in the West in the last decade has increased the likelihood of a continued increase in politically motivated violence in the next decade. There were 270 politically motivated terrorist attacks between 2013 and 2018.
- At least 84 people have been killed in politically motivated terrorist attacks in 2019 thus far.

Conflict and Terrorism

- Conflict is the primary driver of terrorist activity. In 2018, 95 per cent of deaths from terrorism occurred in countries where violent conflict was occurring.
- This increases to 99 per cent of deaths when countries with high levels of state sponsored terror are also included.
- Every one of the ten countries most impacted by terrorism in 2018 was also involved in an armed conflict.
- Terrorism is also correlated with the intensity of conflict. There is a strong correlation between the number of battle deaths per year in a conflict country, and the number of terrorist attacks in the same year.

- Terrorist attacks in conflict countries are over three times as lethal on average, than terrorist attacks in non-conflict countries.
- Insurgent groups use terrorism as a tactic of war and are more likely to target infrastructure, the police and state military.
- The average duration across all conflicts is 17 years, the average duration of conflicts involving groups that started as terrorist groups is 33 years.

Gender and Terrorism

- There have been over 300 suicide attacks involving at least one female since 1985, which killed 3,071 people.
- From 2013 to 2018, incidents of female suicide attacks increased from four in 2013 to 22 in 2018.
- The majority of female suicide attacks in the past five years have been attributed to Boko Haram. Since 2014, the group has been responsible for 87 per cent deaths from female suicide attacks with at least 146 suicide attacks causing over 900 deaths.
- Excluding Boko Haram, female suicide deaths have increased by 30 per cent since 2013 and attacks by 200 per cent. Attacks were attributed to eight other terrorist groups, primarily in the MENA region.
- Thirteen per cent of ISIL foreign recruits were female, with the majority of female recruits joining from the MENA region.
- Asia Pacific had the largest proportion of women joining ISIL at 31 per cent. The next highest proportion was Europe at 24 per cent.
- As a percentage, more males returned to their country of origin than females. Europe had the highest disparity in percentages, with nearly 50 per cent of males returning, compared to only 18 per cent of women.

About the Global Terrorism Index

The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) is a comprehensive study analysing the impact of terrorism for 163 countries and which covers 99.7 per cent of the world's population.

Given the significant resources committed to counter terrorism by governments across the world, it is important to analyse and aggregate the available data to better understand its various properties.

Examples of the information contained in this study are:

- The differing socio-economic conditions under which it occurs.
- The longer term trends and how terrorism changes over time.
- The geopolitical drivers associated with terrorism and ideological aims of terrorist groups.
- The types of strategies deployed by terrorists, their tactical targets and how these have evolved over time.

In this context, one of the key aims of the GTI is to examine these trends. It also aims to help inform a positive, practical debate about the future of terrorism and the required policy responses.

The GTI is based on the Global Terrorism Database (GTD); the most authoritative data source on terrorism today. The GTI produces a composite score so as to provide an ordinal ranking of countries on the impact of terrorism. The GTD is unique in that it consists of systematically and comprehensively coded data for 170,000 terrorist incidents.

The GTI was developed in consultation with the Global Peace Index Expert Panel. The GTI scores each country on a scale from 0 to 10; where 0 represents no impact from terrorism and 10 represents the highest measurable impact of terrorism. Countries are ranked in descending order with the worst scores listed first in the index.

Defining terrorism is not a straightforward matter. There is no single internationally accepted definition of what constitutes terrorism and the terrorism literature abounds with competing definitions and typologies. IEP accepts the terminology and definitions agreed to by the GTD and the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START).

The GTI therefore defines terrorism as 'the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.'

This definition recognises that terrorism is not only the physical act of an attack but also the psychological impact it has on a society for many years after. Therefore, the index score

accounts for terrorist attacks over the prior five years.

In order to be included as an incident in the GTD, the act has to be 'an intentional act of violence or threat of violence by a non-state actor.' This means an incident has to meet three criteria in order for it to be counted as a terrorist act:

1. The incident must be intentional - the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator.
2. The incident must entail some level of violence or threat of violence - including property damage as well as violence against people.
3. The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors. This database does not include acts of state terrorism.

In addition to this baseline definition, two of the following three criteria have to be met in order to be included in the START database from 1997:

- The violent act was aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious or social goal.
- The violent act included evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate or convey some other message to a larger audience other than to the immediate victims.
- The violent act was outside the precepts of international humanitarian law.

In cases where there is insufficient information to make a definitive distinction about whether it is a terrorist incident within the confines of the definition, the database codes these incidents as 'doubt terrorism proper'. In order to only count unambiguous incidents of terrorism, this study does not include doubted incidents.

It is important to understand how incidents are counted. According to the GTD codebook 'incidents occurring in both the same geographic and temporal point will be regarded as a single incident but if either the time of the occurrence of the incidents or their locations are discontinuous, the events will be regarded as separate incidents.

Illustrative examples from the GTD codebook are as follows:


- Four truck bombs explode nearly simultaneously in different parts of a major city. This represents four incidents.
- A bomb goes off and while police are working on the scene the next day, they are attacked by terrorists with automatic weapons. These are two separate incidents as they were not continuous given the time lag between the two events.

“Defining terrorism is not a straightforward matter. There is no single internationally-accepted definition of what constitutes terrorism, and the terrorism literature abounds with competing definitions and typologies.”


- A group of militants shoot and kill five guards at a perimeter checkpoint of a petroleum refinery and then proceeds to set explosives and destroy the refinery. This is one incident since it occurred in a single location (the petroleum refinery) and was one continuous event.
- A group of hijackers diverts a plane to Senegal and, while at an airport in Senegal, shoots two Senegalese policemen. This is one incident since the hijacking was still in progress at the time of the shooting and hence the two events occurred at the same time and in the same place.

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
MEASURING THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM



THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM



RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	RANK CHANGE	RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	RANK CHANGE	RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	RANK CHANGE
1	Afghanistan	9.603	↑ 1	28	United Kingdom	5.405	↔	56	Sweden	3.45	↓ 5
2	Iraq	9.241	↓ 1	29	Ethiopia	5.345	↓ 3	57	Algeria	3.409	↓ 3
3	Nigeria	8.597	↔	30	Saudi Arabia	5.238	↓ 1	58	Bolivia	3.387	↑ 80
4	Syria	8.006	↔	31	Bangladesh	5.208	↓ 6	59	Spain	3.354	↓ 9
5	Pakistan	7.889	↔	32	Palestine	5.177	↓ 1	60	Tanzania	3.272	↑ 1
6	Somalia	7.8	↑ 1	33	Burundi	5.102	↓ 1	61	Bahrain	3.201	↓ 8
7	India	7.518	↑ 1	34	Nepal	5.093	↓ 1	62	Paraguay	3.119	↓ 3
8	Yemen	7.259	↔	35	Indonesia	5.07	↑ 7	63	Italy	3.109	↑ 6
9	Philippines	7.137	↑ 1	36	France	5.008	↓ 6	64	Jordan	3.091	↓ 4
10	Democratic Republic of the Congo	7.039	↑ 1	37	Russia	4.9	↓ 3	65	Nicaragua	2.952	↑ 36
11	Egypt	6.794	↓ 2	38	Chad	4.762	↔	66	Rwanda	2.948	↑ 10
12	Libya	6.766	↑ 1	39	Iran	4.717	↑ 5	67	Peru	2.84	↓ 1
13	Mali	6.653	↑ 9	40	Israel	4.525	↑ 1	68	Zimbabwe	2.834	↑ 18
14	Central African Republic	6.622	↑ 1	41	South Africa	4.511	↑ 5	69	Ireland	2.692	↓ 4
15	Cameroon	6.62	↑ 1	42	China	4.465	↓ 6	70	Republic of the Congo	2.687	↓ 9
16	Turkey	6.533	↓ 4	43	Lebanon	4.395	↓ 8	71	Australia	2.645	↓ 3
17	South Sudan	6.316	↓ 3	44	Germany	4.254	↓ 5	72	Cote d' Ivoire	2.598	↓ 9
18	Thailand	6.029	↓ 1	45	Greece	4.167	↔	73	Brazil	2.53	↑ 17
19	Colombia	5.912	↑ 8	46	Chile	4.123	↑ 12	74	Malaysia	2.495	↓ 4
20	Sudan	5.807	↓ 2	47	Venezuela	4.101	↑ 8	75	Kuwait	2.487	↓ 11
21	Kenya	5.756	↓ 2	48	Mexico	4.08	↑ 8	76	Ecuador	2.455	↑ 12
22	United States of America	5.691	↓ 2	49	Uganda	3.957	↑ 3	77	Netherlands	2.347	↑ 1
23	Niger	5.596	↔	50	Tajikistan	3.947	↑ 24	78	Japan	2.291	↓ 11
24	Ukraine	5.547	↓ 3	51	Tunisia	3.938	↓ 4	79	Kosovo	2.255	↓ 8
25	Mozambique	5.542	↑ 15	52	Angola	3.784	↓ 9	80	Haiti	2.18	↑ 1
26	Myanmar	5.512	↓ 2	53	Belgium	3.636	↓ 5	81	Finland	2.026	↓ 8
27	Burkina Faso	5.418	↑ 10	54	Canada	3.591	↑ 3	82	Madagascar	1.957	↓ 10
				55	Sri Lanka	3.569	↓ 6				



RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	RANK CHANGE	RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	RANK CHANGE	RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	RANK CHANGE
83	Argentina	1.68	↑ 1	110	Cyprus	0.42	↓ 18	138	Costa Rica	0	↓ 32
84	Austria	1.655	↓ 5	110	Albania	0.42	↓ 13	138	Slovenia	0	↓ 32
85	Kazakhstan	1.566	↓ 10	112	Bulgaria	0.372	↑ 1	138	Togo	0	↓ 30
86	Ghana	1.559	↑ 36	113	Djibouti	0.32	↓ 10	138	Mauritania	0	↔
87	Kyrgyz Republic	1.467	↓ 7	114	Zambia	0.305	↓ 10	138	Portugal	0	↔
88	Bosnia and Herzegovina	1.388	↑ 3	115	Macedonia (FYR)	0.301	↓ 9	138	Croatia	0	↓ 1
89	Papua New Guinea	1.364	↓ 12	116	South Korea	0.296	↓ 2	138	El Salvador	0	↔
90	Georgia	1.335	↓ 1	117	Latvia	0.229	↓ 10	138	eSwatini	0	↔
91	Guatemala	1.331	↑ 29	118	Switzerland	0.191	↑ 6	138	Mongolia	0	↔
92	Morocco	1.215	↑ 40	119	Hungary	0.181	↓ 9	138	Romania	0	↔
93	Senegal	1.186	↑ 3	120	Dominican Republic	0.177	↓ 11	138	Benin	0	↔
94	Armenia	1.173	↓ 11	121	Uruguay	0.172	↓ 10	138	Equatorial Guinea	0	↔
95	Laos	1.033	↓ 10	122	New Zealand	0.143	↓ 8	138	Cambodia	0	↓ 3
96	Taiwan	1.008	↑ 3	123	Estonia	0.115	↓ 7	138	Botswana	0	↔
97	Montenegro	0.999	↑ 35	123	Moldova	0.115	↓ 7	138	Namibia	0	↔
97	Vietnam	0.999	↑ 7	123	Serbia	0.115	↓ 7	138	Cuba	0	↔
99	Honduras	0.992	↓ 18	126	Liberia	0.105	↓ 7	138	Turkmenistan	0	↔
100	Guinea	0.971	↑ 12	127	Lesotho	0.095	↓ 6	138	Mauritius	0	↔
101	Denmark	0.957	↓ 1	128	Norway	0.076	↓ 5	138	Timor-Leste	0	↔
102	Czech Republic	0.866	↓ 15	129	Slovakia	0.057	↓ 3	138	Singapore	0	↔
103	Azerbaijan	0.698	↓ 5	130	United Arab Emirates	0.048	↓ 3	138	Eritrea	0	↔
104	Malawi	0.663	↑ 3	131	Panama	0.038	↓ 3	138	North Korea	0	↔
105	Gabon	0.551	↓ 12	131	Guyana	0.038	↓ 3	138	The Gambia	0	↔
106	Poland	0.477	↓ 4	133	Qatar	0.029	↓ 3	138	Oman	0	↔
107	Jamaica	0.472	↓ 13	133	Iceland	0.029	↓ 3	138	Guinea-Bissau	0	↔
108	Sierra Leone	0.458	↓ 13	135	Trinidad and Tobago	0.019	↓ 10	138	Belarus	0	↔
108	Lithuania	0.458	↑ 30	135	Uzbekistan	0.019	↓ 3				
				137	Bhutan	0.01	↓ 2				




TERRORIST INCIDENTS

The twenty most fatal terrorist attacks in 2018

● All attacks in 2018 scaled by number of fatalities

○ Worst attacks in 2018

					DESCRIPTION	
1	COUNTRY	AFGHANISTAN	CITY	GHAZNI	DEATHS 466	Assailants armed with mortars, explosive devices, and firearms attacked Ghazni, Afghanistan. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the incident.
	DATE	8/10/18	GROUP	TALIBAN		
2	COUNTRY	AFGHANISTAN	CITY	FARAH	DEATHS 330	Approximately 2,000 assailants, including suicide bombers, attacked Farah, Afghanistan. At least 330 people were killed and 116 other people were injured in the ensuing clash.
	DATE	5/15/2018	GROUP	TALIBAN		
3	COUNTRY	PAKISTAN	CITY	DARENGARH	DEATHS 150	A suicide bomber detonated at an election rally for Balochistan Awami Party candidate Nawabzada Siraj Raisani in Darengarh, Balochistan, Pakistan. At least 150 people, including Raisani, were killed.
	DATE	7/13/2018	GROUP	KHORASAN CHAPTER OF THE ISLAMIC STATE		
4	COUNTRY	AFGHANISTAN	CITY	KABUL	DEATHS 104	A suicide bomber detonated an explosives-laden ambulance at a police checkpoint outside Jomhuryat hospital in Kabul, Afghanistan.
	DATE	1/27/2018	GROUP	TALIBAN		
5	COUNTRY	AFGHANISTAN	CITY	DILA DISTRICT	DEATHS 77	Assailants attacked the district centre of Dila district, Paktika, Afghanistan. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the incident.
	DATE	10/12/18	GROUP	TALIBAN		
6	COUNTRY	AFGHANISTAN	CITY	KABUL	DEATHS 70	A suicide bomber detonated an explosives-laden belt targeting a voter registration centre in Dasht-e-Barchi, Kabul, Afghanistan.
	DATE	4/22/2018	GROUP	KHORASAN CHAPTER OF THE ISLAMIC STATE		
7	COUNTRY	AFGHANISTAN	CITY	MUHMAND DARA DISTRICT	DEATHS 69	A suicide bomber detonated an explosives-laden vest targeting demonstrators calling for the dismissal of a police commander in Muhmand Dara district, Nangarhar, Afghanistan. No group claimed responsibility for the incident.
	DATE	9/11/18	GROUP	UNKNOWN		
8	COUNTRY	AFGHANISTAN	CITY	DAY MIRDAD DISTRICT	DEATHS 62	Assailants attacked the district centre and the police headquarters in Day Mirdad district, Wardak, Afghanistan.
	DATE	9/9/18	GROUP	TALIBAN		
9	COUNTRY	AFGHANISTAN	CITY	MAYWAND DISTRICT	DEATHS 61	Assailants attacked security check posts in Maywand district, Kandahar, Afghanistan. No group claimed responsibility for the incident. However, sources attributed the attack to the Taliban.
	DATE	9/11/18	GROUP	TALIBAN		
10	COUNTRY	AFGHANISTAN	CITY	FARAH	DEATHS 61	Assailants attacked Farah, Afghanistan. At least 61 people, including 16 security personnel and 45 assailants, were killed. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the incident.
	DATE	5/12/18	GROUP	TALIBAN		



						DESCRIPTION	
11	COUNTRY	NIGERIA	CITY	GWASKA	DEATHS	58	Assailants attacked Gwaska, Kaduna, Nigeria. At least 58 people were killed in the attack. No group claimed responsibility for the incident. However, sources attributed the attack to Fulani extremists.
	DATE	5/5/18	GROUP	ATTRIBUTED TO 'FULANI EXTREMISTS'			
12	COUNTRY	AFGHANISTAN	CITY	KABUL	DEATHS	56	A suicide bomber detonated an explosives-laden vest at a wedding hall where religious scholars and clerics had gathered to celebrate the birth of the prophet Muhammad in Kabul, Afghanistan.
	DATE	11/20/2018	GROUP	KHORASAN CHAPTER OF THE ISLAMIC STATE			
13	COUNTRY	AFGHANISTAN	CITY	SARI PUL	DEATHS	56	Assailants attacked an unknown number of security check posts in Sari Pul, Afghanistan. An unknown number of security forces were abducted and their whereabouts is unknown.
	DATE	9/10/18	GROUP	TALIBAN			
14	COUNTRY	AFGHANISTAN	CITY	CHORA DISTRICT	DEATHS	51	Assailants attacked an unknown number of security check posts and a military base in Chora district, Uruzgan, Afghanistan. The ensuing clash lasted until August 4, 2018.
	DATE	8/3/18	GROUP	TALIBAN			
15	COUNTRY	AFGHANISTAN	CITY	PUR CHAMAN DISTRICT	DEATHS	51	Assailants attacked Pur Chaman district, Farah, Afghanistan. At least one police officer and 50 assailants were killed and two people were injured in the ensuing clash. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the incident.
	DATE	6/12/18	GROUP	TALIBAN			
16	COUNTRY	SYRIA	CITY	ALBU KAMAL	DEATHS	51	Assailants, including ten suicide bombers, equipped with four explosives-laden vehicles attacked Albu Kamal, Deir Ez-Zor, Syria. Sources attributed the incident to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).
	DATE	6/8/18	GROUP	ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND THE LEVANT (ISIL)			
17	COUNTRY	AFGHANISTAN	CITY	AZRA DISTRICT	DEATHS	50	Assailants attacked police check posts in Azra district, Logar, Afghanistan. At least 50 people were killed in the ensuing clash, which lasted until August 7, 2018.
	DATE	8/6/18	GROUP	TALIBAN			
18	COUNTRY	AFGHANISTAN	CITY	KABUL	DEATHS	47	A suicide bomber detonated an explosives-laden vehicle outside the Ministry of Public Works government compound and additional assailants stormed the Ministry for Martyrs and Disabled in Kabul, Afghanistan.
	DATE	12/24/2018	GROUP	TALIBAN			
19	COUNTRY	AFGHANISTAN	CITY	OSHAN	DEATHS	46	Assailants attacked Oshan village in Shahrak district, Ghor, Afghanistan.
	DATE	5/11/18	GROUP	TALIBAN			
20	COUNTRY	CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	CITY	TAGBARA	DEATHS	44	Assailants attacked a United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) base in Tagbara, Ouaka, Central African Republic.
	DATE	4/3/18	GROUP	ANTI-BALAKA MILITIA			

Results

TERRORISM IN 2018


The total number of deaths from terrorism declined for the fourth consecutive year in 2018, falling by 15.2 per cent to 15,952 deaths. This represents a 53 per cent reduction since its peak in 2014 when 33,555 people were killed in terrorist attacks.

The primary driver of this reduction in the number of deaths from terrorism has been a fall in the intensity of conflict in the Middle East, and the subsequent decline of ISIL. However, the fall in deaths was not restricted to a single region, with the MENA, North America, Europe, and Asia-Pacific regions all recording falls in deaths from terrorism of at least 30 per cent from 2017 to 2018.

The year-on-year fall in deaths mirrors a fall in the number of attacks, which dropped from 8,629 to 7,551, a 12.5 per cent decrease. Preliminary data for 2019 suggests that the decrease in both incidents and deaths from terrorism has continued, and that 2019 will have the lowest level of terrorist activity since 2011.

FIGURE 1.1
Total terrorism deaths by country, 2017–2018

Total deaths from terrorism fell 15.2 per cent from 2017 to 2018.



Source: START GTD, IEP Calculations

The GTI assesses more than just the total number of deaths and incidents. It measures the full impact of terrorism, which takes into account a weighted average of all terrorist activity over a five-year period. The 2019 GTI found that the impact of terrorism improved in 98 countries, compared to 40 that deteriorated in the past year. However, the overall impact of terrorism was still higher in 80 countries when compared to five years ago.

Although the number of deaths from terrorism is now at its lowest level since 2013, it is still a major global threat. Deaths remain substantially higher than a decade ago, and are still nearly three times as high as the number recorded in 2001. Terrorism remains a widespread problem, with 67 countries experiencing at least one death in 2017, and 19 countries recording over 100 deaths.

Figure 1.1 shows the distribution of deaths from terrorism by country for 2017 and 2018. Of the countries that experienced the highest levels of terrorism, only two countries, Afghanistan and Nigeria, recorded an increase in the number of deaths, while the total number of deaths fell in Iraq, Somalia, and Syria.

Figure 1.2 highlights the distribution of deaths from terrorism for the ten countries with the most deaths. In 2018, Afghanistan had 46 per cent of all deaths from terrorism. This is the first time since 2007 that a single country accounted for more than 40 per cent of all deaths.

The ten countries with the most deaths from terrorism accounted for 87 per cent of all deaths in 2018.

INCREASES AND DECREASES IN TERRORISM


Figure 1.3 highlights the countries that experienced the largest decreases in the number of deaths from terrorism from 2017 to 2018. Iraq and Somalia experienced the largest falls, owing mainly to less activity from ISIL and Al-Shabaab respectively.

The fall in deaths in Iraq is particularly noticeable given its recent history. Since the peak of violence in 2014, deaths from terrorism in Iraq have fallen by just over 90 per cent. The decrease in the impact of terrorism from 2017 to 2018 can be attributed to the near total defeat of ISIL in Iraq, which

FIGURE 1.2

Deaths from terrorism by country, 2018

Ten countries accounted for 87 per cent of deaths from terrorism in 2018.




Source: START GTD, IEP calculations

FIGURE 1.3

Largest decreases in deaths from terrorism, 2017–2018

Iraq had the largest decrease in the number of deaths from terrorism for the second consecutive year.



Source: START GTD, IEP calculations

decreased the level internal conflict and resulted in a rise in political stability. Notably, Iraq recorded one of the biggest improvements in peacefulness on the 2019 Global Peace Index, although in 2019 it remains one of the five least peaceful countries in the world.

Somalia had the second largest fall in total deaths, owing largely to a 57 per cent reduction in fatalities from Al-Shabaab. Deaths from terrorism in Somalia are now at their lowest level since 2013. Egypt had the third largest total fall in deaths and one of the largest percentage decreases, with deaths from terrorism falling 90 per cent in a single year. The fall in deaths in Egypt was the result of reduced activity from the Sinai Province of the Islamic State following military operations by the Egyptian government.

Figure 1.4 highlights the countries with the largest increases in deaths from terrorism in 2018. While the increases were offset


by much more significant decreases elsewhere, there were a number of countries with worrying rises in terrorism deaths. The country with the largest total increase in deaths from terrorism compared to the prior year was Afghanistan, where the number of people killed rose by 2726, a 56 per cent increase. Nine of the ten deadliest attacks in 2018 were in Afghanistan.

In Nigeria, the number of deaths rose by 508, or 33 per cent. Despite this increase, total deaths from Nigeria remain 72 per cent below their peak in 2014, and the number of deaths attributed to Boko Haram actually decreased from 2017 to 2018. The increase in deaths was the result of the intensification of the conflict between pastoralists and the nomadic Fulani people, with deaths attributed to extremist Fulani elements increasing by 261 per cent in a single year.

FIGURE 1.4

Largest increases in deaths from terrorism, 2017–2018

Deaths from terrorism in Afghanistan increased by just under 59 per cent.



Source: START GTD, IEP Calculations

“Ten countries accounted for 87 per cent of deaths from terrorism in 2018.”

TERRORIST GROUPS

The four terrorist groups responsible for the most deaths in 2018 were the Taliban, ISIL, the Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State, and Boko Haram, as shown in Figure 1.5. These four groups were responsible for 9,223 deaths from terrorism, representing 57.8 per cent of total deaths in 2018. In 2012, just prior to the large increase in terrorist activity around the world, these four groups were responsible for just under 29 per cent of all deaths from terrorism. Ten years ago, the Taliban was the only one of the four groups to be in existence.

Determining which terrorist groups are the most active and responsible for the most deaths can be difficult, as many groups have regional affiliates and other groups working in partnership or partially under the same command. For the purposes of this section, IEP does not include affiliates in its definition of a terrorist group. For example, ISIL refers only to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, and does not include the Khorasan chapter or Sinai Province of the Islamic State, despite the strong connections between the two groups. Similarly, Al-Shabaab is counted as a single group, rather than an affiliate of Al-Qa’ida.

The past decade has seen the largest surge in terrorist activity in the past fifty years. However, of the four deadliest groups in 2018 only the Taliban and the Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State, both of which operate primarily in Afghanistan, have seen increases in the level of terrorism over the past year.


Taliban

The Taliban emerged in Afghanistan in 1994 as a reactionary group that combined the Mujahideen that had previously fought against the 1979 Soviet invasion, and groups of Pashtun tribesmen. The Taliban took control of Afghanistan in 1996. The group declared the country an Islamic emirate and promoted its leader to the role of head of state. The Taliban ruled Afghanistan until 2001 when a NATO invasion toppled the regime, which was thought to be harbouring Al-Qa’ida. After the regime was overthrown, the Taliban regrouped across the border in Pakistan and has since led an insurgency against the government of Afghanistan and the US-led International Security Assistance Force.

FIGURE 1.5

Four deadliest terrorist groups in 2018 (1999–2018)

For the first time since 2013, ISIL was not the deadliest terrorist group.



Source: START GTD, IEP Calculations

Since 2001, the Taliban has steadily regained territory across Afghanistan. As of January 2018, the Taliban are thought to control approximately 15 per cent of Afghanistan’s 229 districts, whilst a further 119 districts remain contested.¹ Terrorist activity attributed to the Taliban increased sharply in 2018 as the group perpetrated attacks across all of Afghanistan’s provinces and one province in Tajikistan.

Changes since 2017

Taliban-related terrorist deaths reached a new high in 2018. The Taliban were responsible for 6,103 deaths in 2018, marking a 71 per cent increase since 2017. Seeking to strengthen its position in future peace negotiations, the Taliban have embarked on a deadly campaign to seize more territory in 2018.²

The total number of terrorist attacks by the Taliban increased by 39 per cent in 2018, rising to 972. Attacks also became more deadly in 2018, with an average of 6.3 deaths per attack, compared to 5.1 in 2017. It is estimated that approximately half the population of Afghanistan, or 15 million people, reside in areas that are either controlled by the Taliban, or where the Taliban are active and regularly conduct attacks.³

Whilst the Taliban perpetuated a particularly deadly year in Afghanistan, across the border, the group’s Pakistani affiliate—Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)—recorded a decline in terrorism-related deaths. TTP were responsible for 57 attacks and 102 fatalities, a 56 per cent decline in deaths since 2017.

On the 10th of August 2018, the Taliban committed the deadliest terror attack of the year when assailants mounted an assault on the city of Ghazni in Afghanistan, killing 466. In 2018, the Taliban sought territorial expansion through armed sieges of strategic cities, which have provided a territorial and logistical hub to coordinate and wage deadly attacks.

Compared to 2017, the Taliban has expanded beyond their traditional battlefield in Afghanistan’s southern region and now operate across provinces in the north, east and west.

Tactics Favoured by Taliban

In 2018, the Taliban’s main targets were military and police personnel, which accounted for 53 per cent of attacks and 59 per cent of all deaths. The group’s focus on state forces has been a feature of their insurgency campaign as a means to undermine state stability. In 2018, over 3,600 military and police personnel were killed in attacks attributed to the Taliban. Whilst most Taliban attacks were sporadic, such as armed assaults against police buildings and checkpoints, the group was also responsible for a series of organised bombings.⁴

Civilian deaths increased by 108 per cent, from 548 in 2017 to 1,140 in 2018. The majority of attacks against civilians were bombings, increasing by 49 per cent from the preceding year. After civilian deaths decreased in 2017, the Taliban’s renewed focus reflects their expansionist tactics. Most civilian deaths occurred when the group launched large-scale attacks on villages and cities, such as Ghazni and Farah.

Armed assaults and bombings continue to be a feature of the Taliban’s insurgency. Whilst instances of bombings decreased slightly, armed assaults increased by 23 per cent. Instances of kidnapping also increased significantly by 92 per cent since 2017, with the majority of incidents targeting police and military personnel, followed by civilians.

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)

For the first time since 2014, ISIL, also known as ISIS and Daesh, is no longer the deadliest terrorist group in the world. ISIL’s origins trace back to a local militant outfits in Iraq in the

early 2000s, its most immediate predecessor being the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI). Emerging in 2010, ISI was formed by surviving members of Al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) and disaffected former members of the US-trained Sons of Iraq that supported US operations to dismantle AQI before the 2010 withdrawal. ISIL emerged in 2014 when emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared an Islamic Caliphate in parts of Iraq and Syria, following significant ISI territorial gains in northern Iraq.⁵ Since then, ISIL has been responsible for 27,947 terrorist deaths. Of these, 80 per cent were in Iraq and 17 per cent in Syria.

Changes since 2017

In 2018, ISIL was responsible for 1,328 deaths. This is a 69 per cent drop from the previous year and 85 per cent drop from its peak in 2016. The dramatic decline in ISIL activity over the past two years has mainly been driven by the success of local forces and a US-led international coalition, which have militarily defeated the group in Syria and Iraq. In addition to ISIL activity in Iraq and Syria, the global spread of ISIL attacks has declined. In 2018, ISIL was only active in five countries, whereas it had been active in ten and fifteen countries in 2017 and 2016, respectively.

While only six per cent of ISIL attacks in 2018 were in Syria, these accounted for 36 per cent of deaths for that year. This was due to a number of highly deadly attacks in Syria, as well as a significant amount of failed attacks in Iraq. Almost 38 per cent of attacks in Iraq had zero fatalities, and 25 per cent had one fatality. The deadliest attack attributed to ISIL in 2018 was in Deir Ez-Zor, Syria in which at least ten suicide bombers with four explosive-laden vehicles attacked and killed at least 51 people.

ISIL's defeat in Iraq and Syria has also left governments worldwide unsure what to do about nationals who left their countries to join ISIL. Thousands of foreign fighters remain detained in a war zone by Syrian Democratic Forces.⁶ However, many governments are unwilling to take their radicalised nationals back. Of the 41,490 total recorded foreign fighters, 18 per cent have returned to their countries of origin.⁷

Despite the dramatic decline in ISIL activity, the number of ISIL affiliates outside of Iraq and Syria continue to rise, as does the number of non-affiliate groups that have pledged allegiance to the group. The group's influence has continued to push into South Asia via the Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State, as well as North and Western Africa via the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, respectively the third and ninth deadliest terrorist groups in 2018.

Tactics Favoured by ISIL

ISIL is also known for kidnapping and beheading a number of hostages, including several international journalists, and posting videos of these crimes on social media. Additionally, as well as more 'traditional' terrorist and insurgent tactics, ISIL is listed by the United Nations as strategically and systematically using sexual violence as a tactic.⁸

Boko Haram

Islamist group Boko Haram, formally known as Jama'tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad, continues to show a significant

decline in terrorist activity since its peak in 2014. Despite this, Boko Haram ranked as the fourth deadliest terrorist group in 2018, and remains the deadliest in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Since its rise in 2009, Boko Haram has been responsible for thousands of deaths throughout the Lake Chad Basin region of West Africa. The salafi-jihadi insurgency has led to 35,000 combat-related deaths and 18,000 deaths from terrorism since 2011, mainly in Nigeria.⁹ The group is most active in the north-eastern Nigerian state of Borno, but has also perpetrated attacks in Burkina Faso and Cameroon.

Boko Haram's demographic profile is unique among terrorist groups in its unusually high proportions of women and children.¹⁰ Two-thirds of Boko Haram suicide attackers are female; of these, one in three are minors.¹¹

Changes since 2017

Internal rifts have led Boko Haram to split into multiple factions, which now appear relatively distinct.¹² The largest splinter group is the ISIL-aligned Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP), led by Musab al-Barnawi. ISWAP is reported to control territory on the shores of Lake Chad and collect taxes in north-east Nigeria.¹³ Rival to ISWAP is the Shekau faction, led by Abubakar Shekau. While ISWAP predominantly targets the Nigerian military and government agents, the Shekau faction is known for considering any Muslims that do not follow him as potential targets. This ideological difference is thought to have motivated their split.¹⁴

Terrorism-related deaths committed by Boko Haram dropped 42 per cent in 2018 compared to the previous year, an 89 per cent decline from their peak in 2014. Furthermore, the fatality rate of Boko Haram attacks has fallen from 15 deaths per attack to four in the past five years. Consistent with previous years, about 85 per cent of attacks in 2018 were in Nigeria.

The main counterterrorism response combating Boko Haram is the Multinational Joint Task Forces (MNJTF), which operates in conjunction with the Nigerian military. Military offensives through 2015 and 2016 saw the MNJTF reclaim territory from Boko Haram and significantly weaken the group. However, while the MNJTF has continued to claim military success over Boko Haram forces, Boko Haram was responsible for at least 615 combat-related deaths in the first eight months of 2019 alone.¹⁵

Tactics Favoured by Boko Haram

Boko Haram is noted for favouring highly-lethal bombings as well as for suicide bombings, the latter of which are a relatively rare terrorist tactic in Sub-Saharan Africa.¹⁶ Despite their infamy, suicide attacks are not a major source of Boko Haram's lethality; many bombers do not detonate, and those that do kill fewer people than bombers from other groups, on average.¹⁷

While Boko Haram was responsible for more suicide attacks than any other terrorist group in 2018, suicide attacks have contributed to 19 per cent of Boko Haram's death toll, compared to 38 per cent of ISIL's.

Boko Haram adopts a conscious strategy to recruit women and children as suicide bombers, sometimes forcibly.¹⁸ The group's leaders realised the strategic benefits of including more women and children.¹⁹ Women are less likely to be searched than men,

particularly in countries with male-dominant police forces and norms of gender segregation, and children are rarely suspected.²⁰ Boko Haram's child suicide bombers, which have mostly targeted bus stops and markets, have had higher casualty rates on average on than their adult counterparts.²¹

Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State

The Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State is an affiliate of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) active in Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. As an ISIL affiliate, the Khorasan Chapter seeks to establish a caliphate in the Khorasan region, covering parts of Iran, Central Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan.²²

Emerging in 2014, the Khorasan Chapter is comprised of local militants including members of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and estranged members of Lashkar-e Islam.²³ The majority of terrorist activity attributed to the Khorasan Chapter occurs in Afghanistan and Pakistan, with at least 2,800 deaths and 419 terror-related incidents since 2014.

The Khorasan Chapter formally pledged their allegiance to ISIL in January 2015. Following territorial losses in Iraq and Syria, ISIL has facilitated the relocation of militants to the Khorasan Chapter in Afghanistan.²⁴ As an affiliate of ISIL, the group seeks to inspire attacks both locally and globally. The UN reported terrorist plots inspired by the Khorasan Chapter had been thwarted in Europe in 2018.²⁵

The Khorasan Chapter's violent expansion into South Asia has been met by hostility from existing militant organisations, most notably the Taliban. Increasing terrorist activity by the Khorasan Chapter in Afghanistan threatens to disrupt peace talks between the Taliban and the US.²⁶ In 2018, the Khorasan Chapter was estimated to have a fighting force between 600 and 800 militants, a significant fall from 2016 when the group's fighting force was between 3,000 and 4,000.²⁷

Changes since 2017

The Khorasan Chapter recorded its deadliest year in 2018. Terror-related deaths increased by 24 per cent, from 891 in 2017 to 1,060 in 2018. Of the 1,060 deaths attributed to the Khorasan Chapter, at least 75 per cent occurred in Afghanistan, followed by Pakistan and India with 241 and 5 deaths respectively. The Khorasan Chapter remains the second-deadliest terror group in South Asia for the third consecutive year.

Whilst the number of deaths increased, the number of attacks by the Khorasan Chapter declined, highlighting an increased lethality rate. There were 125 recorded attacks by the Khorasan Chapter in 2018, compared to 148 in 2017. Lethality has risen steadily from one death per attack in 2014, to 8.5 deaths per attack in 2018.

In Pakistan, the group's operations have had a substantial impact on lethality, with a sharp increase from 6.3 deaths per attack in 2017, to 12.1 in 2018.

As of 2018, the group has come under intense military pressure from Afghan security forces and the US-led coalition. However, the Khorasan Chapter retains a presence in eastern and northern Afghanistan, with sleeper cells in Kabul, Herat and

Jalalabad.²⁸ The majority of terrorist activity attributed to the Khorasan Chapter occurs in Nangarhar in eastern Afghanistan where the group is strongest.²⁹ Most deaths by the Khorasan Chapter in 2018 occurred in Kabul, Afghanistan, increasing by 61 per cent since 2017.

Tactics Favoured by the Khorasan Chapter

Like ISIL, the Khorasan Chapter primarily conducts bombings or explosions, which constitute 59 per cent of all its attacks. These attacks resulted in 881 deaths in 2018. The Khorasan Chapter also carried out armed assaults, assassinations and kidnappings against civilians, police, military and government targets. Of 125 attacks in 2018, 36 per cent were suicide bombings, marking a 50 per cent increase from the preceding year. In Afghanistan, suicide bombings by the Khorasan Chapter were responsible for 9 per cent of total deaths from terrorism in 2018.

The majority of Khorasan Chapter attacks targeted civilians causing 292 deaths, a 139 per cent increase between 2017 and 2018. Whilst civilian deaths increased, attacks on civilians fell from 47 in 2017 to 32 in 2018. Like ISIL, the Khorasan Chapter engages in sectarian violence with civilian attacks deliberately targeting Shia Muslims.³⁰

In Afghanistan, the Khorasan Chapter increased attacks on government targets, recording twice as many attacks between 2017 and 2018. In Nangarhar, attacks targeting the government increased by 240 per cent in 2018 whilst civilian attacks declined by 35 per cent. The majority of attacks on government targets occurred in response to the October 2018 parliamentary elections, with Kabul recording 156 deaths.³¹

"Four groups were responsible for 9,223 deaths from terrorism in 2018, or 57.8 per cent of total deaths."

10

COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM

Table 1.1 highlights the ten countries most impacted by terrorism according to the 2019 GTI, and how they have ranked on the index since its inception in 2002. Of these ten, nine were ranked in the ten countries most impacted by terrorism in 2017, with the Democratic Republic of the Congo being the only country that was not ranked in the worst ten in 2017.

Although there were no new countries amongst the five countries most impacted by terrorism in 2018, there was some

movement amongst the worst five. For the first time since the inception of the index, Afghanistan was the country most impacted by terrorism, replacing Iraq, which had held that position since 2004.

Afghanistan was also the only country amongst the ten countries most impacted by terrorism to have a deterioration in score from 2017 to 2018. Every other country in the ten most impacted improved its 2018 GTI score, with the largest improvement occurring in Iraq, followed by Syria and Pakistan.

TABLE 1.1

Ten countries most impacted by terrorism, ranked by number of deaths

For the first time since 2003, Iraq did not have the greatest impact of terrorism.

Country	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Afghanistan	16	13	11	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	3	2	2	2	1
Iraq	30	7	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2
Nigeria	36	25	26	32	12	13	17	11	11	6	4	4	2	3	3	3	3
Syria	118	120	56	65	50	58	39	46	57	14	6	5	5	5	4	4	4
Pakistan	12	10	6	6	5	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	4	4	5	5	5
Somalia	44	39	43	36	30	9	6	6	6	5	7	7	6	7	7	6	6
India	2	2	3	2	2	4	4	4	4	4	5	6	7	8	8	7	7
Yemen	45	32	40	39	36	30	22	20	10	9	8	8	8	6	6	8	8
Philippines	13	8	10	12	14	12	8	9	9	10	11	9	11	12	12	10	9
Democratic Republic of the Congo	25	20	24	25	25	20	12	5	8	11	13	17	19	17	13	11	10

Source: START GTD, IEP Calculations


Afghanistan

GTI RANK
1


GTI SCORE
9.603

7,379 DEAD
6,514 INJURED
1,443 INCIDENTS


Total deaths since 2001



Deaths by group



Attacks by target



In 2018, Afghanistan recorded the highest number of terror-related deaths and incidents for the second consecutive year. It also recorded nine of the ten deadliest terrorist attacks in 2018. Afghanistan had 7,379 fatalities and 1,443 terrorist incidents in 2018, with the Taliban accounting for 83 per cent of these fatalities. Afghanistan has witnessed a substantial escalation in violence owing to a strengthened Taliban insurgency, increased presence of the Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State and ongoing political instability. Both terrorism and battle-related deaths have risen sharply in the last year, reaching their highest levels in 2018.


The largest number of deaths from terrorism were recorded in Ghazni province, replacing Kabul, which had the most deaths since 2016. In 2018, there were 1,055 deaths in Ghazni province, a 225 per cent increase from the prior year. Farah, Kabul and Kandahar provinces were the next deadliest provinces, reporting 1,039, 693 and 570 deaths respectively. Forty-five per cent of all terror-related deaths in Afghanistan occurred in these four provinces.

Terror-related deaths attributed to the Taliban have been increasing sharply since 2015, following a period of steady decline. The Taliban were responsible for the deadliest terror attack of 2018 when assailants seized the city of Ghazni in August 2018, causing 466 fatalities.

As international attention turns toward a potential political settlement between the US and the Taliban, the Taliban has strengthened its position territorially. In 2018, the group regained lost territory and launched several high-profile attacks against civilians and the Afghan security service. It is conservatively estimated that the group now controls approximately 17 per cent of Afghan districts.¹

The Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State, the ISIL-affiliate active in Afghanistan and Pakistan, was responsible for 11 per cent of terror-related deaths in Afghanistan in 2018, a three per cent decrease from the previous year. The Khorasan Chapter has shifted its focus to targeting police and security forces, with 2018 being its deadliest year on record. The majority of deaths

Worst attacks



GHAZNI
Assailants armed with mortars, explosive devices, and firearms attacked Ghazni, Afghanistan. At least 466 people, including 326 assailants, were killed in the ensuing clashes. Additionally, some security personnel may have been abducted in the attack. The victims included security personnel and civilians.

were in Kabul province, at 420 deaths.

The Taliban have consistently targeted police and military personnel, with a small increase in attacks against civilians and property. Just over 60 per cent of all deaths from terrorism attributed to the Taliban in 2018 were caused during attacks on the police and military. Attacks on civilians led to 18 per cent of total deaths attributed to the group. Part of the Taliban's shifting tactics consists of assaults on strategic cities such as Ghazni and Farah.

Whilst the Taliban's threat is confined to Afghanistan and neighbouring Pakistan, the Khorasan Chapter has international scope, and uses Afghanistan as a hub to launch domestic and international attacks.² In 2018, the Taliban was responsible for terrorist attacks across 34 provinces, whilst the Khorasan Chapter was active in seven provinces.

The presence of the Khorasan Chapter has challenged the Taliban's influence across Afghanistan. Both groups were involved in clashes between themselves in 14 of the 34 provinces in Afghanistan.³ The Khorasan Chapter was responsible for more deaths in Kabul, Kunar and Nangarhar provinces than the Taliban.

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM

Iraq

GTI RANK

2

GTI SCORE


9.241

1,054  DEAD


1,723  INJURED

1,131  INCIDENTS


Total deaths since 2001



Deaths by group



Attacks by target



Iraq recorded the largest reduction in terror-related deaths in 2018. The number of deaths decreased from 4,271 in 2017 to 1,054 in 2018, marking a 75 per cent decrease. In 2018, terror-related deaths reached their lowest level since 2003. There was also a fall in terror-related incidents, dropping to 1,131 from 1,956 in 2017. The lethality of attacks continued to fall significantly, with 0.9 deaths per attack in 2018, compared to 2.2 deaths per attack in 2017.

Both terrorism and battle-related deaths have fallen significantly since their peak in 2014, with both reporting a 90 per cent decrease. Since 2001, there have been 66,573 deaths from terrorism in Iraq.

Terrorist activity in Iraq has been dominated by ISIL since 2013. ISIL was responsible for 801 deaths from terrorism in 2018 or 76 per cent of total deaths in Iraq, with the remaining 24 per cent having unknown perpetrators.

Ongoing efforts by Iraqi and international forces have been effective in regaining former ISIL-held territory in Iraq. By the beginning of 2018, ISIL had lost approximately 95 per cent of its territory, including the strategic city of Mosul.⁴ In Mosul, ISIL-perpetrated attacks decreased by 95 per cent over the prior year, with just 12 recorded attacks in 2018.

In line with a decrease in ISIL's terrorist activity, civilian deaths caused by ISIL also declined. In 2018, civilian deaths fell by 44 per cent from the preceding year. However, whilst the number of attacks on civilians declined, ISIL attacks on government targets doubled between 2017 and 2018.

Suicide bombings by ISIL followed a downward trend in 2018. Of the 506 attacks perpetrated by ISIL in Iraq, 33 attacks or seven per cent were suicide bombings, down from 20 per cent of attacks in 2017. In general, suicide bombings have declined by 85 per cent since they peaked in 2016. This decrease in suicide

Worst attacks



SADIYAH

Two explosive devices detonated targeting a funeral procession at a cemetery in Sadirah, Kirkuk, Iraq. At least 25 people were killed and 15 people were injured in the blasts.

bombings has followed increased security measures and declining fighter numbers.

In 2018, ISIL perpetrated attacks in eight provinces across Iraq. Although most provinces across Iraq recorded a fall in attacks, Kirkuk reported a 127 per cent increase in terror-related incidents by ISIL between 2017 and 2018. The resurgence of violence in Kirkuk came as ISIL has conducted more bombings against civilians and police.



Despite the fall in deaths from terrorism in 2018, ISIL remains a substantial threat. In Iraq, ISIL continues to operate in rural areas, including Anbar and Nineveh provinces, where it conducts kidnappings, assassinations and attacks on utilities.⁵

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM


Nigeria

GTI RANK
3


GTI SCORE
8.597

2,040  DEAD
772  INJURED
562  INCIDENTS


Total deaths since 2001



Deaths by group



Attacks by target



Deaths from terrorism in Nigeria rose to 2,040 in 2018, a 33 per cent increase. This increase follows a steady decline in deaths since 2014. Terror-related incidents increased 37 per cent, from 411 in 2017 to 562 in 2018. The increase was due to a substantial escalation of violence by Fulani extremists, whilst Boko Haram recorded a decline in deaths from terrorism.


Violence between Nigerian herders and farmers intensified in early 2018 with approximately 300,000 people fleeing their homes.⁶ The most recent escalation in violence follows increased militia attacks and implementation of new anti-grazing legislation.⁷

In Nigeria, terrorist activity is dominated by Fulani extremists and Boko Haram. Together, they account for 78 per cent of terror-related incidents and 86 per cent of deaths from terrorism.

The Fulani extremists do not constitute a single terrorist group. Certain deaths within the ongoing conflict between pastoralists and the nomadic Fulani have been categorised as terrorism and attributed to extremist elements within the Fulani. This categorisation is reflective of terrorism used as a tactic within an ongoing conflict. Further detail is given later in the report in Appendix D. There are an estimated 14 million Fulani in Nigeria, with substantial populations also in Guinea, Senegal, Mali, and Cameroon.

In 2018, Fulani extremists were responsible for the majority of terror-related deaths in Nigeria at 1,158 fatalities. Terror-related deaths and incidents attributed to Fulani extremists increased by 261 and 308 per cent respectively from the prior year. Of 297 attacks by Fulani extremists, over 200 were armed assaults. Over 84 per cent of these armed assaults targeted civilians. However, also active and not recorded as terrorist activity are pastoralist militias who target the Fulani, increasing the likelihood of reprisals.

Worst attacks



GWASKA

Assailants attacked Gwaska, Kaduna, Nigeria. At least 58 people were killed in the attack. No group claimed responsibility for the incident, however, sources attributed the attack to Fulani extremists.

Boko Haram were less active in 2018 than previous years. Both terror-related deaths and incidents attributed to Boko Haram have steadily declined since peaking in 2014. In 2018, Boko Haram caused 589 deaths from terrorism, a 42 per cent decrease from the preceding year. Terror-related incidents declined by 35 per cent, from 222 in 2017 to 144 in 2018.

The two main factions of Boko Haram, ISWAP and the followers of Abubakar Shekau, are both engaged in an insurgency campaign against the Nigerian government. In addition to Nigeria, Boko Haram also operates in Cameroon, Chad and Niger.

Since 2015, a multinational task force comprised of representatives from Cameroon, Chad and Niger assisted the Nigerian government in reducing violence and regaining territory from Boko Haram.⁸ In April 2018, the Nigerian leader, President Muhammadu Buhari, approved a \$1 billion purchase of security equipment to counter the Boko Haram insurgency.⁹ Despite these improvements, the group still threatens regional stability and development.¹⁰

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM

Syria

GTI RANK

4

GTI SCORE


8.006

662  DEAD


725  INJURED

131  INCIDENTS


Total deaths since 2001



Deaths by group



Attacks by target



Following a de-escalation of conflict in Syria, deaths from terrorism decreased by 40 per cent to 662 in 2018. Terror-related incidents fell to 131 in 2018, a nine per cent decrease from the preceding year. Whilst the number of deaths and incidents has steadily declined, Syria remains one of the worst ten countries for terror-related deaths in 2018.


The trend of reduced deaths reflects the decline in terrorist activity by ISIL, which is responsible for more deaths in Syria than any other group. In 2018, deaths attributed to ISIL reached their lowest level since 2013, and declined by 68 per cent since peaking in 2015. The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) were the second and third deadliest groups in Syria in 2018, responsible for 20 and 11 deaths respectively. Collectively, these three groups accounted for 77 per cent of terror-related deaths in 2018.

Despite a decline in deaths attributed to ISIL, the group remained the deadliest in Syria for the fifth consecutive year. ISIL was responsible for 73 per cent of deaths from terrorism in Syria in 2018. Whilst deaths and incidents decreased, there was a significant increase in lethality of attacks by ISIL. In 2018, attacks by ISIL caused on average 16 deaths per attacks, compared to 10.2 deaths per attack in 2015.

Most deaths from terrorism in Syria have been from bombings, with the majority targeting civilians. In 2018, bombings accounted for 68 per cent of deaths. Syria recorded a 65 per cent decline in the number of bombings and explosions attributed to ISIL in 2018. Whilst the number of terror-related incidents fell, ISIL attacks on civilians became more deadly, with 25.1 fatalities per attack compared to 9.4 in 2017.

Terror-related incidents occurred in 11 of Syria's 14 provinces, highlighting the wide-ranging impact of terrorism in the country. The majority of attacks occurred in Aleppo, at 36 per cent, followed by Idlib, Damascus and Deir es-Zor. In October 2017, the SDF regained the city of Raqqa, ISIL's self-proclaimed

Worst attacks



ALBU KAMAL

Assailants, including 10 suicide bombers, equipped with four explosives-laden vehicles attacked Albu Kamal, Deir Ez-Zor, Syria. At least 51 people, including 16 Syrian Armed Forces (SAF) soldiers, 14 militia members, and 21 assailants, were killed and an unknown number of other people were injured in the ensuing clash.

capital.¹¹ ISIL attacks in Raqqa declined by 95 per cent in 2018, highlighting the loss of its key territorial and logistical centre.

The province of As Suwayada saw the largest increase in deaths from terrorism and recorded 309 deaths in 2018, compared to only one death in 2017. The majority of the deaths were caused by 11 coordinated ISIL attacks that targeted the village of Al-Shibiki on 25th July 2018.

Effective counterterrorism measures and increased military pressure have reduced ISIL's capacity to carry out attacks across much of Syria. However, even in the absence of territorial claims, ISIL remain the largest terrorist threat in Syria, and the region. Members of the group can be found across Syria, in provinces such as As Suwayda and Dier es-Zor, where they have resorted to guerrilla tactics against civilians and military personnel.¹²


Pakistan

GTI RANK
5


GTI SCORE
7.889

537 DEAD
1,016 INJURED
366 INCIDENTS


Total deaths since 2001



Deaths by group



Attacks by target



The impact of terrorism fell for the fifth consecutive year in Pakistan in 2018, with the number of deaths falling 37 per cent to 537, and the number of incidents falling 36 per cent to 366. The number of deaths and incidents are 81 per cent and 77 per cent lower respectively than their peaks in 2013.


The ISIL-affiliated Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State was the deadliest terrorist group in Pakistan in 2018, with 251 deaths or 36 per cent of total fatalities, most of which occurred in Balochistan. The next deadliest group in 2018, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), was responsible for 151 deaths. The year 2018 saw a historically low level of activity from Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), with the third major terrorist group committing only two attacks, which killed six people.

The most impacted regions in 2018 remained Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, which merged with the previously highly-impacted Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in May 2018¹⁵, and Balochistan. Collectively, the two accounted for 77 per cent of attacks and 84 per cent of deaths. The deadliest attack was a suicide attack at an election rally for candidate Nawabzada Siraj Raisani of the Balochistan Awami Party in Darengarh, Balochistan. The attack killed 150 people, making it the second deadliest since 1970 after the 2014 attack on a school in Peshawar that killed 151.¹⁴ ISIL claimed responsibility for the attack.

The trend of reduced terrorism reflects the continued decline in activity of TTP, Pakistan's deadliest terrorist group over the past decade. TTP has been responsible for at least 4,800 deaths since 2007, killing over 740 people in 2010 alone. Since then, the group has been in decline, following the government's National Action Plan and crackdowns on militant strongholds in North Waziristan and the FATA.¹⁵ In 2018 alone, deaths attributed to the TTP dropped by 56 per cent.

By contrast, 2018 marked the deadliest year on record for the Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State. This is in line with the

Worst attacks



DARENGARH

A suicide bomber detonated at an election rally for Balochistan Awami Party (BAP) candidate Nawabzada Siraj Raisani in Darengarh, Balochistan, Pakistan. In addition to the assailant, at least 150 people, including Raisani, were killed and 186 people were injured in the blast.

ISIL's growing presence in South Asia, following military defeats in Iraq and Syria. Since ISIL's declaration of an Afghanistan/Pakistan province in 2015, the Khorasan Chapter has substantially reinforced its organisational capacity in both countries, largely due to its ability to foster partnerships with regional militant groups. At least 11 groups in the region have been found to have worked with the Khorasan Chapter, including TTP and LeJ.¹⁶

Despite this year's relative improvement, terrorism remains a major threat in Pakistan. Links among terrorist groups are especially prevalent across conflict-prone borders, like those separating Pakistan from India and Afghanistan.¹⁷

"The ISIL-affiliated Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State was the deadliest terrorist group in Pakistan in 2018."

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM

Somalia

GTI RANK

6

GTI SCORE


7.8

646  DEAD


638  INJURED

286  INCIDENTS


Total deaths since 2001



Deaths by group



Attacks by target



Following its deadliest year on record in 2017, Somalia recorded the second largest reduction in terror-related deaths in 2018, behind only Iraq. Deaths from terrorism declined by 56 per cent from 1,470 in 2017 to 646 in 2018. Terror-related incidents also fell in 2018, with 286 reported attacks compared to 372 in 2017. The fall in attacks came after an increase in US airstrikes against Al-Shabaab, with at least 47 airstrikes carried out in 2018.¹⁸

The most active terror group in Somalia was Al-Shabaab, an affiliate of Al-Qa'ida. Al-Shabaab has been Somalia's deadliest terror group since 2007, responsible for 5,233 deaths and 1,923 incidents. The only other active terror group, Jabha East Africa, claimed responsibility for 22 attacks in 2018.


Al-Shabaab was responsible for 91 per cent of all deaths from terrorism in Somalia in 2018, or 586 people. This marks a 57 per cent decline between 2017 and 2018. In 2018, deaths began to fall for the first time since the group emerged in 2007.

The reduction in terrorist activity is partially due to a successful African Union-led peacekeeping mission, which has regained civilian areas from Al-Shabaab's control.¹⁹

Most deaths attributed to Al-Shabaab occurred in Banaadir, marking a 105 per cent increase from the previous year. The next deadliest provinces were the Lower Shebelle and Middle Shebelle, Hiiraan and Mudug. These five provinces accounted for 84 per cent of all terror-related incidents by Al-Shabaab with over 500 recorded deaths.

Of the 286 terror attacks perpetrated by Al-Shabaab in 2018, roughly a third or 98 occurred in the capital city of Mogadishu. Deaths from terrorism in Mogadishu declined by 67 per cent since 2017, from 1005 to 333 in 2018. Counterterrorism operations have been effective in reducing the overall number of incidents and deaths in Mogadishu. However, the city remains the deadliest location for Al-Shabaab. The group have

Worst attacks



WADAJIR

Two suicide bombers detonated two explosives laden vehicles and additional assailants stormed the front gate of Sahafi hotel in Wadajir, Mogadishu, Somalia. This was one of two coordinated attacks on the hotel on the same day. At least seven assailants were killed in this attack and 65 people were killed and 106 people were injured across both attacks.

maintained a presence on the outskirts of the city, which has enabled Al-Shabaab to conduct assassinations, armed assaults and bombings predominantly against hard targets such as government personnel.²⁰

Al-Shabaab have consistently utilised bombings, armed assaults and assassinations as its main modes of attack. The majority of attacks carried out in Mogadishu were car bombings, with 17 incidents causing 218 deaths, or 38 per cent of total deaths attributed to the group. Attacks on civilians became less common in Mogadishu, as the group focused more on military personnel and recorded a 63 per cent increase in targeted attacks in 2018.

In 2018, the US and the African Union supported counterterrorism operations led by the Somali National Army. Whilst these efforts have significantly reduced terrorist activity in Somalia, the group maintains safe havens across Central and Southern Somalia and preliminary data for 2019 suggests there has been a surge in violence in Mogadishu.^{21,22}

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM


India

GTI RANK
7


GTI SCORE
7.518

350  DEAD
540  INJURED
748  INCIDENTS


Total deaths since 2001



Deaths by group



Attacks by target



There were 748 terrorist attacks and 350 deaths from terrorism in India in 2018. This marks a fall in both deaths and attacks of around ten per cent. Compared to other countries amongst the ten most impacted, India faces a wider range of terrorist groups, with Islamist, communist, and separatist groups all active in the country.

Since 2009, India has seen two diverging trends in terrorism. The number of deaths from terrorism has dropped by 53 per cent since 2009. However, the number of terrorist attacks has increased by 14 per cent over the same period, peaking in 2016 at over 900. While India ranked ninth in the countries suffering the most deaths from terrorism in 2018, it ranked third in the countries with the greatest number of terrorist attacks.

These trends also indicate that attacks are becoming less deadly. The average number of deaths per attack has dropped from 4.3 in 1998 to 1.6 in 2008 to 0.5 in 2018. India's rate of deaths per attack is the lowest among the ten countries most impacted by terrorism in 2018, and ranks 59th in the world. In 2018 alone, 69 per cent of attacks had zero fatalities and 22 per cent had one fatality.

In 2018, India continued to face a diverse set of terrorism threats, as it has since early in its post-colonial history. These threats include terrorism related to the ongoing territorial disputes in Kashmir, a Sikh separatist movement in the northern state of Punjab, and a secessionist movement in the north-eastern state of Assam. Meanwhile, a violent Maoist-inspired left-wing insurgency has re-emerged across central India in what has been dubbed the "red corridor", following the realignment of various Naxalite factions under the Communist Party of India (Maoist) in 2004, after the movement's near-total government defeat in the 1970s.²³

Jammu and Kashmir remained the regions most impacted by terrorism in 2018, with 321 attacks, resulting in 123 deaths, most of which were perpetrated by Islamist groups. The three most

Worst attacks



SAKLER

Assailants opened fire on District Reserve Guard (DRG) personnel in Sakler, Chhattisgarh, India. At least 11 people, including two DRG members and nine assailants, were killed and an unknown number of assailants were wounded in the ensuing clash.

active groups remained Hizbul Mujahideen, Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Both JeM and LeT have also been active in Pakistan and Afghanistan, though most of their attacks are carried out in India.

The second most impacted region was Chhattisgarh, in the centre of the red corridor. Chhattisgarh suffered 138 attacks in 2018, resulting in 123 deaths all from Maoist extremists.

Collectively, Maoists and the Communist Party of India (Maoist) were responsible for one third of total attacks and half of total deaths. The deadliest attack in 2018 occurred in Sakler, Chhattisgarh when armed assailants open fired on District Reserve Guards on November 26, killing at least 11 people. No group claimed responsibility for the attack.

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM


Yemen

GTI RANK
8


GTI SCORE
7.259

301 DEAD
325 INJURED
227 INCIDENTS


Total deaths since 2001



Deaths by group



Attacks by target



Deaths from terrorism in Yemen fell for the fourth consecutive year, down 20 per cent from 2017 to 2018. This is an 80 per cent drop from the peak in deaths in 2015, which exceeded 1,500 fatalities.

Despite the significant decline in the impact of terrorism in recent years, Yemen remains entrenched in a prolonged civil war. The war has claimed over 91,000 fatalities since January 2015, with 2018 being the deadliest and most violent year on record.²⁴ UN sources estimate that two million Yemenis have been displaced and the country driven to the brink of famine, describing the situation as “the world’s worst humanitarian tragedy”.²⁵

Terrorism in Yemen is closely linked to ongoing armed conflict. Yemen has suffered decades of low-intensity armed conflict since achieving independence. Violence escalated drastically in 2015 following the multinational intervention in support of ousted President Hadi after Houthi insurgents seized Sanaa.²⁶

Ansar Allah has become the deadliest terrorist group in Yemen since overtaking Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in 2015. Ansar Allah has been responsible for over 1,500 deaths since 2015. The group accounted for 56 per cent of attacks and 55 per cent of deaths in 2018 alone. Most of these attacks were perpetrated around and to the southwest of Sanaa in the governorates of Amanat Al Asimah, Al Hudaydah, and Taizz.

The year 2018 saw a continued decline in the activity of ISIL-affiliates in Yemen. Of the five ISIL-affiliates that have been active in Yemen in the past five years, only the Adan-Abyan Province of the Islamic State remains. The Adan-Abyan Province of the Islamic State was responsible for only two terrorist attacks in 2018, both in the southern governorate of Adan.

Al-Qa’ida in the AQAP remains in an active conflict with both the forces of ousted President Hadi and Ansar Allah, to which it is ideologically opposed.²⁷ In 2018, AQAP was responsible for 19

Worst attacks



ADEN

Two suicide bombers detonated explosives-laden vehicles and six other assailants attacked a counterterrorism headquarters in Gold Mohur area of the Tawahi, Aden, Yemen. In addition to four assailants, 14 people were killed and 40 others were injured in the attack.

deaths, down from 21 in the previous year. Most of these attacks were in the southern and central Hadramawt and Shabwah governorates and targeted other terrorists or non-state militia. AQAP activity has dropped by 88 per cent in Yemen since peaking in 2015, contributing to the recent decline in overall terrorism in Yemen.

"Ansar Allah has been responsible for over 1,500 deaths since 2015. The group accounted for 56 per cent of attacks and 55 per cent of deaths in 2018 alone."

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM


Philippines

GTI RANK
9


GTI SCORE
7.137

297 DEAD
343 INJURED
424 INCIDENTS


Total deaths since 2001



Deaths by group



Attacks by target



In 2018, terror-related deaths in the Philippines declined by nine per cent, to 297 deaths. Terror-related incidents also decreased by 13 per cent from 486 in 2017 to 424 in 2018. Despite a slight fall in terrorist activity, the Philippines remains the only Southeast Asian country to be ranked in the ten countries most impacted terrorism.

Terrorist activity in the Philippines was dominated by the communist New People's Army (NPA). The NPA was responsible over 36 per cent of deaths and 39 per cent of terror-related incidents, at 107 and 179 respectively. The NPA has engaged in an insurgency against the Filipino government for five decades and has been the Philippines' deadliest terror group, causing 2,387 deaths since 1970.


In 2018, the NPA conducted attacks across 39 provinces. The group was most active in the provinces of Negros Oriental and Negros Occidental, causing 36 deaths collectively. NPA attacks on the island of Negros increased by 111 per cent since 2017, with a surge in violence attributed to land rights issues.²⁸

Approximately 53 per cent of NPA attacks on the island of Negros were against police, military and government targets.

The second deadliest group was the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFM), a separatist organisation based in the southern Philippines.²⁹ Between 2017 and 2018, attacks by BIFM increased by 115 per cent. This was driven by an uptake in violence in Maguindanao, which experienced a 343 per cent increase in terrorist incidents.

In the Philippines, ISIL conducts terrorist operations both on its own and through its affiliates: BIFM, Abu Sayyaf (ASG) and the Maute group.³⁰ These groups have all pledged allegiance to ISIL since 2014. ISIL was the third deadliest group in the Philippines, causing 18 deaths from three attacks in 2018. Both ISIL and ASG claimed responsibility for the only suicide bombing of 2018 that killed 12 people. This was the first recorded suicide bombing by ISIL in the Philippines, highlighting the spread of ISIL's tactics in the region.³¹

Worst attacks



LAMITAN

A suicide bomber detonated an explosives-laden vehicle at a military and Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) joint checkpoint in Colonia, Lamitan, Basilan, Philippines. In addition to the assailant, at least 10 people, including soldiers and civilians were killed, and six people were injured in the blast.

Terror groups were most active on the southern island of Mindanao with the resurgence of the NPA and ISIL-affiliated groups.³² The government's response to the terrorist threat has been hampered by limited coordination, lack of capacity and geographical challenges.³³

Attacks on government targets increased by 45 per cent between 2017 and 2018, causing 139 deaths. This was primarily driven by an 83 per cent increase in NPA attacks on government targets, mainly in Negros Oriental. However, attacks on civilians fell slightly from 103 in 2017 to 92 in 2018, whilst attacks on police and military targets also declined by 41 per cent.

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM


Democratic Republic of the Congo

GTI RANK
10


GTI SCORE
7.039

410  DEAD
145  INJURED
135  INCIDENTS


Total deaths since 2001



Deaths by group



Attacks by target




Renewed action from the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), Democratic Front for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and Mayi Mayi groups has increased the impact of terrorism in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Particularly hard-hit are the eastern Kivu regions, which border Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. In 2018, number of terrorist attacks rose 18 per cent from the previous year. Both the ADF and FDLR committed twice as many terrorist attacks and killed more than double the number of people in 2018 than in the previous year.

The ADF was responsible for 205 deaths from terrorism in 2018, a 136 per cent increase from the previous year. Many of these attacks are related to the ongoing internal armed conflict between the ADF and (government) Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC). The year 2018 also saw an increase in Mayi Mayi (Congolesse Swahili for “Water Water”)³⁴ terrorist activity. The Mayi Mayi are a loose collection of local militias based in the Kivu regions, some of whom engage in terrorism. The groups most active in terrorism in 2018 were the Hapa Na Pale, Malaika, Mazembe, Yakutumba and Raia Mutomboki militias, collectively committing ten attacks.

North Kivu remains the hardest-hit region by terrorism, accounting for over half of attacks and 69 per cent of deaths in 2018. This included the deadliest attack, in which at least 19 civilians and eight assailants were killed. North Kivu also saw terrorist groups abducting children, with at least nine abducted by the ADF and at least three by the Mazembe Mai-Mai militia in 2018.³⁵

The most frequent forms of terrorism in 2018 were hostage takings and armed assaults, together comprising 84 per cent of attacks. Additionally, the ADF, FDLR and several Mai-Mai groups were once again listed by the UN as credibly suspected of committing conflict-related sexual violence in 2018.³⁶ The UN explicitly considers sexual violence a “tactic of terrorism”³⁷, and eleven of thirteen non-state actors recorded as committing conflict-related sexual violence in the DRC since 2017 are also terrorist actors.³⁸

Worst attacks



RUTSHURU DISTRICT

Assailants attacked an unknown number of villages in Rutshuru district, North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo. At least 19 civilians and eight assailants were killed while an unknown number of people were injured in the attacks.


"The most frequent forms of terrorism in 2018 were hostage takings and armed assaults, together comprising 84 per cent of attacks."

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TERRORISM

FIGURE 1.6

The economic impact of terrorism, US\$ billions, 2000–2018

The global economic impact of terrorism peaked in 2014.



Source: IEP

The global economic impact of terrorism in 2018 amounted to US\$33 billion, a decline of 38 per cent from its 2017 level. This is the fourth consecutive year that the economic impact of terrorism has declined from the peak of \$111 billion in 2014.

These estimates are considered conservative, as there are many items that are not included in the methodology due to the difficulty in costing them. These include the longer-term economic implications of terrorism such as reduced tourism, business activity, production and investment.

The reduction in the economic impact of terrorism reflects the decreasing level of violence from global terrorism. The improvement over the last four years is largely driven by the declining level of terrorism related violence in Iraq, Nigeria and Pakistan. Since 2014, the economic impact of terrorism declined by 62 per cent in Nigeria, 82 per cent in Iraq and 90 per cent in Pakistan.

Figure 1.6 shows trends in the economic impact of terrorism globally from 2000 to 2018. The impact of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks is shaded separately.

Countries suffering from armed conflict experience a significantly higher economic impact of terrorism. In 2018, Afghanistan was the country most affected by terrorism in terms of economic cost, equivalent to 19.4 per cent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP), an increase of seven percentage points from 2017. Afghanistan has experienced a consistent increase in the level of violence from terrorist incidents and ongoing conflict in the country. No other country experienced a cost of terrorism greater than five per cent of its GDP. Iraq had the second highest economic cost of terrorism as a percentage of GDP, equivalent to 3.9 per cent in 2018.

Table 1.2 shows the ten countries most affected by the economic cost of terrorism as a percentage of their GDP, all of which are also experiencing ongoing conflict.

TABLE 1.2

Top ten countries for economic cost of terrorism as a percentage of GDP, 2018

The countries with the highest economic impacts of terrorism are all suffering from ongoing conflict.

Country	% of GDP	GTI 2019 Rank
Afghanistan	19.4%	1
Iraq	3.9%	2
Nigeria	2.7%	3
Central African Republic	1.6%	14
Syria	1.6%	4
Mali	1.4%	13
Libya	1.2%	12
Somalia	1.1%	6
South Sudan	0.8%	17
Yemen	0.6%	8

Source: START GTD, IEP Calculations

ESTIMATING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TERRORISM

The economic impact of terrorism model includes the costs from four categories: deaths, injuries, property destruction, and the GDP losses from terrorism. The GDP losses included in the model are a country's losses in economic activity as a result of terrorism. GDP losses are included when the total of all terrorism incidents within a country, in a year, caused more than 1,000 deaths. More detail is given in Box 1.1.

Figure 1.7 shows the breakdown of the economic impact of terrorism. Deaths from terrorism are the largest category in the model, accounting for 58 per cent of the global economic impact of terrorism, which is equivalent to \$19.3 billion in 2018.

GDP losses are the second largest category contributing to 39 per cent of the total, or \$12.9 billion.

Property destruction is estimated at two per cent of the global economic impact of terrorism.³⁹ Finally, the economic impact of injuries from terrorism was less than one per cent of the total economic impact of terrorism.


Table 1.3 provides details on the economic impact by category and the change in the economic impact between 2017 and 2018.

In 2018, all four categories in the economic impact of terrorism model decreased from 2017 levels. Overall, the impact of terrorism declined by \$20.6 billion, or 38 per cent from 2017. The largest percentage decline was for injuries, which decreased by

FIGURE 1.7

Breakdown of the economic impact of terrorism, 2018

Deaths account for just over 58 per cent of the economic impact of terrorism.



Source: START GTD, IEP Calculations

56 per cent, or \$400 million. The second largest percentage decline was in the economic impact of terrorism deaths, which decreased by 49 per cent, or \$18.8 billion.

The economic impact of terrorism is smaller than many other forms of violence, accounting for approximately 0.2 per cent of the global cost of violence in 2018.

BOX 1.1

The economic impact of terrorism model

The economic impact of terrorism is calculated using IEP's cost of violence methodology. The model for terrorism includes the direct and indirect cost of deaths and injuries, as well as the property destruction from incidents of terrorism. The direct costs include costs borne by the victims of the terrorist acts and associated government expenditure, such as medical spending. The indirect costs include lost productivity and earnings as well as the psychological trauma to the victims, their families and friends.

Unit costs for deaths and injuries are sourced from McCollister et al. (2010). To account for the income differences for each country, the unit costs are scaled based on country GDP per capita relative to the source of the unit costs.

The analysis uses data on incidents of terrorism from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) that is collected and

collated by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. The data provides the number of deaths and injuries for each incident as well as the extent of property destruction.

In addition, the data provides estimated dollar values of property destruction for a sample of incidents. The property destruction estimates from the GTD are then used to generate costs of property destroyed by various types of terrorist attacks. Each of the different property costs is further calibrated by country income type such as OECD, high-income non-OECD, upper middle income, lower middle income and lower income country groups.

Terrorism has implications for the larger economy depending on the duration, level and intensity of the terrorist activities. Where countries suffer more than 1,000 deaths from terrorism, IEP's model includes losses of national output, equivalent to two per cent of GDP.

TABLE 1.3

Change in the economic impact of terrorism, US\$ billions, 2017–2018

In 2018, the economic impact of terrorism decreased by 38 per cent from its 2017 level.

INDICATOR	2017	2018	CHANGE (BILLIONS) 2017–2018	CHANGE (%) 2017–2018
Injuries	0.7	0.3	-0.4	-56%
GDP losses	14.2	12.9	-1.3	-9%
Deaths	38.1	19.3	-18.8	-49%
Property destruction	0.8	0.7	-0.1	-11%
Total	53.8	33.2	-20.6	-38%

Source: IEP

TABLE 1.4

Economic impact of terrorism by region, \$US billions, 2018

REGION	ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TERRORISM (US\$ BILLIONS)	REGIONAL ECONOMIC IMPACT AS PERCENTAGE OF THE GLOBAL TOTAL
sub-Saharan Africa	12.17	37%
Middle East and North Africa	11.9	36%
South Asia	5.87	18%
Asia-Pacific	1.22	4%
Europe	0.6	2%
South America	0.59	2%
North America	0.49	1%
Russia and Eurasia	0.23	0.7%
Central America and the Caribbean	0.12	0.4%

Source: IEP

The total global economic impact of violence was estimated at \$14.1 trillion for 2018, or 11.2 per cent of global GDP. However, IEP's estimate of the costs associated with terrorism calculate only the globally quantifiable and comparable costs. It does not take into account the costs of counterterrorism or countering violent extremism, nor the impact of diverting public resources to security expenditure away from other government activities. It does not calculate any of the longer-term economic implications of terrorism from reduced tourism, business activity, production and investment. As a result, the economic impact of terrorism is a conservative estimate. The estimated impact of these additional costs is outlined later in this section.

The economic impact of terrorism varies substantially by region, as shown in Table 1.4. MENA and sub-Saharan Africa have the highest economic impact, respectively representing \$11.9 and \$12.2 billion. This is equivalent to 73 per cent of the total for 2018.

The economic impact of terrorism is equal to \$5.9 billion in South Asia, the third largest economic impact by region. Central America and the Caribbean, and Russia and Eurasia are the regions with the lowest economic impact, the equivalent of \$0.1 and \$0.2 billion, respectively.

"Property destruction is estimated at two per cent of the global economic impact of terrorism."

TERRORISM AND THE BROADER ECONOMY

Violence stemming from terrorism and the fear of terrorism creates significant economic disruptions. Fear of terrorism alters economic behaviour, primarily by changing investment and consumption patterns as well as diverting public and private resources away from productive activities and towards protective measures. Terrorism and the fear of terrorism also generate significant welfare losses in the form of productivity shortfalls, foregone earnings and distorted expenditure - all of which affect the price of goods and services.

IEP's cost of terrorism model focuses on the direct costs of terrorism that stem from deaths, injuries, property damage, and GDP losses in countries experiencing conflict. However, terrorism also results in a large number of indirect costs, which can be summarised into the following categories:

1. Economic growth and terrorism
2. Trade and terrorism
3. Financial markets and terrorism
4. Tourism and terrorism
5. Foreign direct investment and terrorism.

Although there is insufficient data to include all of these costs in IEP's economic impact of terrorism model, the following section provides a brief summary of the costs associated with each of these categories:

ECONOMIC GROWTH AND TERRORISM

Studies on various countries have tried to quantify at a more granular level the adverse effects of terrorism on the economy. Some prominent studies have found that:

- After the outbreak of terrorism in the Basque Country in Spain in the late 1960s, economic growth in the region declined by ten per cent.⁴⁰
- Per capita income in Israel would have been ten per cent higher if the country had avoided terrorism from 2001 to 2004.⁴¹
- Results from research on Turkey show that terrorism has severe adverse effects on the economy when the economy is in an expansionary phase.⁴² Furthermore, provinces would have had higher GDP had they not suffered terrorism from 1988 to 2001.⁴³
- In Pakistan, an increase in the number of terrorist incidents resulted in a reduction of per capita GDP growth.⁴⁴

The impact of terrorism on economic growth has also been demonstrated at a regional level:

- Terrorism impaired GDP per capita growth for 18 Western European countries from 1971 to 2004, for each additional terrorist attack per one million inhabitants, GDP per capita growth fell by 0.4 percentage points.
- Similarly, terrorism impaired GDP per capita growth for 42 Asian countries from 1970 to 2004. An additional terrorist

event per million persons reduced GDP per capita growth on average by about 1.5 per cent.

- For 51 African countries from 1970 to 2007, transnational terrorism was found to have a significant but small impact on income per capita growth. An increase in transnational terrorism resulted in a reduction in income per capita by 0.1 per cent.⁴⁵
- Across 177 countries from 1968 to 2000, transnational terrorism negatively impacted GDP per capita growth rates up to 1.5 per cent.⁴⁶

TRADE AND TERRORISM

- Terrorism and the threat thereof can develop greater uncertainty, higher insurance and wage premiums - leading to higher trade transaction costs.
- Terrorism can lead to increased security measures at ports, leading to higher costs of trade.⁴⁷
- The negative impact of terrorism is greater on the manufactured goods trade relative to the primary commodities trade.⁴⁸
- If the number of terrorist incidents increases in a year in two trading countries, then trade between the two countries falls in the same year.⁴⁹
- The terrorist attacks in Yemen on the USS Cole in 2000 and on the French tanker Limburg in 2002 led to the circumventing of the Yemen trade route. These attacks contributed to a 300 per cent rise in the cost of insurance for ships using the Yemen route, increasing costs of trade.⁵⁰

FINANCIAL MARKETS AND TERRORISM

- A large terrorist attack can affect financial markets negatively in the short-term. However, in the long-term, financial markets continue to function efficiently, absorbing the shock.⁵¹
- Developed economies' financial markets are more resilient to terrorism shocks, whereas terrorism shocks in emerging markets have a greater impact on both returns and volatility.⁵²
- Terrorist attacks on specific companies have significant and negative impacts on their stock price.⁵³
- Terrorist incidents promote a flight-to-quality effect, a phenomenon where investors change investments from stocks to bonds.⁵⁴
- An increase in terrorism, on average, downgraded the Standard & Poor's sovereign credit rating of a country.⁵⁵

TOURISM AND TERRORISM

- Tourism is particularly vulnerable to terrorism as terrorism heightens the anxiety of travel.
- Terrorist attacks reduced tourism revenue by reducing tourist arrivals.⁵⁶

- Tourism to Israel from 1991 to 2001 was hindered more by the frequency of attacks rather than the severity of the terrorism.⁵⁷
- Estimates quantifying the dollar value of terrorism on a selection of European countries from 1974 to 1988 found collectively, the countries lost \$16.145 billion due to terrorism.⁵⁸
- Terrorism affects spill over into neighbouring countries and reduces the level of tourism in the neighbouring countries.⁵⁹

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND TERRORISM

- Due to the heightened risk of a loss of investment, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) decreases with increasing levels of terrorism in that country.
- Transnational terrorism has a greater negative impact on FDI in developing countries.⁶⁰

2

Trends in Terrorism

Key Findings

- Deaths from terrorism are now 52 per cent lower than their peak in 2014. The fall in deaths has been largest in Iraq and Syria and Nigeria.
- Despite the fall in total deaths, the number of countries affected by terrorism remains high. Seventy-one countries recorded at least one death from terrorism in 2018, the second highest number of countries since 2002.
- Bombings and armed assaults have been the most common type of terrorist attack over the past two decades.
- Afghanistan is now the country most impacted by terrorism, with 7379 deaths from terrorism, an increase of 59 per cent from the prior year.
- For the first time since 2003, Iraq was not the country most impacted by terrorism.
- Between 2002 and 2018, South Asia, MENA and sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 93 per cent of all deaths from terrorism. The largest number was recorded in MENA, with more than 93,700 fatalities.
- The average country score in MENA improved for the third year in the row.
- South Asia has had the highest impact from terrorism since 2002, while Central America and the Caribbean region has had the lowest impact.
- In the US in 2018, there were no recorded attacks by a known terrorist group. Out of 57 events, 28 were committed by far-right extremists, 27 by unknown perpetrators, and two by jihadi-inspired extremists.

TRENDS SINCE 2002

Since the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001, there have been four distinct trends in global terrorism, as shown in Figure 2.1.

Between 2002 and 2007, attacks increased steadily, correlating with an increase in violent conflict in Iraq. This trend peaked in 2007, coinciding with the US troop surge, after which terrorism steadily fell, with deaths from terrorism falling by 35 per cent between 2007 and 2011.

The third trend from 2011 to 2014 saw the level of global terrorism surge, with deaths from terrorism increasing by more than 350 per cent in just three years. This surge coincided with the rise of ISIL, the start of the Syrian civil war, and the re-emergence of Boko Haram in Nigeria.

The fourth and current trend, from 2014 onwards, has seen a substantial decrease in deaths from terrorism, with the most

dramatic reductions occurring in Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan and Syria. The winding down of the Syrian civil war, the collapse of ISIL, and increased counterterrorism coordination at both the state and international level have all played a role in reducing the impact of terrorism around the world.


In 2001, 51 countries experienced at least one death from terrorism. This number dropped to 39 in 2004. However, the number of countries has grown steadily since then, with 60 or more countries experiencing at least one fatal attack each year since 2012, as shown in Figure 2.2. This number peaked in 2016, when 79 countries had at least one death from terrorism.

Between 1998 and 2006, there was never more than one country in a year that recorded more than a thousand deaths from terrorism. However, since 2012, there have been at least four countries every year, until 2018, when the number dropped to three.

FIGURE 2.1

Deaths from terrorism, 2002–2018

Deaths from terrorism have decreased 52 per cent since their peak in 2014.




Source: START GTD, IEP Calculations

"Afghanistan is now the country most impacted by terrorism, with 7,379 deaths from terrorism, an increase of 59 per cent from the prior year. "

FIGURE 2.2

Distribution of deaths by terrorism, 1998–2018

Terrorism has remained widespread even as total deaths have declined.




Source: START GTD, IEP Calculations

FIGURE 2.3

Types of terrorist attack, total and indexed trend, 2002–2018

Bombings and explosions have been the most popular terrorist tactic since 2002.



Source: START GTD, IEP Calculations

There has been a rise in all forms of terrorism since 2002, as shown in Figure 2.3. Bombings and armed assaults made up the majority of terrorist attacks in 2018, accounting for 37 per cent and 24 per cent of total attacks respectively.

Bombings and armed assaults were the most common forms of attack in 2018. However, the largest percentage increase in incidences involved hostage-taking, assassination, and attacks on facilities or infrastructure, which all increased over tenfold from 2002 to 2018.

Assassination attempts made up a small percentage of total

attacks in all regions, other than Central America and the Caribbean, where they accounted for over a quarter of all terrorist attacks between 2002 and 2018.

Attacks on facilities and infrastructure were the most common form of terrorist attacks in the US between 2002 and 2018, with 239 total attacks. The largest number of attacks were carried out by animal rights and environmentalist groups. However, these types of attacks result in very low casualties and rarely have loss of life as the main goal. There were almost three times as many facility and infrastructure attacks as armed assaults and bombings in the US.

REGIONAL TRENDS

The impact of terrorism lessened in seven of the nine world regions in 2018, in line with the global trend, which recorded a significant drop in both deaths from terrorism and terrorist attacks.

The largest improvement occurred in MENA, while South America had the largest deterioration, followed by Central America and the Caribbean. Table 2.1 shows the regions of the world by their average GTI score for 2018, as well as changes in score from 2017 and from 2002, the first year of the GTI.

South Asia has had the highest regional score on the GTI for the past 16 years. Conversely, Central America and the Caribbean recorded the lowest score for the past sixteen years. A total of

TABLE 2.1

Average GTI score and change by region

South Asia has the highest average impact of terrorism in 2018.

Region	Overall score	Change 2002-2018	Change 2017-2018
South Asia	4.861	-0.101	-0.164
North America	4.641	0.202	-0.156
Middle East and North Africa	4.267	2.126	-0.208
sub-Saharan Africa	2.836	1.156	-0.003
South America	2.76	0.721	0.57
Asia-Pacific	2.131	0.651	-0.151
Russia and Eurasia	1.731	0.029	-0.086
Europe	1.598	0.555	-0.158
Central America and the Caribbean	1.02	0.369	0.221

212 deaths from terrorism have been recorded in Central America and the Caribbean since 2002, with 28 deaths occurring in 2018.

Between 2002 and 2018, South Asia, MENA and sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 93 per cent of all deaths from terrorism. The largest number was recorded in MENA, at more than 93,700 fatalities. South Asia recorded roughly 67,500 over the same period, with a further 45,000 occurring in sub-Saharan Africa.


MENA, South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa also had the most lethal terrorist attacks, averaging 2.67, 1.95 and 4.11 people killed per attack respectively. Conversely, in Asia-Pacific, Europe, South America, and North America, there were more terrorist attacks than total deaths from terrorism. Figure 2.4 shows total deaths and attacks for all regions from 2002 to 2018.

"Between 2002 and 2018, South Asia, MENA and sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 93 per cent of all deaths from terrorism. The largest number was recorded in MENA, with more than 93,700 fatalities."

FIGURE 2.4

Attacks and deaths from terrorism by region, 2002–2018

The largest number of deaths was recorded in the MENA region, with over 90,000 deaths from terrorism since 2002.



Source: GTD, IEP Calculations

South Asia

TABLE 2.2

South Asia GTI score, rank and change in score, 2002–2018

COUNTRY	OVERALL SCORE	OVERALL RANK	CHANGE 2002-2018	CHANGE 2017-2018
Afghanistan	9.603	1	4.058	0.212
Pakistan	7.889	5	1.866	-0.292
India	7.518	7	0.175	-0.050
Bangladesh	5.208	31	-0.026	-0.489
Nepal	5.093	34	-1.004	-0.202
Sri Lanka	3.569	55	-2.068	-0.479
Bhutan	0.010	137	0.010	-0.009
Regional Average			0.430	-0.187

Six out of seven South Asian countries improved on the 2018 GTI, with Bangladesh recording the largest improvement, followed by Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Nepal, India and Bhutan. Afghanistan was the only country in the region to deteriorate in 2018, recording more attacks than the rest of the region combined.

Fatalities from terrorism in Afghanistan increased by 59 per cent last year, from just over 4,650 to nearly 7,400. Most of the increase was in events attributed to the Taliban, which carried out 971 attacks, killing at 6,100 people. At the start of 2018, the Taliban was active in 70 per cent of Afghanistan's territory.¹ The rise in violence over the ensuing year took place amidst increased military pressure from the US, including intensified airstrikes.²

Bangladesh had the largest improvement of any country in South Asia. It recorded 31 terrorist attacks and seven fatalities in 2018, a 70 per cent reduction in deaths from the prior year. Five of the eight terrorist organisations that perpetrated the attacks in 2017 recorded no incidents in 2018, including the Islamic State in Bangladesh.

Sri Lanka's score improved in 2018 based on an 87 per cent reduction in the number of attacks. The major decline was in attacks attributed to anti-Muslim extremists, falling from 29 in 2017 to none in 2018. However, the terrorist attacks on Easter Sunday 2019 killed 259 people.

Pakistan experienced 366 attacks in 2018, but had a 37 per cent reduction in both the number of attacks and the number of deaths compared to the prior year. The fall in the number of deaths largely resulted from the declining fatality rate of attacks by the TTP. The TTP committed roughly the same number of attacks in 2018 as it did in 2017, but the number of fatalities more than halved. Pakistan also recorded a reduction in attacks by LeJ, falling from 14 attacks in 2017 to one in 2018. The number of fatalities attributed to the group fell from 119 to two.

Attacks in Nepal fell by 61 per cent year on year, with no confirmed fatalities recorded in 2018. India, also recorded an improvement, with a 13.6 per cent reduction in the number of attacks and a nine per cent reduction in deaths.

North America

TABLE 2.3

North America GTI score, rank and change in score, 2002–2018

COUNTRY	OVERALL SCORE	OVERALL RANK	CHANGE 2002-2018	CHANGE 2017-2018
United States of America	5.691	22	-2.358	-0.375
Canada	3.591	54	2.451	0.064
Regional Average			0.047	-0.156

The impact of terrorism decreased in the US last year, driving an average improvement for North America. However, an attack in Toronto that killed ten and wounded 15 led to a deterioration in Canada's score.

The improvement in the US's score in 2018 was driven by a 32 per cent reduction in terrorism deaths. However, the number of total incidents rose year on year from 49 to 57.

In 2018, there were no recorded attacks by a known terrorist group. Out of 57 events, 28 were committed by far-right extremists, 27 by unknown perpetrators, and two by jihadi-inspired extremists.³

Only five of the 57 events that occurred in the US in 2018 incurred fatalities. Four of these five were committed with firearms, resulting in 26 of the 27 deaths. Far-right extremists committed three of these four shootings, while an unaffiliated individual committed the fourth.

The deadliest attack was a mass shooting by an anti-Semitic extremist at a synagogue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania in which eleven people were killed and seven others were injured, including the assailant and four police officers.

In contrast to the US, Canada's score deteriorated last year. In 2018, there were only four attacks in Canada, compared to 12 in the prior year. However, fatalities rose to ten, compared six in 2017.

In April of 2018, a self-identified incel drove a van into a crowd of civilians in Toronto. Incel extremists have perpetrated five attacks in North America since 2002, accounting for 9.5 per cent of total fatalities, making them the third deadliest group or affiliation.

Since 2002, Canada has experienced 49 terrorist attacks, compared to 382 in the US. The majority of the incidents in both countries have been arson or incendiary attacks, but none of these types of attacks have resulted in fatalities.

Middle East and North Africa

The MENA recorded a substantial improvement last year with 17 countries improving, while only Iran and Morocco deteriorated. This is the third year in a row that the region has improved.

Fatalities in MENA accounted for 42 per cent of the global total

TABLE 2.4

Middle East and North Africa GTI score, rank and change in score, 2002–2018

COUNTRY	OVERALL SCORE	OVERALL RANK	CHANGE 2002-2018	CHANGE 2017-2018
Iraq	9.241	2	5.535	-0.505
Syria	8.006	4	7.996	-0.309
Yemen	7.259	8	4.391	-0.275
Egypt	6.794	11	6.417	-0.551
Libya	6.766	12	6.766	-0.221
Sudan	5.807	20	-0.757	-0.371
Saudi Arabia	5.238	30	3.233	-0.241
Palestine	5.177	32	-0.869	-0.153
Iran	4.717	39	2.423	0.318
Israel	4.525	40	-2.265	-0.053
Lebanon	4.395	43	1.178	-0.759
Tunisia	3.938	51	0.359	-0.150
Algeria	3.409	57	-3.754	-0.354
Bahrain	3.201	61	3.201	-0.682
Jordan	3.091	64	1.074	-0.313
Kuwait	2.487	75	2.143	-0.639
Morocco	1.215	92	1.215	1.177
United Arab Emirates	0.048	130	0.048	-0.057
Qatar	0.029	133	0.029	-0.028
Oman	0.000	138	0.000	0.000
Regional Average			1.918	-0.208

deaths from terrorism since 2002. However, since the defeat of ISIL the region's share of the global total has dropped substantially, and in 2018, it accounted for only 15 per cent of total deaths.

The largest decline in fatalities last year was in Iraq, which had 75 per cent fewer deaths from terrorism in 2018. Syria followed, with nearly a 40 per cent reduction. The principal driver of these improvements was the reduction in attacks perpetrated by ISIL, which fell by 36 per cent in Iraq and 53 per cent in Syria from 2017 to 2018.

In December of 2017, Iraq declared that it had reclaimed the last ISIL territories on the Iraqi-Syrian border and the Russian military announced it had fulfilled its mission of defeating the group in Syria.⁴

The fatality rate in Iraq per ISIL attack in 2018 fell to 1.6 people per attack, compared to 4.5 people per attack in 2017. More strikingly, in 2018, no attack killed more than 24 people while in 2017, 28 attacks resulted in 25 or more fatalities. The number of active groups in the country also fell from 12 to eight.

Conversely, in Syria in 2018, while there were fewer attacks overall, there were more active terror groups in the country and attacks by ISIL, while less frequent, these attacks were deadlier than in 2017. The number of active terrorist groups in 2018 increased to 14, compared to only eight in the prior year. Sixty per cent of attacks were attributed to these groups, while 40 per

cent were not claimed in 2018. The number of attacks by ISIL declined substantially, falling from 64 to 30, but the fatality rate of these attacks rose from 10.8 to 16 in 2018, a 48 per cent increase when compared to the prior year.

Lebanon, Bahrain, Kuwait, Egypt and Iraq had the largest improvements in score in the region. Terror attacks in Lebanon have fallen consistently since peaking in 2014, with only two deaths from five incidents recorded in 2018. In 2018, Lebanon did not record a single attack by ISIL, the first year since 2013.

Bahrain recorded one attack in 2018, down from 18 in 2017, while Kuwait has not recorded a single terrorist attack in the past two years. Egypt saw the number of terror attacks fall from 169 to 45, as a result of increased counter-terrorism activities directed at the Sinai Province of the Islamic State.

Morocco and Iran were the only two MENA countries to deteriorate in 2018. Morocco experienced one terrorist attack last year, its first since 2015. Two tourists were killed by Jihadi-inspired extremists who pledged allegiance to ISIL in a video. Previously ISIL had not been present in Morocco.

Sub-Saharan Africa

TABLE 2.5

Sub-Saharan Africa GTI score, rank and change in score, 2002–2018

COUNTRY	OVERALL SCORE	OVERALL RANK	CHANGE 2002-2018	CHANGE 2017-2018
Nigeria	8.597	3	5.089	-0.063
Somalia	7.800	6	4.727	-0.220
Democratic Republic of the Congo	7.039	10	2.983	-0.016
Mali	6.653	13	6.653	0.638
Central African Republic	6.622	14	6.622	-0.097
Cameroon	6.620	15	6.572	0.005
South Sudan	6.316	17	6.316	-0.440
Kenya	5.756	21	1.124	-0.358
Niger	5.596	23	5.329	-0.408
Mozambique	5.542	25	5.456	0.963
Burkina Faso	5.418	27	5.418	0.607
Ethiopia	5.345	29	3.965	-0.286
Burundi	5.102	33	-0.395	-0.214
Chad	4.762	38	3.754	0.010
South Africa	4.511	41	1.426	0.248
Uganda	3.957	49	-1.711	0.031
Angola	3.784	52	-2.571	-0.689
Tanzania	3.272	60	-0.322	-0.096
Rwanda	2.948	66	0.588	0.771
Zimbabwe	2.834	68	-0.409	1.265
Republic of the Congo	2.687	70	-0.983	-0.681
Cote d' Ivoire	2.598	72	-0.072	-0.678
Madagascar	1.957	82	0.494	-0.656
Ghana	1.559	86	1.559	1.397

Senegal	1.186	93	-2.485	0.174
Guinea	0.971	100	-3.239	0.647
Malawi	0.663	104	0.663	0.205
Gabon	0.551	105	0.551	-0.647
Sierra Leone	0.458	108	-3.402	-0.608
Djibouti	0.320	113	0.320	-0.385
Zambia	0.305	114	-1.257	-0.358
Liberia	0.105	126	-1.935	-0.105
Lesotho	0.095	127	0.095	-0.096
Togo	0.000	138	0.000	0.000
Equatorial Guinea	0.000	138	0.000	0.000
Namibia	0.000	138	-2.746	0.000
Guinea-Bissau	0.000	138	-0.076	0.000
The Gambia	0.000	138	-0.076	0.000
Benin	0.000	138	0.000	0.000
Eritrea	0.000	138	0.000	0.000
Mauritania	0.000	138	0.000	0.000
Botswana	0.000	138	0.000	0.000
eSwatini	0.000	138	-0.124	0.000
Mauritius	0.000	138	0.000	0.000
Regional Average			1.089	-0.003

In 2018, 20 of the 44 countries in sub-Saharan Africa improved their GTI score, 13 countries deteriorated, and another 11 maintained their scores of ‘no impact of terrorism,’ resulting in the region’s score remaining steady.

Angola, Republic of the Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Madagascar and Gabon had the largest improvements. All five countries were free of terrorism in 2018. For the Republic of the Congo, this marked the second year in a row without an attack.

Guinea, Rwanda, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Ghana had the worst deteriorations in 2018. Mozambique experienced 62 terrorist attacks in 2018, up from ten the year prior. The number of fatalities increased from 21 to 131. The rise in deaths was mostly driven by violence by Ansar al-Sunna, an Islamist militant group originally active in Kenya that aims to establish an Islamic state in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province. The group was responsible for 34 attacks and 93 fatalities in 2018.

Zimbabwe’s score deteriorated because the country had its first fatalities from terrorism in five years. There were two attacks in 2018, both political in nature. In June, unknown assailants detonated an explosive device targeting a Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) rally in Bulawayo. Two people were killed and at least 47 others were injured. In August, assailants set fire to the home of a Movement for Democratic Change Alliance agent. No group claimed responsibility for the attack, but sources attributed it to the Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union (ZANU), which is distinct from the ZANU-PF political party.

Nigeria, Somalia, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali, and Central African Republic (CAR) remained the countries most affected by terrorism, although all but Mali improved from 2017 to 2018. All of these countries have faced armed conflict and significant instability over the last decade.

Nigeria had the largest number of both attacks and deaths in the region. The country’s improvement in score was due to the fact that attacks by Boko Haram fell by 35 per cent last year. The number of fatalities attributed to the group reached its lowest level since 2011. However, there was a 75 per cent rise in attacks attributed to ‘Fulani extremists,’ which reflects *ongoing conflicts* between groups of Fulani pastoralists and various farmer communities across Nigeria’s Middle Belt region.

Somalia recorded 646 deaths from terrorism last year, from 286 incidents, but this was a 56 per cent reduction in fatalities compared to 2017. The number of attacks by Al-Shabaab, which has been the dominant terror group in the country over the study period, fell by 24 per cent in 2018. The number of fatalities attributed to the group in 2018 was less than half that of 2017.

The DRC recorded a slight improvement on its GTI score. Fatalities in the country fell by 17 per cent despite a 22 per cent rise in attacks. At least 41 terrorist groups or militias have been active in the country since 2002, with the most active groups varying year to year according to local conflict dynamics. The Lord’s Resistance Army has been the deadliest over the period, but the group’s six attacks in 2018 incurred no fatalities. Conversely, the Allied Democratic Forces killed at least 205 people across 38 incidents in 2018 – more than twice the number committed the year prior.

Terrorism in Mali reached its highest level ever recorded in 2018. Five organisations and three extremist groups committed a combined 63 attacks, while unknown perpetrators committed an additional 61 incidents, accounting for nearly 430 deaths. Persistent insecurity in the West African nation appears to have engendered rising Islamist extremism and ethnic conflict. One third of deaths in 2018 were attributed to Muslim extremists, with another 20 per cent perpetrated by Islamic State in the Greater Sahara.

South America

TABLE 2.6

South America GTI score, rank and change in score, 2002–2018

COUNTRY	OVERALL SCORE	OVERALL RANK	CHANGE 2002-2018	CHANGE 2017-2018
Colombia	5.912	19	-1.127	0.301
Chile	4.123	46	3.558	0.669
Venezuela	4.101	47	2.527	0.436
Bolivia	3.387	58	3.387	3.387
Paraguay	3.119	62	2.610	-0.324
Peru	2.840	67	-0.772	-0.110
Brazil	2.530	73	1.783	1.142
Ecuador	2.455	76	0.714	0.984
Argentina	1.680	83	1.432	0.000
Uruguay	0.172	121	0.172	-0.172
Guyana	0.038	131	-0.081	-0.038
Regional Average			1.291	0.570

Six out of the 11 countries in South America deteriorated in score last year, while four improved and one was unchanged.

Since 2002, Colombia has experienced the highest impact of terrorism in the region. However, although it experienced an increase in terrorism in 2018, it has a lower overall impact of terrorism now than in 2002.

Violence by Colombia's armed groups has risen as progress in implementing the peace accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) has stalled in recent years. In 2018, FARC dissidents perpetrated 34 attacks, killing 24 people. In 2019, a group of FARC commanders announced a rearmament.⁵ The Ejército de Liberación Nacional, which has not yet signed a peace agreement with the government, but which did agree to a ceasefire in 2017, perpetrated 87 attacks in 2018, killing 48 people.

Bolivia had the largest year-on-year deterioration, followed by Brazil, Ecuador, Chile, Venezuela and Colombia. Bolivia had been free of terrorism since 2012 until two bombings in the space of three days killed 12 people and injured 60. The perpetrators of the attacks were unknown.

Attacks in Chile more than doubled in 2018 to 45, although no deaths were recorded. Roughly half of the attacks were committed by the indigenous Mapuche activists, some of whom are affiliated with the Arauco Malleco Coordinating Group, whose goal is to recover traditional Mapuche lands. These attacks mostly targeted businesses, in opposition to logging and extractive activities. The number of attacks by Mapuche groups rose sharply from six in 2017 to 22 in 2018.

Brazil recorded seven attacks and three fatalities in 2018, making it the worst year since 2002. The three deaths occurred when unknown assailants fired on the vehicle of councillor Marielle Franco, killing her and her driver, and one month later shot another man who was thought to be a witness to the Franco's murder. Five out of seven attacks were by firearm, consistent with the high levels of gun violence in Brazil.

Ecuador recorded four attacks last year, up from two in 2017. Two were bombings by unknown perpetrators, but the other two were perpetrated by FARC, involving the abduction of five people on two separate occasions in attempts to trade hostages for arrested group members. All five hostages were killed.

Paraguay showed the largest improvement in the region last year, followed by Uruguay, Peru and Guyana. The Paraguayan People's Army, a communist guerrilla group active since 2008, has been responsible for 94 per cent of all incidents recorded in Paraguay. The group's activity peaked in 2015, with 18 attacks that killed 14 people, but has fallen since. In 2018, four attacks and two fatalities were recorded.

Peru's score improved in 2018 and the country has maintained its relatively low levels of terrorist activity since 2002. Although activity by the Shining Path has fallen substantially since the start of the 21st century, the group is believed to be responsible for one of the four attacks that took place last year, which was the only attack to incur fatalities. Four police officers were killed when assailants ambushed a patrol in June of 2018. Altogether, the Shining Path has perpetrated 35 out of the 51 attacks that

occurred in Peru between 2002 and 2018, with the remaining events attributed to unknown actors or indigenous groups.

Asia Pacific

TABLE 2.7

Asia-Pacific GTI score, rank and change in score, 2002–2018

COUNTRY	OVERALL SCORE	OVERALL RANK	CHANGE 2002-2018	CHANGE 2017-2018
Philippines	7.137	9	1.132	-0.044
Thailand	6.029	18	1.984	-0.223
Myanmar	5.512	26	2.281	-0.404
Indonesia	5.070	35	-1.321	0.527
China	4.465	42	1.360	-0.643
Australia	2.645	71	2.530	-0.182
Malaysia	2.495	74	1.999	-0.205
Japan	2.291	78	0.747	-0.635
Papua New Guinea	1.364	89	0.906	-0.676
Laos	1.033	95	-0.710	-0.642
Taiwan	1.008	96	1.008	0.065
Vietnam	0.999	97	0.694	0.336
South Korea	0.296	116	0.143	0.010
New Zealand	0.143	122	0.067	-0.143
Timor-Leste	0.000	138	-0.210	0.000
North Korea	0.000	138	0.000	0.000
Singapore	0.000	138	0.000	0.000
Cambodia	0.000	138	-3.127	-0.019
Mongolia	0.000	138	0.000	0.000
Regional Average			0.499	-0.151

Eleven out of 19 countries in Asia-Pacific improved in 2018 while only four deteriorated - a reversal of the previous year's trend. Country scores in Asia-Pacific have been deteriorating, on average, since 2012. However, four countries have had no terrorist activity since at least 2013.

The four countries that deteriorated were Taiwan, Indonesia, Vietnam and South Korea. New Zealand recorded an improvement in its GTI score for 2019. The Christchurch attacks in March 2019 that killed 51 people will mean that its score will deteriorate significantly on the 2020 GTI.

Papua New Guinea recorded the largest improvement in 2018, closely followed by China, Laos, Japan and Myanmar. However, Laos is the only one of these to have reduced the impact of terrorism below 2002 levels.

There have been nearly 7,000 deaths from terrorism in the Asia-Pacific region since 2002, approximately three per cent of the global total. Of these fatalities, just over 3,000 have occurred in the Philippines.

The Philippines was the country most affected by terrorism in the region in 2018, followed by Thailand. While some of their regional neighbours have experienced intermittent terrorist

activity, the Philippines, Thailand, Myanmar, Indonesia and China have been consistently affected over the last decade. Four of these highly impacted countries improved last year, but Indonesia's score continued to deteriorate in 2018.

The deadliest incident in the Philippines last year was a suicide bombing on a military checkpoint that killed at least ten soldiers and civilians and wounded six. ISIL claimed responsibility for the attack, while authorities attributed it to Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), who are an affiliate of ISIL. They are a jihadist militant group active since the early 1990s. ASG was responsible for at least 21 terrorist attacks in the Philippines last year.

Thailand accounts for another 1,900 fatalities, the majority of which occurred between 2006 and 2016. Both the number of attacks and deaths have fallen in the last two years, but the country still experienced 135 incidents in 2018. 110 of those attacks had no fatalities, and most were committed by unknown or loosely categorised groups, such as 'anti-government extremists.' Of the 25 attacks that resulted in fatalities, 1.56 people were killed per attack, with firearms being the most common form of attack.

Russia and Eurasia

TABLE 2.8

Russia and Eurasia GTI score, rank & change in score 2002–2018

Country	Overall Score	Regional Rank	Change 2002-2018	Change 2016-2018
Ukraine	5.547	24	3.961	-0.501
Russia	4.900	37	-1.933	-0.330
Tajikistan	3.947	50	1.212	1.714
Kazakhstan	1.566	85	1.184	-0.662
Kyrgyz Republic	1.467	87	-0.340	-0.252
Georgia	1.335	90	-1.498	-0.087
Armenia	1.173	94	0.053	-0.519
Azerbaijan	0.698	103	-0.868	-0.259
Moldova	0.115	123	0.077	-0.114
Uzbekistan	0.019	135	-2.068	-0.019
Belarus	0.000	138	-0.229	0.000
Turkmenistan	0.000	138	-0.229	0.000
Regional average			-0.057	-0.086

Nine out of 12 countries in the Russia and Eurasia region improved last year, while two maintained their score of 'no impact of terrorism.' Only Tajikistan deteriorated.

Kazakhstan, Armenia, Ukraine, Russia and Azerbaijan had the largest improvements in the region. Kazakhstan has now been without incident for two years.

Armenia experienced one terrorist attack in 2018, but security forces arrested the suicide bomber before any casualties took place. Ukraine has had a marked improvement since 2014, with deaths down by 98 per cent since then. Azerbaijan recorded one

attack last year, but no fatalities.

Russia also improved, with the number of attacks declining by a third and fatalities falling by 51 per cent in 2018. Of the 21 attacks that occurred last year, nine resulted in fatalities, with six of these being attributed to the Caucasus Province of the Islamic State. A further two attacks by the group took place, but did not result in any deaths. Although still relatively small in number, attacks by the ISIL affiliate have been on the rise for the past four years.

Tajikistan deteriorated in score from 2017 to 2018 largely due to an attack in a prison in November of last year. An ISIL-affiliated inmate attacked a guard, seizing his weapon, and the ensuing riot killed at least 27 and wounded five prisoners and guards. This was one of two events for which ISIL claimed responsibility, the other being a vehicle attack in July that killed four international tourists.

Seventy-two per cent of attacks in the region were not attributed to any group. Most of those attacks that were attributed to a group were carried out by Chechen separatists, or by groups in Ukraine after the war in Donbass. Of nearly 2,500 attacks between 2002 and 2018, roughly 700 have known perpetrators. In 64 per cent of those cases, or just over 450 incidents, the attack is attributed to one of three separatist groups in Russia or the Ukraine: 'Chechen rebels,' the Donetsk People's Republic, or the Luhansk People's Republic.

In recent years, there has been an increasing overlap between these conflicts, and violence driven by Islamist extremism prominent outside the region. For example, the Caucasus Emirate, which was responsible for at least 42 attacks and 227 fatalities between 2008 and 2016, grew out of a schism in the Chechen separatist movement. The group was founded with the goal of building an independent Islamic state in the North Caucasus region of Russia, but by mid-2015, many of the group's commanders had defected to ISIL, prompting the creation of the Caucasus Province of the Islamic State. While terror attacks by Chechen separatists have declined significantly in recent years, ISIL and/or the Caucasus Province of the Islamic State were responsible for at least 30 attacks and 90 fatalities in the region from 2015 to 2018.

Europe

TABLE 2.9

Europe GTI score, rank & change in score 2002–2018

Country	Overall Score	Regional Rank	Change 2002-2018	Change 2016-2018
Turkey	6.533	16	2.365	-0.503
United Kingdom	5.405	28	1.102	-0.205
France	5.008	36	1.269	-0.467
Germany	4.254	44	1.791	-0.347
Greece	4.167	45	0.748	-0.124
Belgium	3.636	53	3.207	-0.424
Sweden	3.450	56	3.355	-0.486
Spain	3.354	59	-1.645	-0.670

Italy	3.109	63	0.488	0.373
Ireland	2.692	69	2.606	-0.353
Netherlands	2.347	77	0.934	0.387
Kosovo	2.255	79	-1.757	-0.439
Finland	2.026	81	2.026	-0.475
Austria	1.655	84	1.645	-0.197
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1.388	88	-0.378	0.049
Montenegro	0.999	97	0.694	0.961
Denmark	0.957	101	0.957	0.140
Czech Republic	0.866	102	0.637	-0.696
Poland	0.477	106	0.038	-0.242
Lithuania	0.458	108	0.458	0.458
Albania	0.420	110	-0.194	-0.588
Cyprus	0.420	110	0.010	-0.786
Bulgaria	0.372	112	-1.217	0.057
North Macedonia	0.301	115	-3.776	-0.348
Latvia	0.229	117	0.038	-0.229
Switzerland	0.191	118	-0.402	0.057
Hungary	0.181	119	0.152	-0.182
Estonia	0.115	123	0.058	-0.114
Serbia	0.115	123	0.115	-0.114
Norway	0.076	128	0.076	-0.077
Slovakia	0.057	129	-0.096	-0.058
Iceland	0.029	133	0.029	-0.028
Croatia	0.000	138	-1.033	-0.014
Slovenia	0.000	138	0.000	0.000
Portugal	0.000	138	0.000	0.000
Romania	0.000	138	0.000	0.000
Regional average			0.397	-0.158

Europe recorded improvements in 25 of its 36 countries in 2018 and is the second best performing region, after Central America and the Caribbean. Only eight countries deteriorated last year, while three recorded no change in score. Europe recorded 62 deaths from terrorism in 2018, of which 40 occurred in Turkey.

Turkey remains the most affected country, although its score did improve based on a 50 per cent reduction in attacks from 2017 to 2018. There were 95 incidents, resulting in 40 deaths, compared to 119 attacks and 123 deaths in 2017.

The United Kingdom, on the other hand, had twice as many attacks, totalling 95 incidents in 2018, but just two fatalities. Eighty out of the 95 attacks occurred in Northern Ireland, including the two that resulted in fatalities. In both cases, civilians were shot by unknown assailants. Terrorism in Northern Ireland remains largely related to the conflict between republicans and unionists there, while at least six of the 12 incidents in England explicitly targeted Jews, Muslims or Sikhs.

Montenegro, Lithuania, Netherlands, Italy and Denmark had the most severe deteriorations in 2018.

Montenegro recorded two terrorist attacks, its first in five years, in the form of a suicide attack on the US Embassy in Podgorica in February and the assassination of a journalist in May. Both attacks were committed by unknown assailants.

Denmark also had no events in 2017, but recorded a minor escalation in 2018, when assailants threw a petrol bomb at the Turkish embassy in Copenhagen in March of that year. No casualties were reported and no group took responsibility for the attack.

The Netherlands and Italy, on the other hand, have faced ongoing terrorism over the last five years. The Netherlands recorded five attacks and one fatality in 2018, while Italy recorded 14 attacks, but no deaths. Three of the five attacks in the Netherlands were committed by unaffiliated perpetrators, while the remaining two were by the PKK and 'Muslim extremists.' In Italy, eight of the 14 attacks were by unaffiliated attackers, while one was attributed to anarchists, two to anti-fascist activists, one to neo-fascists, and one to anti-Semitic extremists.

Central America and the Caribbean

TABLE 2.10

Central America and the Caribbean score, rank & change in score 2002–2018

Country	Overall Score	Regional Rank	Change 2002-2018	Change 2016-2018
Mexico	4.080	48	2.182	0.547
Nicaragua	2.952	65	2.933	2.205
Haiti	2.180	80	0.220	0.466
Guatemala	1.331	91	0.298	1.126
Honduras	0.992	99	0.839	-0.722
Jamaica	0.472	107	0.472	-0.619
Dominican Republic	0.177	120	0.177	-0.205
Panama	0.038	131	-0.057	-0.038
Trinidad and Tobago	0.019	135	0.019	-0.105
El Salvador	0.000	138	0.000	0.000
Costa Rica	0.000	138	0.000	0.000
Cuba	0.000	138	0.000	0.000
Regional average			0.590	0.221

Although only four out of 12 Central American and Caribbean countries deteriorated in 2018, the size of the deteriorations was enough to cause a deterioration in the overall score for the region. Significant deteriorations in score were recorded in Nicaragua, Guatemala, Mexico and Haiti.

Costa Rica, Cuba and El Salvador recorded no terrorist activity over the study period, despite the fact that El Salvador regularly registers one of the highest *homicide rates* in the world.

Honduras, Jamaica, Dominican Republic, Panama and Trinidad and Tobago all improved from 2017 to 2018.

Nicaragua has recorded nine terrorist attacks since 2002, with seven occurring in 2018. Terrorism in Nicaragua in 2018 came amidst political instability, civil unrest and criminal violence, and may have included elements of right-wing extremism. None of the 2018 perpetrators were known terrorist organisations. The two attacks on radio stations in the capital Managua, were

attributed to 'neo-fascists' and 'right-wing extremists.' Four of the remaining attacks targeted police, while in the last, assailants opened fire on a town hall, killing a teacher and wounding five municipal employees.

Mexico recorded a 58 per cent increase in terrorism in 2018, with a noticeable increase in attacks on politicians. There were 22 terrorist attacks last year, with a total of 19 fatalities. Attacks on politicians historically have been rare with only three recorded in the 15 years before 2018. However, the 2018 elections in Mexico were particularly violent, with at least 850 acts of political violence recorded during the campaign period.⁶

Terrorism in Mexico has typically targeted journalists and the media, with these attacks making up 25 per cent of the 122 attacks recorded since 2002.

Both Guatemala and Haiti recorded deteriorations in their scores due to a resurgence of terrorism in 2018. Neither country has experienced more than 20 incidents since 2002, and both were free of terrorism in 2017, but in 2018 Haiti and Guatemala faced five and two attacks respectively. No fatalities were recorded in either country.

FAR-RIGHT TERRORISM IN THE WEST

Key Findings

- Incidents of far-right terrorism have been increasing in the West, particularly in Western Europe, North America and Oceania. The total number of incidents have increased by 320 per cent over the past five years.
- There have been 11 far-right attacks in the last 50 years that have killed more than ten people.
- The three largest politically motivated terrorist attacks in the West in the last 50 years have been perpetrated by far-right extremists.
- However, far-right terrorism remains a tiny fraction of total terrorism worldwide. Even in the West, historically nationalist or separatist, Islamist, and far-left terrorism has been much more common.
- Far-right terrorism in the last ten years has become increasingly associated with individuals with broad ideological allegiances rather than specific terrorist groups.
- Over the past four decades, one in every five mass shootings in the US has been classified as a terrorist attack. In the last decade, that number has risen to one in three.
- The rise in far-right terrorism has been mirrored by an increase in hate crimes in the US, although the total number of hate crimes is lower than it was a decade ago.
- The US has had one of the largest deteriorations in Positive Peace, deteriorating by 6.7 per cent.
- The most noticeable deteriorations in the US occurred on the *Low Levels of Corruption*, *Free Flow of Information*, *Acceptance of the Rights of Others*, and *Equitable Distribution of Resources* Pillars.
- The fall in Positive Peace in the West in the last decade has increased the likelihood of a continued increase in politically motivated violence in the next decade.

Overview

The last few years have seen growing concern over the threat posed by far-right extremism and terrorism, particularly in the West. The attention paid to this threat has been particularly notable after a number of high profile terrorist attacks in 2019. In New Zealand, a lone gunman attacked two mosques in Christchurch, killing 51 people and injuring 49. The fact that the attacks happened in New Zealand, which had almost no prior history of terrorist activity, highlighted the way in which far-right ideology and violence had spread across the Western world.⁷ The attacks in New Zealand were followed by a number of mass shootings in the United States, at least some of which were carried out by people influenced by far-right ideology. In

El Paso, Texas, a gunman carried out an attack on a Walmart store, killing 22 people and injuring 24. The gunmen cited the Christchurch attack as an inspiration.

The rise in far-right attacks has led some observers to state that far-right domestic terrorism has not been taken seriously enough in the West, and that security and intelligence services should be paying closer attention to this threat. This section looks at the history of far-right terrorism over the past fifty years, how it compares to other types of political terrorism, its characteristics, and whether the threat of far-right, and other political terrorism is likely to increase over the next few years.

Far-right terrorism and the West

This section looks at far-right terrorism in Western Europe, North America, and Oceania, using 'the West' as a shorthand for this group of regions. Both of the terms 'far-right' and 'the West' are contested and have strong political and emotional connotations, so it is important to make clear how each of these terms is defined in the 2019 GTI.

Far-right

'Far-right' refers to a political ideology that is centred on one or more of the following elements: strident nationalism (usually racial or exclusivist in some fashion), fascism, racism, anti-Semitism, anti-immigration, chauvinism, nativism, and xenophobia. Far-right groups tend to be strongly authoritarian, but often with populist elements, and have historically been anti-communist, although this characteristic has become less prominent since the end of the Cold War. Groups that are strongly anti-government are not necessarily far-right, although there is a subset of anti-government groups in the US that have been classified as far-right.

Not every group or organisation with any of these characteristics can be considered far-right, and not every far-right group is automatically violent or terroristic. However, terrorist groups with these characteristics and individuals sympathetic to these ideals have been classified as 'far-right terrorism' in the 2019 GTI. In addition to specific terrorist groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan, the GTI classifies the following ideological groupings from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) as far-right:

Anti-feminist extremists	Anti-Muslim extremists	Neo-Fascists
Anti-immigrant extremists	Anti-Semitic extremists	Neo-Nazi extremists
Anti-Islam Extremist	Far-right Extremists	Right-wing extremists
Anti-LGBT extremists	Incel extremists	White extremists
Anti-liberal extremists		

The West

There is no one fixed definition of 'the West', so this section focuses on countries where the concept of far-right terrorism is the most politically applicable. IEP's definition of the West encompasses the following countries:

Andorra	Germany	Portugal
Australia	Iceland	Spain
Austria	Ireland	Sweden
Belgium	Italy	Switzerland
Canada	Luxembourg	United Kingdom
Denmark	Netherlands	United States of America
Finland	New Zealand	Vatican City
France	Norway	West Germany (1970-1990)

"Far-right terrorism in the last ten years has become increasingly associated with individuals with broad ideological allegiances rather than specific terrorist groups."

TRENDS IN POLITICAL TERRORISM

IEP groups terrorist organisations and ideologies into three broad categories: political, nationalist or separatist, and religiously motivated terrorism. Far-right terrorism is classified as a form of political terrorism. There are also a few organisations that fall outside of this categorisation system, such as environmental, and animal rights related terrorism. Although there can be an overlap between these categories, the vast majority of terrorist groups have a primary purpose and self-understanding that fits into at least one of these three groups.

In 2018, far-right terrorist attacks accounted for 17.2 per cent of terrorist incidents in the West. By contrast, attacks by Islamist groups accounted for 6.8 per cent of attacks, and attacks not attributed to any group accounted for 62.8 per cent of incidents in the West.

From 1970 to 2018, 5.2 per cent of all terrorist attacks in the West were classified as far-right, which account for 7.6 per cent of deaths from terrorism in the region.

There has been a significant increase in far-right terrorism over the past decade, as shown in Figure 2.5. The total number of far-right incidents has risen 320 per cent in the past five years, with 38 attacks recorded in 2018, compared to nine in 2013.

There were 56 attacks recorded in 2017, the highest number of far-right terrorist incidents in the past fifty years. However, although the past decade has seen a surge in the number of incidents, this level of far-right terrorism is not historically

unprecedented. In 27 of the last 50 years there have been at least ten far-right terrorist attacks recorded in the west.

There have been a total of 746 far-right terrorist attacks recorded since 1970, which resulted in 688 deaths. Of those 746 attacks, 138 resulted in at least one death. The level of far-right terrorism remained fairly stable in the West between 1970 and 1995, with an average of just over 18 incidents per year. After the Oklahoma City bombing, far-right terrorism began to decline. Over the next fifteen years, there were 98 far-right incidents, at an average of 6.5 attacks a year. Since 2011, there has been a notable increase, with 185 incidents up to December 2018.


Although there has been a surge in far-right terrorism over the past decade, the level of politically related terrorism overall in the West is much lower than it was in the 1970s and 1980s, as shown in Figure 2.6. In the past ten years, there have been 322 politically motivated terrorist attacks in the West. By contrast, between 1970 and 1980 there were 1677 terrorist incidents recorded, 93 per cent of which were carried out by terrorist groups classified as far-left. There were 295 incidents of political terrorism recorded in 1977 alone.

There were 446 deaths from terrorism between 1970 and 1980, just under 58 per cent of which were the responsibility of far-left terrorist groups. As shown in Figure 2.6, deaths committed by far-left groups tended to be more consistent over time, whereas far-right terrorism had large spikes in the number of deaths, usually the result of a single highly deadly attack in a given year. Between 1970 and 2018, there were 274 far-left attacks that resulted in at least one death. However, no single attack killed

FIGURE 2.5

Far-right terrorist incidents in the west, 1970–2018

There has been a 320 per cent increase in far-right terrorism in the past five years.



Source: START GTD, IEP Calculations

more than eight people. By contrast, there were 138 attacks from far-right groups or individuals that resulted in at least one death, but 12 attacks in which ten or more people were killed.

The fall in the total number of terrorist incidents after the 1980s can largely be attributed to the virtual disappearance of organised left-wing political terrorism. Most of the terrorist attacks in the West in the 1970s and 1980s were carried out by small cells of revolutionary Marxist or anarchist terrorist groups.


The relative impact of far-right terrorism is smaller even when non-political terrorism is included in the analysis. Figure 2.7 shows the number of terrorist incidents in the West over the past fifty years attributed to political, nationalist or separatist,

and religiously motivated terrorism. Between 1970 and 2018, there were 11,109 terrorist attacks that fell into these three categories. Of these, 70 per cent were nationalist or separatist, 26 per cent were political, and 3.4 per cent were religious. The vast majority of separatist or nationalist terrorism occurred either in the Basque regions of Spain and France, or in Northern Ireland as part of the Troubles, and the majority of religious terrorism was carried out by ISIL or ISIL-inspired individuals.

In the past decade, the balance of attacks has shifted, with a significant increase in political and religiously motivated terrorist attacks, and a decrease in the amount of nationalist or separatist terrorism. Around 44 per cent of terrorist attacks in the last decade were nationalist or separatist, compared to 38 per cent for political terrorism, and 17.8 per cent for religious

FIGURE 2.6
Far-right vs far-left terrorist incidents and deaths in the west, 1970–2018


The total level of political terrorism in the West has declined significantly since the 1970s.



Source: START GTD, IEP Calculations

FIGURE 2.7
Terrorist attacks in the west by type, 1970–2018

The majority of terrorist incidents in the West since 1970 have been nationalist/separatist.




Source: START GTD, IEP Calculations

FIGURE 2.8

Deaths from terrorism in the west by type, 1970–2018

The last twenty years have seen a resurgence of political and religious terrorism.



Source: START GTD, IEP Calculations

motivated terrorism. The overall number of terrorist attacks remains much smaller in the last decade compared to prior periods.

Figure 2.8 shows terrorist deaths in the West. The first chart shows the number of deaths when the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks are included, while the second chart shows the same period with these attacks removed.

Political terrorism accounted for the lowest proportion of deaths of the three categories, with 12.7 per cent. Separatist or nationalist terrorism accounted for 38 per cent, with the remainder, just under half, being attributed to religiously motivated terrorism. However, the vast majority of these deaths occurred during the September 11 terrorist attacks.

Over the past decade, the number of deaths attributable to religiously motivated groups was just under 65 per cent. However politically motivated deaths, as a proportion of total deaths, increased significantly. Around 32 per cent of all terrorist deaths in the West over the past decade were political, with 2.7 per cent being nationalist or separatist.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF FAR-RIGHT TERRORISM


Far-right terrorism is more than five times deadlier on average than far-left terrorism, with an average of 0.92 deaths per attack, compared to 0.17 deaths per attack since 1970. However, of the ideologies with over 100 attributed terrorist attacks, Islamist terrorism is much deadlier than far-right terrorism, with 3.6 deaths per attack if the September 11th attacks are excluded. As discussed above, far-right terrorism has tended to be episodic rather than consistently deadly over the past 50 years. This can be seen in Figure 2.9, which shows the number of terrorist attacks by ideology that have killed more than ten people.

There were eleven far-right terrorist attacks between 1970-2018

FIGURE 2.9

Number of attacks with more than ten fatalities, 1970–2018

There have been 11 far-right attacks that have killed at least ten people.



Source: START GTD, IEP Calculations

that killed at least ten people. If preliminary data for 2019 is included, that number rises to 13, as a result of the Christchurch and El Paso attacks.


There have been four far-right attacks that have killed more than 50 people: the bombing of the Bologna railway station in 1980, the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, the Norwegian attacks in 2011, and the Christchurch attack in 2019.

In general, far-right terrorists are less likely to be formally affiliated with a group than other terrorists, as shown in Figure 2.10. Terrorist attacks in the GTD can be attributed to specific groups, for example, ISIL, or they can be attributed to broader identity groups or ideologies, such as white nationalist extremists, anti-Muslim extremists, and so on.

FIGURE 2.10

Proportion of affiliated and unaffiliated attacks by ideology

Around 60 per cent of both far-right and Islamist attacks are unaffiliated.



Source: START GTD, IEP Calculations

For attacks attributed to far-right and Islamist groups or individuals, just under 60 per cent were carried out by unaffiliated individuals. By contrast, separatist, far-left, and environmental terrorists were much more likely to be affiliated with a specific group, with just nine, ten, and 15 per cent of attacks respectively carried out by unaffiliated individuals.

There have been changes in the nature of far-right terrorism over the past fifty years. In the past decade, the people responsible for the attacks have been even less likely to be formally affiliated with a terrorist group. Figure 2.11 shows the total and percentage of affiliated and unaffiliated attacks since 1970, for all political terrorism, including far-left and far-right, using a five-year moving average.

The proportion of unaffiliated attacks has risen from under five per cent in the mid-1970s, to over 70 per cent for the period 2014-2018. This rise is a reflection of two distinct trends: the fall in organised far-left political terrorism, and the increase in far-right mass or spree shootings, usually carried out by an individual who was self-radicalised or radicalised primarily via the Internet, rather than by in-person contact with other far-right individuals or groups.

IEP analysis of the 32 far-right terrorist attacks since 2011 that caused at least one fatality found that less than a quarter of the perpetrators had definite in-person contact with other far-right individuals or groups, and over a third appear to have been primarily radicalised online.

This increase in mass shootings as a terrorist tactic is reflected in the change in the proportion of mass shootings that are categorised as terrorist acts in the GTD.


IEP used the Mother Jones mass shooting database⁸ to compare mass shootings to terrorism. This database only includes “indiscriminate rampages in public places resulting in four or more victims killed by the attacker”. This definition excludes a lot of drug and gang-related criminal activity that is not generally considered to be a mass shooting or spree killing.

"Far-right terrorism is more than five times deadlier on average than far-left terrorism, with an average of 0.92 deaths per attack."

FIGURE 2.11

Total and percentage of unaffiliated attacks, five year moving average, 1970–2018

The proportion of attacks that are unaffiliated has increased to almost 70 per cent.




Source: START GTD, IEP Calculations

FIGURE 2.12

Mass shootings and terrorism, 1982–2019

Just under 20 per cent of mass shootings in the US since 1982 were classified as terrorism.



Source: START GTD, Mother Jones, IEP Calculations

Figure 2.12 shows the percentage of mass shootings classified as terrorist attacks by the GTD, and how that figure has changed over time.

Just under 20 per cent of mass shootings since 1982 are classified as terrorist events by the GTD. However, the vast majority of terrorist mass shootings have occurred in the last decade. From 1982 to 2008, there were 47 mass shootings, only two of which were classified as terrorist attacks. There were 67 mass shootings from 2009 to 2019. During that period, the percentage of mass shootings classified as terrorism rose from 4.2 per cent, to at least 30 per cent.

It is difficult to pinpoint a cause of this increase in far-right terrorism, and political violence in general, by looking at terrorism data. However, it is possible to identify the factors that are associated with an increase in terrorism, and to examine the extent to which they have shifted in the West in the last decade. Given the similarity between the trends seen in the US and Western Europe, as shown in Figure 2.13, it seems likely that whatever dynamic is driving this increase, it is not unique to one country.

The increase in far-right terrorist attacks and mass shootings in the US in particular has been blamed on the political climate. It has been suggested that in the current political environment, the rise in aggressive rhetoric has enabled the resurgence of hate speech and the empowerment of far-right figures, as well as increasing the likelihood of radicalisation into the far-right of young men in particular.

Quantifying the way in which the political environment has changed is difficult. However, the trend in FBI-recorded hate crime incidents is one way in which this shift can be tracked. Figure 2.14 shows hate crime incidents in the US for the period 1992 to 2017. Comparable data over a similar time period was not available for Western Europe and at the time of publication, data for 2018 was not yet available.

The number of crimes recorded in 2017 was still lower than every year between 1995 and 2008. However, there has been a noticeable increase in FBI-recorded hate crimes in the past few years, with a rise of nearly 23 per cent between 2014 and 2017.


There has also been a significant increase in political polarisation across the West, with the rise of formerly fringe populist parties on both the left and right. Political polarisation in the US is now at its highest level ever.⁹

Shifts in the political climate may be responsible for an increase

FIGURE 2.13

Far-right terrorist incidents in the US and western Europe, three-year moving average, 1970–2018

The trend in far-right terrorism in Western Europe is almost identical to the trend in the US.



Source: START GTD. IEP Calculations

in the likelihood of violence, but they are themselves shifted by longer term socio-political, economic, and cultural trends. These longer term factors that are most closely correlated with changes in levels of violence are known as ‘Positive Peace’, or the attitudes, institutions, and structures that help build and maintain peaceful societies.

A fall in Positive Peace greatly increases the risk of instability and violence. IEP’s Positive Peace Index identifies factors that are most strongly correlated with an absence of violence, and is measured by 24 indicators across eight domains.

Over the past decade, there has been a noticeable reduction across many Positive Peace indicators in the West, particular in the US. The Positive Peace Index score for the US declined by 6.7 per cent from 2009 to 2018. Only Libya, Greece, and Syria had larger declines over that time period. The most noticeable deteriorations occurred on the *Low Levels of Corruption*, *Free Flow of Information*, *Acceptance of the Rights of Others*, and *Equitable Distribution of Resources* Pillars.

The West, on average, experienced deteriorations on *Low Levels of Corruption*, *Well-Functioning Government*, *Acceptance of the Rights of Others*, and *Equitable Distribution of Resources* Pillars. The most noticeable deteriorations on specific indicators related to the factionalisation of elites, the existence of *group grievances*, and hostility towards foreigners.

This fall in Positive Peace and the associated rise in terrorism and other forms of political violence is very similar to other spikes in political violence in the past hundred years, particularly in the US. Data on political violence in the US, shown in Figure 2.15, suggests that the increase in far-right terrorism and other forms of extremism is part of a broader cycle of increased political violence that has occurred approximately every fifty years for the past two centuries. The data is taken from the *US Political Violence Dataset*¹⁰, which counts violent events (lynchings, terrorism, rampage shootings, assassinations, and riots) that result in at least one fatality.

Whilst data from this source is only available up until 2010, IEP calculations suggest that there has been a significant increase in violent political events from 2010 to 2019. All of these periods were marked by significant socioeconomic and cultural unrest, particularly over the issues of *group grievances* and labour relations.

There are two reasons why this cycle appears to reoccur every 50 years. Firstly, there are specific deteriorations in certain aspects of Positive Peace, described above, which make the political climate particularly susceptible to an outbreak of violence. Secondly, there are the dynamic aspects of violent conflict, in which violent activity becomes contagious and increases rapidly, until resources devoted to combatting it increase, and the popular moods turn against conflict and towards reconciliation.

At times of extreme political and cultural polarisation, as levels of Positive Peace deteriorate, the likelihood of an increase in violence increases, and individuals and groups who are ideologically disposed to violence become much more likely to carry out attacks. The impact of this violence on individuals who are more likely to be radicalised depends on the distance in

time from previous cycles of violence. The cultural memory of the impact of previous waves of violence is lost, thus leading to period where violence is more attractive, and exposure to violence is more likely to radicalise individuals.

FIGURE 2.14
FBI-recorded hate crime incidents in the US, 1992–2017


Although hate crime is still lower than it was a decade ago, it has been increasing.



Source: FBI, IEP Calculations

FIGURE 2.15
Trends in political violence in the United States, 1780–2018, five year average

The recent increase in political violence in the US closely matches the increases in 1970, 1920 and 1870.



Source: USPVP, START GTD, IEP Calculations

TERRORISM, CONFLICT, AND CIVIL WAR

Key Findings

- Conflict is the primary driver of terrorist activity. In 2018, 95 per cent of deaths from terrorism occurred in countries where violent conflict was occurring.
- This increases to 99 per cent of deaths when countries with high levels of state sponsored terror are also included.
- Every one of the ten countries most impacted by terrorism in 2018 was also involved in an armed conflict.
- Terrorism is also correlated with the intensity of conflict. There is a strong correlation between the number of battle deaths per year in a conflict country, and the number of terrorist attacks in the same year.
- Terrorist attacks in conflict countries are over three times as lethal on average than terrorist attacks in non-conflict countries.
- Insurgent groups use terrorism as a tactic of war and are more likely to target infrastructure, the police and state military.
- The average duration across all conflicts is 17 years. The average duration of conflicts involving groups that started as terrorist groups is 33 years.
- The number of countries experiencing at least one attack and ten deaths per year has been steadily increasing over the past 50 years.

Overview

Conflict is one of the primary drivers of terrorism. Every one of the ten countries most impacted by terrorism was involved in an armed conflict in 2018, meaning that they had at least one conflict that led to 25 or more battle-related deaths. Furthermore, of these ten, five were classified as being involved in at least one war, meaning a conflict that resulted in over 1,000 deaths in a calendar year.

In 2018, just under 95 per cent of the total deaths from terrorism occurred in countries involved in at least one violent conflict. When countries in conflict are combined with countries with high levels of *political terror*, the number climbs to 99 per cent.


The last decade has seen a significant increase in both the level of conflict and the impact of terrorism around the world. In 2014, battle-related deaths reached a 25-year high while deaths from terrorism reached their highest point since 1998. However, although the number of battle-related deaths has risen in recent years, it has not come close to the 200,000 deaths per annum recorded in 1985.

Figure 2.16 shows the trend in battle deaths and deaths from terrorism over the past 20 years, as well as a chart of the change in both variables since 2001. While the total number of deaths from terrorism is much smaller than the total number of battle deaths, the percentage change in both has been very similar, particularly from 2011 onwards.

FIGURE 2.16

Deaths from terrorism and conflict, 2001–2018

Terrorism and conflict deaths rose nearly 400 per cent between 2001 and 2014.



Source: UCDP, START GTD, IEP Calculations


Battle-related deaths and deaths from terrorism tend to move together. From 2011 to 2014, battle-related deaths increased 318 per cent, while deaths from terrorism increased 353 per cent. The downward trend over the past three years has also been remarkably similar, with battle-related deaths falling 49 per cent between 2014 and 2018 and deaths from terrorism falling 52 per

cent over the same period. The same trend can be observed by looking at violent conflict deaths and deaths from terrorism in the countries with the highest levels of terrorism. The relationship between the two is shown in Figure 2.17 for the six countries most affected by terrorism.

FIGURE 2.17

Deaths from terrorism and conflict, selected countries, 2003–2018

Terrorism and armed conflict deaths moved in tandem in the countries most affected by terrorism.



Source: UCDP Georeferenced Event Database, START GTD, IEP Calculations

CIVIL WAR AND TERRORISM SINCE 1970

There has been a shift towards internal rather than external conflicts over the past 50 years. Over 97 per cent of armed conflicts from 1990 to 2018 were classified as internal, of which 76 per cent were classified as civil wars. Terrorism has played a role in the vast majority of these civil wars.

Since 1970, 93 per cent of deaths from terrorism have occurred in countries facing internal armed conflicts; 88 per cent were in countries in high-intensity conflicts, or civil wars, while a further five per cent were in countries in low-intensity internal armed conflicts. Over the same time, 94 per cent of years of civil war contained terrorism, as did 84 per cent of years of low-intensity internal armed conflict.

Although the impact of terrorism has declined, the number of countries affected by terrorism is near an all-time high.

However, in the last three years the intensity of some of these conflicts has fallen dramatically. Both battle-related deaths and deaths from terrorism have nearly halved since peaking in 2014. By contrast, the number of ongoing internal armed conflicts and countries with significant terrorism have not.

Figure 2.18 plots the number of countries experiencing at least one attack and ten deaths per year with the number of ongoing internal armed conflicts. It shows that both have been steadily increasing over the past 50 years.

In 2018, more countries experienced this level of terrorism and more ongoing internal armed conflicts than at any other point since 1970.

As shown in Figure 2.19, most terrorist incidents occur in

BOX 2.2

Measuring civil war

Internal armed conflicts are defined by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) as contested incompatibilities between the government of a state and one or more opposition groups that involve the use of armed force and result in at least 25 battle-related deaths per calendar year.¹ The analysis in this section of the GTI includes both internal armed conflicts and internationalised internal armed conflicts, where other states have intervened on one or more sides of the conflict. **Low intensity** conflicts are classified as between 25 and 999 deaths per annum, while **high intensity** conflicts result in 1,000 or more deaths per annum. An

internal conflict with 1000 or more deaths is also classified as a **civil war**.


An **armed conflict year** refers to each combination of each year and each country in conflict. For example, Syria-2018 is one conflict year, and Yemen-2018 is a second conflict year.

Armed conflict groups are identified based on whether they appear in the UCDP database of armed conflicts. Some of these groups also appear as **terrorism groups** in the GTD.

FIGURE 2.18

The global spread of terrorism and internal armed conflict, 1970–2018

The number of countries experiencing a significant amount of terrorism moves in line with the number of ongoing internal armed conflicts.




Source: START GTD, UCDP, IEP Calculations

FIGURE 2.19

Terrorist attacks by conflict type, 1970–2018

Most terrorist incidents occur in countries in high-intensity internal armed conflict.



Source: START GTD, UCDP, IEP Calculations.

countries with internal armed conflicts. Since 1998, 85 per cent of terrorist attacks were committed in civil war countries, with a further three per cent in countries in low-intensity internal armed conflict.

Figure 2.20 compares the proportion of terrorism in conflict contexts in Western countries with the rest of the world. The West is defined as Western Europe, North America, and Oceania. See Box 2.1 on page 45 for a full list of countries included in this definition. More than 89 per cent of terrorist attacks since 1970 took place in non-Western countries. Due to the relative challenges of obtaining data from these countries prior to 1998, this is likely a conservative estimate.


The surge in terrorist attacks since the year 2000 has largely been outside of the West. In contrast, the West has seen lower levels of terrorism since the turn of the century, relative to previous years, although it has been steadily rising since 2004.

Figure 2.20 highlights that in the West, the vast majority of terrorist incidents occurred in countries not engaged in internal armed conflict, especially after the mid-1990s. By contrast, in the rest of the world, most acts of terrorism over the past 50 years, and particularly since the turn of the century, have taken place in contexts of high-intensity internal armed conflicts, or civil wars.

FIGURE 2.20

Terrorist attacks by conflict type, the west and non-west, 1970–2018

The pattern of terrorism in internal armed conflict countries occurs only in non-Western countries.



Source: START GTD, UCDP, IEP Calculations.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF TERRORISM IN CIVIL WAR COUNTRIES

Within countries in conflict, a higher intensity of terrorism is generally associated with longer and deadlier armed conflicts. Figure 2.21 shows that there is a significant statistical relationship ($r=0.45$) between the intensity of internal armed conflicts and the number of terrorist attacks per year. Countries with the highest rates of battle-related deaths per year, such as Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and India, also have very high levels of terrorism. In any given internal armed conflict, a ten per cent increase in the number of terrorist attacks per year is associated with a 4.5 per cent increase in the number of battle-related deaths per year.²

The relationship between terrorism and conflict intensity is also largely independent of the population size.³ Countries with higher populations are not necessarily more likely to experience deadlier conflicts or more terrorist attacks. This is because internal armed conflicts do not always engulf entire countries in violence. Some of the deadliest internal armed conflicts took place in relatively small countries, like the Syrian and Sri Lankan civil wars. Others were limited to certain regions of a country, like the conflict between the Irish Republic Army and the British government and that between the Chinese government and East Turkistan Islamic Movement in Xinjiang.

Terrorism within the course of a conflict also tends to peak at


the same time as conflict intensity peaks, rather than before or after. Figure 2.22 examines the relationship between battle-related deaths and terrorism for the Algerian Civil War, which began after a military coup in January 1992 blocked elections that would have brought the Islamic Salvation Front, an Islamist political party, to power.⁴ The graph indicates how battle-deaths and deaths from terrorism varied before, during and after the high-intensity phase of the conflict.

Terrorism in Algeria peaked during the armed conflict, not before or after. As shown by Figure 2.22, the spike in deaths from terrorism during the Algerian Civil War came only after the high-intensity conflict was well underway and dropped back to pre-civil war levels before this phase of the conflict ended. In the three years after the 1992 coup, battle-deaths rose from 257 to more than 3,000. This was followed by an increase in deaths from terrorism of 449 per cent, peaking at 4,266 in 1997.

"Every one of the ten countries most impacted by terrorism in 2018 was also involved in an armed conflict."

FIGURE 2.21
Conflict intensify and terrorism, 1989–2018

Conflicts with more deaths per year also have more terrorist attacks per year.




Source: START GTD, UCDP, IEP Calculations

FIGURE 2.22

Algeria: terrorism and internal armed conflict, 1991–2018

Terrorism tracked battle-related deaths during and after the peak of the civil war.



Source: START GTD, UCDP, IEP Calculations

Figure 2.22 also shows that Algeria continued to be mired in low-intensity internal armed conflict and significant terrorism for more than a decade following the end of high-intensity conflict in 1999. The year 2018 was the first time battle-related deaths in Algeria fell below the 1991 level. Deaths from terrorism did not fall below 1991 levels until 2011. This is in line with the global trend that civil wars are lasting longer,⁵ a trend that has been called ‘persistent conflict.’⁶

Terrorism in the context of armed conflict also tends to be deadlier on average than terrorism outside of conflict, with terrorism that occurs in civil wars being especially deadly. Figure 2.23 shows a five-year moving average for terrorist attack


lethality in high-intensity, low-intensity, and non-conflict countries.

Terrorist attacks in civil war countries are more than three times deadlier than attacks in non-conflict countries. The average attack lethality in countries in low-intensity internal armed conflict is also more than double that of non-conflict countries. This could be related to larger concentrations of lethal weapons in countries engaged in high-intensity internal armed conflicts. Furthermore, access to, thievery and distribution of those weapons becomes harder to control in countries where the rule of law is weak.

FIGURE 2.23

Average attack lethality by conflict type, five-year moving average, 1970–2018

Average attack lethality is nearly three times higher in internal armed conflict countries than non-conflict countries.



Source: START GTD, UCDP, IEP Calculations

The surge in the lethality of attacks in low-intensity internal armed conflict countries from 2010 to 2015 was largely driven by attacks in Niger, South Sudan, Chad and Cameroon. Cumulatively, these four countries in sub-Saharan Africa suffered 1,971 deaths from 156 terrorist attacks, amounting to an average lethality rate of 13 deaths per attack.

Terrorist groups in conflict countries can often be classified as ‘insurgent’ groups, meaning that they are in open conflict with the government. Terrorist groups that are also insurgent groups more often select traditional military targets than non-insurgent terrorist groups. As Figure 2.24 shows, terrorist groups target the police, military and critical resources and infrastructure more often when they are also waging an insurgency against the government. Non-insurgent terrorist groups, on the other hand, more often target tourists, private citizens and property, and journalists and the media. For example, in Afghanistan in 2018, 43 per cent of attacks were primarily targeted at the police or the military.

Examples of terrorist groups that are also insurgent groups include the FARC in Colombia, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, the Basque Fatherland and Freedom in Spain, Boko Haram in Nigeria, ISIL in Iraq, Ansar Allah in Yemen and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland in India. All of these groups waged insurgencies against their respective governments while also being responsible for a significant amount of terrorist attacks.

Examples of non-insurgent terrorist groups include the Ku Klux Klan in the United States, the Argentine National Organisation

Movement in Argentina, the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance in Nicaragua, the Saharan Revolutionary Armed Front in Niger and the Falanga in Ukraine. While responsible for a significant amount of terrorism in their respective countries, these groups did not wage insurgencies against their governments.

Insurgent groups, using terrorism as a tactic of war, can be expected to more often target the police and state military, for them the equivalent of ‘enemy forces’. They can also be expected to target critical infrastructure and resources, particularly if trying to seize and hold territory.

TRANSITIONING FROM TERRORISM TO INSURGENCY

A large proportion of terrorism in conflict countries is a tactic used by insurgent groups. However, there have been conflicts where terrorist activity preceded the conflict entirely, in which terrorist groups grew and then transitioned to become fully-fledged insurgencies, even if they continued to use terrorism as a tactic.


In the past five decades, 34 terrorist groups went on to become actors in an internal armed conflict against the government, often remaining terrorist organisations as well.

Table 2.11 presents a list of all terrorist groups listed in the GTD that later appeared in internal armed conflicts in the Uppsala/Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) Armed Conflict Database.

FIGURE 2.24

Likelihood of attacking certain targets, conflict and non-conflict countries

Terrorist groups in conflict countries are much more likely to select traditional military targets.



Source: START GTD, UCDP, IEP Calculations

TABLE 2.11

Terrorist groups that became actors in internal armed conflicts, 1970–2018

Armed conflicts involving insurgent groups that were previously terrorist groups generally last much longer than other conflicts.

Country	Region	Conflict	Terrorist actor	Swap year	Conflict duration (years)	Conflict start	Conflict end	Terrorism deaths during conflict	Percentage of deaths from terrorist actor
Peru	South America	Shining Path insurgency	Shining Path (SL)	1994	28	1982	2010	12,653	91.29
Angola	Sub-Saharan Africa	Angolan Civil War	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)	1981	27	1975	2002	2,978	90.66
Somalia	Sub-Saharan Africa	Somali Civil War	Al-Shabaab	2011	36	1982	-	11,197	82.52
Afghanistan	South Asia	War in Afghanistan	Taliban	2004	40	1978	-	49,196	76.47
Sri Lanka	South Asia	Sri Lankan Civil War	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)	1986	25	1984	2009	15,469	70.63
Cambodia	Southeast Asia	Cambodian Civil War (c.1967-75) and residual conflict	Khmer Rouge	1992	28	<1970	1998	520	67.88
Ethiopia	Sub-Saharan Africa	Ethiopian Civil War	Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF)	1979	15	1976	1991	550	57.64
Philippines	Southeast Asia	Philippine communist uprising	New People's Army (NPA)	1988	48	<1970	-	9,898	46.17
Colombia	South America	Colombian Civil War (c.1965-2016) and residual conflict	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)	1980	48	<1970	-	14,746	38.27
Israel	Middle East & North Africa	Israeli-Palestinian conflict	Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement)	1994	48	<1970	-	1,614	34.94
Iraq	Middle East & North Africa	Iraqi Kurdish conflict	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)	1995	26	<1970	1996	446	28.70
Pakistan	South Asia	Islamist militancy against Pakistani government	Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	2011	28	1990	-	21,692	28.42
Uganda	Sub-Saharan Africa	Ugandan civil conflict against Joseph Kony's Lord Resistance Army	Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)	1999	47	1971	-	3,077	13.06
Algeria	Middle East & North Africa	Algerian Civil War (c.1990-98) and residual conflict	Armed Islamic Group (GIA)	1998	27	1991	-	11,082	13.04
Chad	Sub-Saharan Africa	First Chadian Civil War (c.1965-79), Second Chadian Civil War (c.2005-10) and residual conflict	Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD)	2007	48	<1970	-	834	12.35
Colombia	South America	Colombian Civil War (c.1965-2016) and residual conflict	National Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN)	1973	48	<1970	-	14,746	11.44
Iraq	Middle East & North Africa	Iraqi Kurdish conflict	Kurdish Democratic Party-Iraq (KDP)	1984	26	<1970	1996	446	8.97
Philippines	Southeast Asia	Moro conflict	Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)	1995	48	<1970	-	9,172	8.59
Philippines	Southeast Asia	Moro conflict	Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)	1999	48	<1970	-	9,172	8.17
Iran	Middle East & North Africa	Civil conflict between government and groups opposing the Shah	Kurdistan Free Life Party	2011	39	1979	-	950	6.95

Burundi	Sub-Saharan Africa	Burundian Civil War (c.1993-2005) and residual conflict	Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (PALIPEHUTU)	2004	24	1991	2015	4,036	6.67
Ethiopia	Sub-Saharan Africa	Ethiopian civil conflict with Eritrean nationalists	Eritrean Liberation Front	1974	21	<1970	1991	554	5.78
Sudan	Sub-Saharan Africa	First Sudanese Civil War (c.1955-72), Second Sudanese Civil War (c.1983-2005), Darfur conflict (c.2003-) and residual conflict	Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)	2002	47	1971	-	3,920	5.56
India	South Asia	Bodo-Muslim conflict in Assam	National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)	1997	25	1989	2014	9,067	5.49
Mexico	North America	Chiapas conflict (Zapatista uprising)	Democratic Revolutionary Party	1996	2	1994	1996	184	5.43
Iraq	Middle East & North Africa	Iraqi conflict with SCIRI, Civil War (2014-17) and residual conflict	Al-Qaida in Iraq	2009	36	1982	-	79,380	5.38
Algeria	Middle East & North Africa	Algerian Civil War (c.1990-98) and residual conflict	Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)	2013	27	1991	-	11,082	5.32
Algeria	Middle East & North Africa	Algerian Civil War (c.1990-98) and residual conflict	Salafist Group for Preaching and Fighting (GSPC)	2004	27	1991	-	11,082	5.12
India	South Asia	Tripura insurgency	National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT)	1999	25	1979	2004	7,463	3.08
Iraq	Middle East & North Africa	Iraqi conflict with SCIRI, Civil War (2014-17) and residual conflict	Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)	2009	36	1982	-	79,380	2.17
Algeria	Middle East & North Africa	Algerian Civil War (c.1990-98) and residual conflict	Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)	1992	27	1991	-	11,082	1.90
Pakistan	South Asia	Balochistan conflict	Baloch Liberation Army (BLA)	2007	42	1974	2016	17,167	1.85
Israel	Middle East & North Africa	Israeli-Palestinian conflict	Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)	1990	48	<1970	-	1,614	0.74
Afghanistan	South Asia	War in Afghanistan	Hizb-I-Islami	2002	40	1978	-	49,196	0.16

Source: START GTD, UCDP, IEP Calculations

"The average duration across all conflicts is 17 years. The average duration of conflicts involving groups that started as terrorist groups is 33 years."

The 34 groups included in the table span 25 conflicts in 20 different countries. Some conflicts involve multiple groups and some countries were embroiled in multiple internal armed conflicts. For example, at least three terrorist groups in the Philippines have gone on to become involved in internal armed conflicts: the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and Abu Sayyaf Group joined the Moro conflict, while the New People's Army became involved in the simultaneous and ongoing communist insurgency in the Philippines.

The contexts in which terrorist groups become involved in internal armed conflicts are diverse. As Table 2.11 shows, in some cases, the terrorist groups were also the main non-governmental or insurgent group in the internal armed conflict. Examples include the LTTE in Sri Lanka, Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) in Peru and Al-Qa'ida in Iraq for parts of the Iraqi civil war.

Most conflicts represented in Table 2.11 are more complex than two-sided competitions between a government and insurgent group. At least seven conflicts involved more than one insurgent group. For example, the Colombian Civil War was an

intersecting conflict between the Colombian government, the FARC, the National Liberation Army of Colombia and various paramilitary forces.

Further, while some groups listed in Table 2.11 were both the major terrorist and insurgent group, others were entangled in a complex web of organised political violence. For example, the National Liberation Front of Tripura was active in the Tripura insurgency in India from 1999 to 2014, a period during which seven different internal armed conflicts were occurring, with attacks being carried out by 57 different terrorist groups.


Internal armed conflicts involving groups that were previously active as terrorist groups last twice as long as groups that did not begin as a terrorist group. The average duration across all conflicts is 17 years. The average duration of conflicts involving groups that started as terrorist groups is 33 years.

Figure 2.25 shows the duration and intensity of terrorism for every internal armed conflict since 1970.

FIGURE 2.25

Conflict duration and intensity when terrorist actors are involved, 1989–2018

Internal armed conflicts involving conflict actors that were previously terrorist actors last twice as long as ones that do not.



Source: START GTD, UCDP, IEP Calculations.

GENDER AND TERRORISM

Key Findings

- There have been over 300 suicide attacks involving at least one female since 1985, which have killed 3,071 people.
- From 2013 to 2018, incidents of female suicide attacks increased from four in 2013 to 22 in 2018.
- The majority of female suicide attacks in the past five years have been attributed to Boko Haram. Since 2014, the group has been responsible for 83 per cent of deaths from female suicide attacks with at least 146 suicide attacks causing over 900 deaths.
- Excluding Boko Haram, female suicide deaths have increased by 30 per cent since 2013 and attacks by 200 per cent. Attacks were attributed to eight other terrorist groups, primarily in the Middle East and North Africa.
- Other than Boko Haram, the groups most likely to use female suicide attacks in the past five years were ISIL with four attacks, Jamaah Ansharat Daulah with three attacks, and the Tripoli Province of the Islamic State with two attacks. There were 23 female suicide attacks during this period that were not attributed to any group.
- Female suicide attacks are still a small percentage of all terrorist attacks at 0.3 per cent of all attacks in 2018. They accounted for five per cent of suicide attacks globally from 1985 to 2018.
- Historically, female suicide bombings have been five per cent more lethal on average than male suicide bombings, although male suicide bombings have been deadlier over the past six years.
- Thirteen per cent of ISIL foreign affiliates were female, with the majority of female affiliates joining from the Middle East and North Africa.
- Asia Pacific had the largest proportion of women joining ISIL at 31 per cent. The next highest proportion was Europe at 24 per cent.
- As a percentage, more males returned to their country of origin than females. Europe had the highest disparity in percentages, with nearly 50 per cent of males returning, compared to only 18 per cent of women.

Overview

This section of the report explores two trends: the increased number of female suicide attacks and the role of women as ISIL foreign affiliates.

From 1985 to 2018, female suicide bombings have accounted for five per cent of suicide attacks globally. In 2018, they made up seven per cent of all suicide attacks.

Both the Russian-Chechen war and the Sri Lankan civil war recorded high levels of female suicide attacks with 30 per cent of suicide attacks in the Russian-Chechen conflict involving at least one woman, and 25 per cent of total suicide attacks in Sri Lanka.

Since 2014, female suicide bombings have gone from a relatively infrequent occurrence to a prominent feature of some terrorist organisations. However, this trend has been mainly driven by Boko Haram, who were responsible for 80 per cent of all female

suicide attacks and 83 per cent of all deaths since 2014.

For several years, female suicide attacks were considerably more lethal than male attacks, as female bombers were better able to evade detection by security forces. However, in the past decade, security forces have adapted, and attacks by females are now less lethal on average than male attacks. In 2018, male suicide attacks had a lethality rate of 10.2, compared to females who had a lethality rate of 3.3.

More women have also been joining some terrorist groups. ISIL had 6,902 foreign women travelling to join the group in Iraq and Syria between 2013 and 2019.⁷ Following the decline of ISIL, female fighters present new challenges for counterterrorism policy, including strategies for dealing with returnees and accounting for children born in the former caliphate.

FEMALE SUICIDE TERRORISM

Female suicide attacks were responsible for five per cent of deaths from suicide attacks since 1985, resulting in over 3,000 deaths. Figure 2.26 shows the trend in female suicide attacks over the past 35 years. The first verified cases occurred in Lebanon in 1985, and since then, there have been over 300 suicide bombings involving at least one female.

However, as seen in Figure 2.26, they have become more prevalent in the last decade, because of Boko Haram's use of the tactic. Seventy-nine per cent of suicide bombings involving female perpetrators were recorded between 2008 and 2018, with over 48 per cent of deaths in this period being attributed to Boko Haram.

Over the past four decades, there have been four major escalations in the prevalence of female suicide bombings, as the number of incidents fluctuated in line with armed conflicts, major counter-insurgency campaigns or political struggles around the world.⁸

The first notable rise of female suicide bombings occurred between 1997 and 1999, with incidents in Sri Lanka and Turkey reaching their highest levels in 1999.

BOX 2.3

Measuring female suicide attacks

The analysis uses data on incidents of terrorism from the GTD. For the purpose of IEP calculations, the term 'female suicide attacks' refers to a suicide attack that includes at least one female perpetrator.


This definition also captures data for suicide attacks perpetrated by both male and female operatives, with the majority of these attacks occurring in Russia. Male suicide bombings refer to suicide attacks perpetrated solely by male operatives. By designating attacks by male or female involvement, this definition acknowledges the difficulty in disaggregating attacks by gender and obtaining specific numbers of female attackers.

Attacks are attributed to terrorist organisations based on the data provided in the GTD, and is typically based on the group that claims responsibility for the attack.

FIGURE 2.26

Suicide attacks and deaths involving at least one female, 1985–2018

The number of incidents involving female suicide bombers increased dramatically after 2013.



Source: START GTD, IEP Calculations.

The second wave came between 2002 and 2004, during which female suicide attacks were a common feature of the Russian-Chechen conflict. Russia recorded 52 per cent of the incidents and 91 per cent of deaths from female suicide bombings during this period. The first female suicide bombings in Palestine were also recorded in this period, during the second intifada. Amidst escalated violence between Israel and Palestine, there were at least eight female suicide bombings, causing 50 deaths.

The third wave of female suicide bombings was driven by an escalation of conflict in Iraq. Between 2007 and 2010, incidents in Iraq accounted for 67 per cent of total female suicide attacks globally, with 35 attacks occurring in Iraq during that period. Because the US troop surge predominantly targeted male operatives, female suicide bombers were seen by terror groups, including Al-Qa'ida in Iraq, as a logical adaptation.⁹

The most recent wave of female suicide terrorism, between 2014 and 2018, was dominated by terrorist activity in Nigeria and Cameroon, with 164 female suicide bombings causing 1,034 deaths. Eighty-seven per cent of these events were attributed to Boko Haram.

Female suicide bombings have fluctuated in tandem with male suicide bombings, with both increasing substantially since 2000. However, in the last year, suicide bombings in general have begun to decline sharply.

Since 1985, female suicide bombings accounted for at least 3,071 deaths, whilst male suicide bombings have accounted for 55,216 deaths.

The total number of suicide bombings peaked in 2015, with 58 female-perpetrated and 676 male-perpetrated attacks. Whilst 2015 was the deadliest year for female suicide bombings at 503 deaths, 2016 was the deadliest year for male suicide bombings with 7,187 deaths recorded. The uptake in violence attributed to male suicide bombings was largely driven by increased activity


by ISIL in Iraq and Syria.

Figure 2.28 shows the proportion of female to male suicide bombings by country since 1985. Cameroon and Nigeria had the highest proportion of female suicide bombings, compared to male, at 34 and 32 per cent respectively.

Cameroon and Nigeria have larger proportions of attacks committed by women because of Boko Haram's extensive use of female attackers. Female suicide bombings first appeared in Nigeria in 2014, with at least 132 female-perpetrated attacks

FIGURE 2.28
Female suicide attacks as a percentage of the total, 1985–2018


Female suicide attacks were more than 30 per cent of total suicide attacks in Cameroon, Nigeria, and Russia.



Source: START GTD, IEP Calculations

FIGURE 2.27
Suicide attacks, men and women, 1985–2018

Both male and female suicide attacks increased considerably in the last two decades.



Source: START GTD, IEP Calculations

recorded between 2014 and 2018.

Russia recorded 83 suicide attacks. Thirty per cent involved females, with the majority of attacks occurring in the context of the Russian-Chechen conflict.

Female suicide bombings also featured throughout the Sri Lankan Civil War, with approximately 25 per cent of suicide attacks perpetrated by women. Between 1991 and 2009, there were at least 72 suicide attacks in Sri Lanka. The majority were attributed to LTTE, of which 17 were carried out by females.

Despite having the highest impact of terrorism in 2018, there were only two recorded female suicide bombings in Afghanistan from 1985 to 2018. By contrast, there were 1,177 male suicide attacks in the same period. The majority of male suicide bombings in Afghanistan are attributed to the Taliban, and more recently the Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State.

FEMALE SUICIDE BOMBINGS BY GROUP

Figure 2.29 highlights the distribution of female suicide attacks by group. Female suicide bombings have been attributed to at least 26 known terror groups, with Boko Haram responsible for more attacks than any other terror group. Since Boko Haram began including women in suicide bombings in 2014, the group has been responsible for 146 suicide attacks, accounting for over 48 per cent of all female suicide bombings. Of the 454 suicide attacks attributed to Boko Haram since 2011, at least 32 per cent involved female perpetrators.


Boko Haram's use of female attackers has largely driven the increase seen in recent years. Emerging in 2009, the jihadist group launched an insurgency campaign in northern Nigeria, before expanding to Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. After a significant increase between 2014 and 2017, the number of

suicide bombings from Boko Haram decreased substantially in 2018. Female suicide bombings declined 80 per cent, whilst male suicide bombings fell by 53 per cent.

Between 1991 and 2009, 18 female suicide bombings were attributed to the LTTE across Sri Lanka and India. Female suicide bombers during the Sri Lankan Civil War were known

FIGURE 2.29
Suicide attacks involving at least one female by group, 1985–2018


Boko Haram accounted for nearly half of all female suicide attacks.



Source: START GTD, IEP Calculations

FIGURE 2.30
Suicide attacks by target, male and female, Boko Haram, 2014–2018

Female suicide bombers were much more likely to attack public places.



Source: START GTD, IEP Calculations

as the 'Black Tigresses' and formed part of the LTTE's elite commando wing, the 'Black Tigers', who primarily conducted suicide missions.¹⁰ The majority of LTTE female suicide bombings were assassinations targeting high-ranking military and government figures.¹¹

Chechen Rebels were responsible for nine attacks between 2000 and 2009, killing nearly 190 people. All female suicide bombings attributed to Chechen Rebels involved the 'Black Widows', a group of female suicide bombers including women whose male relatives had been killed by Russian forces in Chechnya.¹²

The PKK was responsible for at least eight female suicide bombings in Turkey between 1996 and 2011. The PKK is a militant Kurdish nationalist group primarily operating in Turkey and Iraq. The Free Women's Union of Kurdistan was the PKK military wing launching female suicide bombings.¹³ Within Europe, the PKK was the deadliest terror group for female suicide bombings, causing 16 deaths in total.

FEMALE SUICIDE BOMBING LETHALITY

Table 2.12 shows the ten deadliest suicide attacks involving at least one female attacker since 1985. The deadliest female suicide bombings caused 902 deaths collectively in just five countries: Russia, Iraq, Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Pakistan. The deadliest female suicide bombings targeted both soft and hard targets, with the majority targeting civilians and government personnel in public spaces.

TABLE 2.12

Ten deadliest suicide attacks involving at least one female attacker

Armed conflicts involving insurgent groups that were previously terrorist groups generally last much longer than other conflicts.

Rank	Country	Date	City	Group	Deaths	Description
1	Russia	1/9/04	Beslan	Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs	344	Male and female suicide bombers seized a school in Beslan in the Pravoberezhny district of North Ossetia, Russia. Assailants took approximately 1,200 hostages.
2	Iraq	1/2/08	Baghdad	Al-Qaida in Iraq	90	Two bombs, attached to two mentally disabled women, were detonated in a crowded marketplace in Baghdad, Iraq.
3	Iraq	24/4/09	Baghdad	Unknown	66	Two female suicide bombers struck worshippers outside a heavily guarded Shiite shrine in Baghdad, Iraq.
4	Nigeria	25/11/14	Maiduguri	Boko Haram	65	A female suicide bomber detonated at a market in Maiduguri city, Borno state, Nigeria.
5	Nigeria	9/2/16	Dikwa	Boko Haram	60	Three female suicide bombers attacked an internally displaced persons (IDPs) camp in Dikwa, Borno, Nigeria.
6	Russia	9/12/02	Znamenskoye	Chechen Rebels	59	Three suicide bombers, one of them a woman, drove a truck packed with explosives into a local government building that housed local police and a branch of the Russian Security Service in Znamenskoye, Chechnya.
7	Nigeria	9/12/16	Madagali	Boko Haram	59	Two female suicide bombers detonated in a market in Madagali, Adamawa, Nigeria.
8	Russia	27/12/02	Grozny	Chechen Rebels	57	Three suicide bombers, including one female, blew up their trucks in front of a pro-Russian government headquarters in Grozny, Chechnya.
9	Sri Lanka	24/10/94	Colombo	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)	54	A female suicide bomber detonated an explosive device that killed herself along with the leader of the United National Party, Gamini Dissanayake, and 58 others.
10	Pakistan	25/12/10	Bajaur district	Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	48	A female suicide bomber detonated her explosive vest in a large crowd of people gathering at a checkpoint near the office of the World Food Program.

Source: START GTD, IEP Calculations

Terror groups may choose to include female suicide bombers due to their potential to conduct deadlier attacks.¹⁴ However, spikes in female lethality suggest that female suicide bombings are a short-term tactic.¹⁵ As female suicide bombings become more prevalent, security forces have adapted to the emerging threat. In conservative Islamic societies, male soldiers are often restricted from searching females. The deployment of female security officers has been essential in preventing potential female suicide bombers from infiltrating public areas undetected. Women were also included in intelligence-gathering efforts. In some cases, the Nigerian military has relied on female informants to detect and expose female suicide plots by Boko Haram.¹⁶

In 2009, female suicide bombings caused twice the number of deaths per attack compared to male suicide bombings, due to a series of deadly attacks in Iraq targeting religious institutions and civilians, most of whom were Shia pilgrims in Baghdad and Musayib. After 2009, increased counterterrorism measures had an impact on female lethality. As female suicide bombings became more frequent, the inclusion of women as a feature of suicide terrorism became apparent, and security forces adapted in response.

Between 2017 and 2018, male lethality increased from 8.7 to 10.2, owing primarily to a surge in deadly male suicide bombings attributed to the Taliban and the Khorasan Chapter in Afghanistan. In contrast, female suicide bombings have steadily declined, from 8.7 in 2015 to 3.3 in 2018.

Figure 2.30 shows the target of female suicide bombings by Boko Haram between 2014 and 2018. The overwhelming majority of deaths by female suicide bombings were against civilians or civilian sites, at 64 per cent, or 614 people. In contrast, 16 per cent of female-perpetrated attacks were against infrastructure or security services. Most civilian deaths by female suicide bombings occurred in Borno, Nigeria with 47 attacks killing 397 people.

By contrast, male suicide bombings predominantly targeted religious institutions and civilian sites. Places of worship made up the largest share of targets, at 16 per cent, followed by markets at 14 per cent and civilians at 13 per cent.

In addition to differing target types, male and female suicide bombings by Boko Haram also had distinct modes of attacks. Over 85 per cent of vehicle-borne suicide attacks by Boko Haram were carried out by male perpetrators, with the majority of these attacks against military and police targets. On the other hand, 98 per cent of female suicide bombings involved explosive devices strapped to an individual, such as a suicide vest or belt.

FEMALE ISIL FOREIGN FIGHTERS

At the height of the caliphate in late 2014, ISIL held over 100,000km² of territory with a population of 11 million residents.¹⁷ Since 2013, over 50,000 foreign affiliates travelled to Iraq and Syria to join ISIL from at least 83 countries. Female affiliates comprised 6,902 of total foreign affiliates, or 13 per cent.¹⁸ Between 2015 and 2016, when arrivals peaked, women accounted for an estimated one in three foreign affiliates.¹⁹

Figure 2.31 shows the regional breakdown of female foreign affiliates in ISIL between 2013 and 2019 from the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation's database of foreign affiliates to ISIL.²⁰ Foreign affiliates are defined as all foreign nationals who travelled to Iraq and Syria and became

associated with ISIL.²¹

Whilst there is limited information on the motivations of women travelling to the caliphate, there is some evidence to indicate that affiliates from the West may have been converts to Islam. The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism estimates that between six to 23 per cent of foreign affiliates from the European Union were converts.²² From France, approximately 25 per cent of female affiliates were converts, compared to 20 per cent of male affiliates.²³

Figure 2.32 shows female ISIL affiliates as a relative proportion of adult foreign affiliates by region. For each region, the total number of affiliates excludes data for minors and infants.

Female affiliates from Asia-Pacific represented over 30 per cent of total affiliates from the region, at 536. Whilst 11 females travelled from New Zealand, only one male affiliate was reported.

Although the MENA region had the highest number of female affiliates to ISIL, the proportion of female affiliates was relatively low at 11 per cent. Within the MENA region, Iran had a significantly high proportion of female affiliates at approximately 76 per cent.

Figure 2.33 shows the top five countries for female and male ISIL affiliates between 2013 and 2019.


Turkey had the largest recorded number of adult affiliates travelling to neighbouring Iraq and Syria, at 8,999. An estimated 2,000 were women. Foreign affiliates from Turkey accounted for 18 per cent of total affiliates to ISIL between 2013 and 2019.

The high levels of foreign affiliates from Turkey can be attributed to ISIL recruitment centres along the country's southeast provinces and the proximity to Iraq and Syria.²⁴ For male affiliates specifically, reports indicate that ISIL offered

FIGURE 2.31

Female foreign fighters in ISIL

The majority of female ISIL foreign affiliates come from the Middle East and North Africa.




Source: ICSR, IEP Calculations
Note: Data for the Maldives is excluded

FIGURE 2.32

Relative proportion of female ISIL affiliates by region

Over 30 per cent of foreign ISIL affiliates from the Asia-Pacific region are female.



Source: ICSR, IEP Calculations
 Note: Data for the Maldives is excluded

monetary incentives for Turkish foreign fighters to cross the border and fight in Syria.²⁵ Whilst there is limited data on female affiliates, there are indications that many Turkish women joined ISIL alongside their husbands.²⁶

Russia had the second highest number of female affiliates, at 1,000. The majority of foreign affiliates from Russia came from the provinces of Chechnya and Dagestan.²⁷

Tunisia contributed the second highest number of adult foreign affiliates, at 6,500. Of that number, 700 were female, and 5,800 were male. The establishment of ISIL’s al-Khansa Brigade in Syria, an all-female morality police force, was attributed to a Tunisian woman, Umm Rayan al-Tunisi.

As ISIL has suffered consistent territorial and financial losses, an increasing number of foreign affiliates have returned home. By July 2019, approximately 16 per cent of the 52,808 foreign affiliates that joined ISIL had returned. However, as Figure 2.34 shows, in four of the nine regions sending foreign affiliates to ISIL, a higher percentage of male affiliates returned. Of the 8,202 returnees, seven per cent were female. This may be due to the difficulty of repatriating children born into the caliphate, one of the many complex challenges countries have faced in dealing with former ISIL affiliates.

Globally, an estimated 16 per cent of male affiliates returned from ISIL, compared to nine per cent of female affiliates.

Europe had the largest variation between male and female affiliates who returned. A total of 2,384 affiliates returned, marking 29 per cent of total affiliates who travelled to ISIL from Europe. Of the 4,094 male affiliates, an estimated 45 per cent returned, compared to 18 per cent of female affiliates.


Over 13 per cent of male affiliates from MENA returned, compared to just two per cent of female affiliates.

In Russia and Eurasia, more female affiliates returned compared to male, at 12 per cent and ten per cent respectively. This was largely because in Kazakhstan, at least 137 females were repatriated as part of Operation Zhusan between January and May 2019. Female returnees faced a rehabilitation and reintegration process, with five facing charges for terror-related

FIGURE 2.33

Top five countries for male and female ISIL affiliates

The largest proportion of male and female ISIL affiliates came from Turkey. Tunisia had the second highest proportion for male, and third highest for female affiliates.



Source: ICSR, IEP Calculations


offenses.²⁸ However, in Russia, approximately two per cent of female affiliates returned, compared to 12 per cent of male affiliates. Until November 2017, Russia was actively repatriating women, after which point only minors were repatriated due to the perceived security risk of female ISIL affiliates.²⁹

A number of former female ISIL affiliates remain in Iraq and Syria, possibly due to the difficulty of moving with children. In al-Hol, the largest refugee camp in Syria, approximately 12,000 ISIL affiliates remain, including 4,000 women and 8,000 minors.³⁰

FIGURE 2.34

Foreign fighter returnees by gender and region

Nearly 50 per cent of male foreign fighters from Europe returned home.



Source: ICSR, IEP Calculations
 Note: Data for the Maldives is excluded

"Historically, female suicide bombings have been five per cent more lethal on average than male suicide bombings, although male suicide bombings have been deadlier over the past six years."



EXPERT CONTRIBUTIONS

Global Terrorism and Anti-terrorism after ISIL: Two Key Aspects That Will Not Change Soon

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How much change should we really expect in global terrorism patterns and anti-terrorism after the demise of the physical core of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)¹ in Syria and Iraq? On the basis of Global Terrorism Index data, this chapter explores the main layer of global terrorist activity. It also draws out key implications of a sharp contrast in global distribution of terrorism and a reverse disproportion in broader effects of terrorism on international politics and security for global antiterrorism.

TERRORISM AFTER ISIL: MAIN CENTER OF GRAVITY

In the early 21st century, the main layer of transnational terrorism has not been formed by any single group or macro-network—instead, it has been formed by a handful of larger regional movements that accounted for a lion's share of terrorist activity worldwide, with the bulk of it concentrated in the Middle East, South Asia and Africa. These six-seven violent movements generate from different regions, but display important typological similarities. All are based in Muslim countries or Muslim-populated areas; all are endemic to their regions and had gone through the bottom-up regionalisation process, from the more local and subnational to cross-border and regional level, and in case of ISIL, even further. Almost all operated in and around weak and failing states and all tried to build alternative Islamic states in their regions. All combine systematic terrorist attacks against civilians/non-combatants with military and combat operations against national and foreign forces in the world's deadliest armed conflicts.

In recent years, it is these several groups that accounted for up to 74 per cent of all terrorism fatalities by identified armed actors.² In 2017 alone, the top four of them including ISIL, the Taliban, Al-Shabaab, and Boko Haram, were responsible for over 56.5 per cent of all deaths from terrorism.³ Remarkably, some of these groups outmatched ISIL, even at its peak, in select parameters of terrorist activity. In 2015 to 2017, ISIL was the deadliest terrorist

actor,⁴ but in 2015, Al-Nusra Front in Syria showed the highest rate of lethality per terrorist attack.⁵ In 2014, Boko Haram in Nigeria overtook ISIL as the deadliest terrorist group both in absolute terms and in terms of rate of deaths and attack.⁶ The Afghan Taliban endured as one of the world's most active and deadliest militant-terrorist organisations, longer than any other group in the early 21st century, and Al-Shabaab in Somalia, longer than any of the first three.

Typologically, ISIL at the pre-'caliphate' stage fully belonged to this group. What made ISIL stand out among these regionalised violent Islamist movements is that it extended its Islamic state-building ambitions and violence beyond the Iraq-Syria or Middle Eastern context, went global, and developed into a category of its own. It could be seen as a cumulative product of three trends in transnational violent Islamism: bottom-up regionalisation, network fragmentation of 'global jihad' movement, including in the West,⁷ and intensification of targeted intra- and cross-regional flows of foreign terrorist fighters. These three trends are interrelated, but distinct, develop in parallel, and only partially overlap. But it is precisely where they overlapped, at the interface of all three, that ISIL formed as we knew it at its peak in the mid-2010s – a centrifugal system, with the physical Caliphate in Syria and Iraq at its core, reinforced by inflows of foreign fighters and settlers from different regions, and extending to many localised armed groups, homegrown micro-cells and individual adepts globally.

The demise of the ISIL core in Syria and Iraq has had, and will still generate, some aftershocks for several years to come, but it did bring an end to the ISIL claim at a global caliphate. However, it did not radically change the overall set-up described above. In the coming years, much of global terrorist activity will continue to be generated by a handful of large, regionally based Islamist/jihadist militant movements that control territory and combine terrorism with active combat and state-building ambitions in the world's several most intense and most heavily

transnationalised major armed conflicts in the Muslim countries or areas, unless these conflicts are adequately addressed and fundamentally resolved.

CHALLENGES TO INTERNATIONAL ANTITERRORIST COOPERATION: BEYOND ISIL

International cooperation on anti-terrorism faces all sorts of impediments, from geostrategic rivalries to ubiquitous double standards, and the impact of domestic politics of the day. However, one of the most fundamental complications at the global level reflects objective reality and stems from a major divide in global terrorism patterns. This can be seen as one of the particular, contemporary manifestations of the North-South divide; more precisely, it involves a stark contrast between developed, postindustrial world ('West plus', or 'OECD minus⁸'), on the one hand, and select parts of the Muslim world, especially areas of protracted regional conflicts in the Middle East, South Asia and Africa, on the other. This contrast manifests itself in a colossal disproportion and extremely uneven distribution of (a) actual manifestations and direct harm from terrorism and (b) broader political and international impact and effects of terrorism, between these two 'worlds'.

In the early 21st century, much of direct harm from terrorism was incurred neither in the global West, nor in the 'new East,' such as Eurasia and East Asia. Instead, it has been largely concentrated in just three regions: the Middle East, South Asia, followed by sub-Saharan Africa. These three regions accounted for 93 per cent of terrorism fatalities between 2002 and 2017.⁹ According to the Global Terrorism Index, up to 90 per cent of all terrorist activity tend to be concentrated in the top ten terrorism-affected countries, none of which has been a Western state. Conflict-torn Iraq and Afghanistan were the two countries most heavily affected by terrorism in the early 21st century, followed, in different orders, by Syria, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen. In contrast, direct manifestations of terrorism in the 'peacetime', post-industrial, mostly Western world remained very limited: between 2000 and 2014, Western states accounted for only 4.4 per cent of all terrorist attacks and 2.6 per cent of fatalities.¹⁰ A wider group of Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member states, referred here as the 'West plus', accounted for just one per cent of terrorism deaths in 2016—a peak year since 2001 (even as that was an increase from 0.1 percent in 2010 that was mainly due to the ISIL activity).¹¹

This does not mean that it is terrorism in three most heavily affected regions, and respective conflict areas, that is always in the focus of the world politics, grasps main international media and political attention and dominates global anti-terrorist agenda. More generally, political significance and impact of terrorist attacks are not

necessarily proportional to their physical parameters: instead, destabilising effect of terrorism on international politics and security largely depends on comparative centrality of a specific political or regional context to the world politics. This explains why, despite relatively limited, even minimal, exposure of the Western and most OECD countries to direct harm from terrorism, any deadly attack in London, Brussels, Paris, Nice or Chistchurch overwhelms international media and has a major effect on the world politics and security, far exceeding media-political effect from more regular and deadly attacks in Kabul, Baghdad, Lahore or Mogadishu. With or without ISIL, *this fundamental disproportion is not going anywhere*. Most physical manifestations of terrorism will continue to be associated with a handful of regional conflicts in the Middle East, South Asia and Africa, but it is relatively limited manifestations of terrorism in the 'peacetime', developed world that have the largest media and political effect globally.

This discrepancy has three important lessons, or implications, for international anti-terrorist cooperation.

The first implication is the only one that brings some good news and points at the only lesson (out of three) that has been at least partly learned by the international community. High concentration of much of global terrorist activity in just several areas of major regional conflicts, in the hands of few violent movements, clearly implies that any major increase in international security pressure even against one or two such movements should reduce global terrorism by a substantial share. A case in point has been the recent decline in terrorist attacks and fatalities by ten or more per cent a year, since the historical peak of terrorism in 2014. This decline is largely due to stepped-up international efforts against ISIL and other jihadist groups in Iraq and Syria and to consolidation of mostly region-level efforts against Boko Haram in Nigeria.

The second implication is less inspiring. The fact that relatively limited, by global standards, manifestations of terrorism in Europe, the United States, or in the developed world at large tend to produce the largest effects on global media, politics, and security also disproportionately affects and shapes global anti-terrorist agenda. Concerns that are more typical for a post-industrial society radicalisation of second-generation Muslim migrants, the phenomenon of homegrown jihadist loners and micro-cells, the rise in right-wing anti-migrant and anti-Muslim violent extremism are over-represented in international antiterrorist agenda, including at the United Nations level. However, these concerns are not a priority, or hardly even relevant, for those states and societies in the Middle East, South Asia or Central and East Africa that suffer incomparably heavier burden of direct losses from terrorism aggravated by enormous, direct and indirect, harm from broader armed conflicts. They have every right to claim that their

concerns are not adequately addressed or prioritised enough at the international level—especially as many of them do not have the resources and sometimes even lack basic state functionality required to effectively counter terrorism or implement even those international measures against terrorism to which they signed up to. For any effective international cooperation on antiterrorism, especially at the cross-regional and global and United Nations level, there is a need to bridge or at least narrow down this gap.

One of several ways to bridge that gap leads us to the third and final lesson, or conclusion. A lion's share of global terrorist activity is still concentrated in, and tied to the agenda of, a handful of regional armed conflicts of a certain type. These are not localised, low-intensity conflicts on the periphery of functional states, but the world's most intense, heavily transnationalised civil wars in failed or weak states. This fact alone is the best evidence for the need for a qualitative upgrade of multilateral efforts to advance genuine resolution and prevention of this type of conflict that accounts for the bulk of global terrorism, as one of the most effective, long-term global anti-terrorism strategies. One big question, among several others, is whether this task could be achieved, especially in relation to conflicts such as Syria or Afghanistan, without improved cooperation across the widening East-West divides, between the expanded 'West plus' and the 'new East', or Eurasia in a broader sense.

"In the early 21st century, much of direct harm from terrorism was incurred neither in the global West, nor in the 'new East,' such as Eurasia and East Asia. Instead, it has been largely concentrated in just three regions: the Middle East, South Asia, followed by sub-Saharan Africa. These three regions accounted for 93 per cent of terrorism fatalities between 2002 and 2017.⁹"

Women's involvement in terrorism: New trends and developments

H.E BARONESS MICHÈLE CONINSX, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, COUNTER-TERRORISM COMMITTEE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORATE, UNITED NATIONS

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, women's support for, and participation in, activities of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has generated growing attention. Women's radicalisation to political violence and terrorism is nothing new per se, but ISIL's success in recruiting women has been remarkable in several ways including in terms of the sheer numbers, the geographical diversity of the women, and the new policy challenges that have emerged as a result of this unprecedented level of mobilisation.

It is estimated that at least 6,797–6,902 foreign women travelled to the conflict zone.¹ According to recent research figures, only 609 women, or nine per cent of those who travelled, have been recorded as returned.² This rate of return remains significantly lower than for men and children.³ Following the territorial collapse of ISIL, thousands of women are now detained or held in camps in Northern Syria and Iraq, facing a precarious humanitarian, human rights, and security situation.

However, these numbers are likely a significant underestimation of women's involvement in ISIL. The lack of gender-disaggregated data has been a consistent challenge since the start of the flow of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) to Syria and Iraq. This data gap continues to pose problems for a full appraisal of the scope of female participation in ISIL, the rate of return and repatriation, and consequently, for developing a more tailored response.

The roles of women in ISIL also remain poorly understood. Women joined ISIL for a range of different reasons and performed different types of roles during their time with the group. Some may have been involved in violence, others have played important non-combat roles as enforcers of ISIL's gender norms, recruiters, propagandists, and as mothers to the next generation of ISIL supporters. In many cases, the distinction between victims and perpetrators is non-binary and the degree of women's

agency, and thus criminal responsibility, is unclear.

There is now growing concern that the women remaining in dire conditions in camps in the region will be central to the transformation and potential resurgence of ISIL.⁴

The importance of women's roles is not unique to ISIL. Boko Haram is infamous for its use of women and girls as suicide bombers. Available data shows that between April 2011 and June 2017, Boko Haram deployed 434 bombers to 247 different targets during 238 suicide-bombing attacks. The majority of the suicide bombers, at least 56 per cent, were women and girls.⁵

While less is known about the role of women in al-Shabaab, recent reports suggest that women form an important social base for the group and partly explain the insurgency's resilience.⁶ While women and girls are often forcibly married off to Al-Shabaab fighters, they are reportedly also involved in recruitment, generating funds, and carrying out operations. They gather intelligence that enables military operations or extortion, or ferry explosives ahead of attacks, taking advantage of the fact that security forces tend to watch women less closely than they do men.⁷ In a handful of cases, women are believed to have carried out strikes themselves

RISK AND RESPONSES

As both policymakers and the public pay growing attention to the role of women in terrorist groups, there are risks and pitfalls that must be avoided in our collective response to this phenomenon.

The first risk is *oversimplification*. Women are not simply 'jihadi brides'. Women joined ISIL as a result of a range of complex motivations, their roles within the group varied and so does the level of regret or remorse that they exhibit subsequently. Yet, women who joined ISIL are often portrayed as passive, easily manipulated, and emotionally-

driven by factors such as marriage prospects, past experiences of sexual violence, and familial loss at the hands of 'the enemy'.⁸ Such explanations see women as victims, rather than agents who determine their participation in extremism.⁹ Yet, a growing body of research has shown that the drivers of female radicalisation include political and economic factors, as well as personal and psychological factors. Women living in different contexts, with different life experiences and needs, and different individual trajectories join terrorist groups.

While we must appreciate women's agency and the often political nature of their motivation to join violent extremist groups, we also have to be mindful of the fact that the categories of perpetrator and victim are not binary or mutually exclusive—and that women, as well as men, can be both. A nuanced understanding of the diverse circumstances and motivations behind women's radicalisation is therefore essential for designing adequate measures to counter or prevent their involvement in terrorism.

The second risk is *sensationalism*. Women who break with the gendered stereotype of women's inherent peacefulness are often seen as 'deviant' and their violent behaviour therefore tends to attract disproportionate attention.¹⁰ Understanding women's violent roles in terrorist organisations is undoubtedly important and neglecting them has led to security blind spots that must be fixed.¹¹ At the same time, an excessive focus on violent behaviour should not distract us from the many essential non-combat roles that women play and which have proven vital for the survival of terrorist groups. An important lesson from the experience with ISIL is in fact women's centrality to the group's wider ideological and state-building project.

Terrorist groups, including ISIL, understand the importance of appealing to women and have proven very skilful in doing so by developing tailored messaging, and often the recruiters targeting women are female themselves. Analyses of ISIL's English and French language propaganda materials have shown how the group sought to project messages of female empowerment and agency, geared specifically towards Western women whom they hoped to entice to travel to the conflict zone.¹² In these messages women were not simply portrayed as mothers and wives, but as agents of change in creating and shaping the global caliphate.¹³

Efforts to counter these narratives, however, have lagged behind ISIL's skilful and manipulative use of gendered language.¹⁴ It will be important to continue to develop more effective and tailored counter-narratives and step-up efforts to prevent female radicalisation.

The third risk is *stigmatisation*. Stigma disproportionately affects women as their association with terrorist groups is seen as a transgression of traditional gender norms. Such attitudes can lead to a strong sense of alienation and social isolation of women who return from terrorist groups, thus undermining rehabilitation and reintegration efforts and potentially contributing to (re-) radicalisation and recidivism.¹⁵ A particular challenge relates to women who have experienced sexual violence at the hands of terrorist groups. In some communities, victims of sexual violence may be shamed and rejected. In certain cases, the women may be reintegrated, but their children may not be accepted by the community upon their return.

More must be done to proactively address the issue of stigma and design tailored rehabilitation and reintegration programmes that take gender-specific needs into account. However, there continues to be limited understanding of best practices and most effective methods in the rehabilitation and reintegration of women returning from terrorist groups. Experiences in other contexts have shown, for example, that socio-economic reintegration and opportunities are a key factor for success, but that vocational and other related programmes, are more commonly offered to men than to women. A case study of women who returned to Boko Haram after completing disengagement programmes suggested that poverty, social marginalisation and lack of socio-economic opportunity were key factors.¹⁶

THE WAY FORWARD

Greater female participation in terrorism will have a profound impact on the nature of the threat and our collective counterterrorism efforts. It is therefore crucial to recognise that there remains an urgent need to better understand the drivers of female radicalisation, the different roles women play in relation to terrorism and violent extremism, and the differential impact of counterterrorism strategies on women's human rights. We must also step-up efforts to ensure that women's potential as agents of change in preventing and countering terrorism is fully realised.

In a landmark resolution passed unanimously in 2015, the United Nations Security Council recognised the linkages between countering terrorism, and the Women Peace and Security agenda.¹⁷ Since then, the council has introduced a range of provisions that require states and United Nations entities to integrate gender considerations into counterterrorism and CVE responses.

On the critical issue of dealing with individuals returning from terrorist groups, the Security Council has introduced specific provisions that require states to develop gender-sensitive risk assessments, devise comprehensive and tailored prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration

strategies that take gender considerations into account, and ensure the participation and leadership of women in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of strategies for returning and relocating foreign terrorist fighters and their families. The *Addendum to the guiding principles on foreign terrorist fighters (2018)* adopted by the United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee in December 2018, provides further guidance on these issues.¹⁸

Continuing to further develop and refine policy and guidance on gender mainstreaming in this and other areas will be a crucial task for the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), and it is therefore essential that we continue our engagement with governments, civil society partners and the private sector to assess implementation and capacity gaps, identify good practices and facilitate the provision of technical assistance where needed.

It will also be important to continue to strengthen the evidence base on the gendered drivers of terrorism and violent extremism. In recent years, the research agenda on this issue has grown to include studies of different terrorist groups operating in different regional contexts, and accounts of the many roles women play, not only as victims and perpetrators, but also as agents in efforts to counter and prevent terrorism and violent extremism.

Much more research remains to be done and it will be our task, through forums such as CTED's Global Research Network, to ensure that the latest research findings are brought to the attention of decision-makers at the national and international level so as to inform the design of better, more effective and gender-sensitive counter-terrorism responses and prevention efforts.

"Greater female participation in terrorism will have a profound impact on the nature of the threat and our collective counterterrorism efforts."

Terrorist threats in the Industry 4.0 Era

RAMONA MANESCU, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ROMANIA

Today, we are living in the Industry 4.0 era. This is not new, as it has already been happening for the last seven or eight years. It is an era of smart manufacturing and factories, but also of smart cities and energy grids, cloud and cognitive computing, the Internet of things and artificial intelligence.

Our world has changed and continues to do so to an even faster pace. The first phase of the industrial revolution lasted around 150 years. The second phase commenced in 1913 with the first permanent assembly line introduced by Ford, and lasted just 56 years, until 1969, when the first programmable controller for machinery was introduced. The third industrial revolution lasted just 42 years, until 2011, when the term "Industry 4.0" was publicly introduced at the Hannover Fair.

This new context, analysed from the terrorist threat perspective, unfortunately presents more and new vulnerabilities. All the "classic" threats are still there, from plane hijacking to mail bombs, and many new ones have been added.

We have to defend cities' computerised transport systems from being breached, energy grids from being remotely crippled, super-computers from reaching into terrorist groups' control, digital currencies from becoming the new source of financing for terrorist activities, toy game consoles from being used as untraceable means of communication between terrorists, drones from being used to block millions of passengers on world busiest airports, and even personal computers from becoming tools for which spreading fear is the main goal.

From a legislative and political perspective, I must add that the problems come not only from the huge diversity of threats we face; there is also a real difficulty to define the threats. When does a criminal activity become a terrorist activity? When does the responsibility of the non-state actor end and the responsibility of the state actor begin? How can a cyber attack be criminalised when a single perpetrator can hide behind many layers of geographical locations, jurisdictional authority, and cyber identity, and operate with no prior warning signs before an attack and

no traces left after?

In the European Union (EU), our work is based on the legal definition of terrorist offences as defined in the Council Framework decision 2002/475/JHA¹. We consider terrorist acts as actions committed with the aim of:

- seriously intimidating a population
- unduly compelling a government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act
- seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation.

Criminal offences, from attacks upon a person's life to interfering with or disrupting the supply of water or power, if committed as part of one of the above aims, are treated as a terrorist offence.

In 2017, there was a strong step in the right direction, as under the new Directive on Combating Terrorism, cyberattacks were added to the list of terrorist offences, allowing for the prosecution of cyberterrorism. The 2018 Network and Information Security Directive and the proposed establishment of an European Union Cybersecurity Agency mirrors this step forward.

Despite being among the most advanced forces in the response to terrorist threats, the European Union still lacks behind perpetrators' resourcefulness and rapid technological advancements. Adding to the practical difficulties of identifying what exactly can be considered as terrorist activity, we have the problem of an outdated definition. In the Industry 4.0 era, working with a 17 year-old terrorism definition is already archaic. At the time when we agreed upon what can be considered as a terrorist act, there were no social networks, no cryptocurrencies, and no civilian or commercial drones.

We need clarity and determination in our legislative tools. They are the cornerstone for a strong and efficient institutional framework, and they are equally important for

an effective array of intervention tools designed to foil, protect, deter, and, of course, criminalise terrorism.

Of course, the European Union alone can't be effective in the Industry 4.0 era context. Even with the strong involvement of our traditional partners, we are still vulnerable and weak in criminalising terrorism. A global effort, backed by resolute United Nations decisions, is mandatory.

Fortunately, we have the power and instruments to push forward the international community towards a future where those whose goal it is to instil fear or cripple whole countries, will no longer be able to strike, run, and hide. Let's not overlook the fact the EU is a global power in any way we measure it. We have formidable economic, political and diplomatic might. This force can bring to our grasp the necessary intervention and persuasion tools for reaching our goals, if we really want to.

Looking at the conclusions of numerous social studies published in the last years, I must say that European citizens desperately want this "fight with terror" to end. They also want the EU to be the winner of this fight.

In 2016², 2017, and 2018³, EU citizens pointed out "more EU involvement in the fight against terrorism" as their top priority. Even with a drop in support from 82 per cent to 77 per cent it remained the topic with the highest support at EU level, surpassing unemployment, environment, and migration. Citizens clearly want the EU to have a more determined role in countering terrorism and, as we already saw, this can't be done only by building a 'Fortress Europe'. In today's connected world we need global solutions.

I consider the EU citizens' concern as fully justified. It is not only because we, in Europe, have been a prime target in the last five years of so many terrorist attacks, during which hundreds of EU citizens lost their lives. It is also because, considering the level and particularities of our development, the EU is particularly vulnerable to the new terrorist threats of Industry 4.0 era.

The WannaCry attack from 2017 showed us how vulnerable our computer networks are. The National Health Services of both England and Scotland were crippled with up to 70,000 devices—including computers, MRI scanners, blood-storage refrigerators and theatre equipment—affected. Many European companies including car producers, banks, telecommunication operators from almost all EU countries, and even universities and ministries, were also hit. With 200,000 computers infected and US\$4 billion in losses, WannaCry was also immensely costly.

Is Lazarus Group, the alleged cybercrime group behind the

WannaCry attack, a criminal group or a terrorist group? We have to decide and act accordingly. For the moment, it was labelled as an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT), along with other 15 similar already identified structures from China, Vietnam, Iran, North Korea, Russian Federation, and one from the United States.

The attack's impact would have been much worse if a kill-switch had not been discovered, or if it had been specifically targeting highly critical infrastructure, like nuclear power plants, energy grids, dams or railway systems.

This opens the discussion about another terrifying vulnerability that we have: a terrorist attack that would take full advantage of the tools and targets available in the Industry 4.0 era—our critical infrastructure, and especially our energy grids.

WannaCry attacks, and the many similar, but smaller ransom attacks, have the main purpose of generating resources (money and data). Rarely can they physically harm someone.

"This new context, analysed from the terrorist threat perspective, unfortunately presents more and new vulnerabilities. All the "classic" threats are still there, from plane hijacking to mail bombs, and many new ones have been added."

Meanwhile, a direct attack upon energy grids, for example one targeting the gas transport systems, performed in the middle of the winter, can actually kill people. Not to mention that it will score very high in the intimidation factor and in the socio-economic destabilising factor. Such an attack could also be accompanied by threats and demands related to a specific governmental policy.

We know that the tools are available. For example, Stuxnet, a malicious computer worm, first uncovered in 2010, specifically targets programmable logic controllers (PLCs), which allow the automation of electromechanical processes, such as those used to control machinery and industrial processes, including centrifuges for separating nuclear material. In a report published in December 2010⁴,

the Institute for Science and International Security suggests that Stuxnet is a reasonable explanation for the apparent damage of up to 1,000 centrifuges at the Natanz nuclear enrichment lab in Iran.

Stuxnet's design and architecture are not domain-specific and could be tailored as a platform for attacking modern supervisory control and data acquisition, also known as SCADA, and PLC systems. For example, in factory assembly lines, power plants or energy grids, the majority of which reside in Europe, Japan and the US. Maybe we've just been lucky here, in Europe, as Stuxnet is apparently linked to the National Security Agency and Israeli intelligence. But, this doesn't mean that other APT state-sponsored groups don't have the resources or the motivation to develop similar cyber weapons.

Looking back, we notice that our counterterrorism measures are generally developed in response to an attack. First, a new kind of attack takes place and after we develop and implement countering measures. Some work, some don't.

Today, the state of play indicates the imminence of a major terrorist attack, targeting, for example, energy grids. We

already saw recently, in Saudi Arabia, that it is possible, using inexpensive and ready-available drones, and it can have global effects. We also saw that, despite huge military spending—Saudi Arabia has the third largest military expenditures and is ranked first when measured as a share of GDP—the vulnerability remains.

If we want to be effective, and our citizens demand it, the solution doesn't come from taller and thicker walls or firewalls. While they are needed, they will not deliver lasting security, but more costs.

In the Industry 4.0 era, the lasting solutions to the new terrorist threats requires cooperation at the global level. As others are not ashamed to use their power for personal gains, the EU should not be ashamed to use its own tremendous economic, political and diplomatic power for the benefit of all. Tackling the new terrorist threats can be done only on a global scale by closing all the rabbit holes, committing to pursue the perpetrators no matter where they hide, and bringing those responsible to justice.

Just like the European environmental agenda, tackling terrorism will make a better tomorrow possible not only to the European citizens, but to all.

Rising right-wing violence and its impact on the fight against terrorism

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Recent high-profile lone actor attacks and the detection of similar plans by terrorist networks have made the threat emanating from right-wing terrorism evident. A rise in right-wing violence poses a number of challenges to current counterterrorism efforts. It puts additional strains on existing deficiencies in resources and personnel, but also defies some approaches adopted to prevent and counter terrorism. These challenges urge security actors to work out a balanced distribution of resources to counter the multiple terrorist ideologies and to rethink some assumptions on how terrorism manifests itself. The current situation also represents an opportunity to improve and relaunch some much-criticised features of countering violent extremism (CVE).

REALIGNING COUNTERTERRORISM BUDGETS

Right-wing extremism is rising in various Western countries. In the United States (US), domestic terrorism has surpassed jihadist-related attacks by large: approximately 60 percent of terrorist incidents would be related to right-wing ideologies.¹ There, a number of recent lone actor terrorist attacks, such as the El Paso shooting, made the headlines due to their high number of casualties. In Europe, the official figures on right-wing attacks are lower, which is partly due to difficulties in distinguishing right-wing terrorist offences from hate crimes. Nevertheless, Europe saw in 2019 the number of arrests linked to right-wing terrorism increase for the third year in a row.² Arrests included lone actors but also networks, such as a French terrorist group that planned to carry out attacks on Muslims,³ and an Italian-Swiss network that had managed to get hold of sophisticated weapons, including an air-to-air missile.⁴

An increasing right-wing terrorist threat complicates the fight against terror as it stretches the resources and personnel employed to counter terrorism. Additional means will be needed to conduct each of the counterterrorism (CT) phases on right-wing violence, including monitoring, prosecution, imprisonment, and rehabilitation. Counterterrorism operations in Western Europe related to right-wing extremist activity in 2017-2018 had already increased almost three times with respect to the previous two-year period.⁵ Some European governments have already announced their plans to

increase these efforts further.⁶

The demand for extra resources to fight right-wing terrorism adds to current funding and personnel shortages in dealing with the jihadist threat. Following the attack on a Strasbourg Christmas market in 2018 by a Fiche-S, the French security services claimed they were severely understaffed to adequately monitor all jihadists on the national security watch list.⁷ Extending current CT-means to extreme-right terrorism could thus be tricky. Transferring jihadist-allocated resources towards right-wing extremism might seem a quick fix, considering the general decrease in jihadist attacks. Yet, the jihadist threat remains real with Daesh regrouping and Al-Qaeda planning a comeback, many European foreign fighters still at large, and the upcoming release of hundreds of jihadist inmates from prison. Challenges to distribute resources and personnel towards the different currents of terrorism might soon also arise in the US, where law enforcement resources have mainly been devoted to target domestic jihadists, often neglecting right-wing offenders.⁸

HURDLES TO PROSECUTING RIGHT-WING TERRORISM

The rise in right-wing violence also poses practical challenges to the implementation of some CT-measures. An example is the criminal prosecution of terrorist offences. Western judicial systems are adequate to deal with terrorist crimes, yet, in practice, certain characteristics of today's right-wing terrorism make it complicated to prosecute them as such. For instance, right-wing terrorists have a history of not claiming responsibility for their attacks as their message is often straightforward, in particular when they target specific racial or ethnic individuals or groups. Their violent acts are frequently considered isolated and near-spontaneous incidents.⁹ For these reasons the social and political objectives of right-wing attacks are not always picked up, making that a considerable amount of them are prosecuted as hate crimes rather than terrorist offences.¹⁰

In the US, difficulties in prosecuting right-wing violence as terrorism are also linked to a misjudgement of its internationality. International connections between right-wing violent offenders do exist, both online as in real life, but are often less evident. This has important

consequences, as terrorist-related charges in the US are most commonly used for acts of international terrorism.¹¹ This includes many attacks by jihadist lone actors,¹² even though most of them are homegrown and only had limited connections to a foreign terrorist organisation.¹³ On the contrary, right-wing violence is generally considered domestic terrorism, for which no federal criminal charge exist, and thus prosecuted as other types of criminal offences, such as hate or gun crimes.

Right-wing violent acts are not left unpunished. However, the absence of their prosecution as terrorism has a huge impact on efforts to counter right-wing terrorism. For instance, inaccurate figures on right-wing violent crimes can result in a distorted threat assessment and lead to systematic underfunding of CT efforts to counter this type of terrorism. Court economics would already complicate efforts to prove the charge of forming a terrorist organisation or a terrorist intent of right-wing offenders,¹⁴ thus completing the vicious circle.

Incomplete investigations into the existence of right-wing networks increase our vulnerability to future attacks. But an inaccurate picture of the right-wing threat also diminishes our understanding of specific traits of extreme-right terrorism, in particular tactics, targets, means of connection and communication, and the background and radicalisation pathway of offenders. Last but not least, understanding right-wing offences as isolated incidents also minimises prospects for international cooperation to fight this type of terrorism.

STRESS TESTING PREVENTION AND COUNTERING OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM (P/CVE)

Rising right-wing extremism also puts to the test certain components of CVE, a branch predominantly developed around Islamist extremism. For instance, reactive measures to address violent extremism largely base on the early warning and detection of signs of radicalisation. The basic elements of the radicalisation process are very similar for right-wing and jihadist extremism, but for practitioners or relatives detecting right-wing extremism is in practice sometimes less straightforward. A recent study evaluating a Swedish helpline for radicalisation showed how concerns for Islamist radicalisation were in more than half of the cases spurred by the mere exercise of religious practice. Concerns about right-wing radicalisation occurred only when individuals had already taken some radical non-violent or violent actions.¹⁵ A study on lone actors also noted how the detection of right-wing extremists occurs more often by chance, as they are less likely to exhibit noticeable changes in their behavior or discuss plans with relatives than their jihadist counterparts.¹⁶

Challenges also exist for the preventive window of CVE. Preventive measures to counter Islamist radicalisation focus in practice often on specific 'at-risk' racial or religious subgroups or neighbourhoods. Reaching groups at-risk of right-wing extremism is arguably more complex, considering the absence of similar targeting criteria

other than white, young and male or clear-cut hotbeds of radicalisation. Countering the narratives of extreme-right terrorism is also a challenge, as some have made their way into mainstream societal and political discourses,¹⁷ such as ideas underlying the Great Replacement theory, or resentment of, and distrust in the establishment and mainstream media.

CONCLUSIONS

The threat emanating from right-wing terrorism is becoming widely acknowledged after having been overlooked for too long. An example: right-wing extremists have made abundantly use of the internet to communicate and coordinate their efforts since at least the mid-1990s,¹⁸ yet a real focus on their online activities emerged only after recent attacks in Christchurch and El Paso.

The emerging focus on right-wing violence lays bare a number of challenges to counterterrorism. It exposes the need for a complicated balance of funding to counter jihadist and right-wing-related terrorism, as both will most probably continue to present a challenge in the near future. An adequately resourced fight against right-wing terrorism goes hand in hand with a better comprehension of its manifestations, such as the importance of the extremist milieu (both on- as offline) in connecting right-wing extremists, providing funding, and allowing the exchange of tactical and strategic ideas.

At the same time, practical difficulties in applying P/CVE to right-wing extremism presents an opportunity to revisit some often-criticised aspects of counter-radicalisation. For instance, it can lead to extending the current exhaustive focus on religion to inquire other often-underdeveloped aspects of radicalisation, such as the link between violent and non-violent extremism and the role political radicalism plays in the societal radicalisation process. Including a focus on right-wing extremism could contribute to neutralising P/CVE programmes, which have been recurrently criticised for their disproportionate focus on Muslim extremism and stigmatising effect on Muslim communities. It also offers the opportunity to remodel some of its aspects. For instance, rather than vehemently fighting radical right-wing ideas, it could be more effective to focus on promoting positive alternatives, such as through healthy identity-building, civic engagement, and media literacy.

"An increasing right-wing terrorist threat complicates the fight against terror as it stretches the resources and personnel employed to counter terrorism."

Hydra: The Evolving Anatomy of Extremism

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A PERSISTENT GLOBAL JIHADIST THREAT

The “global war on terror,” which had as its goal to prevent another 9/11 terrorist attack, has instead increased international insecurity worldwide. Since 2001, the number of Salafi-jihadist¹ groups has more than doubled, their membership has tripled, and they are present in more countries than ever before.² The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant group (ISIL) still has considerable resources³, and it has called upon its dispersed legions and Internet-inspired adherents to “organise, arm, and fund” new terror operations to avenge the fall of the caliphate.

The predominant threat to multiple states is transnational militant Salafi-jihadists who are calling for offensive *jihād* (holy war) in the hopes of overthrowing apostate states in order to create caliphates and practice sharia law. The Jihadist movement has proven resilient in the Middle East, parts of the Sahel, North Africa and the Horn of Africa, as well as South Asia.

A United States Institute of Peace study⁴ has suggested that Western intervention has helped increase domestic religious terrorism in states with high Muslim populations, especially in states experiencing conflict. Foreign interventions have weakened state institutions, making states more vulnerable to conflict, crime and terror.⁵

Salafi-Jihadists groups are proving to be an enduring global security threat due to the following trends:

1. The Sunni-Shia conflict that overlaps with the Saudi-Iran regional proxy wars playing out in Syria and Yemen and elsewhere;
2. State collapse across the Middle East and North Africa, most extensively in Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen;
3. ISIL's ability to maintain its affiliate structure even after losing its so-called caliphate. It still has the loyalty of more than a dozen “provinces” in West Africa and the Khorasan (parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan and some neighbors), as well as a new Central African “province” that was recently announced;
4. Thousands of trained combat veterans that fought from 2012-2018 in Salafi-Jihadist battle spaces, who

represent a new cadre of fighters who are relocating into new conflict zones;

5. Climate change which has destroyed livelihoods helps drive recruitment because terrorist groups have been using access to food and water as either a weapon or a tool of war;⁶
6. The withdrawal of US troops in Syria not only may increase the risk of an ISIL resurgence in Syria but may also increase the terrorist threat in Europe due to escaping high risk prisoners from Kurdish-run prisons in Syria.
7. Turkey's invasion into Syria to attack the YPG is shifting the YPG's focus from fighting ISIL to fighting Turkey.

A NEW RIGHT-WING RENAISSANCE

It is important to note that terrorism is also symptomatic of a wider disease of extremism and hate which is escalating worldwide in many different guises. While populist right-wing extremism has been growing since 2000⁷, right-wing terrorism dwindled in the wake of 9/11. In recent years, however, far-right extremist groups and white-supremacy groups (WSG) are on the rise in Europe and elsewhere. According to Katherine Belew, terrorist attacks by WSG's in the US has been the dominant form of terrorism in the US over the past ten years.⁸

WSGs are posing a transnational challenge and are forming global networks that reach from Australia, New Zealand, Ukraine to Norway.⁹ These groups will likely persist and grow, driven by ongoing conflicts, the racist and Islamophobic rhetoric of populist politicians worldwide and growing migration.

Separatist far-right militias are fighting in Eastern Ukraine and are using it as a training ground for further action in Europe. They are gaining foreign fighters, forming global networks, and are learning from jihadi-terrorist tactics. According to the Soufan Group, more than 17,000 people from 50 countries have traveled to fight in Eastern Ukraine contributing to both Ukrainian nationalist and pro-Russian separatist sides.¹⁰

Despite their ideological differences, Salafi-Jihadism and far-right groups share commonalities. They derive their strength from a similar narrative, believing they are in the midst of an existential crisis that threatens their way of life, and that the only path to ensure self-preservation is violence. Offshoots of both have apocalyptic ideologies. Both have demonstrated that their aim is to inflict mass casualties and create and exacerbate divisions within countries. Julia Ebner's research documenting incidents across the US, Australia, France, Germany and the UK have shown that far-right and Salafi-Jihadist terrorism attacks tend to spike at the same time creating a circle of rage and terror.¹¹

THE DIGITAL BATTLEFRONT

21st century technology is offering terrorists new means for military operations. Multiple terrorist groups are buying and engineering drones for reconnaissance operations or to carry small munitions and IEDs. Drones could potentially be used to take down planes, as well as to disperse chemical and biological weapons in large public spaces. In 2018, one serious attempt at a large scale bio attack using ricin was foiled in Germany.¹²

Information warfare and cyber operations, however, are proving to be terrorists' most valuable weapon. ISIL is building a cyber army to conduct cyber warfare against the West. In 2016, ISIL united five distinct hacking groups into a "United Cyber Caliphate".¹³ It has been publishing kill lists and distributing guidelines on terror and cyber operations. With the growing nexus of crime and terror, terrorists are conducting secret transactions and buying untraceable firearms online.¹⁴

There is concern that these groups will have access to powerful criminal warfare via the dark web to attack critical infrastructure. Much of the cyber threat focused on military, critical infrastructure and commercial targets in the West is developed by so-called Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups who not only work for states but freelance as well. If al-Qaeda or ISIL were able to buy cyberattack capabilities, then large swathes of critical infrastructure could be attacked, including critical power grids.¹⁵

Tahrir al-Sham, a merger of al-Nusra Front and others, is representative of a new amplified digital threat. Intelligence experts maintain that with a limited number of dedicated actors, this group could take down power grids, G.P.S. and satellite communications.¹⁶

Tahrir is using platforms like Sarahah¹⁷ to send messages anonymously to one person—they test messages to targeted audiences to find which ones resonate and retool those that don't. Tahrir is experimenting with an app that

reaches 16 million youth, the top download in over 25 countries. They claimed to have recruited a dozen fighters in six hours with a new crowd sourcing approach using Telegram

Multiple terrorist groups are infiltrating the whole ecosystem of cyberspace. The Irish Republican Army used to boast that "We only need to be lucky once; you need to be lucky all the time." The maxim holds true in the internet age: one influencer, one video, or one manifesto, can have global repercussions.¹⁸ A prime example was the far-right white supremacist who killed 51 people at a Christchurch mosque in March 2019, when he e-mailed his 74-page manifesto and live-streamed his attack on Facebook where it was shared 1.5 million times.¹⁹

ISIL has also turned to video games to attract youth. ISIL is copying the aesthetic of first person shooter games such as Call of Duty to recruit. This allows ISIL to tap into approximately 57% of the two billion who play shooter games, most who represent their demographic target -- young, male and technologically savvy.²⁰ Their recruitment videos are a "visual dog whistle" to this gaming demographic.²¹

EMERGING NARRATIVES: GLOBAL CIVIL WAR

Maajid Nawaz argues that "ISIL seeks not to spark a World War but to ignite a World Civil War."²² He points to the online playbook of Al-Qaeda's propaganda head Abu Bakr Al Naji: *The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Islamic Nation Will Pass*. It maintains that in a state of chaos and savagery, even the strongest militaries can be defeated because 'Overwhelming military power (weapons, technology, fighters) has no value without the cohesion of society' and may in fact 'become a cure to the great superpower.'²³

According to Weiss and Hassan, Abu Bakr al-Naji has conceived an effective battle plan for weakening the enemy states through what he called "power of vexation and exhaustion" by making use of local frustrations, propaganda and political violence among the people, with the aim of provoking savagery.²⁴ States will respond with even more violence and eventually governments and their partners will have lost all the legitimacy in the eyes of their people.

Behavioural research by Scott Atran in conflict zones, maintains "that sacred values such as national liberation, God and Caliphate, mobilized by devoted actors, empowers low-power groups. They are able to prevail against materially more powerful armies that rely on standard incentives such as pay, promotion and punishment."²⁵

KILLING THE HYDRA

Terrorism is like a hydra which sprouts multiple heads. We can attempt to destroy the threat with kinetic power and drone attacks, but according to Ali Soufan, “the real battle lies in the battle of ideas and the methods that terrorists are using to recruit, if we are not able to counter those, this war will never end.”²⁶ Counter terrorism efforts therefore should concentrate on combatting effective extremist narratives and their means of delivery via communication technologies.

The modus operandi of the US and its alliance partners has been to measure the “tangible” capabilities of ISIL and other global Salafi-Jihadist groups including territorial control, manpower, finances, and equipment. However, the coalition has not yet been able to understand and fully grasp the “intangible soft power” of ISIL. Joseph Nye, the architect of the term “soft power,” defines it as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments.”

To counter the entire global Salafi-Jihad movement, we must understand the ideology guiding it before deciding how to properly address it.²⁷ These groups are multi-faceted; they don’t just call for jihad, they also take credit for new roads, clinics, schools, water systems that were constructed and paid by the West to win new followers.

War against extremists groups cannot be “won” in the traditional sense. Since their ideology provides a long-term strategy and justification for global jihadi way into the future, that cannot be easily countered with military action, especially not by external Western forces. Moreover, support for terrorist groups today is also a reflection of a multitude of human security factors -- social, economic, and political, stemming from crime to climate change that cannot be “neutralized” with fire power.²⁸

In 2001, David Arquillo correctly predicted that in the future “netwar” will become a policy tool of choice for terrorists, transnational criminals and revolutionary organisations. Strong netwar actors will not only have organisational, but also doctrinal, technological and social layers that will bolster their power. While ISIL is far from being the first extremist movement to combine terrorism with grandiose ambitions and territorial control, it is one of the first groups that has managed to embrace the digital domain so strategically. It marks a completely new global phenomenon by changing the importance of the military theatre into the digital domain. In some instances, the World Wide Web has become more powerful than governments, explaining why repressive dysfunctional governments afflicted by protests usually attempt to turn it off.²⁹

Stephan Walt and others have argued that “Revolutions pose serious dangers only when they involve great powers, since only great powers have proved capable of spreading revolutionary principles.”³⁰ This argument does not take into consideration the growing power of digital domains. ISIL may not have the backing of a great power, but it has the backing of a 5th military domain of “virtual power” this still needs to be acknowledged by military strategists. Instead of being dependent on one nation, they can crowd source “all nations” to harvest foreign fighters, cyber-mercenaries, e-terrorists and digital currencies to create not only a real caliphate but also a virtual united cyber caliphate.³¹

In this new security threat landscape driven by virtual extremists, hackers, bloggers and Youtubers, militaries lack the necessary skills to stop extremists from hijacking technology, tech firms and their associated ecosystem of influencers, fans, publishers and producers to achieve their goals.

ISIL’s uses a variety of platforms and has autonomous production units worldwide. It utilizes narrowcasting – creating content that caters to niche audiences and hotspot-mapping social media programmes. They discuss economic, development, portray public works projects among their military wins. In the future, all extremist groups will have greater access with 5G technology, able to access the minds and eyeballs of people across the globe.

COUNTERING THE NARRATIVES

ISIL’s communication technology delivers a coherent ideology. According to Pellerin, it combines a political narrative (a new and just world order, an expansive and global caliphate), a moral narrative (hypocrisy of the West). It uses religious narratives and it deploys socio-psychological strategies.³² Counter terrorist approaches will need to deploy counter-narratives that are equally sophisticated.

Policymakers will also need to address the issue of fake news. In a complex world, black-and-white narratives that eliminate all confusing grey zones can be comforting.³³ Fake news is embraced by countries, internet entrepreneurs, and extremists who brainwash vulnerable people.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

In trying to stop terrorist groups from spreading, the West, and its coalition partners are finding themselves in a vicious cycle of: invade, occupy, withdraw, repeat.³⁴ Netwar has given Salafi-Jihadists access to domains (air, cyber) that in the past were solely in the hands of states.

The Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism, which includes Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter and YouTube, is working in concert to remove terrorist information. Google³⁵ and Facebook are investing heavily in AI-based programmes but extremists are finding alternative ways to spread their messages. Laws have not been sufficient to keep extremists from using the internet as a strategic asset.

"War against extremists groups cannot be "won" in the traditional sense. Since their ideology provides a long-term strategy and justification for global jihadi way into the future, that cannot be easily countered with military action, especially not by external Western forces."

Europe has a big role to play in promoting its democratic values and key regulatory frameworks. EU Member states and the Commission need to strengthen their cooperation with Internet and social media companies. The US should follow the 9/11 Commission Report which recommended: "The U.S. government must define what the message is,

what it stands for. We should offer an example of moral leadership in the world, committed to treat people humanely, abide by the rule of law, and be generous and caring to our neighbors. It includes respect for the rule of law, openness in discussing differences, and tolerance for opposing points of view."

The immediate goal for weakening the growth of Salafi-Jihadist groups should be containment both on and offline. Yet beyond containment, all those countering Salafi-jihadism worldwide must also deliver an example of moral leadership and social justice and thus provide a better story.

In the long run, ISIL will not be able to achieve its goal to create a global spanning caliphate. Over time, the movement may collapse from its own excesses and internal divisions. In the short term, efforts must focus on inoculating our youth from extremism, rebuilding shattered lives and delivering much needed security, access to healthcare and education. A new Global Partnership Development Fund built on global solidarity³⁶ should be designed similar to the German Marshall Fund that was created after WWII. This should be led by regional powers to ensure their own security.

Efforts should focus on key diplomatic messages that the West is not opposed to Islamic people and that the West is not trying to suppress their religion and political change. Fundamentally, people need to feel that they are in control of their destinies and that their lives matter. US Franklin D. Roosevelt stated in 1941, "that our only real enemy is hate and that our best weapon is solidarity." It is time to build global solidarity and hope - to counter the cycle of hate, extremism and misunderstanding from continuing to shape our world.



GTI Ranks & Scores, 2019

GTI rank	Country	2018 GTI score (out of 10)	Change in score (2018-2019)
1	Afghanistan	9.603	0.212
2	Iraq	9.241	-0.505
3	Nigeria	8.597	-0.063
4	Syria	8.006	-0.309
5	Pakistan	7.889	-0.292
6	Somalia	7.800	-0.220
7	India	7.518	-0.050
8	Yemen	7.259	-0.275
9	Philippines	7.137	-0.044
10	Democratic Republic of the Congo	7.039	-0.016
11	Egypt	6.794	-0.551
12	Libya	6.766	-0.221
13	Mali	6.653	0.638
14	Central African Republic	6.622	-0.097
15	Cameroon	6.620	0.005
16	Turkey	6.533	-0.503
17	South Sudan	6.316	-0.440
18	Thailand	6.029	-0.223
19	Colombia	5.912	0.301
20	Sudan	5.807	-0.371
21	Kenya	5.756	-0.358
22	United States of America	5.691	-0.375
23	Niger	5.596	-0.408
24	Ukraine	5.547	-0.501
25	Mozambique	5.542	0.963
26	Myanmar	5.512	-0.404
27	Burkina Faso	5.418	0.607
28	United Kingdom	5.405	-0.205
29	Ethiopia	5.345	-0.286
30	Saudi Arabia	5.238	-0.241
31	Bangladesh	5.208	-0.489
32	Palestine	5.177	-0.153
33	Burundi	5.102	-0.214
34	Nepal	5.093	-0.202
35	Indonesia	5.070	0.527

GTI rank	Country	2018 GTI score (out of 10)	Change in score (2018-2019)
36	France	5.008	-0.467
37	Russia	4.900	-0.330
38	Chad	4.762	0.010
39	Iran	4.717	0.318
40	Israel	4.525	-0.053
41	South Africa	4.511	0.248
42	China	4.465	-0.643
43	Lebanon	4.395	-0.759
44	Germany	4.254	-0.347
45	Greece	4.167	-0.124
46	Chile	4.123	0.669
47	Venezuela	4.101	0.436
48	Mexico	4.080	0.547
49	Uganda	3.957	0.031
50	Tajikistan	3.947	1.714
51	Tunisia	3.938	-0.150
52	Angola	3.784	-0.689
53	Belgium	3.636	-0.424
54	Canada	3.591	0.064
55	Sri Lanka	3.569	-0.479
56	Sweden	3.450	-0.486
57	Algeria	3.409	-0.354
58	Bolivia	3.387	3.387
59	Spain	3.354	-0.670
60	Tanzania	3.272	-0.096
61	Bahrain	3.201	-0.682
62	Paraguay	3.119	-0.324
63	Italy	3.109	0.373
64	Jordan	3.091	-0.313
65	Nicaragua	2.952	2.205
66	Rwanda	2.948	0.771
67	Peru	2.840	-0.110
68	Zimbabwe	2.834	1.265
69	Ireland	2.692	-0.353
70	Republic of the Congo	2.687	-0.681
71	Australia	2.645	-0.182

GTI rank	Country	2018 GTI score (out of 10)	Change in score (2018-2019)
72	Cote d' Ivoire	2.598	-0.678
73	Brazil	2.530	1.142
74	Malaysia	2.495	-0.205
75	Kuwait	2.487	-0.639
76	Ecuador	2.455	0.984
77	Netherlands	2.347	0.387
78	Japan	2.291	-0.635
79	Kosovo	2.255	-0.439
80	Haiti	2.180	0.466
81	Finland	2.026	-0.475
82	Madagascar	1.957	-0.656
83	Argentina	1.680	0.000
84	Austria	1.655	-0.197
85	Kazakhstan	1.566	-0.662
86	Ghana	1.559	1.397
87	Kyrgyz Republic	1.467	-0.252
88	Bosnia and Herzegovina	1.388	0.049
89	Papua New Guinea	1.364	-0.676
90	Georgia	1.335	-0.087
91	Guatemala	1.331	1.126
92	Morocco	1.215	1.177
93	Senegal	1.186	0.174
94	Armenia	1.173	-0.519
95	Laos	1.033	-0.642
96	Taiwan	1.008	0.065
97	Montenegro	0.999	0.961
98	Vietnam	0.999	0.336
99	Honduras	0.992	-0.722
100	Guinea	0.971	0.647
101	Denmark	0.957	0.140
102	Czech Republic	0.866	-0.696
103	Azerbaijan	0.698	-0.259
104	Malawi	0.663	0.205
105	Gabon	0.551	-0.647
106	Poland	0.477	-0.242
107	Jamaica	0.472	-0.619
108	Lithuania	0.458	0.458
109	Sierra Leone	0.458	-0.608
110	Albania	0.420	-0.588
111	Cyprus	0.420	-0.786
112	Bulgaria	0.372	0.057
113	Djibouti	0.320	-0.385
114	Zambia	0.305	-0.358
115	Macedonia (FYR)	0.301	-0.348
116	South Korea	0.296	0.010
117	Latvia	0.229	-0.229

GTI rank	Country	2018 GTI score (out of 10)	Change in score (2018-2019)
118	Switzerland	0.191	0.057
119	Hungary	0.181	-0.182
120	Dominican Republic	0.177	-0.205
121	Uruguay	0.172	-0.172
122	New Zealand	0.143	-0.143
123	Estonia	0.115	-0.114
123	Moldova	0.115	-0.114
123	Serbia	0.115	-0.114
126	Liberia	0.105	-0.105
127	Lesotho	0.095	-0.096
128	Norway	0.076	-0.077
129	Slovakia	0.057	-0.058
130	United Arab Emirates	0.048	-0.057
131	Guyana	0.038	-0.038
131	Panama	0.038	-0.038
133	Iceland	0.029	-0.028
133	Qatar	0.029	-0.028
135	Trinidad and Tobago	0.019	-0.105
135	Uzbekistan	0.019	-0.019
137	Bhutan	0.010	-0.009
138	Belarus	0.000	0.000
138	Benin	0.000	0.000
138	Botswana	0.000	0.000
138	Cambodia	0.000	-0.019
138	Costa Rica	0.000	0.000
138	Croatia	0.000	-0.014
138	Cuba	0.000	0.000
138	El Salvador	0.000	0.000
138	Equatorial Guinea	0.000	0.000
138	Eritrea	0.000	0.000
138	Guinea-Bissau	0.000	0.000
138	Mauritania	0.000	0.000
138	Mauritius	0.000	0.000
138	Mongolia	0.000	0.000
138	Namibia	0.000	0.000
138	North Korea	0.000	0.000
138	Oman	0.000	0.000
138	Portugal	0.000	0.000
138	Romania	0.000	0.000
138	Singapore	0.000	0.000
138	Slovenia	0.000	0.000
138	eSwatini	0.000	0.000
138	The Gambia	0.000	0.000
138	Timor-Leste	0.000	0.000
138	Togo	0.000	0.000
138	Turkmenistan	0.000	0.000

B

50 Worst Terrorist Attacks in 2018

Rank	Country	Date	City	Organisation	Fatalities	Attack type
1	Afghanistan	10/8/18	Ghazni	Taliban	466	Bombing/Explosion
2	Afghanistan	15/5/18	Farah	Taliban	330	Bombing/Explosion
3	Pakistan	13/7/18	Darengarh	Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State	150	Bombing/Explosion
4	Afghanistan	27/1/18	Kabul	Taliban	104	Bombing/Explosion
5	Afghanistan	12/10/18	Dila district	Taliban	77	Armed Assault
6	Afghanistan	22/4/18	Kabul	Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State	70	Bombing/Explosion
7	Afghanistan	11/9/18	Muhmand Dara district	Unknown	69	Bombing/Explosion
8	Afghanistan	9/9/18	Day Mirdad district	Taliban	62	Unknown
9	Afghanistan	12/5/18	Farah	Taliban	61	Unknown
10	Afghanistan	11/9/18	Maywand district	Taliban	61	Armed Assault
11	Nigeria	5/5/18	Gwaska	Fulani extremists	58	Facility/Infrastructure Attack
12	Afghanistan	10/9/18	Sari Pul	Taliban	56	Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)
13	Afghanistan	20/11/18	Kabul	Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State	56	Bombing/Explosion
14	Afghanistan	12/6/18	Pur Chaman district	Taliban	51	Unknown
15	Afghanistan	3/8/18	Chora district	Taliban	51	Armed Assault
16	Syria	8/6/18	Albu Kamal	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)	51	Bombing/Explosion
17	Afghanistan	6/8/18	Azra district	Taliban	50	Armed Assault
18	Afghanistan	24/12/18	Kabul	Taliban	47	Hostage Taking (Barricade Incident)
19	Afghanistan	11/5/18	Oshan	Taliban	46	Armed Assault
20	Central African Republic	3/4/18	Tagbara	Anti-Balaka Militia	44	Armed Assault
21	Syria	20/3/18	Jaramana	Unknown	44	Bombing/Explosion
22	Afghanistan	12/2/18	Nesh district	Taliban	43	Armed Assault
23	Central African Republic	17/5/18	Alindao district	Anti-Balaka Militia	41	Armed Assault

Rank	Country	Date	City	Organisation	Fatalities	Attack type
24	Afghanistan	12/4/18	Khwaja Umari district	Taliban	40	Armed Assault
25	Somalia	9/11/18	Mogadishu	Al-Shabaab	40	Bombing/Explosion
26	Afghanistan	7/10/18	Saydabad district	Taliban	39	Armed Assault
27	Afghanistan	16/4/18	Ting	Taliban	37	Armed Assault
28	Afghanistan	16/6/18	Ghazi Amanullah Khan	Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State	37	Bombing/Explosion
29	Afghanistan	3/8/18	Gardez	Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State	36	Bombing/Explosion
30	Syria	3/6/18	Hasrat	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)	36	Unknown
31	Afghanistan	15/8/18	Kabul	Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State	35	Bombing/Explosion
32	Afghanistan	5/11/18	Qala Kah district	Taliban	35	Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)
33	Afghanistan	2/12/18	Maruf district	Taliban	35	Bombing/Explosion
34	Nigeria	13/9/18	Bolki	Fulani extremists	35	Facility/Infrastructure Attack
35	Syria	3/6/18	Ash Shafah	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)	35	Unknown
36	Afghanistan	4/5/18	Andar district	Taliban	34	Armed Assault
37	Afghanistan	17/5/18	Ajristan district	Taliban	34	Unknown
38	Afghanistan	11/11/18	Khost	Taliban	34	Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)
39	Pakistan	23/11/18	Kalaya	Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State	34	Bombing/Explosion
40	Syria	25/7/18	Al-Shibki	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)	34	Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)
41	Mali	23/6/18	Koumaga	Dogon extremists	32	Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)
42	Pakistan	25/7/18	Quetta	Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State	32	Bombing/Explosion
43	Somalia	17/3/18	Bulobarde district	Al-Shabaab	32	Unknown
44	Somalia	9/11/18	Mogadishu	Al-Shabaab	32	Bombing/Explosion
45	Afghanistan	12/6/18	Muqur	Taliban	31	Bombing/Explosion
46	Afghanistan	16/7/18	Ongah	Taliban	31	Armed Assault
47	Afghanistan	8/8/18	Sikandarkhel	Taliban	31	Unknown
48	Afghanistan	14/8/18	Arghandab district	Taliban	31	Unknown
49	Afghanistan	14/11/18	Pur Chaman district	Taliban	31	Armed Assault
50	Mali	27/4/18	Awakassa	Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS)	31	Armed Assault



GTI Methodology

The GTI ranks 163 countries based on four indicators weighted over five years.¹ A country's annual GTI score is based on a unique scoring system to account for the relative impact of incidents in the year. The four factors counted in each country's yearly score are:

- ▶ **total number of terrorist incidents in a given year**
- ▶ **total number of fatalities caused by terrorists in a given year**
- ▶ **total number of injuries caused by terrorists in a given year**
- ▶ **a measure of the total property damage from terrorist incidents in a given year.**

Each of the factors is weighted between zero and three, and a five year weighted average is applied in a bid to reflect the latent psychological effect of terrorist acts over time. The weightings shown in table C.1 was determined by consultation with the GPI Expert Panel.

The greatest weighting is attributed to a fatality.

The property damage measure is further disaggregated into four bands depending on the measured scope of the property damage inflicted by one incident. These bandings are shown in table C.2; incidents causing less than US\$1 million are accorded a weighting of 1, between \$1 million and \$1 billion a 2, and more than \$1 billion a 3 weighting. It should be noted a great majority of incidents are coded in the GTD as 'unknown' thus scoring nil with 'catastrophic' events being extremely rare.

HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE OF A COUNTRY'S GTI SCORE

To assign a score to a country each incident is rated according to the four measures. The measures are then multiplied by their weighting factor and aggregated. This is done for all incidents and then all incidents for each country are aggregated to give the country score. To illustrate, Table C.3 depicts a hypothetical country's record for a given year.

TABLE C.1

Indicator weights used in the Global Terrorism Index

Dimension	Weight
Total number of incidents	1
Total number of fatalities	3
Total number of injuries	0.5
Sum of property damages measure	Between 0 and 3 depending on severity

TABLE C.2

Property damage levels as defined in the GTD and weights used in the Global Terrorism Index

Code/ Weight	Damage Level
0	Unknown
1	Minor (likely < \$1 million)
2	Major (likely between \$1 million and \$1 billion)
3	Catastrophic (likely > \$1 billion)

TABLE C.3

Hypothetical country terrorist attacks in a given year

Dimension	Weight	Number of incidents for the given year	Calculated raw score
Total number of incidents	1	21	21
Total number of fatalities	3	36	108
Total number of injuries	0.5	53	26.5
Sum of property damages measure	2	20	40
Total raw score			195.5

Given these indicator values, this hypothetical country for that year would be assessed as having an impact of terrorism of

$$(1 \times 21) + (3 \times 36) + (0.5 \times 53) + (2 \times 20) = 195.5.$$

FIVE-YEAR WEIGHTED AVERAGE

To account for the after effects of trauma that terrorist attacks have on a society, the GTI takes into consideration the events of previous years as having a bearing on a country's current score. For instance, the scale of the 2011 terrorist attacks in Norway will continue to have a psychological impact on the population for many years to come. To account for the lingering effects of terrorism, the prior four years are also included in the scoring with a decreasing weight each year. Table C.4 highlights the weights used for each year.

TABLE C.4

Time weighting of historical scores

Year	Weight	% of Score
Current year	16	52
Previous year	8	26
Two years ago	4	13
Three years ago	2	6
Four years ago	1	3

LOGARITHMIC BANDING SCORES ON A SCALE OF 1-10

The impact of terrorism is not evenly distributed throughout the world. There are a handful of countries with very high levels of terrorism compared to most countries which experience only very small amounts, if not no terrorism. Hence, the GTI uses a base 10 logarithmic banding system between 0 and 10 at 0.5 intervals.

As shown in table C.5 this mapping method yields a total number of 21 bands. This maps all values to a band of size 0.5 within the scale of 0-10. In order to band these scores the following method is used:

1. Define the Minimum GTI Score across all countries as having a banded score of 0.
2. Define the Maximum GTI Score across all countries as having a banded score 10.
3. Subtract the Minimum from the Maximum GTI scores and calculate 'r' by:
 - a. $\text{root} = 2 \times (\text{Highest GTI Banded Score} - \text{Lowest GTI Banded Score}) = 20 \times (10 - 0) = 20$
 - b. $\text{Range} = 2 \times (\text{Highest Recorded GTI Raw Score} - \text{Lowest Recorded GTI Raw Score})$
 - c. $r = \sqrt[\text{root}]{\text{range}}$
4. The mapped band cut-off value for bin n is calculated by rn .

Following this method produces mapping of GTI scores to the set bands as defined in table C.5.

TABLE C.5

Bands used in the GTI

Band number	Bands	Band cut off values	Band number	Bands	Band cut off values
1	0	0	12	5.5	328.44
2	0.5	1.69	13	6	556.2
3	1	2.87	14	6.5	941.88
4	1.5	4.86	15	7	1595.02
5	2	8.22	16	7.5	2701.06
6	2.5	13.93	17	8	4574.08
7	3	23.58	18	8.5	7745.91
8	3.5	39.94	19	9	13117.21
9	4	67.63	20	9.5	22213.17
10	4.5	114.53	21	10	37616.6
11	5	193.95			



A note on pastoral violence in the Sahel

Herders have been driving their cattle across the Sahel region of Africa for centuries and the Fulani reportedly make up 90 per cent of these herders.¹ The Fulani are an ethnic group numbering in the order of 20 million and are found in several West and Central African countries, especially Nigeria. Many of them are nomadic or semi-nomadic herders.

Traditionally, the relationship between nomadic herders and sedentary farmers throughout the region has been relatively violence free, if at times contentious. Herders migrate seasonally to graze their livestock, and in return for grazing rights, fertilise farmland. However more recently, tensions and violence have increasingly flared between herders and farmers with some estimates suggesting that in Nigeria alone up to 60,000 people have been killed in clashes since 2001.² In Nigeria, this conflict is driven by the increases in population that have contributed to resource scarcity and desertification. Ambiguous land laws and a weak rule of law, especially in rural areas, have also played a part.

Tensions between the Fulani, the majority of whom are Muslim, and farmers, of whom the majority in Nigeria for example are Christian, is largely driven by economic causes and low levels of Positive Peace. However, extremist Islamic groups such as the

Front de Libération du Macina (FLM) in Mali have, and may continue to, build from these underlying grievances and recruit susceptible members of the Fulani ethnic group through the use of ethno-religious narratives. The FLM, which formed in 2015, has similar stated goals and methods to al Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).³ The FLM was responsible for approximately 12 per cent of terror attacks in Mali in 2015 and 2016. These attacks were responsible for ten per cent of deaths from terrorism in Mali during these two years.

Of particular concern is the increasing terror threat from radicalised Fulani in Nigeria, where there is already an ongoing violent conflict between herders and farmers. The ongoing conflict over land use in Nigeria has been exacerbated by worsening droughts, erratic rainfall and land degradation. This has contributed to thousands of deaths in recent years,⁴ resulting in a strong government response.

Events in the GTD attributed to 'Fulani Extremists' reflect the use of terrorism as a tactic in the conflict between pastoralists and farmers, rather than the existence of an organized terrorist group.

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