

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX

2017

Measuring and understanding
the impact of terrorism



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**NATIONAL CONSORTIUM FOR THE
STUDY OF TERRORISM AND RESPONSES TO TERRORISM**

A CENTER OF EXCELLENCE
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LED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND

SPECIAL THANKS to the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), a Department of Homeland Security Center of Excellence led by the University of Maryland, for their cooperation on this study and for providing the Institute for Economics and Peace with their Global Terrorism Database (GTD) datasets on terrorism.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This is the fifth edition of the Global Terrorism Index (GTI). The report provides a comprehensive summary of the key global trends and patterns in terrorism over the last 17 years in covering the period from the beginning of 2000 to the end of 2016.

The GTI is produced by the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) and is based on data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). Data for the GTD is collected and collated by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START); a Department of Homeland Security Centre of Excellence led by the University of Maryland. The GTD is considered to be the most comprehensive global dataset on terrorist activity and has now codified over 170,000 terrorist incidents.

The 2017 GTI report highlights a turning point in the fight against radical Islamist extremism. The main positive finding shows a global decline in the number of deaths from terrorist attacks to 25,673 people, which is a 22 per cent improvement from the peak in 2014. Terrorism has fallen significantly in the epicentres of Syria, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Nigeria, which are four of the five countries most affected by terrorism. The ten countries with the largest improvements experienced 7,348 fewer deaths while the 10 countries with the largest deteriorations experienced only 1,389 terrorism deaths. This highlights the strength of the positive trend with the number of people killed by terrorism decreasing for the second successive year.

The largest improvement occurred in Nigeria where terrorism deaths attributed to Boko Haram decreased by 80 per cent in 2016. However, counteracting this, was the number of terrorism deaths attributed to ISIL, which increased by 49 per cent in 2016. The majority of these deaths occurred in Iraq, which accounted for 40 per cent of the increase. ISIL has suffered major battlefield defeats and in sign of its desperation has increased the number of suicide attacks and terrorist attacks on civilians. The group has now been pushed out of most of Iraq and at time of writing no longer controls any major urban centres in the country.

However, while the global numbers of deaths and attacks improved in 2016, other trends are disturbing. More countries experienced at least one death from terrorism. This is more than at any time in the past 17 years and reflects an increase from 65 countries in 2015 to 77 in 2016. Two out of every three

countries in the Index, or 106 nations, experienced at least one terrorist attack. This is an increase from 95 attacks in the prior year and resulted in the overall global GTI score deteriorating by four per cent since 2015. Aside from the increase in terrorism in Iraq, which is related to ISIL's tactics to delay its defeat, the next largest increases were much smaller. These smaller increases occurred in South Sudan, Turkey, Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of Congo although it should be noted that the majority of Turkey's terrorism is not related to ISIL.

The major battlefield defeats of ISIL in Iraq and Syria in the 18 months prior to June 2017 signalled the beginning of the end of the group's long term territorial ambitions and military strength. As the group has lost territory, it has also suffered a significant loss of revenue, which is estimated to have declined threefold between 2015 and 2016. This decline in revenue is likely to continue throughout the remainder of 2017 and into 2018. Due to its territorial losses, the group has a dramatically smaller revenue base from tax collections with much of its oil deposits also either lost or destroyed. As its battlefield losses have intensified, many foreign and domestic fighters have deserted and sought to return to their countries of origin. These developments fundamentally undermine the group's ability to recruit based on its existing marketing strategy and brand, which has been partly centred on an image of invincibility.

More troubling, is the potential for many hardened fighters and leaders to leave Iraq and Syria to join new radical permutations of ISIL or existing ISIL affiliates in other countries. This has

contributed to a continuation of last year's trend of an expansion of ISIL expanded activities into other countries. However while the number of countries that suffered an ISIL directed attack increased from 11 in 2015 to 15 in 2016, six fewer countries suffered an attack from an ISIL affiliated group.

The major challenge facing post-conflict Iraq will be whether the government can build a more inclusive society and address the grievances that have fuelled sectarian violence and terrorist activity. There still remain large supplies of small arms and weapons as well as many former combatants and radicalised individuals.

The decline of Boko Haram following interventions from the Multinational Joint Task Force has contributed to an 80 per cent fall in the number of deaths caused by the group in 2016. Consequently there were substantial improvements in the GTI ranking of Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Chad. This coincided with the splintering of the group into three separate groups although Nigeria will likely continue to face challenges as 13 separate groups undertook attacks in 2016. This includes attacks in the Niger Delta, as well as by Fulani extremists in the Middle Belt.

The picture in Afghanistan is more complex. While the Taliban reduced their use of terrorist tactics in 2016, especially against civilians, the group stepped up their conventional armed conflict with the government. The Taliban was responsible for nearly 18,000 battle-related deaths in 2016, which is nearly 700 more than in 2015. This is the most since the war commenced in 2001. Consequently, the group expanded its direct territorial control and as of April 2017 controlled at least 11 per cent of the country and contested at least 29 per cent of Afghanistan's 398 districts.

In Europe and other developed countries, ISIL's activity was the main driver for a continuation of a negative trend. The year 2016 was the most deadly for terrorism for OECD member countries since 1988; although this analysis excludes the September 11 attacks. However, ISIL's diminishing capacity has coincided with positive trends in the first half of 2017 with the number of deaths dropping to 82 compared to 265 deaths in 2016; although this analysis excludes Turkey and Israel. Since 2014, 75 per cent of terrorist deaths in OECD countries have been ISIL directed or inspired.

Associated with this trend was a change in terrorist tactics used in OECD countries. Since 2014, there has been a general shift towards simpler attacks against non-traditional and softer civilian targets. ISIL inspired attacks also increased to 68 in 2016 from 32 in 2015. A greater number of attacks were foiled by security services with half of the attacks using bombs and explosives thwarted. Two years ago, only a third of these types of attacks were foiled by security services. These more sophisticated types of attacks involve more people and planning, and therefore are more likely to be detected. Less sophisticated attacks that can be executed at lower cost can

be more difficult to detect.

It should be noted the 2016 levels of terrorism in OECD countries is not without precedence. Since 1970 there have been nearly 10,000 deaths from terrorism in OECD countries, excluding Turkey and Israel, with 58 per cent of these deaths occurring prior to 2000. ISIL is only the fourth most deadly group and accounts for 4.7 per cent of terrorist deaths in OECD countries since 1970. Separatist groups such as Irish separatists (IRA) and Basque nationalists (ETA) have killed over 2,450 people since 1970, accounting for 26 per cent of the total deaths from terrorism since 1970.

The 2017 report highlights how terrorism remains unevenly spread throughout the world. Central America and the Caribbean continues to be the least affected region. There were only 12 deaths recorded in 2016, which accounts for less than 0.4 per cent of all terrorism deaths. Meanwhile, 94 per cent of all terrorist deaths are located in the Middle-East and North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia.

When examining the drivers of terrorism the presence of armed conflict, political violence by governments, political exclusion and group grievances remain critical factors. The analysis finds that 99 per cent of all deaths over the last 17 years has been in countries that are either in conflict or have high levels of political terror. Political terror involves extra-judicial killings, torture and imprisonment without trial. This shows that the great majority of terrorism is used as a tactic within an armed conflict or against repressive political regimes. It also demonstrates the risks of political crackdowns and counterterrorism actions that can exacerbate existing grievances and the drivers of extremism and terrorism. Both Egypt and Turkey recorded substantially higher levels of terrorism following government crackdowns.

The global economic impact of terrorism in 2016 was slightly lower than 2015 although it still cost the global economy US\$84 billion. While this is a significant number in its own right, it is important to note that the economic impact of terrorism is small compared to other major forms of violence. This amount is only one per cent of the total global economic impact of violence, which reached \$14.3 trillion in 2016. However, the figures for terrorism are conservative as they do not account for the indirect impacts on business, investment and the costs associated with security agencies in countering terrorism. As a result, terrorism is one of the few categories of violence where the costs associated with containment likely exceed its consequential costs. However, while the economic impact of terrorism is small it is still critical to contain it as it has the potential to spread quickly and with major social ramifications.

KEY FINDINGS

2017 GTI Results

1

- **Deaths caused by terrorism decreased** by 13 per cent from 2015 to 2016. There were 25,673 deaths in 2016. This is the second consecutive year that the number of deaths from terrorism have decreased. Deaths have now fallen by 22 per cent since the peak in 2014.
- **Four of the five countries with the highest impact from terrorism recorded a reduction in the number of deaths;** Afghanistan, Nigeria, Syria and Pakistan. Together with Iraq, these five countries accounted for three quarters of all deaths from terrorism in 2016.
- **Nigeria saw the greatest reduction in deaths** with 3,100 fewer people killed by terrorism in 2016 than in 2015. This was due to an 80 per cent reduction in the number of people killed by Boko Haram.
- **There were also substantial decreases in deaths from terrorism in Yemen, Afghanistan and Syria,** which collectively witnessed over 500 fewer deaths in 2016 than in the prior year.
- **However, the global GTI score deteriorated by four per cent** between 2015 and 2016 due to a record number of countries experiencing at least one death from terrorism.
- **A total of 77 countries recorded at least one death.** This is an increase from 65 countries in 2015.
- **Iraq experienced a 40 per cent increase in deaths in 2016** in reflecting the increased intensity of ISIL activity following attacks by the Iraqi Armed Forces to reclaim several major urban centres.

Trends

2

- **Since 2002, eight of the nine regions in the world experienced an increase in terrorism.** North America was the only region to experience a reduced impact.
- **Over the last 15 years, South Asia experienced the most terrorist activity** while Central and South America were least affected. The MENA region had the sharpest increase in terrorism.
- **Egypt and Turkey witnessed very large increases in terrorism** following government crackdowns. In Egypt, terrorism deaths increased nine-fold and in Turkey this figure has increased by 16 times.
- **Globally, attacks against civilians increased by 17 per cent** from 2015 to 2016. The primary targets of terrorists are private citizens and property.
- **Deaths from terrorism have risen in tandem with battle-related deaths.** From 2006 to 2016, deaths from terrorism increased 67 per cent while battle deaths increased by 66 per cent.
- **Terrorist attacks are deadlier in conflict-affected countries** where there is an average of 2.4 fatalities per attack in 2016 compared to 1.3 fatalities in non-conflict countries.

Terrorism in OECD Countries

3

- **There have been nearly 10,000 deaths from terrorism in OECD countries between 1970 and 2016** with 58 per cent of these deaths occurring prior to 2000.
- **The OECD accounted for one per cent of global deaths from terrorism in 2016.** This is an increase from 0.1 per cent in 2010.
- **The first six months of 2017 recorded fewer deaths** than the corresponding period for 2016. The first half of 2017 recorded 82 deaths compared to 265 for the whole of 2016.
- **Since 2014, there has been a shift in tactics toward simpler attacks** against non-traditional targets. ISIL has also shown that attacks against soft targets using unconventional tactics are more likely to be effective than elaborate schemes.
- **Since 2014, ISIL-directed or ISIL-inspired attacks have occurred in 18 of the 33 OECD countries** and account for three quarters of all deaths.

Characteristics of Terrorists

4

- **Over the last 17 years, 99 per cent of all terrorist deaths** occurred in countries that are either in conflict or have high levels of political terror.
- **There are multiple paths to radicalisation** and individuals can exhibit both high and low levels of education, income, religious or political knowledge.
- **Relative deprivation can also be a driver of terrorist recruitment** as it leads to the creation of an 'us vs them' mentality.
- **In the last ten years lone actor terror attacks have increased in OECD countries**, from one in 2008 to 56 in 2016. The greatest number of these attacks have occurred in the United States.

Terrorist Groups

5

- **The four deadliest terrorist groups were responsible for 59 per cent of all deaths in 2016.**
- **ISIL was the deadliest group in 2016** with a 50 per cent increase in deaths from its previous peak in 2015. The group killed 9,132 people in 2016 with the majority of these deaths occurring in Iraq.
- **However, ISIL is now near complete military defeat in Iraq and Syria** and has a greatly diminished revenue base and capacity. ISIL's revenue is estimated to have declined threefold from US\$81 million per month in 2015 to US\$16 million per month in 2016.
- **ISIL undertook directed attacks in 15 countries**, which is four more than the previous year. ISIL-affiliated groups killed a further 2,417 people and undertook attacks in 11 other countries, although this is fewer than in 2015.
- **The three other most deadly terrorist groups, Boko Haram, al-Qa'ida and the Taliban**, were each responsible for fewer deaths from terrorism in 2016.
- **There are many ways in which terrorist groups end.** Since 1970, around a third of groups have ended following the attainment of their political goals, a third due to internal splintering and a third following defeat by the military or police.

Economics of Terrorism

6

- **The global economic impact of terrorism was US\$84 billion in 2016.** This represents a seven per cent decline from the previous year and a 19 per cent decline from the peak in 2014.
- **This calculation is conservative** and does not include costs associated with countering terrorism and countering and preventing violent extremism nor the indirect costs on business from terrorism.
- **The four largest terrorist groups have diverse revenue sources** including money transfers, donations, trafficking, taxation and extortion.
- **The cost of conducting an attack in Europe has decreased significantly** with a shift towards simpler attacks. Most attacks in Europe cost less than US\$10,000 in total. This means most attacks are self-funded and do not require any external support.

ABOUT THE GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX

The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) is a comprehensive study analysing the impact of terrorism for 163 countries and which covers 99.7 per cent of the world's population.

Given the significant resources committed to counter terrorism by governments across the world, it is important to analyse and aggregate the available data to better understand its various properties.

Examples of the information contained in this study are:

- The differing socio-economic conditions under which it occurs.
- The longer term trends and how terrorism changes over time.
- The geopolitical drivers associated with terrorism and ideological aims of terrorists groups.
- The types of strategies deployed by terrorists, their tactical targets and how these have evolved over time.

In this context, one of the key aims of the GTI is to examine these trends. It also aims to help inform a positive practical debate about the future of terrorism and the required policy responses.

The GTI is based on the Global Terrorism Database (GTD); the most authoritative data source on terrorism today. The GTI produces a composite score so as to provide an ordinal ranking of countries on the impact of terrorism. The GTD is unique in that it consists of systematically and comprehensively coded data for 170,000 terrorist incidents.

The GTI was developed in consultation with the Global Peace Index Expert Panel. The GTI scores each country on a scale from 0 to 10; where 0 represents no impact from terrorism and 10 represents the highest measurable impact of terrorism. Countries are ranked in descending order with the worst scores listed first in the index.

Defining terrorism is not a straightforward matter. There is no single internationally accepted definition of what constitutes terrorism and the terrorism literature abounds with competing definitions and typologies. IEP accepts the terminology and definitions agreed to by the GTD and the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START).

The GTI therefore defines terrorism as **'the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non state actor**

to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.'

This definition recognises that terrorism is not only the physical act of an attack but also the psychological impact it has on a society for many years after. Therefore, the index score accounts for terrorist attacks over the prior five years.

In order to be included as an incident in the GTD the act has to be **'an intentional act of violence or threat of violence by a non-state actor.'** This means an incident has to meet three criteria in order for it to be counted as a terrorist act:

1. The incident must be intentional - the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator.
2. The incident must entail some level of violence or threat of violence - including property damage as well as violence against people.
3. The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors. This database does not include acts of state terrorism.

In addition to this baseline definition, two of the following three criteria have to be met in order to be included in the START database from 1997:

- The violent act was aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious or social goal.
- The violent act included evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate or convey some other message to a larger audience other than to the immediate victims.
- The violent act was outside the precepts of international humanitarian law.

In cases where there is insufficient information to make a definitive distinction about whether it is a terrorist incident within the confines of the definition, the database codes these incidents as 'doubt terrorism proper'. In order to only count unambiguous incidents of terrorism this study does not include doubted incidents.

It is important to understand how incidents are counted. According to the GTD codebook 'incidents occurring in both

the same geographic and temporal point will be regarded as a single incident but if either the time of the occurrence of the incidents or their locations are discontinuous, the events will be regarded as separate incidents.’

Illustrative examples from the GTD codebook are as follows :

- *Four truck bombs explode nearly simultaneously in different parts of a major city.* This represents four incidents.
- *A bomb goes off and while police are working on the scene the next day, they are attacked by terrorists with automatic weapons.* These are two separate incidents as they were not continuous given the time lag between the two events.
- *A group of militants shoot and kill five guards at a perimeter checkpoint of a petroleum refinery and then proceeds to set explosives and destroy the refinery.* This is one incident since it occurred in a single location (the petroleum refinery) and was one continuous event.
- *A group of hijackers diverts a plane to Senegal and, while at an airport in Senegal, shoots two Senegalese policemen.* This is one incident since the hijacking was still in progress at the time of the shooting and hence the two events occurred at the same time and in the same place.

ABOUT THE REPORT

The 2017 GTI report is comprised of seven sections:

- 1 THE RESULTS SECTION** analyses the changes in terrorism over the last year and highlights the ten countries most impacted by terrorism
- 2 THE TRENDS SECTION** section explores the overall trends in terrorism over the past 17 years.
- 3 THE TERRORISM IN OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES SECTION** discusses trends in the impact of terrorism in OECD countries.
- 4 THE CHARACTERISTICS OF TERRORISTS SECTION** explores the individual characteristics of terrorists and terrorist groups in order to shed a light on the drivers of terrorism.
- 5 THE TERRORIST GROUPS SECTION** analyses the major terrorist groups, including a historical analysis of how groups have ended in the past.
- 6 THE ECONOMICS OF TERRORISM SECTION** summarises the economic costs of terrorism and explores the financing of terrorist groups.
- 7 THE EXPERT CONTRIBUTIONS SECTION** features research from leading academics and practitioners on approaches to understanding and countering terrorism.

* Global Terrorism Database, ‘Codebook: Inclusion Criteria and Variables’, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf>, 2016, (accessed 20 September 2017).

RESULTS

RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE
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
1	Iraq	10
2	Afghanistan	9.441
3	Nigeria	9.009
4	Syria	8.621
5	Pakistan	8.4
6	Yemen	7.877
7	Somalia	7.654
8	India	7.534
9	Turkey	7.519

10	Libya	7.256
11	Egypt	7.17
12	Philippines	7.126
13	Democratic Republic of the Congo	6.967
14	South Sudan	6.821
15	Cameroon	6.787
16	Thailand	6.609
17	Ukraine	6.557
18	Sudan	6.453

19	Central African Republic	6.394
20	Niger	6.316
21	Bangladesh	6.181
22	Kenya	6.169
23	France	5.964
24	Ethiopia	5.939
25	Mali	5.88
26	Saudi Arabia	5.808
27	Lebanon	5.638

28	Burundi	5.637
29	Colombia	5.595
30	Palestine	5.551
31	China	5.543
32	United States	5.429
33	Russia	5.329
34	Chad	5.269
35	United Kingdom	5.102
36	Israel	5.062

THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM



GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2017

MEASURING THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM

RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE
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
77	Georgia	2.114
78	Bosnia and Herzegovina	2.029
79	Kyrgyz Republic	1.989
80	Laos	1.964
81	Rwanda	1.929
82	Cyprus	1.894
83	Czech Republic	1.889
84	Senegal	1.795
85	Spain	1.701
86	Ecuador	1.616

87	Brazil	1.572
88	Honduras	1.562
89	Austria	1.522
90	Denmark	1.512
90	Albania	1.487
92	Nicaragua	1.437
92	Macedonia	1.186
94	Bulgaria	1.178
95	Azerbaijan	1.153
95	Djibouti	1.119
97	Dominican Republic	0.892

98	Hungary	0.835
99	Argentina	0.807
100	Uruguay	0.779
101	Guinea	0.723
101	Sierra Leone	0.667
103	Korea	0.611
104	New Zealand	0.611
105	Guatemala	0.506
106	Taiwan	0.499
106	Moldova	0.47
108	Estonia	0.461

108	Lesotho	0.384
110	Poland	0.384
110	Ghana	0.326
112	Switzerland	0.269
112	Trinidad and Tobago	0.25
112	Slovakia	0.23
112	United Arab Emirates	0.211
116	Zimbabwe	0.202
117	Angola	0.154
117	Guyana	0.154
119	Panama	0.154

37	Myanmar	4.956	47	South Africa	4.092	57	Paraguay	3.598	67	Kazakhstan	2.95
38	Germany	4.917	48	Republic of the Congo	4.04	58	Japan	3.595	68	Sri Lanka	2.905
39	Mozambique	4.882	49	Algeria	3.97	59	Tanzania	3.413	69	Italy	2.75
40	Belgium	4.656	50	Kuwait	3.801	60	Malaysia	3.334	70	Kosovo	2.548
41	Tunisia	4.619	51	Jordan	3.788	61	Mexico	3.292	71	Peru	2.544
42	Indonesia	4.55	52	Sweden	3.756	62	Madagascar	3.287	72	Tajikistan	2.427
43	Burkina Faso	4.52	53	Iran	3.714	63	Chile	3.254	73	Netherlands	2.412
44	Nepal	4.387	54	Cote d'Ivoire	3.701	64	Ireland	3.141	74	Haiti	2.4
45	Uganda	4.319	55	Bahrain	3.668	65	Australia	3.091	75	Armenia	2.374
46	Greece	4.139	56	Venezuela	3.632	66	Canada	2.958	76	Finland	2.341



* refer to the GTI methodology in Appendix C

119	Iceland	0.125	130	Cambodia	0.038	130	Lithuania	0	130	Portugal	0
121	Liberia	0.125	130	Croatia	0.029	130	Latvia	0	130	Romania	0
122	Qatar	0.115	130	Bolivia	0.019	130	Mongolia	0	130	Singapore	0
122	Morocco	0.077	130	Benin	0	130	Mauritania	0	130	El Salvador	0
122	Montenegro	0.077	130	Botswana	0	130	Mauritius	0	130	Slovenia	0
125	Uzbekistan	0.077	130	Costa Rica	0	130	Malawi	0	130	Swaziland	0
126	Jamaica	0.058	130	Cuba	0	130	Namibia	0	130	Togo	0
126	Serbia	0.043	130	Eritrea	0	130	Norway	0	130	Turkmenistan	0
128	Belarus	0.038	130	Gabon	0	130	Oman	0	130	Timor-Leste	0
129	Bhutan	0.038	130	The Gambia	0	130	Papua New Guinea	0	130	Vietnam	0
130	Guinea-Bissau	0.038	130	Equatorial Guinea	0	130	North Korea	0	130	Zambia	0

● All attacks in 2016 scaled by number of fatalities


○ Worst attacks in 2016



TERRORIST INCIDENTS

THE TWENTY MOST FATAL TERRORIST ATTACKS IN 2016

						DESCRIPTION	
1	DATE	10/12/2016	CITY	PALMYRA	DEATHS	433	Suicide bombers attacked Palmyra killing at least 421 people. At least 12 hostages were executed on 19 January 2017.
	COUNTRY	SYRIA	GROUP	ISIL			
2	DATE	03/07/2016	CITY	BAGHDAD	DEATHS	283	Suicide bombers detonated an explosives laden vehicle at a shopping centre.
	COUNTRY	IRAQ	GROUP	ISIL			
3	DATE	07/02/2016	CITY	MOSUL	DEATHS	300	Assailants executed 300 civilian activists and security force members in Mosul.
	COUNTRY	IRAQ	GROUP	ISIL			
4	DATE	21/10/2016	CITY	MOSUL	DEATHS	284	Assailants abducted 284 civilians. All were killed in three waves at the Agricultural Facility in Mosul on 22 October 2016.
	COUNTRY	IRAQ	GROUP	ISIL			
5	DATE	19/08/2016	CITY	PAJUT	DEATHS	283	At least 250 Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition assailants and 33 people including civilians and soldiers were killed.
	COUNTRY	SOUTH SUDAN	GROUP	SPLM-IO			
6	DATE	21/04/2016	CITY	MOSUL	DEATHS	250	Assailants executed 250 women in Mosul reportedly because the victims had refused to marry ISIL members.
	COUNTRY	IRAQ	GROUP	ISIL			
7	DATE	03/10/2016	CITY	HAMMAM AL-ALIL	DEATHS	190	In Hammam al-Alil assailants executed 190 people, who were primarily former members of the Iraqi police and army.
	COUNTRY	IRAQ	GROUP	ISIL			
8	DATE	03/10/2016	CITY	KUNDUZ	DEATHS	154	Assailants attacked Kunduz city killing at least 154 people in the ensuing clashes.
	COUNTRY	AFGHANISTAN	GROUP	TALIBAN			
9	DATE	29/10/2016	CITY	HAMMAM AL-ALIL	DEATHS	130	Assailants kidnapped and executed at least 130 former police officers near Hammam al-Alil.
	COUNTRY	IRAQ	GROUP	ISIL			
10	DATE	04/01/2016	CITY	HADITHAH	DEATHS	112	Assailants attacked armed forces with explosives laden vehicles and killed at least 11 security personnel. More than 100 assailants died.
	COUNTRY	IRAQ	GROUP	ISIL			



						DESCRIPTION	
11	DATE	12/09/2016	CITY	BARARI	DEATHS	100	At least 100 assailants and suicide bombers in explosives laden vehicles were killed when they attacked police forces in Barari.
	COUNTRY	IRAQ	GROUP	ISIL			
12	DATE	28/10/2016	CITY	HAMMAM AL-ALIL	DEATHS	100	Assailants kidnapped and executed 100 former police officers near Hammam al-Alil.
	COUNTRY	IRAQ	GROUP	ISIL			
13	DATE	24/11/2016	CITY	SHOMALI	DEATHS	98	A suicide bomber detonated an explosives laden vehicle targeting buses carrying pilgrims.
	COUNTRY	IRAQ	GROUP	ISIL			
14	DATE	04/08/2016	CITY	HAWIJAH DISTRICT	DEATHS	97	Assailants abducted 3,000 fleeing civilians in Hawijah. At least 97 hostages were executed either shortly after or on 6 August 2016.
	COUNTRY	IRAQ	GROUP	ISIL			
15	DATE	11/10/2016	CITY	CHAH ANJEER	DEATHS	90	Assailants attacked security forces as they were retreating in Chah Anjeer. At least 90 soldiers and police officers were killed.
	COUNTRY	AFGHANISTAN	GROUP	TALIBAN			
16	DATE	30/01/2016	CITY	DALORI	DEATHS	88	Assailants armed with firearms and explosive devices raided Dalori village killing 88 people including three of the assailants.
	COUNTRY	NIGERIA	GROUP	BOKO HARAM			
17	DATE	14/07/2016	CITY	NICE	DEATHS	87	An assailant rammed a truck into a crowd and then opened fire on police officers. A total of 87 people were killed.
	COUNTRY	FRANCE	GROUP	LONE ACTOR			
18	DATE	05/09/2016	CITY	GIRO DISTRICT	DEATHS	85	At least 80 assailants and five security personnel were killed.
	COUNTRY	AFGHANISTAN	GROUP	TALIBAN			
19	DATE	23/11/2016	CITY	BRIA	DEATHS	85	At least 85 civilians were killed in an assault near Bria hospital.
	COUNTRY	CAR	GROUP	FPRC			
20	DATE	23/7/2016	CITY	KABUL	DEATHS	83	Suicide bombers targeted a Hazara protest killing 83 people and injuring at least 230.
	COUNTRY	AFGHANISTAN	GROUP	KHORASAN CHAPTER OF THE ISLAMIC STATE			

TERRORISM IN 2016

For the second consecutive year the total number of deaths resulting from terrorism decreased in providing some optimism for future trends.

In 2016, deaths resulting from terrorism decreased by 13 per cent to 25,673. Deaths have now fallen by 22 per cent from the peak in 2014. There has also been an increase in the number of countries that improved their GTI score: 79 countries improved while 58 countries deteriorated. Some countries, including Nigeria and Pakistan saw large improvements. However, overall the index deteriorated because the countries that deteriorated did so by a much larger degree than those that improved.

The decline in deaths is encouraging but 2016 was still the third deadliest year for terrorism since 2000 with a nearly eight-fold increase in the number of deaths over this time period.

While the intensity of terrorism in many countries has decreased, terrorism continues to spread to more countries. The average country score for the GTI, which measures the impact of terrorism, deteriorated by four per cent and reflects this spread of terrorism. There were 77 countries that experienced deaths from terrorism, which is an increase from 65 the previous year. Two thirds of all countries experienced a terrorist attack in 2016.

IMPROVEMENTS IN THE MOST AFFECTED COUNTRIES


In a positive trend, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Syria and Pakistan - which are among the five countries most impacted by terrorism - all recorded a reduction in the number of deaths from terrorism. Combined, these countries recorded 33 per cent fewer deaths. Along with Iraq, these countries accounted for three quarters of all deaths in 2016.

Nigeria recorded the biggest decrease in terrorism with 3,100 fewer people killed compared to 2015. This reflects both the success of the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram as well as fractures within the group. Boko Haram's decline also contributed to significant reductions in deaths in neighbouring countries with Cameroon, Chad and Niger collectively recording a 75 per cent reduction in deaths or over 1,000 fewer deaths.

Improvements were also seen in Afghanistan with 14 per cent fewer deaths compared to the previous year. This decline in deaths from terrorism reflects the Taliban's engagement in more traditional conflict activities against the Afghan National

FIGURE 1.1 DEATHS FROM TERRORISM, 2014-2015


There was a 13% reduction in deaths from terrorism in 2016. The majority of the improvement came from seven countries and more than offset the deterioration in Iraq.



“ Deaths have fallen by 22 per cent from the peak in 2014.

FIGURE 1.2 DEATHS FROM TERRORISM, 2000-2016

Deaths from terrorism continued to decline with total deaths decreasing by 22% from the peak in 2014.



Source: START GTD, IEP calculations

Guard in focusing on territorial gains rather than terrorist activity. There were nearly 18,000 battle-related deaths in 2016, which is nearly 700 more than in 2015 and is the most since the war in Afghanistan began in 2001. These battle-related deaths saw Afghanistan record the second highest number of all deaths in 2016 with 4,574 deaths attributed to terrorism.

Syria has seen the most dramatic increases in terrorism in the last decade with this increase coinciding with the start of the ongoing conflict in 2011. However, in 2016 it recorded its first reduction since 2011. The number of deaths from terrorism decreased 24 per cent from the previous year to 2,102. This reduction reflects the reform efforts of the al-Nusra Front, which has sought to portray itself as an anti-Assad rebel group rather than as a terrorist organisation loyal to al-Qa'ida. As such in 2016 it renamed itself Jabhat Fateh al-Sham. As a result of this transition, the group killed nearly 500 fewer people through terrorist acts in 2016 when compared to the previous year. However this still resulted in 105 deaths. The decline in deaths attributed to this group accounts for three quarters of the decline of deaths from terrorism in Syria.

Pakistan also recorded a decrease in the number of people killed by terrorism with a 12 per cent reduction to 956 deaths. This is the lowest number of deaths since 2006. This decline reflects a slight decrease in the activity of Sindh in southeast Pakistan with the Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) placing greater focus on Afghanistan.

There were also substantially fewer deaths in Yemen with a 58 per cent reduction in 2016 to 641 deaths. Yemen continued to be embroiled in a civil war that has become internationalised with the involvement of both Saudi Arabia and Iran, which are supporting opposing militias. The decline in fatalities in 2016 reflects the various peace talks and truces that took place last year with the Houthi group, Ansar Allah responsible for 70 per

cent fewer deaths. However, the humanitarian situation remains dire with at least three million Yemenis internally displaced as a result of the conflict.¹

IRAQ CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE

The improvement recorded in Afghanistan, Nigeria, Syria and Pakistan is contrasted with a 40 per cent increase in deaths from terrorism in Iraq. In 2016, Iraq recorded 9,765 deaths, which is only slightly shy of the 2014 peak of 9,924. This increase in deaths is largely attributable to the changed activity of ISIL in Iraq. In 2016, as the international coalition against ISIL in Iraq systematically re-captured territory, ISIL responded by increasing terrorist attacks especially in the provinces of Kirkuk, Nineveh and Saladin.

IMPACT ON OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES

The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member countries recorded a further increase in terrorism since 2015 with 27 of the 35 OECD countries witnessing a terrorist attack in 2016. This is up from 22 the previous year. Additionally, there were deadly attacks in 13 countries, which is two more than the previous year. The OECD is a grouping of economically developed nations. The GTI excludes Israel and Turkey from its categorisation of the OECD as the nature of the terrorist threat in these countries has specific historical origins and intensity. Deaths in Turkey increased by nearly double, up to 658 in 2016. As a result, for the first time Turkey was listed as one of the ten countries most impacted by terrorism.

CHANGES IN THE INDEX

More countries are experiencing moderate to high levels of terrorism. Nine countries scored more than 7.5 out of 10 in the index in 2016; this is two more than in 2015 and the highest

number of countries in the 15 years covered by the index. Additionally, more countries recorded moderate levels of terrorism. Seventy-one countries scored at least 2.5 out of 10 in the GTI, up from 66 in the previous year. This resulted in an overall deterioration of four per cent in the average GTI score.

MOST ACTIVE TERRORIST GROUPS

ISIL was the deadliest terrorist group in 2016 and killed 50 per cent more people than in 2015. The year 2016 was the group's deadliest year ever with ISIL accountable for 9,132 deaths; the majority of which occurred in Iraq. ISIL undertook attacks in 15 countries, which is four more than the previous year. ISIL affiliated groups killed a further 2,417 people and undertook attacks in another 11 countries, although this is six less than the previous year.

The three next deadliest terrorist groups all were responsible for fewer fatalities than in the previous year. Together, Boko Haram, the Taliban and al-Qa'ida killed 6,000 fewer people than in 2015. Boko Haram, which was the deadliest terrorist group in 2014 with 6,700 deaths, is now the third deadliest terrorist group, with their total number of attributable deaths dropping to 1,079 in 2016. Boko Haram has been targeted by the Multinational Joint Task Force and has also splintered into three distinct groups because of the mounting pressure from military defeats.

Terrorism deaths attributed to the Taliban declined by 21 per cent in 2016. However, this figure is offset by a high number of

battle-related deaths, which increased to nearly 18,000. This is the most battle-related deaths since the conflict began in 2001. This decline in terrorism deaths but increase in battle-related deaths reflects the evolution of the protracted conflict in Afghanistan in recent years. In 2016, the Taliban took control of more areas of Afghanistan and subsequently are engaging in fewer terrorist attacks in a bid to increase local legitimacy and support.


Al-Qa'ida and its affiliates accounted for 35 per cent fewer fatalities in 2016. This reduction was mostly driven by fewer terrorist attacks conducted by its affiliate in Syria, the al-Nusra Front.

COUNTRIES WITH THE MOST DEATHS FROM TERRORISM

Five countries account for three quarters of all deaths from terrorism: Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Nigeria and Pakistan. These same countries have been the five most affected by terrorism every year since 2013. For the first time Turkey was one of the ten most affected countries. This is due to the increased activity of the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) and ISIL. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has rejoined the ten countries with the most deaths from terrorism for the first time since 2010 with 479 deaths in 2016. The tenth placed country, South Sudan, suffered 472 deaths in 2016. Excluding the ten countries with the highest deaths from terrorism, the actual number of terrorism deaths in 2016 declined by 800 to 3,454.

FIGURE 1.3 COUNTRIES WITH THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF DEATHS FROM TERRORISM, 2016

Five countries account for three quarters of all deaths from terrorism.



Source: START GTD, IEP calculations

LARGEST DECREASES & INCREASES IN TERRORISM 2015-2016

Eight of the ten countries with the largest reductions in terrorism related deaths in 2016 had major military operations targeting terrorist groups.

Nigeria recorded its second consecutive year of reductions with a 63 per cent drop to 1,832 deaths. The Multinational Joint Task Force, which includes forces from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria, has targeted Boko Haram, which is based in Nigeria. Accordingly, there were also reductions in terrorism-related deaths in neighbouring Cameroon, Chad and Niger where Boko Haram has also been subject to intense military pressure.

Yemen had the second largest decline in deaths with a reduction of 58 per cent. This is in part a reflection of the maturing nature of the conflict with various ceasefires brokered in 2016. However, there has not been a commensurate reduction in terrorist attacks. This is often seen when groups wish to demonstrate their capabilities through attacks but do not want fatalities to interfere with negotiations.

Afghanistan continued to record very high levels of deaths from terrorism. There was a reduction of 14 per cent to 4,574


deaths but the year 2016 was still the second deadliest year. This reduction reflects the Taliban's sizeable territorial gains and subsequent change in tactics as it consolidates its territory.

Syria had the fourth biggest decrease in terrorism deaths in 2016 with a reduction of 24 per cent compared to the previous year. This reduction reflects ISIL reconcentrated efforts in Iraq where it was losing substantial territory. Furthermore, the terrorist organisation, the al-Nusra Front, has attempted to reposition itself as an anti-Assad rebel group and hence has engaged in fewer terrorist attacks in order to strengthen its potential negotiating position. The al-Nusra Front was responsible for 105 deaths in 2016, which is nearly 500 fewer than the previous year and accounts for three quarters of the decline in deaths in Syria.

In 2016, 293 people were killed by terrorism in Egypt, which is a 56 per cent reduction compared to 2015. In 2015, there was one high fatality attack with the downing of a passenger flight,

FIGURE 1.4 LARGEST DECREASES IN TERRORISM DEATHS FROM 2015 TO 2016

Nigeria had the largest decrease in deaths from terrorism, recording over 3,000 fewer deaths.



Source: START GTD, IEP calculations

which resulted in 224 fatalities. However, even if this one attack was excluded the reduction this year would still have been a substantial 33 per cent.

The ongoing decline in deaths from terrorism in Ukraine reflects the declining intensity of the conflict there. There were only 11 deaths in 2016 compared to 665 deaths in 2014 and 358 deaths in 2015. Most of these deaths were caused by the Donetsk People’s Republic. This is reminiscent of the 2008 Russo-Georgian conflict which was concentrated in South Ossetia. Without any formal settlement, tensions still continue.


Similarly, the reduction in deaths in Kenya reflects a shift in al-Shabaab’s strategy, which resulted in fewer attacks in 2016. Al-Shabaab is based in Somalia and is the most active terrorist group in Kenya. Al-Shabaab has killed over 4,000 people since it was established in 2006 and is the subject of an international military coalition involving Somalia, the United States and the African Union Mission. In 2016 the group’s deadliest attack in Kenya killed 12 people at a guesthouse in Mandera. This in part reflects al-Shanaab’s renewed focus on Somalia, where the group undertook 36 per cent more attacks in 2016. This increase in attacks killed ten per cent more people when compared to the previous year. In prior years, there have been several extremely deadly attacks by al-Shabaab in Kenya. This includes the attack at Westgate Mall in Nairobi in 2013, which killed 72 people and the attack at Garissa University College in 2015, which killed 152 people.

“ Iraq had by far the largest increase in terrorism since 2015 with 2,800 more deaths in 2016.

Iraq had by far the largest increase in terrorism since 2015 with 2,800 more deaths in 2016. This is due to an increase in activity by ISIL. Other countries had more modest increases. The nine other countries with the largest increases had a combined total of 3,105 deaths in 2016. Of these countries, five had increases of less than 100 deaths with the increase in several of these countries due to a few high fatality attacks rather than an increase in the number of attacks. In Myanmar, two attacks targeting the police killed 18 people, which represents over half of the increase in deaths in 2016. Similarly, in Belgium, a country which had no deaths in terrorism in 2015, the increase was almost entirely due to the attacks in Brussels in March 2016 which killed 35.

FIGURE 1.5 LARGEST INCREASES IN TERRORISM DEATHS FROM 2015 TO 2016

Iraq had by far the largest increase in terrorism since 2015 with 2,800 more deaths in 2016.



Source: START GTD, IEP calculations

REGIONAL OVERVIEW

The vast majority of terrorism occurs in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa regions. Collectively these regions account for 84 per cent of all attacks and 94 per cent of deaths. In contrast, Central America and the Caribbean accounted for the lowest levels of terrorism with only 0.05 per cent of attacks and deaths.

The MENA region witnessed the largest number of both attacks and fatalities. However, sub-Saharan Africa has been the most deadly region in terms of fatalities per attack with an average of 4.8 deaths per attack in 2016.

There are regional variations in terms of who is attacked and the methods used however in all regions civilians are frequently targeted. In MENA and sub-Saharan Africa civilian attacks accounted for 60 and 56 per cent of attacks respectively in 2016. In both regions government infrastructure and personnel were targeted less frequently, in accounting for eight per cent and 20 per cent of attacks respectively. In Europe, civilians were the target of 41 per cent of attacks while a quarter of attacks targeted the police and military. There were 150 attacks on police and military targets in 2016 compared to 192 attacks aimed at civilians.


Civilians were also predominately targeted in Asia-Pacific and accounted for 40 per cent of attacks. Government targets accounted for 31 per cent of attacks, while attacks targeting the military and police combined accounted for only 18 per cent of attacks. In stark contrast to all other regions, Central America and the Caribbean had a third of its attacks directed at journalists and non-governmental organisations. This regional variation reflects high local levels of organised crime.

TYPES OF ATTACKS

Globally, bombings and explosions accounted for 54 per cent of attacks in 2016. Armed assaults was the next most common form of attack in accounting for 18 per cent followed by hostage takings and assassinations at 17 per cent each. Facility or infrastructure attacks accounted for only six per cent of all attacks.

FIGURE 1.6 NUMBER OF DEATHS AND ATTACKS BY REGION, 2016

MENA had the highest number of deaths and attacks in 2016 followed by South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.



Source: START GTD, IEP calculations

Different tactics are preferred by certain groups in different regions. Bombings and explosions account for the majority of attacks and are very common in MENA in accounting for 71 per cent of the region's attacks. This reflects the region's long history of conflict and more sophisticated bomb-making expertise. In contrast, hostage taking or assassinations accounted for only 12 per cent despite their frequent high profile media coverage. Armed assaults accounted for only ten per cent of the attacks and the remaining seven per cent was directed against infrastructure or other targets.


In contrast, bombings and explosions account for only 31 per cent of attacks in sub-Saharan Africa, while armed assaults account

for another 32 per cent of attacks. Notably, hostage taking and assassinations are also relatively high in sub-Saharan Africa at 25 per cent. This reflects the strategies of sub-Saharan Africa's two biggest groups, Boko Haram and al-Shabaab, who both utilise a variety of tactics.

Bombings and explosions were also dominant in Europe. However, unlike in MENA, the majority of bombings in Europe resulted in no deaths. Facility and infrastructure, including arson attacks against buildings such as mosques, were highest in North America with 31 attacks. However, none of these North American attacks resulted in any deaths. The Other category in Figure 1.8 includes ramming attacks with vehicles, hijacking and unarmed assault.

FIGURE 1.7 PERCENTAGE OF ATTACKS BY TARGET TYPE, 2016


Civilians are targeted in most attacks in MENA and sub-Saharan Africa.



Source: START GTD, IEP calculations

FIGURE 1.8 PERCENTAGE OF ATTACKS BY ATTACK TYPE, 2016

Hostage taking or assassinations accounted for only 12% despite frequent media coverage.



Source: START GTD, IEP calculations

THE TEN COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM

The ten countries most impacted by terrorism in 2016 were:

- | | |
|----------------|------------|
| 1. Iraq | 6. Yemen |
| 2. Afghanistan | 7. Somalia |
| 3. Nigeria | 8. India |
| 4. Syria | 9. Turkey |
| 5. Pakistan | 10. Libya |

Nine of these countries featured on last year's list with the only change being the inclusion of Turkey and the exclusion of Egypt. However, an examination of the longer term 14 year trend shows that only Pakistan, India and Afghanistan would have been ranked among the 10 countries most impacted by terrorism in 2002.

In 2002, neither Libya nor Syria were included in the list and both had relatively low GTI rankings of 120 and 118 respectively. However, in 2016, their rankings were tenth and fourth respectively. The ranking of both countries has been deteriorating since 2011 following events that coincided with the Arab Uprisings. It likely highlights a lack of institutional resilience in both countries in their ability to absorb sudden internal and external shocks. More broadly, the examples of Syria and Libya reflect a trend whereby all ten countries, with the exception of India, have seen substantial increases in their GTI scores since 2002. By contrast, India's score has remained steady


for the last ten years and reflects the country's long history of being persistently affected by terrorism-related violence.

In 2002, these ten countries combined witnessed 245 terrorist attacks with 60 per cent of these attacks occurring in one country; India. However, by 2016, both the number and the spread of attacks in these countries had dramatically increased to 8,226 attacks; an increase of nearly 25 times. In illustrating the size of this increase, Libya experienced the fewest attacks in this cohort with over 330 attacks in 2016. Yet this figure alone is higher than the total number recorded for all ten countries in 2002.

The rise in terrorism in these ten countries is reflective of a global trend. Six of these countries were involved in internal conflict, which has facilitated and led to an increase in terrorism. With the exception of India, each of these countries has a single terrorist group that is responsible for the majority of deaths. Some groups, such as Boko Haram in Nigeria, actually pre-date the rise in terrorism. However, other countries, such as Yemen, have been impacted by events which have led to the rise of terrorist groups. In other countries, such as Libya and Syria, terrorism has followed the destabilisation of the government, while in others, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, terrorism has resulted from a foreign power invasion.

FIGURE 1.9 GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX SCORES OVER TIME FOR TEN MOST IMPACTED COUNTRIES IN 2016, 2002-2016





All of the countries ranked as the ten most impacted in 2016, other than India, have seen significant deterioration in their GTI scores over time.



Source: IEP

IRAQ

GTI RANK | 1
GTI SCORE | 10



Levels of terrorism in Iraq were very low prior to the 2003 invasion. The destabilisation of the country led to a steady rise in terrorism and for the last 13 years it has consistently been the country most impacted by terrorism. In 2016, Iraq experienced its worst year with a 40 per cent increase in deaths. This increase resulted in 2,803 more deaths with a total of 9,765 people killed.

There have been two notable peak periods of terrorism in Iraq; the first occurred in 2007 and then fell with the US troop surge; the second commenced in 2011 and has been dominated by the rise of ISIL. The group's expansion exploited increased sectarian hostilities between Shi'a and Sunnis, an inefficient Iraqi military and the start of the Syrian civil war.²

In 2014, ISIL engaged in significant levels of terrorism in Iraq as it captured and consolidated territory. By 2015, the group controlled large swathes of territory and had a greater focus on the establishment of its self-proclaimed caliphate.

However, in 2016, there was a large increase in attacks undertaken by ISIL. This increase was responsible for three quarters of all terrorist attacks in Iraq that year. ISIL carried out a total of nearly 1,000 attacks. This is an increase of 22 per cent from 2015 and resulted in 7,351 deaths.

This increase in attacks was in direct reaction to the territorial losses the group suffered following interventions by the international coalition against ISIL in Iraq. The international



“...for the last 13 years Iraq has consistently been the country most impacted by terrorism.”

coalition's systematic recapture of territory, including the cities of Baiji, Fallujah and Ramadi, drove ISIL to re-engage in terrorist tactics to spread fear and to discourage Iraqi Armed Forces.



ISIL is the deadliest terrorist group in Iraq's history and is responsible for over 18,000 deaths between 2013 and 2016. Forty per cent of these deaths occurred in 2016. Other groups active in Iraq in 2016 include Shi'a groups that, in some cases are supported by Iran, such as Kata'ib Hezbollah³ and Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq.⁴ However combined these lesser known groups were responsible for just over 100 deaths in 2016.

AFGHANISTAN

GTI RANK | **2**
GTI SCORE | **9.441**



TOTAL DEATHS SINCE 2000



Afghanistan had the second highest number of deaths from terrorism in 2016. However this was 14 per cent lower than the previous year in large part due to reduced terrorist activity by the Taliban. While this reduced number of deaths provides some optimism, it is the second highest number of deaths recorded from terrorism in Afghanistan since the 2002 US invasion.

The Taliban was responsible for 94 per cent of attacks by known groups in Afghanistan in 2016. However, the tactics of the Taliban appear to be evolving somewhat from previous years. While the number of battle-related deaths in 2015 and 2016 increased by five per cent to 18,000, the opposite occurred with terrorism related deaths which reduced by 23 per cent in 2016. This trend reflects the move by the Taliban to engage in more traditional conflict tactics against the Afghan National Guard and focus on territorial gains rather than terrorist activity. As of April 2017, the Taliban had control over 11 per cent of the country and contested another 29 per cent of Afghanistan's 398 districts.⁵

Terrorist attacks, in the context of an ongoing armed conflict, can serve a range of purposes. Attacks which focus on government, military and police targets aim to discourage support for the Afghan Government, dissuade people from joining government organisations and dishearten members of the police and the Afghan National Guard. Conversely, attacks on civilians aim to illustrate that the government is unable to provide security.

Although the overall number of deaths from terrorism is down, the Taliban has engaged in more attacks that specifically target civilians. In 2016, there were 252 attacks against civilians that killed 1,217 people. This is an increase of 16 per cent and resulted in a 24 per cent increase in deaths from the previous year. Over half of the deaths from these attacks resulted from armed assaults while bombings accounted for a quarter of all deaths. The remaining fatal attacks resulted from kidnappings and assassinations. Nearly a third of attacks targeting civilians occurred in the four northern provinces; Baghlan, Faryab, Samangan and Sari Pul. Deaths from terrorism doubled in these provinces from the prior year.

The Taliban is committing fewer attacks on their traditional targets. There were 38 per cent fewer attacks on the government, 41 per cent fewer attacks on police and 20 per cent fewer against the Afghan National Guard. However, attacks on these targets still accounted for just over half of all attacks.

The ISIL affiliated Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State continued to be active in Afghanistan in 2016. The group undertook 51 attacks that killed 505 people. This is a significant escalation from 2015 when 120 people were killed by the group and it is trend that is likely to continue as more former members of Tehrik-e Taliban (TPP) join the chapter.




NIGERIA

GTI RANK | **3**
GTI SCORE | **9.009**


1,832  DEAD

919  INJURED

466  INCIDENTS



TOTAL DEATHS SINCE 2000



Nigeria saw the biggest decrease in deaths from terrorism in 2016. Deaths dropped by 63 per cent from 4,940 in 2015 to 1,832. This is a further decline from the peak in 2014 when over 7,500 people were killed. This significant decrease has coincided with successful military actions against various terrorist groups coupled with a decline in domestic support for these groups due to their coercive approaches to recruitment and the pillaging of villages.

Boko Haram killed over 12,000 people in Nigeria through terrorist attacks committed between 2013 and 2015. However it was responsible for only 762 deaths in 2016; which is a decline of 81 per cent from the previous year. This decline reflects the success of the Multinational Joint Task Force comprising Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria as well as fractures within the group.

Like other jihadist groups, Boko Haram has split into competing factions based in part on the acceptability of certain tactics. One faction has encouraged extreme violence against those who it deems to be apostates, another seeks affiliation with ISIL and yet another retains affiliation with al-Qa'ida. It has been reported that negotiations between the Nigerian government and the latter two factions have taken place with the intention of isolating the former faction.




A similar split occurred between ISIL and al-Qa'ida in Iraq in 2014 with al-Qa'ida discouraging ISIL's practice of excessively

targeting civilians and viewing Sh'ia as apostates. In some ways this is a debate over how close a terrorist group should align with the strategy outlined in a 2004 book, *The Management of Savagery*. The work by an al-Qa'ida aligned strategist, outlines how a campaign of continual violence can lead to the establishment of a caliphate.



Even with the decline in attacks by Boko Haram, Nigeria will likely continue to face terrorism as 13 separate groups undertook attacks in 2016. There have been attacks by 37 separate groups in Nigeria since 2000. This includes attacks in the Niger Delta, as well as by Fulani extremists in the Middle Belt who undertook more attacks and were responsible for more deaths than Boko Haram in 2016. These attacks take place in the context of ongoing tension between nomadic herders and sedentary farmers throughout the region and which are exacerbated by resource scarcity and desertification. Fulani are an ethnic group of 20 million people found across West and Central Africa and who account for around 90 per cent of herders.⁶ Only a small subset of herders, so-called Fulani extremists, engage in attacks and there is confusion as to whether there is any communication or coordination between attackers. According to the Global Terrorism Database, Fulani extremists killed over 2,500 people in Nigeria countries between 2012 and 2016.

SYRIA

GTI RANK | **4**
GTI SCORE | **8.621**



TOTAL DEATHS SINCE 2000



Terrorism in Syria is linked to the ongoing civil war which began in 2011. Prior to the conflict, Syria ranked 57 in the GTI and was better placed than the Netherlands. It now ranks fourth. This rapid deterioration highlights the devastating impact of the civil war.

Nevertheless, deaths from terrorism represent only a fraction of the deaths associated with conflict. Estimates of the number of people killed from 2011 onwards vary but it is likely to be over half a million people. Most of these deaths are classified as a result of warfare rather than acts of terrorism. For example there were 50,000 battle-related deaths from the conflict in 2016.

There has been a proliferation of groups active in Syria that undertake terrorism. This figure has increased from nine in 2014 to 17 in 2015 and currently stands at 23 active groups.




In 2016, around three quarters of deaths from terrorism in Syria were committed by ISIL, which killed 1,504 people. Over half of all ISIL's terrorist activities targeted civilians and civilian deaths accounted for over half of the deaths caused by the group. ISIL also targeted businesses, utilities and religious sites such as the suicide attack at a Shi'a shrine which killed 83 people. Most deaths resulted from bombings and explosions, including suicide bombings that targeted crowds. Suicide bombings were much more deadly than other tactics with an average of 17 more deaths per attack.

“...deaths from terrorism represent only a fraction of the deaths associated with the Syrian conflict.”



Nevertheless, Syria saw a 24 per cent decrease in deaths from terrorism in 2016 compared to the previous year. This was partially due to the changing strategy of the al-Nusra Front. The group renamed itself Jabhat Fateh al-Sham in 2016 with the aim of re-positioning itself as an anti-Assad rebel group rather than as an al-Qa'ida affiliated terrorist organisation. As a result of this transition, the group's activities accounted for nearly 500 fewer deaths in 2016 than the previous year. This change in strategy and the evolution of the al-Nusra Front accounts for three quarters of the decline in terrorism in Syria. Like ISIL, most attacks attributed to al-Nusra were bombings and explosions that targeted civilians. In an apparent attempt to further distance itself from al-Qa'ida, a new alliance called Hayat Tahrir al-Sham was announced on 28 January 2017 following a merger with four smaller factions.⁷

PAKISTAN

GTI RANK | **5**
GTI SCORE | **8.4**



TOTAL DEATHS SINCE 2000



For the third consecutive year Pakistan has witnessed fewer terrorist attacks and deaths. In 2016, there were 956 deaths from terrorism; the lowest number in a decade. This is a 12 per cent decrease from the previous year and a 59 per cent decline from the peak in 2013.

These improvements are notable as Pakistan has a long history of high levels of terrorism and this year's result is the best in a decade. Since 2007, Pakistan has ranked as at least the fourth worst country for terrorism and on six occasions was ranked second.

“ The reduction in deaths from terrorism is in part attributable to Operation Zarb-e-Azb by the Pakistani Army; a military effort which started in mid-2014.

The trend of reduced deaths reflects the decline in activity of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP); which has killed the most people in Pakistan. Since 2000, TTP has been responsible for at least 4,500 deaths, which account for over half of all deaths from terrorism by known groups.

The reduction in deaths from terrorism is in part attributable to Operation Zarb-e-Azb by the Pakistani Army; a military effort which started in mid-2014. The operation focused on destroying militant safe havens in the North Waziristan district of the federally administered tribal areas. As a result of this operation, the military estimates that over 3,500 TTP members have been killed. It is also assumed that many more members have fled into Afghanistan, which unfortunately has bolstered the number of Taliban fighters in Afghanistan.

TTP was responsible for 283 deaths in 2016, which accounted for 30 per cent of total deaths from terrorism that year. However it should be noted that 30 per cent of all deaths are not claimed by any group. Most of these deaths resulted from suicide bombings. The largest bombing targeted Christians celebrating Easter Sunday at Gulishan-e-Iqbal Park in Lahore and killed 79 people. This was the deadliest attack in Pakistan since the 2014 attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar which killed 151 people.

Other groups active in Pakistan include the ISIL-affiliated Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State. This chapter, which also operates in Afghanistan, was responsible for 16 per cent of deaths in Pakistan. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, a Sunni jihadist group, continued to be active in Pakistan in 2016 and accounted for 11 per cent of deaths. At least seven different Baloch nationalist groups in the southwest undertook attacks in 2016 which resulted in 61 deaths from 60 separate attacks.




YEMEN

GTI RANK | **6**
GTI SCORE | **7.877**



641  DEAD

812  INJURED

366  INCIDENTS



TOTAL DEATHS SINCE 2000



Like the situation in Syria with the on-going civil war, terrorism reflects only a portion of the effects of the Yemeni conflict on the general population. UN sources estimate the Yemeni conflict killed 10,000 civilians in the first few months of 2017.⁸ Further, it is estimated the conflict has internally displaced at least three million Yemenis out of a total population of 27.6 million.⁹

Overshadowed by the violence associated with this on-going conflict was a notable decline of 58 per cent in deaths from terrorism. This figure dropped to 641 deaths last year compared to 1,519 in 2015. This significant decline reflects the progress of various peace talks and truces that took place during 2016. Negotiations in particular with the Houthi group, Ansar Allah, contributed to 70 per cent fewer deaths in 2016. This group was the most active of ten groups that committed terrorist attacks in Yemen in 2016. Other groups include five different ISIL affiliated groups. However, Ansar Allah was responsible for 57 per cent of the attacks; the majority of which were in Taizz in the Yemen's south west Highlands.

Ansar Allah are part of the broader Houthis militant Islamist insurgency, which attracts followers from the Zaydi sect of Shi'ism. The socio-political movement emerged from Sa'dah, in northern Yemen in the 1990s and has intermittently fought against the central government since 2004. The movement initially sought an end to economic underdevelopment, political

marginalisation and perceived discrimination in Zaydi areas. The movement also sought greater autonomy in Zaydi predominant areas. The Houthis are in conflict with the Sunni-majority government as well as other groups active in the conflict.

In 2016 Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was responsible for 13 per cent of terror attacks in Yemen in killing 111 people. Most of these attacks were in areas where ISIL affiliated groups are active. AQAP primarily attacked police and government targets through suicide bombings, armed assaults and assassination attempts. In contrast it targeted civilians through kidnappings, public stonings and explosives.

In 2015 there was a sudden increase in the presence of ISIL affiliate groups which collectively were responsible for 21 per cent of deaths that year. The influence of these groups has persisted and in 2016 attacks by these groups accounted for 23 per cent of deaths. These affiliates all operate within specific geographic locations within Yemen; the Hadramawt Province of the Islamic State undertakes attacks in Hadramawt, the Adan-Abyan Province of the Islamic State in Adan, Al Bayda Province of the Islamic State in Al Bayda and Sana'a Province of the Islamic State in Amanat Al Asimah.


SOMALIA

GTI RANK | **7**
GTI SCORE | **7.654**


740  DEAD

943  INJURED

359  INCIDENTS




- ATTACKS BY TARGET**
- Private citizens and property
 - Government
 - Military, militia or terrorist groups
 - Police
 - Other



- DEATHS BY GROUP**
- Al-Shabaab
 - Unknown

TOTAL DEATHS SINCE 2000



Terrorism in Somalia continues to be synonymous with al-Shabaab. In 2016, al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for over 92 per cent of deaths from terrorism. However it is likely that they were involved in the remaining 61 deaths where no group claimed responsibility. Al-Shabaab has been responsible for at least 100 deaths from terrorism every year in Somalia since 2008. It has also conducted at least 70 per cent of all terrorist attacks in Somalia since 2000.

The persistence of the group contributed to 2016 being the second deadliest year in Somalia since 2000. The number of terrorism deaths increased by 12 per cent despite some success with Operation Indian Ocean. The military operation, which commenced in August 2014, includes forces from the Somali military, African Union, and U.S. military. It has successfully killed many al-Shabaab's operatives, including the group's leader, Moktar Ali Zubeyr, who was killed by a US drone strike in September 2014. His replacement Ahmad Umar has reinforced al-Shabaab's allegiance to al-Qa'ida.

Al-Shabaab slightly shifted tactics in 2016 to increasingly target private citizens with attacks rising from 28 per cent to 34 per cent. There was a corresponding change in attacks on government employees where attacks dropped by 8 per cent to 26 per cent. However, these attacks resulted in many less deaths. In 2015, these attacks resulted in 52 per cent of all deaths, yet accounted for only 15 per cent in 2016. Suicide bombings and explosions were the most common type of attack.

“ Tactics increasingly targeted private citizens with attacks increasingly became more deadly...

As a consequence of this new tactic focusing on private citizens, attacks increasingly became more deadly and accounted for 37 per cent of the total deaths. An example was seen with the bombing of a passenger bus in Lafoole which killed 20 people. Attacks against businesses also increased, largely in the form of suicide bombings at hotels and cafes. Al-Shabaab conducted 28 suicide bombings that killed on average eight people per attack. In contrast, armed assaults killed nearly three people per attack. Other tactics used by al-Shabaab include the planting of explosives, assassinations and kidnappings. Most attacks continue to focus on the south with 69 per cent of attacks and 74 per cent of deaths occurring in Banaadir, Bay, Lower Juba and Lower Shebelle.

The only other group who claimed responsibility for an attack in 2016 was Ahlu-sunah Wal-jamea; a paramilitary group opposed to al-Shabaab. In 2016 the group undertook two attacks but neither resulted in any deaths.



INDIA

GTI RANK | **8**
GTI SCORE | **7.534**


340  DEAD

636  INJURED

929  INCIDENTS



TOTAL DEATHS SINCE 2000



In 2016, India witnessed an increase of 18 per cent in the number of deaths resulting from terrorism when compared to 2015. However, this is still the third lowest number of people killed by terrorism since 2000. From 2002 to 2015 India has been ranked between second and sixth on the GTI. In the last two years India's ranking improved to eighth. However despite the decrease in deaths over the last two years, the number of terrorist attacks have actually increased. There were 16 per cent more attacks in 2016 than in 2015 in continuing the four year trend of increasing attacks.

India has the lowest rate of deaths per attack among the ten countries most affected by terrorism. The nine other countries had an average of 2.7 deaths per attack whereas in India there were on average 0.4 deaths per attack. Most of the attacks which did not result in any deaths were bombings or explosions which were often laid outside of houses or government buildings and which detonated away from crowds. These bombings were largely by Maoist groups such as the Communist Party of India. This discrepancy between the number of attacks and deaths reflects how the nature of terrorism in India differs when compared to other countries. There is a large number of terrorist groups but many are seeking political recognition and so their attacks are not aimed at killing people. Accordingly, most terrorist attacks in India have low casualties. Over three quarters of attacks in 2016 were non-lethal with only two per cent of attacks resulting in more than two deaths. In reflecting

this there were many groups which committed terrorist acts that did not kill a single person with only 20 of India's 56 terrorist groups responsible for fatalities.




More than half of all deaths were committed by Maoists operating in the eastern, central and the southern areas of India known as the Red Corridor. Police and private citizens were predominately targeted with subsequent attacks accounting for over half of all attacks and 88 per cent of deaths.

The dispute with Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir remains the main source of Islamist terrorism. The two deadliest Islamist terrorist groups in 2015 in India were Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Hizbul Mujahideen, both of which are also operating in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh. LeT mainly operates in Pakistan and was responsible for 30 deaths arising from 20 attacks in 2016. Hizbul Mujahideen, an Islamist group allegedly based in Pakistan, was prominent in 2013 and claimed responsibility for 30 deaths. However, in 2016 it was responsible for five deaths.


India's north east region has continued to see ethno-political unrest from various ethnic secessionist movements. The deadliest of these groups in 2016 were the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) which killed 15 and the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) which killed seven. ULFA claimed responsibility for five deaths in 2015.

TURKEY

GTI RANK | **9**
GTI SCORE | **7.519**



TOTAL DEATHS SINCE 2000



Turkey has never previously been ranked in the ten countries most impacted by terrorism. The situation has been steadily deteriorating from a score of 27 in 2014 to 14 in 2015. It is now ranked ninth and accounted for 2.6 per cent of all global deaths and 3.3 per cent of all attacks from terrorism.

Deaths from terrorism almost doubled from 2015 to 2016 and increased to 658 deaths. This steep increase in deaths contrasts starkly with the period from 2000 to 2014 when Turkey had an average of only 15 deaths per year from terrorism. Partly driving this increase are the reverberations from the ongoing conflict in neighbouring Syria and rising instability within the country, especially within the predominately Kurdish regions. This has led to increases in terror attacks from two main sources: Kurdish nationalists and ISIL. An underlying source also lies in the increasing domestic political tensions.

The two major Kurdish nationalist groups are the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK). Both groups have been responsible for significant attacks with the newer TAK killing 132 people in 2016. However, the PKK remains the dominant group and has been responsible for three quarters of all deaths by Kurdish nationalists in Turkey since 2014. Overall, deaths by Kurdish nationalists have increased from 13 in 2014 to 174 in 2015. In 2016, the number of deaths doubled to 399 which represented 61 per cent of terrorism deaths.

“ Turkey's steep increase in deaths contrasts starkly with the period from 2000 to 2014 when it had an average of only 15 deaths per year from terrorism.

The PKK were established in 1978 and initially sought an independent Kurdish state. However, in recent years the group has focused more on Kurdish autonomy within a Turkish state. Operating primarily in Turkey and Iraq, waves of violence waged by the PKK in the 1990's are estimated to have caused approximately 40,000 deaths. The most recent increase in violence stems from a broken ceasefire in 2013. The PKK formally opted out of this agreement in 2015 following what it claimed were blatant breaches by the Turkish government.

The other major source of terrorism in Turkey is attacks by ISIL. The group were responsible for 25 per cent of deaths from terrorism in 2016 in causing 162 deaths. These attacks are attributed to the flow-on effects of the ongoing conflict in neighbouring Syria. The two biggest attacks committed by ISIL in 2016 in Turkey were the suicide bombing of Ataturk Airport in June, which killed 48 people and a suicide bombing at a wedding in Gaziantep, which also killed 48 people.


LIBYA

GTI RANK | **10**
GTI SCORE | **7.256**

376  DEAD


481  INJURED

333  INCIDENTS



ATTACKS BY TARGET


- Private citizens and property
- Military, militia or terrorist groups
- Government
- Business
- Other



DEATHS BY GROUP

- Tripoli Province of the Islamic State
- Unknown
- Barqa Province of the Islamic State
- Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries
- Other

TOTAL DEATHS SINCE 2000



Terrorism in Libya is linked to a crisis that began in 2011 following the overthrow of then Prime Minister Muammar Gaddafi. Levels of terrorism in the country have increased steadily since and the fractured country is now ruled by various militia groups. There were no deaths from terrorism in Libya until 2012 when there were 51 attacks that killed 28 people. Since then the number of deaths annually has exponentially increased and peaked in 2015 with 434 attacks that killed 454 people. By comparison, in 2016 there were 78 fewer deaths than in 2015, which was a reduction of 17 per cent. The number of attacks had an even steeper decline dropping by 30 per cent to 100. Notwithstanding this, the year 2016 was the third deadliest year for terrorism in Libya.

There are three affiliates of ISIL in Libya that are each named after the provinces where they have a presence. The groups are separately run and have all separately pledged allegiance to ISIL. The largest improvement was with the Barqa Province of the Islamic State which killed 50 people in 37 attacks compared to 2015 when it killed 146 people in 55 attacks. Most attacks were in Derna and largely targeted civilians. This group is allegedly made up of many Libyan jihadists who have returned from Syria and Iraq as well as fighters who fled Tunisia in 2013.

The deadliest affiliate was the Tripoli Province of the Islamic State which killed 214 people in over 157 attacks. Over 80 per cent of attacks took place in Sirte - a city between Tripoli and

Benghazi - with attacks mainly targeting civilians. Half of these attacks were kidnappings which targeted the families of political rivals as well as civilians accused of crimes or apostasy. The majority of deaths came from bombings and explosions. The deadliest attack in 2016 carried out by this group was the bombing of a police training facility in Suq al-Thulatha which killed 66 people.

“ 2016 was the third deadliest year for terrorism in Libya although the number of attacks declined by 30 per cent.

The third affiliate, known as the Fezzan Province of the Islamic State, was responsible for killing two people in four attacks. All of these attacks were in Jufra. The group was also responsible for several unsuccessful suicide bombing attempts.

Other deaths in Libya attributed to seven different brigades or insurgency groups including Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries, which is a military coalition of jihadist groups.

TRENDS

THE CONFLICT-TERRORISM NEXUS

The last decade has seen a significant increase in both the level of conflict and the impact of terrorism around the world. In 2014, battle-related deaths reached a 25 year high and deaths from terrorism also peaked. However while the impact of terrorism has been increasing slowly for most of the past 30 years, the number of battle-related deaths has fluctuated with the onset of different conflicts.

Although the number of battle-related deaths has risen in recent years, it has not come close to the 200,000 deaths per annum recorded in 1985, as shown in Figure 2.1.

The recent increase in both battle-related deaths and deaths from terrorism raises two questions:

- **does conflict increase the likelihood of the use of terrorism?**
- **are certain terrorist tactics more likely to occur in a conflict zone?**


The number of attacks in non-conflict countries has increased in the last five years. However, it is still the case that since 1985 terrorism and terrorist tactics are far more likely to occur as

part of an ongoing military or paramilitary campaign within an existing conflict. A clear example of the relationship between terrorism and conflict can be seen in Figure 2.2 displaying the case of Afghanistan.

Figure 2.3 shows that there is a strong statistical relationship ($r=0.73$) between the intensity of a conflict and the impact of terrorism. Countries with the highest number of battle-related deaths since 2012 such as Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Yemen also have very high levels of terrorism. Conversely, there are a number of countries with relatively high levels of terrorism that are not currently part of an active conflict within their own borders. However, not one of these countries has a GTI score higher than six out of ten on the index. According to the 2017

FIGURE 2.1 BATTLE DEATHS AND DEATHS FROM TERRORISM (1985-2016)


The last decade has seen an increase in the number of both battle deaths and deaths from terrorism.



Source: PRIO, UCDP, GTD

FIGURE 2.2 BATTLE-RELATED DEATHS AND DEATHS BY TERRORISM IN AFGHANISTAN, 2000-2016

Battle-related deaths and deaths from terrorism have risen in tandem, though at different rates, since 2003. The decrease in deaths from terrorism in 2016 was almost offset by the increase in battle-related deaths.



Source: START GTD, UCDP


“ Countries with the highest number of battle-related deaths since 2012 such as Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Yemen also have very high levels of terrorism.

GTI, the 22 countries most impacted by terrorism were all defined as in conflict. France is ranked 23 on the index as the most impacted non-conflict country. France experienced 265 deaths from terrorism between 2012 and 2016 with 256 of these deaths occurring since 2015. Other countries with no active conflict within their own borders but with high levels of terrorism include Saudi Arabia, China, the United Kingdom and Germany. All of these countries score higher than five on the 2017 GTI.

Figure 2.4 overleaf shows the total number of deaths from terrorism between 1985 and 2016 in both conflict and non-conflict countries. It shows that there has been a small increase in recent years in the number of deaths from terrorism occurring in non-conflict countries. However, from the mid-1980s onwards there was a much more significant increase in deaths from terrorism in conflict countries. This increase rose to over 30,000 deaths in 2014 with around 95 per cent of terrorism related deaths occurring in countries experiencing a conflict. These deaths mainly occurred in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), where countries such as Syria, Iraq and Yemen have been mired in long term civil conflicts.

FIGURE 2.3 IMPACT OF TERRORISM VS BATTLE DEATHS (2012-2016)


Countries with higher levels of conflict also have higher levels of terrorism.



Source: IEP

FIGURE 2.4 DEATHS FROM TERRORISM IN CONFLICT AND NON-CONFLICT COUNTRIES, 1985-2016

Nearly 95% of deaths from terrorism occur in countries currently experiencing a conflict.



Source: UCDP, GTD, IEP calculations

However, from 2015 to 2016, the number of terrorism related deaths in non-conflict countries increased as the number of deaths in conflict countries decreased. This is only the sixth time in the last 25 years that this has occurred and reflects the impact of terrorism in OECD member countries. In the first half of 2017, deaths from terrorism among OECD countries were slightly down when compared to the equivalent period from 2016. Provisional data suggests that this decline will continue. It is also highly likely that over 90 per cent of deaths from terrorism in 2017 will have occurred in countries involved in a conflict.

Countries involved in conflict are more susceptible to terrorism in part because of the lack of a fully functioning state. Terrorism is also one of many tactics employed by insurgencies and paramilitaries in a civil conflict. For example, terrorist groups like ISIS, Boko Haram and the Taliban all carry out conventional military attacks in the context of their respective conflicts as well as undertaking extensive terrorist activity.

While there can be large differences in the political stability and general security environment between conflict and non-conflict countries, there is little difference between the mixture of who and what is targeted by attacks. This trend has remained fairly constant since 1985.

Figure 2.5 shows deaths from terrorism by target type in conflict countries. It shows that civilians or civil society organisations are the target of about 50 per cent of attacks. In 2016, attacks against government targets constituted only 29 per cent of all attacks that occurred in conflict countries. A further six per cent targeted infrastructure.

“ On average, terrorist attacks in conflict countries lead to more fatalities than attacks in non-conflict countries.


Figure 2.6 looks at who terrorists target in countries which are not in conflict. In 2016, 57 per cent of terrorist attacks in non-conflict countries targeted civilians. This is slightly higher than in conflict countries with 51 per cent of attacks targeting civilians. Attacks in non-conflict countries on government targets accounted for 27 per cent of total terrorist incidents, which is slightly more than the equivalent figure of 29 per cent for conflict countries.

Terrorist groups in conflict and non-conflict countries share similar targets but there are significant differences between these two groups in the distribution of fatalities and the deadliness of attacks. On average, terrorist attacks in conflict countries lead to more fatalities than attacks in non-conflict countries. This trend has continued for every year bar one since 1985. As shown in Figure 2.7, in 2016, there was an average of 2.4 fatalities per terrorist attack in conflict countries. This compares to approximately 1.3 fatalities per attack in non-conflict countries.

There are numerous possible reasons for this difference. Countries in conflict have a greater availability of more military grade small arms and also bomb making capabilities. Countries

FIGURE 2.5 TERRORIST ATTACKS BY TARGET TYPE, COUNTRIES IN CONFLICT (1985-2016)


Around 50% of terrorist attacks in conflict countries are targeted at civilians and civil society.



Source: GTD, IEP calculations

FIGURE 2.6 TERRORIST BY TARGET TYPE, COUNTRIES NOT IN CONFLICT (1985-2016)

There is little difference in the proportion of target types between conflict and non-conflict countries.



Source: GTD, IEP calculations

FIGURE 2.7 AVERAGE FATALITIES PER TERRORIST ATTACK, CONFLICT AND NON-CONFLICT COUNTRIES (1985-2016)

Terrorist attacks in conflict countries are deadlier on average than attacks in non-conflict countries.



Source: GTD, IEP calculations

not in conflict tend to be economically-developed and so spend more on intelligence gathering, policing and counterterrorism.

The discrepancy in the deadliness of attacks is also evident when analysing the types of targets. Terrorist attacks are more lethal in conflict countries when targeted at civilians and civil society, government and infrastructure. The greatest discrepancy in the deadliness of attacks between conflict and non-conflict countries occurs with attacks against government targets. On average, 2.65 people are killed for every attack on a government target in a conflict country compared to 1.23 fatalities for equivalent attacks in non-conflict countries.


“ Between 2012 and 2016 there were over 27,000 terrorist attacks that did not result in a single fatality.

The distribution of fatalities per attack differs between conflict and non-conflict countries. Figure 2.9 finds that between 2012 and 2016 the majority of attacks in non-conflict countries had no fatalities.

Between 2012 and 2016 there were over 27,000 terrorist attacks that did not result in a single fatality. Over the same time period, only 8.5 per cent of attacks resulted in more than five fatalities. Despite the considerable attention paid to high profile terrorist attacks over the past five years, there have only been 37 attacks in non-conflict countries that have resulted in more than 25 deaths. This compares to 551 equivalent attacks in conflict countries.

FIGURE 2.8 AVERAGE FATALITIES PER TERRORIST ATTACK, CONFLICT AND NON-CONFLICT COUNTRIES (2016)


Terrorist attacks aimed at government targets are twice as deadly in conflict countries.



Source: GTD, IEP calculations

FIGURE 2.9 DISTRIBUTION OF DEATHS FROM TERRORISM IN CONFLICT AND NON-CONFLICT COUNTRIES, 2012-2016

Over 70% of terrorist attacks in non-conflict countries resulted in no fatalities.



Source: GTD, IEP calculations

TERRORISM AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY

The influence of conflict and instability on terrorism can perhaps be best examined when considering the impact of the Arab Spring. The popular protest movement against authoritarian governments in MENA began in December 2010 with the Tunisian Revolution. The movement spread to nearby countries in continuing throughout 2011 and into 2012. Of the 20 countries impacted by the Arab Spring, 14 experienced protests or minor protests, two witnessed more expansive protests that led to a regime change and three countries descended into civil war. The increase in deaths from terrorism in these countries is shown in Table 2.1.

The countries that experienced the greatest upheavals as part of the Arab Spring also had the largest increases in the impact of terrorism. As shown in Figure 2.10, by far the greatest increase in the number of deaths from terrorism occurred in countries experiencing civil war. A smaller but still significant increase was also seen in Tunisia and Egypt, both of which experienced regime change.

In Egypt the increase in terrorism has been directly linked to the coup against President Mohamed Morsi and the subsequent

crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood under the presidency of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. In the two years preceding the Arab Spring there was only a single death from terrorism in Egypt. In the years immediately after the 2011 protests, terrorist activity remained low with a total of 47 deaths recorded in 2011 and 2012. However, by 2015 the number of deaths had jumped to 663; of which 224 resulted from the bombing of a passenger jet. In 2016 there were 293 terrorism deaths.

Notably, the recent surge in terrorism in Egypt is dissimilar to the spike in terrorism in the 1990's when a series of high-profile attacks by Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad targeted tourists.

Police are now most frequently targeted in terrorist attacks in Egypt with 120 attacks in 2016, which account for nearly half of all attacks. There was only one attack targeting tourists in 2016 which resulted in no casualties when the Sinai Province of the Islamic State opened fire on a bus carrying Israeli tourists.

In the three countries that descended into civil war following the Arab Spring, there was an even more pronounced increase in the impact of terrorism. In the year prior to the Arab Spring,


TABLE 2.1 DEATHS FROM TERRORISM IN ARAB SPRING COUNTRIES, 2009-2016

The countries most severely impacted by the Arab Spring experienced the greatest increase in the impact of terrorism.

IMPACT	Country	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Regime change	Tunisia	-	-	4	-	6	10	81	22
Regime change	Egypt	1	-	27	20	179	184	663	293
Civil war	Yemen	47	330	258	372	293	653	1,517	641
Civil war	Libya	-	-	-	28	121	434	454	376
Civil war	Syria	-	-	136	646	1,109	1,698	2,768	2,102
Protests	Morocco	-	-	17	-	-	-	-	-
Protests	Bahrain	-	-	-	4	3	9	5	1
Protests	Algeria	153	65	11	25	89	7	11	9
Protests	Iran	97	114	16	7	34	9	16	9
Protests	Lebanon	17	2	1	8	137	87	82	20
Protests	Jordan	-	1	-	1	-	1	7	20
Protests	Kuwait	-	-	-	-	-	-	28	1
Protests	Oman	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Protests	Sudan	76	75	187	49	76	385	187	95
Minor protests	Djibouti	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-
Minor protests	Mauritania	2	1	1	-	-	-	-	-
Minor protests	Palestine	7	-	14	11	5	30	72	41
Minor protests	Saudi Arabia	5	-	3	3	1	18	107	106

FIGURE 2.10 TERRORIST ATTACKS BY TARGET TYPE, COUNTRIES IN CONFLICT (1985-2016)


Countries in civil war had a significant increase in deaths from terrorism after the Arab Spring. Note: Iraq and Somalia were not included as they were embroiled in war prior to the Arab Spring.



Source: START GTD, IEP calculations

FIGURE 2.11 IMPACT OF TERRORISM BEFORE AND AFTER THE ARAB SPRING, 2007-2016

The countries most severely affected by the Arab Spring all experienced significant increases in the impact of terrorism in 2011 and beyond.



Source: GTD, IEP calculations

Libya and Syria had no deaths from terrorism. As both countries became embroiled in civil war, the number of deaths from terrorism increased. In 2015, deaths peaked at 454 in Libya and 2,768 in Syria. Likewise, Yemen also experienced an increase from 47 deaths in 2009 to a peak of 1,517 in 2015 although Yemen did not witness a civil war.

Iraq, which was at war prior to the Arab Spring, was nevertheless impacted by a similar phenomenon with deaths increasing from 2,500 in 2009 to nearly 10,000 in both 2014 and 2016. Of the 19 countries directly impacted in some way by the Arab Spring, 16 had an increase in terrorism related deaths between 2010 and 2015. The total number of deaths from terrorism increased by just under 750 per cent in these countries over that time period.

As shown in Figure 2.11, the impact of terrorism after the Arab Spring increased the most in Egypt, Yemen, Libya and Syria. The impact of terrorism, as measured by the GTI, includes not only deaths but also the number of incidents, the number of wounded and the level of property damage over a five year period.

Tunisia had the smallest overall increase and is the only country where protests and reforms associated with the Arab Spring led to the implementation of a constitutional democracy.

THE DISTRIBUTION OF TERRORISM


Looking at global trends, countries with relatively fewer deaths from terrorism recorded a decrease in number of deaths in 2016. While these deaths increased until 2015, in 2016 there was a 20 per cent decrease.

Figure xx shows the trend for the number of terrorism deaths excluding the ten countries with the highest number of terrorism deaths. In 2010 there were 717 deaths in this group. This figure increased to 4,302 in 2015, a 500 per cent increase in just five years. However, in 2016, it declined to 3,454 deaths.

In 2016, more countries experienced at least one attack and one death than at any other point since data was first collected in 1970. A total of 106 countries experienced a terrorist attack in 2016 with 77 experiencing at least one death. This increase in the spread of terrorism came at the same time as the total number of deaths decreased. In 2016, there were only 30 countries that scored a zero on the GTD. This score indicates there had not been a single incident of terrorism at any point in the past five years. By contrast in 2002, which was the first year in which an index score was calculated, there were 44 countries that had no attacks in the preceding five years.

FIGURE 2.12 DEATHS FOR COUNTRIES NOT IN TEN COUNTRIES WITH THE MOST DEATHS


Deaths from terrorism for countries not in the ten countries most impacted by terrorism.



Source: START GTD, IEP calculations

FIGURE 2.13 NUMBER OF COUNTRIES THAT EXPERIENCED AN ATTACK OR DEATH FROM TERRORISM, 2011-2016


In 2016, 106 countries had a terrorist attack and 77 countries experienced at least one death from terrorism.



Source: GTD, IEP calculations

FIGURE 2.14 NUMBER OF COUNTRIES BY DEATHS FROM TERRORISM, 2014-2016

In 2016, the number of countries that experienced 100 or more deaths decreased to 19 from 26.



Source: START GTD, IEP calculations

REGIONAL TRENDS

Over the last 15 years, eight out of the nine regions of the world have seen a deterioration in their GTI scores.

North America was the one regional exception; however if the September 11 attacks were to be excluded from the calculations, it too would have recorded a marked increase. The largest increase in the impact of terrorism occurred in the MENA region.

Over the last two years, South Asia and the MENA regions had small improvements in their GTI scores while the rest of the world deteriorated. North America had the largest deterioration over this period.

South Asia has consistently had the highest impact from terrorism since 2002 while the Central America and the Caribbean region has consistently had the lowest impacts from terrorism. North America has had the highest levels of variation.


The MENA region has suffered the highest number of terrorist attacks and fatalities since 2002. Both the Central America and the Caribbean, and North America regions have recorded the lowest numbers, as seen in Figure 2.17.

TABLE 2.2 AVERAGE COUNTRY SCORE BY REGION, 2016

REGION	GTI 2016
South Asia	5.555
Middle East and North Africa	4.670
North America	4.194
Sub-Saharan Africa	2.695
Asia-Pacific	2.238
South America	2.143
Russia and Eurasia	2.123
Europe	1.836
Central America and the Caribbean	0.879

FIGURE 2.15 REGIONAL CHANGES IN GTI SCORE


Changes in GTI scores over a 15 year time frame and a one year time frame. North America improved the most when considering the long time frame, but deteriorated the most in the shorter time frame.



Source: START GTD, IEP calculations

FIGURE 2.16 AVERAGE GTI SCORE BY REGION, 2002-2016


North America has had the biggest variance in average GTI score in highlighting the effect of the September 11 attacks in the United States.



Source: IEP

FIGURE 2.17 NUMBERS OF ATTACKS AND DEATHS FROM ATTACKS BY REGION, 2002-2016

The MENA region has suffered the highest number of terrorist attacks and deaths from terrorist activity in the 15 years between 2002 and 2016.



Source: IEP

The MENA region dominates in terms of absolute numbers of attacks and fatalities. However, sub-Saharan Africa has been the most deadly region in terms of fatalities per attack with an average of 4.8 deaths per attack. North America has been the least deadly region with 0.5 deaths per attack.


At the regional level there is considerable variation in both terrorist targets and attack types. In most regions private citizens and private property have been the main targets of terrorism. However, in Central America and the Caribbean, government and journalists have been the most frequently targeted. In North America businesses and religious institutions have been targeted

as frequently as private citizens. In South America most attacks over the last 15 years have been against businesses. Globally, food and water supplies, maritime infrastructure and tourists have been the least targeted.

Globally, bombings and explosions are the most common method of attack. In North America facility and infrastructure attacks were the highest. In Central America and the Caribbean armed assaults and assassinations were equally as prominent as bombings and in sub-Saharan Africa most attacks took the form of armed assaults.

FIGURE 2.17 TOTAL ATTACKS BY METHOD ACROSS REGIONS, 2002-2016

Bombings and explosions are the most common form of terrorism globally.



Source: START GTD, IEP calculations

SOUTH EAST ASIA

South Asia had the highest impact from terrorism of any region in 2016 with three countries among the ten most affected globally; Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. Regionally, there has been a slight improvement since 2015 largely due to decreases in the numbers of attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The region had a marked increase in terrorist activity over the 15 year period to 2016 with an increase from 883 deaths in 2002 to 5,949 deaths in 2016. The number of attacks also significantly increased from 282 in 2002 to 3,137 in 2016. Since 2002, Sri Lanka and Nepal have been the only countries to have seen large decreases in terrorist activity. Over the last 15 years, Bhutan and the Maldives have experienced the lowest levels of terrorist impact in the region.

Private citizens and police have consistently and predominantly been targeted in South Asia and account for 46 per cent of the total incidents and 59 per cent of the fatalities since 2002.

TABLE 2.3 SOUTH ASIA GTI SCORE, RANK AND CHANGE IN SCORE FROM 2002-2016

COUNTRY	SCORE	GLOBAL RANK	CHANGE IN SCORE
Afghanistan	9.441	2	3.880
Pakistan	8.4	5	2.360
India	7.534	8	0.167
Bangladesh	6.181	21	0.929
Nepal	4.387	44	-1.729
Sri Lanka	2.905	68	-2.751
Bhutan	0.038	128	0.038

* A reduced score indicates lessening terrorism

MENA

In 2016, the MENA had the second highest impact from terrorism with four countries in the region amongst the ten most impacted. Only four of the twenty MENA countries had no change or improvement in their GTI score from 2002 to 2016.

In 2002, MENA had 1,651 deaths and 300 incidents from terrorism. Yet in 2016, these statistics increased to 13,512 deaths from 4,732 attacks. Iraq and Syria have suffered the highest numbers of fatalities since 2002 with over 60,000 and 8,000 deaths respectively. Yemen has experienced the third highest number of fatalities with over 4,000 deaths recorded. Algeria and Israel are the only countries in the region that have seen a steady decline in the number of fatalities since 2002 although the number of attacks in Israel per year has not decreased.

Private citizens and property are predominately targeted in the MENA region and account for 46 per cent of terrorist attacks and 54 per cent of related fatalities. Since 2002, police were targeted in 17 per cent of attacks, which resulted in 16 per cent of the fatalities. The other main targets include the military and government, which together account for 15 per cent of fatalities.

Algeria has seen a decrease in terrorist activity largely due to efforts to abate attacks from the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), which has not carried out an attack since 2005. Attacks by Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have also dramatically decreased from a peak of 55 in 2007 to one in 2016.

TABLE 2.4 MENA GTI SCORE, RANK AND CHANGE IN SCORE FROM 2002-2016

COUNTRY	SCORE	GLOBAL RANK	CHANGE IN SCORE
Iraq	10	1	6.281
Syria	8.621	4	8.611
Yemen	7.877	6	4.997
Libya	7.256	10	7.256
Egypt	7.17	11	6.791
Sudan	6.453	18	-0.131
Saudi Arabia	5.808	26	3.797
Lebanon	5.638	27	2.409
Palestine	5.551	30	-0.513
Israel	5.062	36	-1.726
Tunisia	4.619	41	1.029
Algeria	3.97	49	-3.218
Kuwait	3.801	50	3.455
Jordan	3.788	51	1.765
Iran	3.714	53	1.411
Bahrain	3.668	55	3.668
United Arab Emirates	0.211	115	0.211
Qatar	0.115	122	0.115
Morocco	0.077	123	0.077
Oman	0	134	0

* A reduced score indicates lessening terrorism

NORTH AMERICA

The United States has experienced the majority of terrorist activity in the region and since 2002 accounts for 89 per cent of attacks and 95 per cent of the fatalities. Since 2014, there has been a dramatic increase in terror attacks on religious figures and institutions, which combined accounts for the highest number of attacks as a target type in 2016. North American is also the only region in which terrorist activity against abortion clinics have been carried, in accounting for over ten per cent of the total number of attacks.

Since 2002, there have been 301 attacks for which a single organisation was responsible. Attacks by Earth Liberation Front (ELF) and Animal Liberation Front (ALF) combined accounted for 40 per cent of all attacks but none of these attacks resulted in any deaths. In contrast, jihadi-inspired extremist organisations have been responsible for fewer attacks but have been by the far the deadliest. Attacks by these organisations are responsible for 96 of the 172 fatalities since 2002.

TABLE 2.5 NORTH AMERICA GTI SCORE, RANK AND CHANGE IN SCORE FROM 2002-2016

COUNTRY	SCORE	GLOBAL RANK	CHANGE IN SCORE
United States	5.429	32	-2.605
Canada	2.958	66	1.814

* A reduced score indicates lessening terrorism

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

In 2016, sub-Saharan Africa was the fourth worst performing region with 51 different terrorist organisations carrying out at least one attack in the region. There were a total of 1,450 attacks that resulted in 4,715 deaths. Since 2002, Sub-Saharan Africa has also seen the second largest deterioration in its GTI score in deteriorating by 60 per cent. At the same time, the region has witnessed the biggest improvement in terms of GTI with Angola improving its score by 98 per cent, from a score of 6.382 in 2002 to 0.154 in 2016. Since 2002, 14 of the 44 countries in sub-Saharan Africa have improved their terrorism scores while nine saw no change and 21 deteriorated.

Since 2002, terrorist activity has increased markedly in terms of both the number of attacks and fatalities. The vast majority of countries in the region have experienced at least one terrorist attack with 37 of the 44 countries impacted. However, there is wide variation both in terms of the number of attacks and lethality of the terrorist attacks. Notwithstanding this, in 2016, there were 4,715 deaths as a result of 1,450 attacks, which is an increase since 2002, when the sub-Saharan Africa region witnessed 91 attacks that caused 309 death.

Nigeria and Somalia have experienced both the highest numbers of attacks and the highest death toll in the last 15 years primarily due to Boko Haram and al-Shabaab. Of the 35,559 people killed in terrorism attacks since 2002, 65 per cent of the fatalities and 70 per cent of the attacks occurred in these two countries.

Although Nigeria and Somalia have seen the highest numbers of fatalities, attacks in Chad and Niger have been the deadliest. In each country respectively, there has been an average of 12 and 11 people killed per attack compared to six deaths in Nigeria and two in Somalia.

Boko Haram is the deadliest group in the region and claimed approximately half of the deaths since 2002. Al-Shabaab is second deadliest group in killing 4,139 people since 2002.

Both Boko Haram and al-Shabaab have been active since 2008 while the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO) commenced their terror campaign only in 2014. Yet SPLM-IO is responsible for the fifth highest number of fatalities over the last fifteen years. Furthermore, while both Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab have carried out terrorist attacks in multiple countries, the SPLM-IO has conducted terrorist attacks solely in South Sudan.

Over the last 15 years, attacks targeting private citizens and government accounted for 39 and 14 per cent of the total attacks respectively in sub-Saharan Africa. Other key targets include police, businesses, military and religious figures.

Armed assaults account for 37 per cent of the total attacks carried out since 2002.

TABLE 2.6 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA GTI SCORE, RANK AND CHANGE IN SCORE FROM 2002-2016

COUNTRY	SCORE	GLOBAL RANK	CHANGE IN SCORE
Nigeria	9.009	3	5.491
Somalia	7.654	7	4.571
DRC	6.967	13	2.898
South Sudan	6.821	14	6.821
Cameroon	6.787	15	6.739
Central African Republic	6.394	19	6.394
Niger	6.316	20	6.047
Kenya	6.169	22	1.521
Ethiopia	5.939	24	4.552
Mali	5.88	25	5.88
Burundi	5.637	28	0.124
Chad	5.269	34	4.258
Mozambique	4.882	39	4.796
Burkina Faso	4.52	43	4.52
Uganda	4.319	45	-1.368
South Africa	4.092	47	0.997
Republic of the Congo	4.04	48	0.357
Cote d'Ivoire	3.701	54	1.022
Tanzania	3.413	59	-0.192
Madagascar	3.287	62	1.817
Rwanda	1.929	81	-0.44
Senegal	1.795	84	-1.889
Djibouti	1.119	96	1.119
Guinea	0.723	101	-3.502
Sierra Leone	0.667	102	-3.209
Lesotho	0.384	109	0.384
Ghana	0.326	111	0.326
Zimbabwe	0.202	116	-3.054
Angola	0.154	117	-6.228
Liberia	0.125	120	-1.921
Guinea-Bissau	0.038	128	-0.039
Benin	0	134	0
Botswana	0	134	0
Equatorial Guinea	0	134	0
Eritrea	0	134	0
Gabon	0	134	0
Malawi	0	134	0
Mauritania	0	134	0
Mauritius	0	134	0
Namibia	0	134	-2.756
Swaziland	0	134	-0.125
The Gambia	0	134	-0.077
Togo	0	134	0
Zambia	0	134	-1.567

* A reduced score indicates lessening terrorism

ASIA-PACIFIC

In 2016, the Asia-Pacific region had the third lowest impact from terrorism. However there is large variation within the region with the Philippines ranking 12th globally while six countries including Mongolia, North Korea and Papua New Guinea all rank 134th as they have not experienced a terrorist incident in the last five years.

Since 2002 the region has seen an increase in terrorist activity with an increase in both the number of attacks and fatalities resulting from these attacks. Over the last fifteen years, there has been a 720 per cent increase in the number of terrorist attacks from 106 in 2002 to 870 in 2016. In 2002, there were 350 fatalities related to terrorism in the Asia-pacific region. This figure increased to 744 deaths in 2014 but declined to 469 deaths in 2016.

The Philippines, China and Thailand have suffered the highest numbers of fatalities from terrorism since 2002 in accounting for 85 per cent of the total deaths in the region.

Since 2002, the Philippines, Thailand and Myanmar have seen the largest increases in terrorist activity. In 2016, these three countries accounted for 94 per cent of attacks, which is a significant increase from 55 per cent in 2002. This increase is due to varying factors in each country. In 2016 in the Philippines, jihadist forces took control of the city of Marawi on Mindanao Island for many months; in 2002 in Thailand, Malay Muslim groups reignited conflict with the Thai government; and in 2016 in Myanmar, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) was formed and has increasingly targeted police posts.

TABLE 2.7 SOUTH ASIA GTI SCORE, RANK AND CHANGE IN SCORE FROM 2002-2016

COUNTRY	SCORE	GLOBAL RANK	CHANGE IN SCORE
Philippines	7.126	12	1.104
Thailand	6.609	16	2.552
China	5.543	31	2.428
Myanmar	4.956	37	1.713
Indonesia	4.55	42	-1.869
Japan	3.595	58	2.046
Malaysia	3.334	60	2.835
Australia	3.091	65	2.976
Laos	1.964	80	0.214
Korea	0.611	103	0.457
New Zealand	0.611	103	0.534
Taiwan	0.499	106	0.499
Cambodia	0.038	128	-3.099
Mongolia	0	134	0
North Korea	0	134	0
Papua New Guinea	0	134	-0.461
Singapore	0	134	0
Timor-Leste	0	134	-0.211
Vietnam	0	134	-0.307

* A reduced score indicates lessening terrorism

SOUTH AMERICA

In 2016, South America ranks fifth out of the nine regions in the GTI and has had the third highest deterioration since 2002. Only three of eleven countries improved in the last 15 years with Colombia recording the biggest gains.

In 2002, South America recorded 309 deaths and 144 incidents from terrorism. This decreased to 39 deaths from 120 attacks by 2016. Since 2002, Colombia has accounted for 85 per cent of the terrorist attacks and 89 per cent of fatalities. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) has been the major terrorist group and mainly target civilians. FARC accounted for 60 per cent of total fatalities from terrorist attacks in South America between 2002 and 2016. In December 2016, the Colombian government and FARC struck a peace deal to end decades of conflict. In late August 2017, FARC unveiled its new political party that will contest the national elections scheduled for 2018. Although FARC has dominated the terrorism landscape

TABLE 2.8 SOUTH AMERICA GTI SCORE, GTI AND CHANGE IN SCORE FROM 2002-2016

COUNTRY	SCORE	GLOBAL RANK	CHANGE IN SCORE
Colombia	5.595	29	-1.465
Venezuela	3.632	56	2.053
Paraguay	3.598	57	3.085
Chile	3.254	63	2.685
Peru	2.544	71	-1.08
Ecuador	1.616	86	-0.132
Brazil	1.572	87	0.821
Argentina	0.807	99	0.557
Uruguay	0.779	100	0.779
Guyana	0.154	117	0.034
Bolivia	0.019	133	0.019

* A reduced score indicates lessening terrorism

in Colombia for the majority of the last 15 years, there has been an increase since 2013 in attacks in Colombia by the National Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN). However, in February 2017 the Colombian government and the ELN announced a return to peace negotiations.

Since 2002, Paraguay has had the largest deteriorations in its GTI score in the region. The Paraguay People's Army (EPP), a small self-proclaimed Marxist guerrilla organisation operating in the north of Paraguay, has carried out a number of kidnappings, executions and attacks against the military. Its stated goal is the overthrow of the Paraguayan government and claims to fight for the poor campesinos. One of the group's tactics is to kidnap wealthy locals and landowners with 16 kidnappings between 2014 and 2016. Estimates suggest that EPP membership is small but nevertheless the group has been responsible for 61 terrorist

attacks since 2010, which has resulted in 32 deaths.

Peruvian terrorist group, Shining Path accounted for the third highest number of fatalities in killing 68 people since 2002. The group, which was once considered a serious threat to the state, is now focused on trying to register as a legitimate political party although some elements are involved in drug trafficking.

Businesses, private citizens, police and utilities have been predominantly targeted by terrorist attacks in this region with each group experiencing over 200 attacks since 2002. Attacks against the police have resulted in the highest level of fatalities in causing 442 deaths. Terrorist attacks have largely been carried out through bombings and explosions, which since 2002 have accounted for 971 of the 1,729 attacks. However, armed assaults have been the deadliest form of attack with an average of two fatalities per attack.

RUSSIA & EURASIA

In 2016, Russia and Eurasia had the third lowest impact from terrorism with an average GTI score of 2.12. However, some countries have experienced significant terrorist activity, most notably Russia and Ukraine, which owe in part to the ongoing regional hostilities. Since 2014, Ukraine has been among the 20 countries most impacted by terrorism and had the largest deterioration in the region over the last 15 years. Nevertheless, in 2016, there was a substantial reduction in terrorism with a total of only 11 deaths. This is down from 358 deaths in 2015. Conversely, Turkmenistan received a score of zero in 2016, which indicates there was no recorded terrorist activity between 2012 and 2016.

In 2016, 17 known groups carried out attacks in the region. However, the group responsible was not identified in 68 per cent of attacks. The total death toll in 2016 stood at 86 but 42 of these deaths were not attributed to any group. Of the known groups, the Caucasus Province of the Islamic State and the Kazakhstan Liberation Army was the most fatal with 12 and ten fatalities respectively. In 2002, Russia and Eurasia had 455 deaths and 80 incidents from terrorism. This decreased to 86 deaths from an increase of 107 attacks in 2016.

Russia and Ukraine have dominated the region in terms of both the number of terrorist attacks and fatalities over the last 15 years. The rest of the region accounted for only four per cent of attacks and seven per cent of fatalities. Between 2002 and 2016, the region experienced a total of 2,348 terrorist attacks and 3,777 fatalities. Every country in the region has suffered at least one terrorist attack since 2002, and every country, bar Turkmenistan, has suffered fatalities as a consequence.

Russia's most lethal period of terrorism occurred between 2002 and 2004 although it was also considerably impacted between

2010 and 2011. Georgia had the third highest number of attacks and fatalities with 38 deaths from 97 attacks.

Over the last 15 years, 59 known groups have been active in the region but six of these groups have caused over 100 fatalities each. The Donetsk People's Republic in the Ukraine has been responsible for both a large number of attacks and fatalities in executing 234 attacks, which have led to 777 fatalities between 2014 and 2016.

TABLE 2.9 RUSSIA AND EURASIA GTI SCORE, RANK AND CHANGE IN SCORE FROM 2002-2016

COUNTRY	SCORE	GLOBAL RANK	CHANGE IN SCORE
Ukraine	6.557	17	4.965
Russia	5.329	33	-1.532
Kazakhstan	2.95	67	2.566
Tajikistan	2.427	72	-0.318
Armenia	2.374	75	1.251
Georgia	2.114	77	-0.73
Kyrgyz Republic	1.989	79	0.174
Azerbaijan	1.153	95	-0.419
Moldova	0.47	107	0.432
Uzbekistan	0.077	123	-2.016
Belarus	0.038	128	-0.192
Turkmenistan	0	134	-0.23

* A reduced score indicates lessening terrorism

In the region, police are primarily targeted and have been the focus of 20 per cent of attacks since 2002. These attacks have resulted in 546 fatalities. Private citizens, the military, and airports and aircraft have seen a similar numbers of attacks although attacks against the latter two target types have been less successful in causing fatalities.

Bombings and explosions have been the predominant mode of terrorist attacks. However the deadliest attacks resulted from hostage takings including the 2002 Moscow theatre hostage crisis and the Beslan massacre in 2004 which combined killed 514 people.

EUROPE

In 2016, Europe was the second best performing region according to the GTI despite 2016 being the deadliest year for the region since 2002. This increase in fatalities caused the region's score to substantially deteriorate. Over the 15 years to 2016, Europe had the fourth largest deterioration in terms of the average GTI score.

Since 2002, Turkey, France, Spain and the United Kingdom have suffered the brunt of the terrorist activity and account for 67 per cent of the total attacks and 90 per cent of total fatalities. Turkey alone accounts for 32 per cent of the attacks and 64 per cent of the fatalities since 2002.

In 2002, there were 14 deaths from 129 attacks in Europe. This increased to 826 deaths from 630 attacks by 2016 which equates to nearly 60 times more deaths and over 3.7 times more attacks. Since 2002, more than 200 different terrorist organisations have carried out attacks in Europe with the Kurdistan People's Party (PKK), Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades and more recently ISIL, being the most deadly. These three groups account for over 57 per cent of total fatalities over the last 15 years.

Bombings and explosions have been used in over 55 per cent of the attacks but since 2015 there has been a marked increase in armed assaults as well as attacks on facilities and infrastructure. The majority of attacks have been carried out against private citizens and property, businesses and government targets. These targets have been the focus of 55 per cent of all attacks since 2002. Attacks against police have resulted in the second highest number of fatalities in accounting for 22 per cent of total deaths from terrorism in Europe since 2002. The majority of these deaths occurred in Turkey.

“ Since 2002, Turkey, France, Spain and the United Kingdom have suffered the brunt of the terrorist activity in Europe...

TABLE 2.10 EUROPE GTI SCORE, RANK AND CHANGE IN SCORE FROM 2002-2016

COUNTRY	SCORE	GLOBAL RANK	CHANGE IN SCORE
Turkey	7.519	9	3.336
France	5.964	23	2.211
United Kingdom	5.102	35	0.782
Germany	4.917	38	2.443
Belgium	4.656	40	4.224
Greece	4.139	46	0.705
Sweden	3.756	52	3.66
Ireland	3.141	64	3.055
Italy	2.75	69	0.121
Kosovo	2.548	70	-1.475
Netherlands	2.412	73	0.992
Finland	2.341	76	2.341
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2.029	78	0.256
Cyprus	1.894	82	1.481
Czech Republic	1.889	83	1.659
Spain	1.701	85	-3.312
Austria	1.522	89	1.512
Denmark	1.512	90	1.512
Albania	1.487	91	0.869
Macedonia	1.186	93	-2.904
Bulgaria	1.178	94	-0.416
Hungary	0.835	98	0.806
Estonia	0.461	108	0.403
Poland	0.384	109	-0.058
Switzerland	0.269	112	-0.328
Slovakia	0.23	114	0.076
Iceland	0.125	120	0.125
Montenegro	0.077	123	-0.23
Serbia	0.043	127	0.043
Croatia	0.029	132	-1.007
Latvia	0	134	-0.192
Lithuania	0	134	0
Norway	0	134	0
Portugal	0	134	0
Romania	0	134	0
Slovenia	0	134	0

* A reduced score indicates lessening terrorism

CENTRAL AMERICA & THE CARIBBEAN

In 2016, Central America and the Caribbean had the lowest average impact from terrorism. However, wide variations exist within the region. Costa Rica, Cuba and El Salvador all received a score of zero, which is the best possible score on the GTI. In contrast, Mexico's score of 3.292 ranks it as the 61st worst performer globally for 2016.

Central America and the Caribbean has recorded the lowest levels of terrorism of any region with just 0.09 per cent of all terrorism deaths since 2002. In 2002, Central America and the Caribbean had no deaths from terrorism and only two attacks. This increased to 12 deaths from six attacks by 2016. Over the last 15 years, eight of the 12 countries have seen a deterioration in their GTI scores, three have remained unchanged and only Guatemala has improved.

Terrorism activity in Mexico dominates both the number of attacks and the number of fatalities in accounting for 52 per cent of the 119 attacks and 54 per cent of the 170 fatalities. Although every country in the region has experienced at least one attack since 2002, four countries have not experienced a fatal attack.

Nearly three quarters of terrorist attacks in the region have not been claimed by any group. The 42 attacks that were claimed by a group were so by a variety of groups. These include the Mexican group, the Pagan Sect of the Mountain, which was responsible for nine of the 42 attacks and all of which occurred in 2015. This group has claimed that it conducts attacks in order to protest the 'frenzied advancement of modern development' and vowed to continue attacks so long as civilization continues on its path of destroying nature. Their attacks resulted in no casualties.

Terrorist attacks in Central America and the Caribbean have predominantly focused on government and media as targets in accounting for 29 and 26 per cent of all attacks respectively. However, attacks against businesses have proven the most deadly and accounting for 22 per cent of the 170 total fatalities since 2002. Bombings and explosions, armed assault and assassinations are the most common method of attack in Central America and the Caribbean. But the most deadly attacks have been those against facilities or infrastructure with an average of 3.7 fatalities per attack.

TABLE 2.11 CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN GTI SCORE, RANK AND CHANGE IN SCORE FROM 2002-2016

COUNTRY	SCORE	GLOBAL RANK	CHANGE IN SCORE
Mexico	3.292	61	1.385
Haiti	2.4	74	0.431
Honduras	1.562	88	1.408
Nicaragua	1.437	92	1.418
Dominican Republic	0.892	97	0.892
Guatemala	0.506	105	-0.53
Trinidad and Tobago	0.25	113	0.25
Panama	0.154	117	0.058
Jamaica	0.058	126	0.058
Costa Rica	0	134	0
Cuba	0	134	0
El Salvador	0	134	0

* A reduced score indicates lessening terrorism

“ Central America and the Caribbean has recorded the lowest levels of terrorism of any region with just 0.09 per cent of all terrorism deaths since 2002.

TERRORISM IN OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES

In 2016, OECD member countries experienced the highest number of deaths from terrorism since 2001 yet this recent increase in terrorism is not without precedent.

OECD countries have suffered from higher levels of terrorism in the past. Since 1970, there have been nearly 10,000 deaths from terrorism among OECD countries and 58 per cent of these deaths occurred prior to 2000. To further put the level of terrorism in recent years into perspective, deaths from terrorism in 2016 were less than half of the number of deaths in 1985.ⁱ

However, it is important to note that this analysis excludes Israel and Turkey as the nature of the terrorist threat in these countries is not directly comparable with the other OECD member states. In Israel, the majority of terrorism is driven by broader political tension as part of the long standing Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Similarly, in Turkey the majority of terrorist attacks are either from Kurdish separatists or arise from flow-on effects from the neighbouring Syrian conflict. Since 1970, Turkey and Israel combined have had over 5,000 deaths from terrorism in this time.

The majority of deaths from terrorism in the OECD were in the United States, which accounts for over a third of all deaths since 1970. However, 85 per cent of deaths from terrorism in the United States were attributed to the September 11 attacks which killed 2,996 people. If the September 11 attacks are excluded from the analysis, the United States would account for only eight per cent of global deaths.

The United Kingdom accounted for a quarter of the deaths from terrorism among OECD countries with approximately 2,400


“...deaths from terrorism in 2016 were less than half of the number of deaths in 1985.

deaths between 1970 and 2016. Most of these deaths resulted from attacks by Irish separatist groups. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) was responsible for every second death from terrorism in the United Kingdom. Following the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, the subsequent ceasefire and decommissioning of the IRA, other movements and groups have emerged including the New Irish Republican Army and the Irish National Liberation Army. However, attacks from Irish separatist groups have been dramatically lower since the agreement and the IRA has not been responsible for any deaths from terrorism in nearly two decades.

Spain has witnessed over 1,000 deaths from terrorism since 1970. The Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA) was responsible for around 70 per cent of these deaths. ETA also conducted attacks in France. However, in September 2010 the group declared that it would not carry out further attacks and announced in April 2017 that it had completely disbanded.

FIGURE 3.1 ESTIMATED DEATHS FROM TERRORISM IN OECD COUNTRIES, 1970-2016

Deaths from terrorism among OECD countries have fluctuated from a high in 2001 due to the September 11 attacks to the lowest levels in the years preceding and following these attacks. The year 2016 had the eighth most deaths from terrorism in OECD countries since 1970.



Source: START GTD

There were over 9,600 deaths from terrorism among OECD countries from 1970 to 2016. Nearly two thirds of these deaths were caused by five different groups:


- Al-Qa'ida was responsible for 31 per cent of the deaths; almost exclusively as a result of the September 11 attacks.
- Irish separatist groups were responsible for 19 per cent of deaths.
- ETA was responsible for seven per cent.
- ISIL and ISIL inspired attacks accounted for 4.7 per cent of these deaths.
- Sikh extremists, who downed Air India Flight 182 over Irish airspace in 1985 and killed 329 people, were responsible for 3.4 per cent of deaths; all as a result of this one attack.
- There were in total 3,345 deaths by all other groups.

The recent increase in deaths from terrorism by Islamic extremists is substantial and is dissimilar from prior waves of terrorism that were largely driven by separatist causes. Additionally, there has been a substantial increase in terrorism related deaths occurring in Turkey following the 2011 Syrian conflict.

The recent spread of terrorism across OECD countries is also not unique. In 1985 there were 14 countries that sustained a fatal terrorist attack. This compares to 11 countries in 2016. Nevertheless, the spread of terrorism has increased in the last decade. In highlighting the trend, from 2000 to 2016 there have been only four years when more than seven countries experienced a fatal terrorist attack: three of these years were from 2014 to 2016.

FIGURE 3.2 NUMBER OF DEATHS BY TERRORISTS IN OECD COUNTRIES, 1970-2016


Since 1970, Irish separatists killed four times more people than ISIL and ISIL inspired attacks in OECD countries.



Source: START GTD, IEP calculations

FIGURE 3.3 NUMBER OF OECD COUNTRIES WITH DEATHS FROM TERRORISM BY YEAR, 1970-2016

In 1985, 14 of the 33 OECD countries covered in this report experienced a fatal terrorism attack.



Source: START GTD

TRENDS SINCE 2014

Terrorism has dramatically increased in the OECD since 2014 due to ISIL and ISIL inspired attacks. Between 2014 and 2016 there was a 67 per cent increase in attacks and a nearly 600 per cent increase in deaths from terrorism. A significant portion of the deaths resulted from a few attacks that caused a very high number of casualties. For example, the November 2015 Paris attacks resulted in 137 deaths; the July 2016 Nice truck attack caused 87 deaths; and the June 2016 Orlando nightclub shooting resulted in 50 deaths. These three attacks account for 44 per cent of all deaths from terrorism in OECD countries between 2014 and June 2017.

This increase in deaths appears to have peaked with a small decline in the first half of 2017. Figure 3.4 shows the different levels of deaths across OECD countries between 1 January and 30 June for various years. Notably, the number of deaths seen in the first six months of 2017 are lower than in 2016, but higher than 2014 and 2015.


“ There has been an increase in both foiled and realised attacks across OECD countries since 2014.

The results for each year were affected by large terrorist events. For example, 2016 was skewed by the Orlando nightclub attacks which resulted in 50 deaths. This represents half of the total deaths in the first six months of 2016. Data for 2015 is also skewed by the November 2015 Paris attacks that killed 137 while 2016 was heavily influenced by the July 2016 Nice truck attack that killed 87.

There has been an increase in both foiled and realised attacks across OECD countries since 2014. While terrorist attacks are becoming less sophisticated and directed against non-traditional

FIGURE 3.4 DEATHS FROM TERRORISM IN OECD COUNTRIES, 1 JANUARY 2014 – 30 JUNE 2017


Deaths from terrorism in the first six months of 2017 are slightly lower than in 2016 but still above 2014 and 2015.



Source: IEP

FIGURE 3.5 FOILED AND REALISED TERRORIST ATTACKS AMONG OECD, 2014-2016


The proportion of attacks that have been foiled has been increasing.



Source: IEP

FIGURE 3.6 TERRORISM EVENTS IN OECD COUNTRIES, 1 JANUARY 2014 – 30 JUNE 2017

The United Kingdom experienced the most terrorist plots and was able to foil 19%. The country with the highest proportion of foiled attacks was Ireland which foiled 72% of plots.



Source: IEP

targets, improvements in counterterrorism strategies have been able to thwart many attacks. This in part reflects a greater resource allocation for counterterrorism. Two in ten attacks were thwarted in 2014 and 2015 while three in ten attacks were foiled in 2016.

There is only a small number of attacks that resulted in high levels of fatalities and this is independent of the proportion of foiled attacks.

Among OECD countries, France experienced the most deaths from terrorism yet it was able to foil a quarter of all attacks. This was a somewhat higher proportion than the United Kingdom which was able to foil 19 per cent of attacks.

Ninety-two per cent of the deaths in France from terrorism were from three attacks: the November 2015 Paris and Île-de-France attacks as well as the 2016 Nice truck attack. Of the 17 member countries in the OECD that experienced deaths from terrorism, France had the sixth highest proportion of foiled attacks. Countries which had far fewer deaths from terrorism, such as the Czech Republic and the Netherlands, also had a much lower proportion of foiled attacks.

Terrorism affects different countries to different degrees and various countries are able to respond to terrorist plots with varying degrees of efficiency. For example, Germany and France have experienced a similar numbers of attacks or attempted attacks between 2014 and 2017, at 119 and 103 respectively. France was able to foil 25 per cent of these as compared to Germany which thwarted 16 percent. However, Germany recorded 33 deaths while France recorded 263 deaths from terrorism. There is not a linear relationship between the number of terrorist attack

“ Among OECD countries, France experienced the most deaths from terrorism yet it was able to foil a quarter of all attacks.

attempts a country experiences and its ability to foil these attacks. Ireland, for example, experienced a high number of attempts but also managed to foil an exceptionally high percentage of these attempts.

In the case of Ireland, the high number of thwarted attacks can be partly attributed to the number of tip-offs received by the government from the groups planting the bombs. Most of these planned attacks are pipe-bombs planted by Irish separatists who seek to remind the government of their presence rather than inflict casualties. At the other extreme, Japan, with a low number of attempted attacks was not able to foil any.

The countries with the largest proportion of foiled attacks all have a history of terrorism. The United States, France, Ireland and Spain have had relatively lengthy periods of domestic terrorism. A history of terrorism means greater experience in dealing with plots and attacks. However, it also likely suggests a greater allocation of resources for counterterrorism. Different countries devote different levels of resources to counterterrorism efforts, including specialised task forces or police and internal security units. This may explain some of the variation seen in levels of counterterrorism efficiency.

UNDERSTANDING THE CHANGE

CHANGING TACTICS

Certain attack types are thwarted more readily than other types. OECD countries have historically had a high level of success in thwarting bombings and explosions. Nearly half of attacks using bombings and explosions have been foiled. This in part reflects that bombings and explosions are a much more complex form of attack. They both require high levels of planning and potentially interactions with a greater pool of people, which is more likely to trigger investigations by security services. These interactions include the procurement of materials as well as the development and construction of incendiary devices.

Thwarting attacks against facilities and infrastructure has seen very low levels of success. Only four per cent of attacks targeting facilities and infrastructure were thwarted. The majority of these attacks did not result in extensive damage and largely used arson tactics that often involved petrol bombs or other largely improvised simple methods. Hence it is not surprising that these attacks are rarely thwarted as there is generally not much planning required. This lessens the opportunity for interception.

Less than one per cent of all attacks targeting facilities and infrastructure resulted in a fatality.


Somewhat surprisingly, most of the realised attacks involving bombings and explosions did not detonate. The majority of non-detonating devices were pipe bombs that were disarmed by authorities. However, there was still a total of 70 deaths from these types of attacks. The third most common attack type in OECD countries was armed assaults that resulted in 393 deaths from 279 attacks; this is an average of nearly 1.5 deaths per attack.

Highly sophisticated attacks are likely to cause more casualties but have a greater opportunity for infiltration and disruption. Terrorist acts appear to cluster in the type of attack as well as the time and location. For example, the 1960s and 1970s there was a spate of airline hijackings by Palestinian groups. Between 1971 and 1980 there were 43 successful embassy takeovers and five unsuccessful attempts in 27 countries.

More recently, the use of vehicles as weapons has increased significantly following the directive by an ISIL spokesman on 22

FIGURE 3.6 NUMBERS OF FOILED AND REALISED ATTACKS BY ATTACK TYPE IN OECD COUNTRIES, 1 JANUARY 2014 – 30 JUNE 2017


A high proportion of attacks using bombings and explosions are foiled.



Source: START GTD, IEP

FIGURE 3.7 ATTACKS AND DEATHS FROM TERRORISM BY TARGET IN OECD COUNTRIES, 2014 TO 2016

There has been an increase in attacks against all targets since 2014 to the end of 2016. There have been notable increases in attacks against civilians.



Source: START GTD, IEP

September 2014 to attack Westerners using cars. These low cost and low tech attacks require minimal organisation. Attacks that see vehicles driven into large crowds are hard to anticipate and therefore difficult to thwart. Since the July 2016 Nice car attack, 12 other similar attacks using vehicles have been carried out in OECD countries. Ten of these attacks have explicitly targeted civilians with at least five targeting crowds.

The beheading of Western hostages as a tactic has also emerged and its frequency has steeply risen with the rise of ISIL, especially in Iraq.

CHANGING TARGETS

There has been an increase in attacks against all targets between 2014 and the end of 2016. Attacks against civilians have increased by 40 per cent between 2014 and 2016, which is the same rate of increase as the overall increase in attacks.


Attacks targeting the police have also increased with 140 attacks in the last three years resulting in a 27 per cent increase between 2014 and 2016. This is proportionally less than the overall increase. Police are viewed as symbols of government and are explicitly targeted by ISIL inspired attackers as well as anti-government actors such as sovereign citizens.

The military has also been increasingly targeted from seven attacks in 2014 to an average of 14 in the last two years.

Attacks against religious targets have nearly doubled every year since 2014. A third of these attacks or plots were anti-Islamic in nature and included attacks targeting mosques. The United Kingdom, France, Germany and Australia combined accounted for 40 per cent of all attacks against religious targets. The remaining 60 per cent of attacks occurred in 13 other OECD countries. A third of the total attacks on religious targets were in the United States, which experienced over 50 attacks from 2014 to 2016. Figure 3.7 shows the breakdown of targets for terrorist attacks among OECD member countries.

FIGURE 3.8 TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST REFUGEES IN GERMANY, SWEDEN, FINLAND AND GREECE, 2014 TO 2016

Over half of attacks against refugees were in Germany.



Source: START GTD

There has also been an increase in attacks on refugees and asylum seekers among OECD countries. The massive influx of refugees and asylum seekers into Europe since the Syrian conflict began in 2011 has given rise to, or exacerbated already existing tensions regarding immigration issues. Between 2014 and 2016 there were 93 terrorist attacks against refugees and asylum seekers or related infrastructure. These attacks were concentrated in four countries; Greece, Finland, Sweden and Germany, as shown in Figure 3.8. The largest number of attacks occurred in Germany, which has also been the OECD country that has accepted the highest intake of refugees and asylum seekers.

THE IMPACT OF ISIL

The changing nature of terrorism in the OECD is largely a result of the impact and activity of ISIL. Since 2014, attacks by ISIL have occurred in 18 of the 33 OECD countries included in this study and account for three quarters of all deaths.

ISIL's ability to undertake and inspire attacks among OECD countries is largely due to its successful exploitation of social media and the internet. ISIL used encryption technology for timely unmonitored communication between commanders in Iraq and Syria and operatives in the OECD. Furthermore, they have developed a broad message that appeals to a wide range of people and which can be easily contextualised.


Since the call to directly target many OECD countries by an ISIL spokesperson on 22 September 2014, there has been a substantial increase in terrorism in these countries. These attacks have either been directed by ISIL or linked indirectly to them through contacts with perpetrators. Some attacks have also been inspired by ISIL but carried out by perpetrators who have had no direct contact with the organisation. As ISIL fortunes

deteriorated on the battlefield in Iraq and Syria it became harder for fighters to travel to the conflict zones. The group subsequently urged sympathisers to carry out attacks in their home countries. However, ISIL's large territorial losses have weakened its ability to stage and launch future attacks and also sustain its propaganda programs.

Attacks appear to have peaked in 2016 and have decreased in the first six months of 2017. In 2014 there were ten attacks involving ISIL. This number increased to 31 in 2015 and seemingly peaked at 43 in 2016 with only 14 attacks in the first six months of 2017. A similar trend can be seen with attacks inspired by ISIL but not actually involving the group. This number of attacks increased from 17 in 2014 to 68 in 2016 yet declined to only 19 attacks in the first six months of 2017.

FIGURE 3.9 CUMULATIVE DEATHS FROM TERRORISM IN OECD COUNTRIES BY ISIL INVOLVED, ISIL INSPIRED AND NO ISIL LINK, 1 JANUARY 2014 – 30 JUNE 2017


Three quarters of all deaths from terrorism since 2014 have either been ISIL involved or ISIL inspired.



Source: IEP

FIGURE 3.10 ATTACKS AND DEATHS BY TARGET TYPE FOR ATTACKS WITH ISIL INVOLVEMENT IN OECD COUNTRIES, 1 JANUARY 2014 – 30 JUNE 2017

The majority of deaths from attacks involving ISIL have come from armed assaults..



Source: IEP

Attacks with direct ISIL involvement have been much more deadly than attacks that are inspired by ISIL. ISIL involved attacks have killed 245 people whereas ISIL inspired attacks killed 208. Attacks conducted by ISIL resulted in an average of 7.4 deaths per attack compared to 3.4 deaths for ISIL inspired attacks. Lone actors killed on average one person per attack and all other terrorists operating in OECD countries killed less than 0.3 persons per attack. Figure 3.10 shows the cumulative deaths from attacks with varying levels of ISIL involvement.

Two in three ISIL involved attacks have been foiled compared to about half of ISIL inspired attacks and 19 per cent of attacks from all other terrorists.

Attacks with greater ISIL involvement are:

- more likely to have high levels of fatalities and injuries
- more likely to be foiled.

Armed assaults result in the highest death rate. About a half of all armed assaults are stopped beforehand by intelligence services while a greater number of bombings are thwarted with two thirds being foiled.


Of all OECD countries, France has by far suffered the highest number of fatalities from terrorism since 2014 in accounting for 43 per cent of all deaths. Further, terrorist attacks related to ISIL caused 92 per cent of the deaths in France. Figure 3.11 shows the distribution of deaths from terrorism since 2014 across all of OECD countries where there was at least one death. The data is further broken down by whether or not the attack was related to ISIL. This demonstrates the wide reach of ISIL attacks in OECD countries.

Part of the reason why attacks involving ISIL have had such high fatalities is because the group has focused on non-traditional terrorist targets. In the OECD there have not been any ISIL involved attacks involving hijacking planes or high profile tourist

“ Attacks with direct ISIL involvement have been much more deadly than attacks that are inspired by ISIL. ISIL involved attacks have killed 245 people whereas ISIL inspired attacks killed 208.

FIGURE 3.11 DEATHS FROM TERRORISM IN OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES, 1 JANUARY 2014 - 30 JUNE 2017

France accounts for 43% of deaths from terrorism in OECD member states. The majority of these deaths have been due to ISIL-related attacks.



Source: IEP

“ The use of vehicles to attack crowds has been copied by other people who are not inspired by ISIL...

attractions. This in part reflects increased security at key targets and comprehensive surveillance from intelligence services, which has increased the difficulty of planning more sophisticated types of attacks.

The attacks involving ISIL have focused on low risk, high impact targets and often focus on civilians. These types of attacks are less likely to be foiled and in some instances are able to be copied by others. Examples include the attempted shooting in August 2015 on a Thalys train in France where the planned attacker was overpowered by passengers. The gunman was initially described as a lone actor yet he was directed by the leader of the November 2015 Paris attacks. Targeting a train was seen as a ‘softer’ target than a plane as the level of security is significantly lower.

Similarly, the 2016 co-ordinated suicide bombings of Brussels

Airport’s departure hall and Maelbeek metro station focused on targets that traditionally have not had the same level of security as the secure zones at airports, which feature comprehensive security screening procedures. The use of vehicles to attack crowds has also been used as a non-traditional tactic aimed at less secure targets. These tactics have been copied by other people who are not inspired by ISIL, such as the 2017 Finsbury Park van attack targeting attendees of a mosque and a 2016 bombing plot at a prison in Arizona, which relied on instructions in ISIL magazines for planning terror attacks.

Modern internet communications had also given ISIL the ability to better communicate with followers in the OECD using encrypted messaging. This allows for strategic planning with new forms of terrorism developed in Iraq or Syria and then communicated to operatives in the field. It is possible the 2017 alleged foiled plot to plant an improvised explosive device on board an Etihad Airways departing Sydney was directed and organised by ISIL operatives in Syria. Parts of the explosive device were allegedly sent by international cargo. While ISIL has shown that targeting soft targets using unconventional tactics is more likely to be effective in OECD countries, it has still attempted more sophisticated attacks in again highlighting the variety of methods adopted by the organisation.

CHARACTERISTICS OF TERRORISTS

TERRORISM IN THE WIDER CONTEXT

The overwhelming majority of terrorism occurs in countries that fall into two categories;

- **countries involved in an armed conflict, or**
- **countries with high levels of political terror.**

In 2016, 99 per cent of all deaths from terrorism and 96 per cent of all attacks globally occurred in countries in these two categories.

Section two of this report examines in more detail terrorism that occurs in a conflict setting. This section analyses the link between political terror and terrorism in exploring the characteristics of terrorist actors and terrorist groups. There is a particular focus on how both political terror and conflict act as drivers of recruitment for terrorist groups. The vast majority of terrorism occurs in countries that are involved in an armed conflict with terrorism in these countries accounting for 95 per cent of all deaths and 91 per cent of all attacks in 2016.

Political terror refers to the levels of state-sanctioned killings, torture, disappearances and political imprisonment in a society.¹ To analyse the link between levels of political terror and terrorism carried out by non-state actors, the GTI is correlated against the Political Terror Scale (PTS). The PTS is measured using a scale from 1-5 with one being no political imprisonment and five being unrestrained political terror waged against the whole of population.² Terrorism strongly correlates with the PTS at $r= 0.57$.

High levels of political terror are defined here as a PTS score of three, four or five, which indicates that there are widespread human rights abuses or wholesale population abuse. Figure 4.1 shows that in 2016, 98.5 per cent of deaths from terrorism occurred in countries with high levels of political terror. These countries accounted for 95 per cent of all attacks.

Globally, countries with low levels of political terror or which are not involved in an armed conflict have very low levels of terrorism. In 2016, countries that fell into this category witnessed

FIGURE 4.1 NUMBER OF DEATHS FROM TERRORISM BY LEVEL OF POLITICAL TERROR, 2016

In 2016, 98.5% of deaths from terrorism occurred in countries with high levels of political terror.





FIGURE 4.2 PERCENTAGE OF DEATHS FROM TERRORISM THAT OCCURRED IN COUNTRIES IN CONFLICT AND WITH POLITICAL TERROR, 2016

Conflict drives terrorism: 99% of terrorism occurs in countries in conflict or with high levels of political terror.



Source: START GTD, Political Terror Scale, IEP calculations

only 405 terrorist attacks. This represented just 3.6 per cent of all attacks and only 1.1 per cent of all deaths. This analysis further highlights that 99 per cent of all deaths from terrorism occurred in countries that are in conflict or have high levels of political terror.

IEP tested for GTI's statistical relationship to more than 5,000 data sets, indices and attitudinal surveys to identify which factors correlated with terrorism. GTI scores are strongly correlated with various measures of ongoing internal and external conflict, the number of displaced people, overall level of peace, levels of political terror, prevalence of group grievances as well as religiously biased violent activities.

Traditional counterterrorism approaches target terrorist activity directly through increased security measures. However, terrorism does not occur for the same reasons everywhere. In non-OECD member countries, terrorism occurs on a larger scale and in the context of both ongoing armed conflict and extensive political terror. In OECD member countries, terrorism is correlated to lower levels of social cohesion and a lack of opportunity. As such, policies to counter or prevent violent extremism must be tailored to the specific drivers in each context.


Counterterrorism approaches need to be sensitive to the factors driving terrorism and avoid further alienating individuals at risk. The systems map in Figure 4.3 was derived through correlations, which show how different factors relate to each other. This does

not mean that IEP has identified all the causes of terrorism; the systems map does not explain when specific causal factors are active. However, it does reflect statistically significant factors that aid in explaining potential drivers of terrorism and violent extremism.

“ Globally, countries with low levels of political terror or which are not involved in an armed conflict have very low levels of terrorism.

FIGURE 4.3 SYSTEMS MAP OF GTI CORRELATES

This is a visual representation of the key correlations with the GTI from over 5,000 socio-economic datasets. Arrows depict flows of influence.



Source: IEP

THE DRIVERS OF TERRORIST RECRUITMENT

IDENTITY, IDEOLOGY AND GROUP FORMATION

Although there are multiple paths to radicalisation, studies focusing on particular organisations or recruits from particular regions or cultures have found some common characteristics among individuals. There are often links to exclusion, poor governance structures and forms of discrimination.³

A recently conducted analysis of 500 former members of various extremist organisations in Africa found that over half of respondents were motivated to join an extremist organisation as they perceived their religion as under attack. However, 57 per cent admitted to having a limited understanding of religious texts.⁴ Former fighters continuously cited low levels of trust in government institutions and high levels of animosity towards the police, politicians and the military. Some form of ‘government action’ was the tipping point for 71 per cent of respondents joining an extremist organisation.⁵

In a study of al-Shabaab members from Kenya, 65 per cent of respondents said they had joined the group in response to the Kenyan government’s counterterrorism strategy⁶ with 97 per cent of respondents claiming their religion was under either physical or ideological threat. While 49 per cent identified the government as ‘the enemy,’ only 24 per cent viewed other religions as the problem.⁷ These findings reinforce that conflict and political terror can be drivers of terrorism.

Much of the drive behind the motivation to join a terrorist groups parallels other group formation: individuals may seek companionship, survival and security, status, power, control and achievement.⁸ Important elements of group dynamics include an interdependence, perception of collective group identity and a shared purpose or goal. Group dynamics and behaviour enables individuals to do things they otherwise might not, such as commit acts of violent extremism.

RELATIVE DEPRIVATION, INEQUALITY AND THE EXPECTATION – ACHIEVEMENT GAP

Recent studies examining the motivating factors for individuals to commit terrorist acts or join terrorist groups have also pointed to relative, rather than absolute, deprivation as an explanatory factor.⁹ Individuals whose expectations for social mobility and economic welfare have been frustrated are at a greater risk of radicalisation.¹⁰ Thus countries where a highly educated population remains largely unemployed or underemployed may be breeding grounds for extremist ideology.

Tunisia, as an example, illustrates this point. The country has among the highest numbers of citizens fighting alongside ISIL as foreign fighters. In 2015, it was estimated that there were 700,000 Tunisian job seekers, of which 200,000 were university graduates who were vying for 79,000 largely low skill job vacancies.¹¹

Nevertheless, while there have been large numbers of Tunisian foreign fighters, this has not corresponded with a dramatic increase in terrorism in Tunisia.

Individuals may feel relatively deprived economically or socially even in situations where in an absolute sense they are not. This partly explains why many studies on terrorism have found that poverty does not correlate with terrorism and that in fact many terrorists have come from well-off families or countries.¹²

In the European Union, where most countries are well-off in absolute economic terms, there remains large differences in youth unemployment levels when comparing native and foreign born citizens. A first generation young immigrant in Belgium is 64 per cent more likely to be unemployed than a young person born in Belgium. Such differences may be due to other factors such as education or language levels but importantly these differences contribute to feelings of ‘unfairness’ in the country.¹³ Belgium also had one of the highest rates of citizens leaving to fight alongside ISIL in Iraq and Syria.

“ ...individuals may seek companionship, survival and security, status, power, control and achievement.

RECRUITMENT HUBS

While individuals have unique paths to radicalisation, there are broader factors that lead to alienation, such as perceived discrimination. This needs to be considered along with the fact that congregations of like-minded individuals radicalise together.¹⁴ The radicalisation process is most potent in group settings, as individuals ‘cluster’ around an influential personality, group of friends or established structure.¹⁵ Group radicalisation through in-person social interaction is at the heart of recruitment in most OECD member countries as well as in many other countries.¹⁶ Studies focusing in Morocco’s radicalisation ‘hotspots’ have concluded that the most important factors for radicalisation are ‘holding a sacred value and being closely connected with your group of friends’.¹⁷ Of course, holding these values is both common and potentially beneficial for society and includes many people that do not have any desire to commit violent extremism.

A 2017 study on German foreign fighters established that ‘peer-to-peer’ networks, interpersonal ties and ‘clustered mobilisation and bloc recruitment within interconnected milieus’ were the most influential factors in the recruitment process.¹⁸

Hildesheim, a German city with a population of about 100,000, is one such radicalisation hub. The municipality was home to the terrorist behind the December 2016 Berlin Christmas market truck as well as at least 17 others who have either travelled to fight for ISIL or have been engaged in terror domestically.¹⁹

Family relationships may also be an important hub for radicalisation. Familial relationships, teacher-disciple connections or formations of ikhwan or brotherhoods were of particular importance in the recruitment process of the Indonesian terror group Jemaah Islamiyah.²⁰ These large kin groups, which were the equivalent of hubs, were founded on loyalty to family. This emphasis on loyalty created extremely strong and long-lasting bonds that made infiltrating or influencing the group incredibly difficult.²¹ The group's spiritual leader, Abu Bakar Bashir, established the al-Mukmin Islamic school, also known as the Ngruki Islamic school, on the island of Java in the 1970s. There have been connections drawn between this school and the 2002 Bali bombings, the 2003 Marriot Hotel bombing and the 2009 Jakarta bombings.²²

“ Investigations into the 2015 and 2016 attacks in Brussels and Paris revealed that the attackers had been involved in drug trafficking as well as organised crime, including the illegal sale of weapons and production of forged documentation.

There have been claims that the Finsbury Park Mosque in London has been connected to terror plots in the United Kingdom in the late 1990s to mid-2000s.²³ These claims included connections between those attending the mosque and large terror groups such as al-Qa'ida and the Taliban.²⁴

Other mosques around the world have also allegedly served as radicalisation hubs. For example, some mosques in Massachusetts were allegedly attended by 13 people connected to terrorist activities and most notably the Boston Marathon bombing.²⁵ In another example, the Great Mosque in Brussels has been referred to by some as a 'hotbed for Salafist radicalisation'.²⁶ However, as with all hubs there is not necessarily any connection between the geographic location and a particular ideology. It is more likely that a particular individual has had influence over a group, as was the case with the 2017 Catalonia attacks in Spain.

THE CRIME – TERRORISM NEXUS

Terrorist organisations have also recruited many fighters with extensive criminal backgrounds. This new crime-terror nexus involves both organised crime groups and terrorist organisations recruiting from a similar profile of recruits. A study across Europe found that 57 per cent of individuals had been in jail prior to becoming radicalised while 31 per cent of incarcerated individuals began the radicalisation process while in jail. Investigations into the 2015 and 2016 attacks in Brussels and Paris revealed that the attackers had been involved in drug trafficking as well as organised crime, including the illegal sale of weapons and production of forged documentation.²⁷

The relationships between crime and terror organisations have been categorised into three types of relationships:

- **Coexistence; when groups share geographical space.**
- **Cooperation; when groups are able to serve mutual interests via temporary partnerships.**
- **Convergence; when groups mesh and absorb each other's methodologies.**²⁸

Cooperation between terror organisations and crime syndicates is often categorised as 'transactional,' such as terror groups purchasing large quantities of illegal firearms from local arms dealers.

PRISONS

Prison radicalisation can be the by-product of more typical prison behaviour such as 'religion seeking, defiance, and the need for protection'.²⁹ There are concerns regarding radicalisation in prisons. This includes the potential for 'unholy alliances' between ideologically driven terrorists and offenders with criminal skills and experience. There is also the risk of terrorists acquiring followers who are experiencing periods of vulnerability and are susceptible to violent extremism.³⁰ Prisoners can be radicalised by external means including books, videos, websites and visitors or by internal sources as well as fellow inmates.

In a case study of French prisons, radicalisers were found to actively seek out one or two vulnerable people with whom they can develop a strong emotional relationship and attempt to change their worldview.³¹ In some prisons in France, Muslim inmates comprise up to 70 per cent of the prison population. This imbalance means that an 'us-versus-them' rhetoric can emerge in some groups of prisoners and also contribute to new prisoners or those struggling with life in prison to seek out jihadist ideology in the hope of attaining both protection and a sense of belonging.³² A challenge for authorities is to ensure there are limited options available to convicted terrorists who are undertaking long sentences who may seek to radicalise other inmates.

FOREIGN FIGHTERS

ISIL has been the most effective terrorist group at attracting foreign fighters into its ranks. Exact figures regarding the number foreign fighters are difficult to construct. However, an estimate from the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL suggested that from 2012 to October 2016 over 40,000 foreign fighters from over 120 countries have entered Syria.³³ Turkish authorities have reported nearly 54,000 people from 146 countries have potentially joined the fighting in Iraq and Syria.³⁴ IEP's estimates – based on data from 2015 to July 2017 – suggest over 28,000 fighters from 50 countries have joined ISIL during that period. Twenty nine of these countries have been a source for 100 or more fighters. Six countries constitute over 60 per cent of these foreign fighters: Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Turkey and Jordan.

TUNISIA

Dissatisfaction, uncertainty and challenges associated with the democratic transition following the Arab Spring have been a contributing factor for the large number of Tunisians joining ISIL in Syria and Iraq. However, there is a history of Tunisians fighting abroad in Afghanistan in the 1980s and again after 2001 and also in Chechnya and the Balkans. However, the extent of the foreign fighter phenomenon has grown substantially since 2011. But this increase in the number of foreign fighters has not corresponded with a dramatic increase in terrorism within

“ Turkish authorities have reported nearly 54,000 people from 146 countries have potentially joined the fighting in Iraq and Syria.

Tunisia. The north African country was the only country to transition to democracy following the Arab Spring and does not have high levels of state sponsored terror.


The high number of Tunisian recruits has been attributed to factors including financial desperation, poor economic and social conditions and a sense of belonging.³⁵ Most Tunisian foreign fighters are aged between 18 and 35, which is perhaps not surprising in a country where university graduate unemployment stands at 34 per cent. At one stage, ISIL was offering a monthly salary of to \$2,000.³⁶ A 2015 Afrobarometer report found that 32 per cent of respondents in Tunisia thought that poverty was the main driver of fighters joining ISIL while only six per cent thought it was due to a lack of education.³⁷

RUSSIA

In 2015, Russian nationals made up approximately eight per cent of all ISIL fighters.³⁸ ISIL has made substantial efforts to reach a

FIGURE 4.4 TOP TEN SOURCE COUNTRIES FOR FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN ISIL

Tunisia has both the most total fighters and the most per 100,000 people in ISIL.



Source: START GTD, IEP calculations

Russian-speaking audience via social media and various propaganda initiatives. Russian was the third most frequently used language by ISIL, after Arabic and English. Recruits from the Caucasus region are reportedly indoctrinated aggressively online. In June 2015 ISIL announced the formation of a Caucasus province named Wilayat al-Qawqaz.

Reports suggest that Russian ISIL fighters differ from other combatants in that they often come with combat experience from successive wars against the Russian army or military service with the Russian army. Additionally, these fighters have a reputation for brutality and a propensity for military leadership.³⁹

JORDAN

Although Jordan has been a politically stable country since its declaration of independence in 1948, Jordanians have a history of being exposed to radicalisation largely due to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. As a result of its close proximity to the ongoing conflict, Jordan has and continues to host hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees. For those who join the conflict in Syria and Iraq, the main motivating factors include unemployment, dissatisfaction with government, inequality, close proximity to

Syria and adjacent terrorist organisations, loyalty to fellow Sunni Muslims and sectarian politics.⁴⁰ The relative fluidity of movement across borders has meant that Jordan is now suffering the consequences of radicalised fighters returning home. In 2016, six terrorist attacks were carried out in Jordan, which killed 20 people and injured 31 others. This is an increase from the single attack in 2013.

EUROPE

Estimates from April 2016 put the total number of foreign fighters from Europe at somewhere between 3,900 and 4,300 people. It is estimated that 30 per cent of these individuals have since returned to their countries of origin and 14 per cent have been confirmed dead. The majority of foreign fighters come from just four countries; Belgium, France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Belgium has the highest per capita ratio of foreign fighters while in Germany nearly two-thirds of the 910 German foreign fighters had previous criminal charges. Female fighters are estimated to make up 17 per cent of the total number of European foreign fighters.⁴¹ For those EU member states who have more than five foreign fighters joining ISIL, somewhere between six and 23 per cent are converts to Islam.

“ ISIL has made substantial efforts to reach a Russian-speaking audience via social media and various propaganda initiatives. Russian was the third most frequently used language by ISIL, after Arabic and English.

LONE ACTOR TERRORISM

Radicalisation often takes place within a group setting. However, there have been increasing concerns about the possibility of lone actor terrorism, which is generally harder to disrupt and prevent. IEP has created a database of 250 lone actor terrorist attacks that took place over the ten year period between 2008 and the end of June 2017 in OECD member countries (excluding Israel and Turkey). This database has been used to analyse patterns in this increasingly prevalent method of terrorism.

The last ten years has seen an increase in the number of lone actor attacks among OECD countries, as seen in Figure 4.5. While there was only one such attack in 2008, during the first half of 2017 alone there were 58 attacks.

The general trend masks variation seen at the country level. The United States has experienced the overwhelming majority of lone actor attacks with 81 attacks accounting for 32 per cent of all attacks within OECD countries. Lone actor attacks in the United States resulted in 177 deaths, which account for 28 per cent of total fatalities among OECD countries. The United Kingdom witnessed the second highest number of attacks with 47 attacks resulting in 69 fatalities. Only five countries have had more than 10 lone actor attacks over the last decade: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Belgium.

In general there are multiple motivating factors driving an individual to commit a terrorist attack. For those attacks in the

IEP database where a primary motivating factor could be ascertained, political factors and Islamic fundamentalism played equally dominating roles. However, the most prevalent motivation varies across countries.

Early in the decade, Islamic fundamentalism was the primary motivating factor for lone actor terror attacks in the United States. However, since 2012, this has changed with political factors now dominating lone actor motivation.


PROFILING LONE ACTOR TERRORISTS

To date, most research agrees that there is no one profile type for lone actor attackers. The collected data indicates there is variation in demographics, socio-economic status, education and motivation. Perhaps the only overwhelming commonality across attackers is gender. Of the detailed data that IEP has collected on 167 attacks perpetrated between 2015 and June 2017, 93 per cent were carried out by males. However, the IEP lone actor database indicates there is diversity in age, education and employment status; all of which confirm findings from previous studies on lone actor terrorists.

Of the 80 cases for which data was available, 58 actors had previous criminal histories. This is a ratio similar to previous studies on lone actors. Overall, 11 per cent of attackers had visited Syria prior to carrying out their attacks.

FIGURE 4.5 LONE ACTOR ATTACKS AND FATALITIES, 2008 -2017


Fatalities from lone actor terrorist attacks have increased considerably in the last three years.



Source: IEP

FIGURE 4.6 MOTIVATIONS FOR LONE ACTOR TERRORIST ATTACKS, OECD, 2008-JUNE 2017


Political factors and Islamic fundamentalism are equally motivating factors in the terrorist attacks that have been carried out in OECD countries since 2008.



Source: IEP calculations

FIGURE 4.7 MOTIVATIONS FOR LONE ACTOR TERRORIST ATTACKS, UNITED STATES, 2008-JUNE 2017

Political factors are the most dominating motivation behind lone actor terrorism in the United States.



Source: STARTGTD, IEP calculations

Belgium had the highest ratio of fighters returning from Syria at 25 per cent, followed by France at 18 per cent, the United States at 17 per cent and Germany at 12 per cent. The vast majority of OECD member countries had no confirmed cases of lone actors traveling to Syria prior to perpetrating their attack.

The ages of perpetrators ranged from 17 in Norway to 55 in South Korea with the average being 30.4 years. This is slightly older than what previous research has found to be the average age for individuals to join terrorist organisations.

TERRORIST GROUPS

THE FOUR MOST DEADLY TERRORIST GROUPS

In 2016, there was a reduction in the activity of three of the four deadliest terrorist groups when compared to the previous year. Deaths attributed to the Taliban, Boko Haram and al-Qa’ida all declined. However, ISIL was an exception to this trend and was subsequently the deadliest terrorist group in 2016 in killing 9,132 people.

If deaths attributed to ISIL affiliates are included then ISIL killed over 11,500 people. This makes 2016 the group’s deadliest ever recorded year for terrorism.


Boko Haram, the Taliban and al-Qa’ida, which are the three next deadliest terrorist groups, were responsible for fewer fatalities than in 2015. Collectively, these three groups killed 6,000 fewer people in 2016 than in 2015. This decline in deaths reflects various factors. Boko Haram has been the target of attacks from the Multinational Joint Task Force and has splintered into three distinct groups as a result of mounting pressure from military defeats. The Taliban’s changing tactics has seen it take control of more areas of Afghanistan where there are fewer government

targets. The changing tactics of Al-Qa’ida and its affiliates resulted in 35 per cent fewer fatalities in 2016. This reduction was mostly driven by fewer terrorist attacks conducted by its affiliate in Syria, the al-Nusra Front as it repositions itself to obtain greater political status in the Syrian conflict.

“ Boko Haram, the Taliban and al-Qa’ida ... were responsible for fewer fatalities than in 2015.

FIGURE 5.1 DEATHS ATTRIBUTED TO THE FOUR DEADLIEST TERRORIST GROUPS, 2000-2016

In 2016 ISIL had its deadliest year yet the three other deadliest terrorist groups had a decrease in deaths.



Source: GTD, IEP calculations

ISIL

GROUP	ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND THE LEVANT (ISIL)
INCIDENTS	1,132
DEATHS	9,132
INJURIES	7,723
LOCATION OF ATTACKS	BELGIUM GEORGIA GERMANY INDONESIA IRAQ JORDAN LEBANON MALAYSIA PHILIPPINES RUSSIA SAUDI ARABIA SYRIA TUNISIA TURKEY YEMEN

TABLE 5.1 LIST OF COUNTRIES WITH ISIL AFFILIATES OR NETWORK, 2014-2017

COUNTRIES	
Afghanistan	Kuwait
Algeria	Lebanon
Bahrain	Libya
Bangladesh	Malaysia
Belgium	Niger
Burkina Faso	Nigeria
Cameroon	Pakistan
Chad	Philippines
Egypt	Russia
France	Saudi Arabia
Georgia	Somalia
Germany	Syria
Indonesia	Tunisia
Iraq	Turkey
Israel	Palestine
Jordan	Yemen

The terrorist organisation that calls itself the Islamic State or Daesh, also known as ISIS or ISIL, is based in Iraq and Syria. The group originally emerged in 2014 as an offshoot of the Iraqi based al-Qa'ida group. Al-Qa'ida formally broke ties with ISIL because of their aggressive attacks against civilians and Shi'a Muslims. ISIL's ambition was to govern the Levant region, which includes Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.

CHANGES FROM LAST 2015

ISIL undertook more deadly attacks in 2016. The number of attacks rose by 18.5 per cent, from 955 in 2015 to 1,132 attacks in 2016. Its death toll rose even more and increased by nearly 50 per cent to 9,132 people.

The group's effectiveness has also increased with an average of 8.1 deaths per attack in 2016 compared to 5.7 deaths per attack in 2014. In 2016, the terrorist organisation's activities affected 308 cities in 15 countries around the world. Its most devastating presence was in its base countries of Iraq and Syria, which collectively accounted for over 93 per cent of ISIL's attacks. Baghdad and Mosul were the cities most affected and accounted for 23 per cent of all attacks. There were nearly 1,000 people killed by ISIL in Baghdad in 2016 with an average of 9.2 deaths per attack. The numbers for Mosul are even higher in accounting for 13.8 per cent of total attacks that killed 1,834 people. On average, each attack in Mosul killed 11.8 people.

The increase in activity from ISIL also corresponded with the loss of a large proportion of its territory. In 2014, ISIL controlled 40

per cent of Iraq. This dropped to an estimated seven per cent by the end of 2016.¹ Recruitment of new forces has dwindled and the organisation is effected by large scale desertions. On 28 May 2016, ISIL caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was killed in a Russian-led airstrike near the Syrian city of Raqqa; his death is reportedly one of the biggest set-backs for the organisation, especially in the wake of substantial territory losses in Iraq and Syria.² It is likely that ISIL will continue to lose territory in Iraq and Syria and with it, much of the groups' appeal. However, as it fragments in Iraq and Syria, some ISIL fighters will spread to affiliated groups causing further terrorism in other countries. There are 32 countries where ISIL has affiliates or networks as shown in Table 5.1.

TACTICS FAVOURED BY ISIL

More than half of the attacks by ISIL in 2016 targeted private citizens and property. These accounted for slightly more than half of all deaths caused by ISIL. Attacks on police accounted for 9.5 per cent of all attacks but caused 14.2 per cent of all deaths. The military was targeted in 6.6 per cent of ISIL attacks and accounted for 9.4 per cent of all deaths.

ISIL's most common method of attack are bombings or explosions, which were used in 753 attacks and which accounted for 66.5 per cent of all attacks in 2016. This was up from 609 in 2015.

Suicide bombings were the most effective with a death rate of 14.2 per attack. These attacks accounted for 43 per cent of deaths but only 24 per cent of incidents.

BOKO HARAM

GROUP	BOKO HARAM
INCIDENTS	192
DEATHS	1,079
INJURIES	1,119
LOCATION OF ATTACKS	CAMEROON CHAD NIGER NIGERIA

Boko Haram, also known as Group of the People of Sunnah for Preaching and Jihad, and as Islamic State West Africa Province, originated in northern Nigeria but has spread into neighbouring countries.³ Following the death of its leader in 2009, the group became increasingly violent. In 2010, the organisation's new leader declared jihad against the Nigerian government and the United States. The war between Boko Haram and Nigerian forces has killed more than 20,000 people and left more than 2.6 million displaced in the seven years since the organisation began using terrorist tactics.⁴

Boko Haram translates as 'Western education is forbidden' and is opposed to what it perceives as the increasing influence of the West in Nigeria and its surrounds. In 2014, Boko Haram changed its affiliation from al-Qa'ida to ISIL. Boko Haram was the deadliest terrorist group in 2014. However, in subsequent years Boko Haram has suffered significant defeats as a result of efforts by the Multinational Joint Task Force, which includes forces from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. The taskforce also receives support from the United States. In 2016, Boko Haram committed 192 attacks that resulted in 1,079 deaths, which is a decline from the peak of 454 attacks with 6,668 deaths in 2014.

CHANGES FROM 2015

Following military defeats, Boko Haram split in August 2016 into three separate factions including a violent faction, one that aligns itself with ISIL and a third faction affiliated with al-Qa'ida.⁵ There have been reports that these two latter factions were negotiating with the Nigerian Government to oust the more violent faction.

As a result of the fragmentation of the group, Boko Haram has been less effective in committing terrorist attacks. In 2016, Boko Haram committed 61 per cent fewer attacks and was responsible for 80 per cent fewer deaths when compared to the previous year. This is reflective of the increasing difficulty Boko Haram is facing due to high levels of security forces targeting the group. In 2015, 29 per cent of attacks were suicide missions resulting in 27 per cent of total deaths. Yet in 2016, suicide attacks jumped to 35 per cent of attacks and resulted in 49 per cent of deaths.

TACTICS FAVOURED BY BOKO HARAM

Boko Haram tactics predominantly focus on civilians who, in 2016, were targeted in 131 out of the 192 attacks and accounted for 70 per cent of deaths. Other targets include the military and religious institutions, including the targeting of a mosque in Maiduguri which killed 22 people.⁶ While previously the majority of attacks were armed assaults using machine guns, the group has begun to rely more on using explosives and bombings. In 2014, bombings accounted for 24 per cent of attacks but this increased to 44 per cent of all attacks in 2016. Nearly four in five bombings in 2016 were suicide bombings with one in five committed by women. After bombings and explosions, armed assault was the second most common form of attack in accounting for 27 per cent of attacks although this is down from 48 per cent in 2014.

TALIBAN

INCIDENTS	848
DEATHS	3,583
INJURIES	3,550
LOCATION OF ATTACKS	AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN

The Taliban emerged in Afghanistan in 1994 as a reactionary group that combined both mujahedeen that had previously fought against the 1979 Soviet invasion and groups of Pashtun tribesmen. The Taliban took control of Afghanistan in 1996. The group declared the country an Islamic emirate and promoted its leader to the role of head of state.⁷ Following the 2001 NATO invasion of Afghanistan, the Taliban was ousted but it has since been attempting to reclaim control of its lost territory. As of April 2017, it is estimated the Taliban had control over 11 per cent of the country and contested another 29 per cent of Afghanistan's 398 districts.⁸ The Taliban are particularly strong in the southern provinces of Helmand, Nimroz, Uruzgan, Zabul and Ghazni.⁹

CHANGES FROM 2015

The tactics of the Taliban have evolved as they have gained more control over territory. Battle-deaths in 2015 and 2016 were around 18,000 per year, but there was nevertheless a 23 per cent reduction in terrorist attacks in 2016. The Taliban engaged in more traditional armed conflict tactics against the Afghan National Guard, mainly aiming for territorial gains, rather than relying on terrorist activity. These attacks are not included in terrorism figures. There has been a shift away from targeting the police towards civilians. Previously police, as a symbol of the Afghan government, were the main target of the Taliban and accounted for half of all terrorist attacks in 2015. In 2016, police

were targeted in 38 per cent of attacks. However, as the Taliban has gained control of more territory, which has led the police to flee, civilians were targeted in a larger proportion of attacks. Civilians were the targets of 19 per cent of attacks in 2015, which rose to 30 per cent of attacks in 2016. This is a 16 per cent increase in attacks and a 24 per cent increase in deaths from the previous year.

TACTICS FAVOURED BY THE TALIBAN

Like the other deadliest terrorist groups, the Taliban's tactics mainly include bombings and explosions or armed assaults. In 2015, which was the group's deadliest year, armed assaults constituted 36 per cent of attacks but this decreased to 24 per cent in 2016. Bombings and explosions increased from 27 per cent of attacks in 2015 to 32 per cent in 2016. In contrast to Boko Haram and ISIL, who used suicide bombings for 35 per cent and 26 per cent respectively for all attacks, only six per cent of attacks by the Taliban were suicide bombings. These bombings killed around eight people per attack.



GROUP	AL-QA'IDA AND AFFILIATES
INCIDENTS	539
DEATHS	1,349
INJURIES	2,201
INJURIES	969
LOCATION OF ATTACKS	ALGERIA BANGLADESH BURKINA FASO COTE D'IVOIRE KENYA MALI NIGER PAKISTAN RUSSIA SOMALIA SYRIA UGANDA YEMEN

Al-Qa'ida was formed in 1988 by Usama bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam with the stated intention of removing Western militaries from the Middle East.¹⁰ Since the September 11 attacks, al-Qa'ida has been the focus of an intervention by a coalition of governments, which has subsequently eradicated much of their influence and leadership. As a result, al-Qa'ida has adapted a

decentralised structure using regional factions known as franchises. These franchises launch attacks in various countries around the world with the aim of provoking Western forces to engage militarily. Al-Qa'ida has stated that this will lead to an army of supporters rising up to eradicate external forces from Muslim majority countries, 'purify' governments in the Middle East and establish a 'true' Islamic state under a particular Salafi sharia.

CHANGES FROM 2015

Despite changes in leadership and reduced influence due to the rise of ISIL, al-Qa'ida has been resilient and adapted to setbacks. In 2016 al-Qa'ida and its affiliates undertook attacks in 13 countries, which is less than the peak in 2011 of 16 countries. In 2016, there were attacks in countries where al-Qa'ida had not previously undertaken an attack, such as Burkina Faso with attacks by al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). In 2015, the group was responsible for 465 attacks in 12 countries that killed a total of 2,070 people. However in 2016, the organisation carried out 539 attacks in 13 countries but this increased number of attacks resulted in fewer deaths with 1,349 people killed.

A distinctive shift has occurred in the targets of al-Qa'ida attacks in that they are focusing less on ideologically motivated targets and increasingly on targets that instil greater fear. This is a reflection of the fact that several of the countries in which al-Qa'ida and its affiliates operate, such as Libya, Mali and Yemen, are in conflict and so the use of more indiscriminate violence is deemed to generate a greater response. For example, the group targeted educational institutions in 17 per cent of attacks in 2009. This figure has been decreasing steadily across the past eight years and in 2016, these attacks accounted for 1.5 per cent of attacks. In 2016 civilians were targeted in 155 attacks, which accounted for 29 per cent of all incidents. This was an increase of eight per cent compared to the previous year.

Al-Qa'ida's decentralised structure allows regional affiliates to operate fairly independently of the group's leadership. The most active affiliate is al-Shabaab, which killed 738 in 2016. A bombing in Mogadishu in October 2017 that killed over 300 was believed to be conducted by al-Shabaab. Another affiliate, al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is estimated to have around 4,000 fighters and has been responsible for over 1,500 deaths since 2010.¹¹ In 2014, al-Qa'ida created a new affiliate called al-Qa'ida in the Indian subcontinent which operates in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India and Pakistan.¹²

TACTICS FAVOURED BY AL-QA'IDA

Al-Qa'ida's most commonly used method of attack in 2016 was bombings and explosions, which accounted for nearly half of all attacks and 766 deaths. Suicide bombings caused 440 of these deaths with on average 8.6 people killed per attack. This is less than in 2015 when suicide bombings killed an average of 14.6 people per attack. This decline is attributable to the rebranding and refocus of al-Nusra Front, an al-Qa'ida franchise in Syria which has distanced itself from al-Qa'ida and shifted its tactics away from terrorist attacks. In 2015, the al-Nusra Front conducted eight suicide attacks that killed 224 people yet it carried out only three suicide attacks in 2016 that killed six people.

A NOTE ON PASTORAL VIOLENCE IN THE SAHEL

Herders have been driving their cattle across the Sahel region of Africa for centuries and the Fulani reportedly make up 90 per cent of these herders.¹³ The Fulani are an ethnic group numbering in the order of 20 million and are found in several West and Central African countries, especially Nigeria. Many of them are nomadic or semi-nomadic herders.

Traditionally, the relationship between nomadic herders and sedentary farmers throughout the region has been relatively violence free, although at times contentious. Herders migrate seasonally to graze their livestock, and in return for grazing rights, fertilise farmland. However more recently, tensions and violence have increasingly flared between herders and farmers with some estimates suggesting that in Nigeria alone up to 60,000 people have been killed in clashes since 2001.¹⁴ In Nigeria, this conflict is driven by the increases in population that have contributed to resource scarcity and desertification. Ambiguous land laws and a weak rule of law, especially in rural areas, have also played a part.

Tensions between the Fulani, the majority of whom are Muslim, and farmers, of whom the majority in Nigeria for example are Christian, is largely driven by economic causes and low levels of Positive Peace. However, extremist groups such as the Front de Libération du Macina (FLM) in Mali have, and may continue to,

“ There are 33 known groups on either side of the farmer-pastoralist conflict in Nigeria with the Fulani being the largest single identity group.

build from these underlying grievances and recruit susceptible members of the Fulani ethnic group through the use of ethno-religious narratives. The FLM, which formed in 2015, has similar stated goals and methods to al Qa’-ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).¹⁵ The FLM was responsible for approximately 12 per cent of terror attacks in Mali in 2015 and 2016. These attacks were responsible for ten per cent of deaths from terrorism in Mali during these two years.

Of particular concern is the increasing terror threat from radicalised Fulani in Nigeria, where there is already an ongoing violent conflict between herders and farmers. The ongoing conflict over land use in Nigeria has been exacerbated by worsening droughts, erratic rainfall and land degradation. This has contributed to thousands of deaths in recent years,¹⁶ resulting in a strong government response.


Between 2010 and 2016, Fulani extremists were responsible for 466 terrorist attacks and 3,068 fatalities in four countries, as seen in Figure 5.2.

It is difficult to determine whether Fulani extremists can be thought of as a single non-state actor. Groups of Fulani may or may not be working together in the way that is typical of terrorist organisations. Reports from Nigeria differ as to whether all Fulani violence arises from a single unified group or if the rising number of incidents across the country are independent from one another but driven by the same causes.¹⁷

Violence committed by Fulani extremists is the product of conflicts with local farmers, other ethnic militias and criminal organisations such as cattle-rustling gangs. There are 33 known groups on either side of the farmer-pastoralist conflict in Nigeria with the Fulani being the largest single identity group.¹⁸ As a result, Fulani violence appears asymmetric in the GTD data, instead of appearing as a large numbers of fatalities from a more traditional conflict between just two groups. UCDP data codes Fulani or Housa-Fulani civilians as facing conflict with 21 other non-state groups. Peacebuilders in Nigeria have reported that neither deaths of Fulani nor attacks against the ethnic group are well reported in the media. This is due to the group’s low literacy rates, low representation and their nomadic or semi-nomadic livelihoods.

FIGURE 5.2 TERRORISM AND FULANI EXTREMISM, 2010-2016

Deaths from Fulani extremists resulted in more than 3,000 deaths across four countries, with 92% of fatalities taking place in Nigeria.



Source: START GTD

HOW TERRORIST GROUPS END

It is important to understand how terrorist groups have historically come to an end and under what circumstances. Analysis of 586 terrorist groups that operated between 1970 and 2007 found that 36 per cent of the groups remained active regardless of the counterterrorism approach adopted.¹⁹

Of the groups that ended, around a third of groups did so after achieving their political goals, a third through internal splintering and a third following defeat by the military or police. The ideological motivation of a group influences how a group ends with religious and nationalist groups more likely to have internal splintering while left wing groups are more likely to be defeated by the military or police. There were not enough right-wing groups in the database to obtain a statistically significant sample size.

There is significant variation in the fate of terrorist groups based on both the ideologies and stated goals of the group; regardless of whether these goals are left-wing, nationalist, religious or right-wing or whether the group is focused on regime change, policy change, territorial change or maintaining the status quo, as seen in Figures 5.4 and 5.5.

Of the 586 groups analysed, 37 per cent were nationalist groups, 37 per cent were left-wing, 21 per cent were religious groups and five per cent were right-wing. Left-wing groups are defined as those favouring the left of the political spectrum including groups motivated by communism, Marxism-Leninism, anarchism, anti-globalisation, environmentalism and animal rights. Nationalist groups are those driven by independence or territorial autonomy. Right-wing groups include racist and fascist groups.²⁰ Religious groups are those that promote a particular religious mandate or force others to follow it.


Religious groups had the highest proportion still active post 2007. An outright military or police defeat was most successful means of ending left-wing terrorist groups and accounted for the demise of 26 per cent of these groups. The same repressive counterterrorism measures have the least success with religious terrorist organisations and have contributed to the demise of only 12 per cent. Forty-eight per cent of right-wing terrorist groups have either achieved their stated goals or have ended via some form of political settlement. Nationalist groups have tended to end because of internal splintering.

Of the groups analysed, 281 wanted either regime change or social revolution, 165 wanted territorial change, 118 wanted some specific policy change and 22 wanted to maintain the status quo.

Military or police responses to terrorist groups were most successful with groups whose stated goal was regime change or

FIGURE 5.3 HOW TERRORIST GROUPS ENDED, 1970-2007

There was a relatively even split as to why terrorist groups end.



Source: Gaibulloev and Sandler (2014)

“ ...repressive counterterrorism measures have the least success with religious terrorist organisations...”

social revolution. This counterterrorism tactic succeeded in ending 23 per cent of terrorist groups but was least successful with groups wanting territorial change. In almost 50 per cent of situations, groups wanting policy change or to maintain the status quo for the most part either achieved their stated goals or entered into a political settlement.


Terrorist groups wanting territorial change have been the most resilient with 85 of the 165 groups still active post 2007.

The Government Actions in a Terror Environment (GATE) database has collected data on conciliatory or deterrent

government actions against terrorist groups in both Israel and Canada.²¹ In both countries, indiscriminate conciliatory actions, which reward the non-terrorist behaviour of the population from which terror groups originate, are more effective at bringing about an end to terrorist activity than repressive measures. For example, gestures toward peace talks in the Israel-Palestine conflict or the provision of foreign aid to Somalia in the Canadian case have proven to be more effective policies than house demolitions in Israel-Palestine or increased domestic surveillance in the Canada. Repressive measures may actually be a recruitment tool for terrorists.

FIGURE 5.4 HOW TERRORIST GROUPS END, BY GROUP TYPE, 1970-2007


Military or police defeat ended 26% of left-wing terrorist groups but only 12% of all religious groups.



Source: Gaibulloev and Sandler (2014)

FIGURE 5.5 HOW TERRORIST GROUPS END, BY GROUP GOAL, 1970-2007

A political settlement was most successful for groups wanting specific policy change or to maintain the status quo.



Source: Gaibulloev and Sandler (2014)

ECONOMICS OF TERRORISM

THE COST OF TERRORISM

The global economic impact of terrorism declined by seven per cent in 2016 to US\$84 billion. This is the second consecutive year in which the impact of terrorism declined. The economic cost of terrorism peaked in 2014 with a total impact of US\$104 billion.


Since 2001 the global economic impact of terrorism has exhibited three peaks corresponding to three major waves of terrorism. The first was the September 11 attacks in New York and Washington D.C. which resulted in losses from deaths, injuries and property destruction amounting to US\$65 billion in 2016 constant dollars. This excludes the indirect costs to the U.S. economy in general which have not been included in the IEP model but which has been estimated at between 0.7 and one per cent of U.S. GDP, or up US\$190 billion.¹

The second peak occurred in 2007 and was driven by increases in terrorism in Iraq. This increase is attributed to the activities of al-Qa'ida affiliated terrorist groups and coincided with a coalition troop surge in the country.

Since 2013, the increased levels of violence from mainly ISIL in Syria and Iraq has led to a third surge in the economic impact of terrorism and which has continued for the last four years. The economic impact of terrorism reached US\$84 billion in 2016. The pattern over the last four years follows the rise and

FIGURE 6.1 THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TERRORISM, US\$ BILLION, 2000-2016

The global economic impact of terrorism peaked in 2014 and has since remained high.



Source: IEP

“ Countries suffering from conflict experience the most costly economic impacts from terrorism.

decline of ISIL and the spread of terrorism to highly peaceful countries, including those within the OECD.

Countries suffering from conflict experience the most costly economic impacts from terrorism. These countries are mainly situated in the Middle East and North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. In 2016, Iraq once again has the largest economic impact of terrorism as a percentage of GDP, at 24 per cent.

Afghanistan is the only other country where the economic impact of terrorism is higher than ten per cent of its GDP. Table 6.1 shows the ten countries with the highest economic impacts of terrorism.

It should be noted that these costings do not include the costs associated with intelligence agencies which would have increased considerably in many countries.

TABLE 6.1 THE COUNTRIES WITH THE HIGHEST ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TERRORISM AS % OF GDP, 2016

The countries with the highest economic impacts of terrorism are also suffering from ongoing conflict.

RANK	COUNTRY	% OF GDP
1	Iraq	24%
2	Afghanistan	13%
3	South Sudan	9%
4	Syria	6%
5	Libya	3%
6	Nigeria	3%
7	Yemen	2%
8	Central African Republic	2%
9	Burundi	1%
10	Turkey	1%

Source: IEP

BOX 6.1 ESTIMATING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TERRORISM

The economic impact of terrorism is calculated using IEP’s cost of violence methodology. The model for terrorism includes the direct and indirect cost of deaths and injuries, as well as the property destruction from incidents of terrorism. The direct costs include costs borne by the victims of the terrorist acts and associated government expenditure, such as medical spending. The indirect costs include lost productivity and earnings as well as the psychological trauma to the victims, their families and friends.

Unit costs for deaths and injuries are sourced from McCollister et al (2010). To account for the income differences for each country, the unit costs are scaled based on country GDP per capita relative to the source of the unit costs.

The analysis uses data on incidents of terrorism from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) which is collected and collated by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). The data provides the number of deaths and injuries for each incident as well as the extent of property destruction.

The data provides estimated dollar values of property destruction for a sample of incidents. The property destruction estimates from the GTD are then used to generate costs of property destroyed by various types of terrorist attacks. Each of the different property costs is further calibrated by country income type; OECD, high income non-OECD, upper middle income, lower middle income and lower income country groups.

Where countries suffer more than 1,000 deaths from terrorism, IEP’s model includes losses of national output which is equivalent to two per cent of GDP.² Terrorism has implications for the larger economy depending on the duration, level and intensity of the terrorist activities.

Deaths from terrorism accounted for 81 per cent of the global economic impact of terrorism. Indirect GDP losses, the second largest category at 15 per cent of the total, is only calculated for countries with more than 1,000 deaths. Property destruction is estimated at two per cent of the global economic impact of terrorism. However, property cost estimates are missing for a large number of incidents. Finally, the economic impact of injuries from terrorism was one per cent of the total economic impact of terrorism. Figure 6.2 shows the breakdown of the economic impact of terrorism.

The economic impact of terrorism is smaller than many other forms of violence, accounting for approximately one per cent of the global cost of violence in 2016. This was estimated at \$14.3 trillion or 12.6 per cent of global GDP. But this estimate of the cost of terrorism is conservative as the indirect effects of terrorism are only calculated for countries that suffer from higher levels of conflict.


This is a very conservative estimate of the costs associated with terrorism and only calculates globally quantifiable and comparable costs. It does not take into account the costs of counter terrorism or countering violent extremism, nor the impact of diverting public resources to security expenditure away from other government expenditure. Nor does it calculate any of the long term economic implications of terrorism from reduced tourism, business activity, production and investment.

Studies from developed and developing countries have tried to quantify at a more granular level the adverse effects of terrorism on the economy. For example:

- **After the outbreak of terrorism in the Basque country in Spain in the late 1960s, economic growth declined by ten per cent.³**
- **A study of the economic impact of terrorism in Israel found that per capita income would have been ten per cent higher if the country had limited terrorism in the three years up to 2004.⁴**
- **Results from research on Turkey show that terrorism has severe adverse effects on the economy when the economy is in an expansionary phase.⁵**

FIGURE 6.2 BREAKDOWN OF THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TERRORISM, 2016

Fatalities account for 81% of the economic impact of terrorism.



Source: IEP

“ ...the global cost of violence in 2016 was estimated at \$14.3 trillion or 12.6 per cent of global GDP.

The level of economic disruption is relatively large and long lasting for small and less diversified economies. In contrast, advanced and diversified economies are economically more resilient and have shorter recovery periods from incidents of terrorism. These effects are mainly explained by the ability of the diversified economies to reallocate resources, such as labour and capital from the terrorism affected sectors. Advanced and more peaceful countries also have more resources and better institutions to avert future terrorism.

FINANCING TERROR

Terrorist activity is funded through various legal and illicit avenues and often benefits from corruption and support from the edges of the formal economy. For example, the owner of a Nigerian telecommunications company was arrested in 2011 for using business profits to fund Boko Haram activities as well as supplying terrorists with SIM cards and mobile phones.⁶

Some examples of illegal sources of funding for terrorist groups include narcotics trafficking, human trafficking, extortion, illegal mining and banking transfers.

Diaspora groups have long been a funding stream for terrorist activities in the homeland. For example, throughout the 1970s Ireland's IRA was bolstered by funds and weapons coming from the Irish-American diaspora and most notably financial support from the Irish Northern Aid Committee (Noraid).⁷

For many terrorist organisations money transfers, such as Western Union, provide a secure avenue for discreetly transferring funds. In recognition of this countries have introduced legislation to place restrictions on short term financial flows; this has occurred largely through compliance with transnational banking laws that aim to stem the flow of terrorist finances. Unfortunately this effort becomes counterproductive in countries such as Somalia where up to 60

per cent of individual incomes rely on overseas remittances.⁸

The United Nations Security Council has long recognised the need to combat the financing of terrorism. It launched a series of resolutions including Resolution 2178 (2014) and Resolution 2249 (2015) that both seek to quell terrorist power. Most notably it has also encouraged all member states to 'prevent and suppress the financing of terrorism.'⁹

Several of the largest terrorist groups have gained territorial control which provides other forms of revenue such as taxes and the operations of businesses. Some of the largest groups have annual revenue akin to small national budgets or large companies. Estimates from 2016 indicate that annual revenues for the biggest terrorists groups range from US\$2 billion for ISIL, US\$400 million for the Taliban to US\$250 million for al-Qa'ida and US\$25 million for Boko Haram.¹⁰

FUNDING OF THE FOUR MOST DEADLY TERRORIST GROUPS

ISIL


ISIL is the deadliest and wealthiest terrorist group. However, the group's strategy of self-funding in controlled territory leaves them susceptible to any action that impinges on its territory. ISIL's funding structure caved in during the last two years due to major losses of territory in Iraq and Syria. Funding for the organisation peaked at US\$2 billion in 2015 with half of these funds coming from oil smuggling. ISIL was producing up to 75,000 barrels a day in generating revenues of US\$1.3 million per day.¹¹ The 68 member Global Coalition has targeted ISIL's revenue sources to hinder its ability to operate. By early 2017, the Global Coalition had destroyed more than 2,600 sites relating to oil extraction, refinement and sale.¹² Cash storage sites have also been targeted which significantly hinder ISIL's operations by making it more

difficult to pay fighters and provide basic services such as the supply of essential medical supplies. By destroying 25 bulk cash storage sites, the Global Coalition has destroyed potentially several hundred million dollars.¹³ The Iraqi government has also shut down banking systems within ISIL controlled territory to restrict payments to government workers in these areas. With the continuing loss of territories, ISIL's funding will be further materially impaired.

In 2015, extensive taxing of individuals and businesses in controlled territories accounted for 30 per cent of the group's funding. By 2017 ISIL had lost control of around 60 per cent of the territory it once held in Iraq and Syria. This has included areas related to oil production and much of ISIL's tax base, particularly in densely populated cities such as Mosul. It has been reported that due to these losses, ISIL has shifted to drug dealing in the region.¹⁵ It is estimated that ISIL's revenue has fallen from US\$81 million per month in 2015 to US\$16 million per month in 2017.¹⁶ It is highly likely that these falls will continue.

FIGURE 6.3 ESTIMATED REVENUE SOURCES FOR ISIL, 2014-2016


The rise in the economic impact of terrorism coincides with the escalation of armed conflict in 2013 and 2014.



Source: IEP estimates

FIGURE 6.12 ESTIMATED MONTHLY REVENUE FOR ISIL, 2015-2017

ISIL's estimated monthly revenue decreased from 81 million in 2015 to 16 million in 2017.



Source: IEP estimates

AL-QA'IDA

The evolution of funding sources and techniques of al-Qa'ida reflects the changing ways in which this organisation has operated. Initially most activities were funded by millionaire founder Usama bin Laden and by large donations from individuals in Gulf states. As these funds depleted and al-Qa'ida expanded, the group diversified their funding sources. By the early 2000's an elaborate network of donations from charities, nongovernmental organisations, mosques, banks and various online forums made up the majority of al-Qa'ida funding.¹⁷ However, more recently donor money has slowed and the group has resorted to a variety of fundraising techniques, including committing petty crimes such as bank robbery, drug trafficking and hostage-taking.¹⁸

Due to the decentralised structure of the organisation, al-Qa'ida affiliates across the world have a range of funding tactics. Al-Shabaab, which operates in Somalia and Kenya, facilitates its activities through various methods including collecting funds from diaspora communities, seizing assets of NGOs and other organisations, acquiring weapons from external sources and by collecting protection fees and taxing businesses in their controlled

“...more recently al-Qa'ida has resorted to a variety of fundraising techniques, including committing petty crimes such as bank robbery, drug trafficking and hostage-taking.

territory.¹⁹ The al-Nusra Front generally acquires funds through oil sales, by kidnapping foreigners in Syria and through private donations from individuals in Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait.²⁰ A study found al-Qa'ida affiliates in Africa raised US\$66 million from ransoms in one year.²¹ Other al-Qa'ida affiliates, such as the AQAP, which are mainly active in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, resort to pettier crimes such as robbing banks or extorting oil and telecommunications companies.

TALIBAN

The Taliban is present in large parts of Afghanistan and estimates indicate that the group either controls or contests land in 171 of Afghanistan's 398 districts; they are particularly strong in the southern provinces of Helmand, Nimroz, Uruzgan, Zabul and Ghazni. Most of the Taliban's revenue is a product of the territory it controls as most of its fundraising comes from opium and heroin smuggling. Afghanistan is the world's largest opium producer exporting 70-80 per cent of the world's illegal opium. In 2015, opium and heroin generated about half of the Taliban's annual revenue of US\$400 million. The United Nations reported that Afghan poppy field coverage increased by 43 per cent in 2016 from the previous year and resulted in even greater revenues for the Taliban.²³ The Taliban's extensive smuggling routes are primarily used for transporting heroin and opium but these same routes are used to transport hashish, arms, cigarettes and other goods.²⁴

The Taliban also taxes the areas it controls. Tax is the second largest source of Taliban funding. This takes the form of ushr, a ten per cent tax on harvest, as well as zakat, a 2.5 per cent tax on wealth. Goods and services, such as potato harvests and vegetable trucks are also subject to taxation. Notably the Taliban has taxation for services it has no control over including

collecting electricity and water bills from locals.²⁵ In the northern Kunduz province alone, the Taliban collected electric bills from 14,000 homes and profited an estimated US\$100,000 per month.

Rampant extortion and reports of large donor sums sent discretely from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates via Islamic charities and other organisations also contribute to the financing of the Taliban.²⁶ Wealthy Saudis in particular have faced scrutiny for providing 'surrogate money' to Islamist groups, madrasas and universities in Afghanistan as part of a larger plan to promote Wahhabi-inspired theology in the region.²⁷ It is likely that self-generated revenue for the Taliban will continue to grow as they control more areas of Afghanistan.

“ ...the Taliban has taxation for services it has no control over including collecting electricity and water bills from locals and from which it profited an estimated US\$100,000 per month.

BOKO HARAM

Boko Haram, unlike ISIL, al-Qa-ida and the Taliban, does not have sophisticated financing structures. Instead, the group has historically relied on one time operations to fund its activities. This reflects the decentralised nature of the group with local commanders required to generate revenue to fund their own activities. Some of the most common fundraising techniques include abductions for ransoms, kidnapping, extortion of various businesses and bank robberies. Boko Haram has also been known to raise funds by utilising a network of alliances with other terror organisations including receiving funding from Al-Qa'ida in the Land of Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).²⁸ Mass kidnapping of foreigners and civilians for ransom has proven to be a lucrative method for raising funds. Boko Haram has a specialised kidnapping task force that sets out to abduct politicians, business people, foreigners, rulers and civil servants with the intention of later trading them back for large sums of money or for the return of other Boko Haram militants.²⁹ In 2013 Boko Haram was paid US\$3 million in ransom to release a French family of seven and in early 2017 negotiations with the Nigerian government resulted

in the release of kidnapped school girls in return for the release of some imprisoned Boko Haram members.³⁰ Boko Haram has also been financed by donations from group members, corrupt politicians and government officials as well as supporters or organisations based in other countries.³¹ There is also evidence that Boko Haram helps facilitate trade in illicit drugs by ensuring their transit through Nigeria.³²

The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), which includes military forces from Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger, was organised in 2014 to combat Boko Haram activities. MNJTF purports to have neutralised 675 Boko Haram fighters in contributing to the arrest of 566 presumed members and shutting down over 30 training and bomb-making facilities.³³ The joint forces also claim to have rescued over 4,500 hostages.

The Central Bank of Nigeria has moved to shut down accounts and transactions involving terror suspects to further curtail Boko Haram's funds.³⁴ It is also reported that various officials in northern Nigeria have paid for protection and guarantees that Boko Haram will avoid attacking their districts.³⁵ Boko Haram's wave of terror has resulted in more than 100,000 displaced people and 7,000 refugees spilling into Chad; in response, Chad has provided military assistance to Nigeria to help combat Boko Haram.³⁶

FINANCING OF ATTACKS

The ease of transferring money to and within terrorist groups has increased with increased access to the internet, online banking, phone money transfers and cryptocurrency. Outside of conflict-areas, the cost of executing attacks is generally low enough that most incidents are self-funded.

While the attacks of September 11 in the U.S. involved substantial financing with estimates of between US\$400,000 and \$500,000³⁷, other deadly attacks in the OECD have not been as costly. The 2004 Madrid train bombings were estimated to have cost \$10,000 and the failed 2007 London car bomb attacks were estimated to have cost about \$14,000.³⁸ The foiled commuter train attack in Cologne, Germany in 2006, was estimated to have cost only \$500. The biggest costs associated with armed assault attacks is generally the cost of the weapons. Attacks using vehicles, such as in Nice in 2016, were similarly inexpensive to conduct and is a reason why the use of vehicles as weapons has become more common recently. The costs of conducting an attack has decreased with a shift in tactics.


A study of 40 terrorist cells that plotted or carried out attacks in Western Europe between 1994 and 2013 found that most plots were self-funded from legal activities.³⁹ Figure 6.6 outlines the breakdowns in the costs of these plots. All costs associated with the attack are included such as travel, communication, storage, acquiring of weapons and bomb-making materials.

Because of the low cost of terrorist attacks, sources of financing need not be elaborately complicated. Only five per cent relied entirely on external support from international organisations such as al-Qaida or ISIL. Since 1994, there has a movement toward using legal activities for financing.

FIGURE 6.6 COST BREAKDOWN OF TERROR ATTACKS IN EUROPE, 1994 – 2013

Three quarters of terror attacks in Europe cost less than US\$10,000.

Not possible to estimate



Source: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment

EXPERT CONTRIBUTIONS

This fifth edition of the GTI includes expert contributions from five leading scholars in the fields of international security, violent extremism, counterterrorism and the linkages between terrorism and organised crime. Collectively the essays explore critical factors that should be considered as part of the global response to the increased spread of terrorism. The 2017 GTI found that deaths from terrorism declined for the second consecutive year but that more countries are experiencing terrorism than at any time in the past 17 years.

This trend highlights the need for more countries to consider the many complex issues associated with terrorism beyond the more frequently discussed military and security responses to the immediate threat posed by terrorism. For example, how do countries address the challenges of rehabilitating violent extremist offenders within the prison system or how do governments formulate counter violent extremist strategies that shift the attitudes away from sympathy for violent groups?

The five essays included in this section have all been selected to help foster a thought-provoking discussion around these complex and increasing pressing issues.

Dr. Christina Schori-Liang, who is the leader for the Terrorism and Organised Crime Cluster at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy analyses the scale of the global terrorist threat and examines how this threat can be reinforced by current politics. In her essay entitled, *Leaderless Jihad in a Leaderless World: The Future of Terror*, Dr Schori-Liang focuses on the examples of ISIL and Al-Qa'ida in the context of the continuing global security threat posed by these two groups.

Eelco Kessels, who is the executive director of the Global Center on Cooperative Security, explores the urgent need to address radicalisation and recruitment to violent extremism in prisons. His essay, *Managing, Rehabilitating and*

Reintegrating Terrorism Offenders, seeks to provide a framework for good practice in addressing the many challenges associated with those convicted of violent extremism.

In their joint essay, Amy Cunningham and Dr Khalid Koser from the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF) review the lessons learned from interventions to prevent violent extremism. The article examines GCERF's own experiences in identifying the drivers of violent extremism and in supporting community-led responses to help provide positive alternatives.

Bryony Lau, who is the Conflict and Development program manager for the Asia Foundation, examines the issue of terrorism and violent extremism in a specifically Asian context. Her essay seeks to provide a more nuanced understanding of violent extremism while also outlining proposed priorities for Asian governments and policymakers in countering violent extremism.

In continuing this Asian focus, Lt General Vijay Ahluwalia, who was formerly Commander in Chief of Indian's Army Central Command, explores the drivers of terrorism in India and the correlations between terrorism and insurgency. His essay entitled *Terrorism and Successful Counterterrorism Strategies: The Indian Chronicle* also explores the key features of successful counterterrorism strategies in highlighting the importance of an integrated government response to terrorism.

The submission of these essay has been drawn from IEP's extensive network of partners which includes numerous leading international research groups, intergovernmental organisations and experts from across the world. These partnerships help ensure IEP delivers relevant and accurate data analysis as it relates to Positive Peace and the evolving trends from the global threat of terrorism.

LEADERLESS JIHAD IN A LEADERLESS WORLD: THE FUTURE OF TERROR

Dr. Christina Schori-Liang, Leader of the Terrorism and Organised Crime Cluster, Geneva Centre for Security Policy

THE SCOPE OF THE CHALLENGE

The fight against terrorism has come at a tremendous cost of lives lost and development disrupted. Radical Islamist extremism has become the world's most potent global revolutionary force and terrorism has become a constant threat inside and outside our societies. As terrorists gain and lose ground, what remains constant is their tenacious ideology, their flexible and adaptable propaganda and their technological prowess in warfare. Unless we start to look deeper, beyond the statistics and the maps and start to understand the allure of the ideology, their modus operandi and how these will evolve and transform their power in the future, we will be far from making a difference or be able to turn back the tide of extremism.

The focus of this essay is to analyse the scale of the global terrorist threat and explain how it is being reinforced by the current state of political affairs. It will describe how both the Islamic State (ISIL) and Al-Qa'ida continue to present a global security threat. This is due to the following macro-trends:

1. The strategy of both Al-Qa'ida and ISIL to become a decentralised leaderless movement;
2. The growth of technology that is offering terrorist groups greater strategic and operational reach;
3. The increasing numbers of at-risk youth reinforced by demographics and the persistent conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa;¹ and finally
4. The growing nexus of crime and terror, which will support terrorists for many years to come.

After more than 39 months of occupation in Syria and Iraq, ISIL-controlled territories and fighting forces have been severely degraded and the loss of Mosul and Raqqa has marked an end of the physical 'caliphate.' ISIL is on the run. However, it remains unique among other terrorist organisations of the past for a multitude of reasons:

1. Its deluded ego that believed itself powerful enough to construct a pseudo state, an 'Islamic Caliphate'.
2. Its ability to sustain itself economically (in 2015 it amassed a wealth of US\$ 2 billion through organised crime).
3. Its globalist and apocalyptic ambitions and its heady millenarianism.
4. Its powerful ideology that it spreads with its sophisticated media campaign. To date it has attracted over 40,000 foreign fighters from over 110 countries to its cause².

While the world has been fixated on ISIL, Al-Qaeda has been shoring up its own power. Today, it is stronger than it was 16 years ago when it launched its September 11 attacks. At that time, Al-Qa'ida numbered in the thousands worldwide. Today, its Syrian affiliate alone commands 30,000 troops by some estimates and it has affiliated groups in Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen, north Africa and elsewhere. It is continuing to reinvigorate its cause and legacy most recently by using Hamza bin Laden; the 28-year-old son of Osama as its new figurehead.

ISIL is far from decimated as well. It is still estimated to have a total of 12,000-15,000 fighters in Syria and Iraq. ISIL spokesperson, Abu Muhammad al-

Adnani, just before he was killed by a drone, prepared the group for its next reincarnation. He proclaimed 'we began in the desert without cities and without territory' and in the desert we can revive once again. While the disruption of the caliphate represents an important strategic milestone, it is worth recalling that ISIL had been beaten before in 2008 and yet this did not prevent its revival four years later as a highly effective military force capable of capturing land the size of Great Britain and luring thousands of recruits. ISIL will now return to the vicious and effective insurgency it ran before it toppled Mosul and Raqqa. The caliphate is gone but the organisation and its ideology is not.

This is largely due to its ability to mutate and change and take advantage of the current state of global disorder. State fragility is becoming endemic with no fewer than one third of the states in the United Nations earning a 'high warning' or worse in the Fragile States Index. ISIL is not the only complex threat. Non-state actors such as Boko Haram, Al-Shabbab and Al-Qa'ida hold effective power over growing areas in Tunisia, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, Libya and Yemen where central governments have lost power.

LEADERLESS JIHAD

Both ISIL and Al-Qa'ida are evolving into a form of leaderless jihad which doesn't portend well for the future. They both were once highly centralised hierarchical structures but have now adopted strategies that transformed them into fluid operational entities. This will serve them well. When under duress, fighters can retreat to the desert or join other jihadi movements, either in MENA or further afield in Asia. Both organisations have multiple franchises across the globe to which they can travel and support. ISIL has established eight official 'province' formal branches, divided into 37 wiliyats or provinces in Libya, Egypt (Sinai Peninsula), Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Algeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria and the north Caucasus. It has received pledges of allegiance from groups in Somalia, Bangladesh and the Philippines. While ISIL does not have

control over its provinces, it cultivates loose networks of cells, operatives and sympathisers globally. ISIL has operational reach in countries without affiliates. It will continue to morph into an insurgent force capable of unspeakable acts including genocide and torture.

A decade ago, Abu Musab al-Suri argued that Osama Bin Laden's hierarchically structured organisation was vulnerable following the United States' invasion of Afghanistan, since Western counterterrorism operations were focused on targeting its leadership. He proposed that Al-Qa'ida should evolve from a central structure to a decentralised, leaderless movement, united by a shared purpose and ideology, involving multiple forms: individuals, self-recruited lone wolves or cells composed of veteran fighters. Although skeptical at first, Al-Qa'ida embraced al-Suri's idea and began opening Al-Qa'ida franchises worldwide.

Anwar-al-Awlaki, a Yemeni-American cleric, leader of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) further developed this idea. His goal was to transform the message of jihad beyond the personality and transform it into a 'social movement.' His online magazine *Inspire* gave birth to Open Source Jihad (OSJ), another form of leaderless jihad and a strategy that inspires lone actors to conduct jihad. The magazine gives multiple instructions from high to low tech attacks. High tech advice includes information on building pressure cooker bombs in your mum's kitchen. Low tech attacks include: brush fires, pipe bombs, knives and vehicle-based assaults. Al-Awlaki was killed in 2011 with little impact; his ideas, like postcards from the dead, continue to inspire people to jihad. His sermons turned up in 72 terrorism cases in the United States and have inspired lone wolf attacks in the United Kingdom, Canada and France.

Along with OSJ there exists another terrorist tactic referred to as 'leaderless resistance.' The strategy is based on a 'phantom cell or individual action' with no chain of command. It was developed

by the ultra-right in the United States in the 1980s. These attacks are impossible to predict and foil using the counterterror tactics currently deployed.

LEADERLESS WORLD

The global campaign of leaderless jihad has been intensified by the current lack of global leadership in the world. We are living in a period of unprecedented global trials. Extremism is on the rise, conflict and unrest are pervasive, fear and hopelessness reign. At the same time, existential threats such as nuclear war and ominous environmental disasters loom. In this climate of fear we have limited and poor leadership.

Undeniably, this dearth of leadership and lack of stability is fomented by a lack of trust in American leadership. It marks the first time in half a century where Americans themselves believe that the United States should be less engaged in world affairs and with a majority believing that the United States is not helping to solve the world's problems. Many scholars believe that the continued presence of the United States in the Middle East is only fueling jihadism. This has created a setback in global leadership that has reinforced a broader cultural shift in the world. While armies, corporations and unions still hold sway, political hierarchies have been flattened by ideas which are becoming more powerful and more pervasive than politicians and armies.

The Facebook revolution, to which it was referred, began with the Arab Spring. While it failed, it launched a revolution of ideas augmented by the rapid flow of information. This is fueling revolutionary causes and extremism worldwide. The new global disorder has become a spontaneous network of Skype calls, Facebook likes and tweets, all of which flow in the arteries of the internet across the globe in real time. The nature of power, and who wields it, has shifted. Cyberspace has leveled the playing field. Individuals, small countries and most recently terrorists and criminals, can now punch above their weight in cyberspace. The global human brain is being swayed by fake news, Twitter and

social media, while real journalism and books are losing authority and power.

As history is unfolding it is also becoming rudderless. No country or individual in global affairs is arousing enough political or moral authority to sway the new generation of Millennials who only believe 19 per cent of people can be trusted.³ It is not surprising that extremists are gaining a foothold in a world with such unprecedentedly low levels of social trust. While the US is failing at leadership, no one is rushing in to fill the vacuum.

TECHNOLOGY – FUTURE CYBER-ARMIES

Technology is offering terrorist groups greater strategic and operational freedom and new types of 'leaderless attacks.' These will grow in scope in the future. Al-Qa'ida mastered satellite television and cable news. ISIL are the masters of social media and the smart phone. The next group will want to further exploit the internet to conduct cyber operations and ultimately cyber war. ISIL is already building up its new 'cyber caliphate' and cyber army focused on collecting intelligence, coordinating operations and unleashing cyber jihad. While ISIL members have yet to acquire the expertise of threat groups backed by nation states such as the Russian Bears, Iran's Kittens and China's Pandas⁴ who hack industrial infrastructure, ISIL has started to build up a cyber army in the hopes of conducting asymmetrical attacks. Several hacker teams conduct cyber operations carrying the ISIL banner. If terrorist groups lack in-house hacking talents, they can buy these skills on the dark web. Everything is for sale, from zombie computers that can swamp a network with traffic to sophisticated cyber malware.⁵ In April 2016, ISIL united five distinct hacking groups into a 'United Cyber Caliphate' (UCC). Its purpose is to build a cyber army and create forums to enable followers to wage cyber-terror campaigns and conduct crime.⁶ The UCC has been busy publishing kill lists, distributing cyber-operations guidelines on terror operations and inviting new followers.

Today, ISIL can use a fraction of its wealth to buy cyber weapons. Stuxnet, believed to have been designed to attack Iranian nuclear facilities cost US\$100 million to develop: a recent malware program called IceFog, which was attributed to China, was designed to attack government agencies in Japan and South Korea. It cost a mere US\$10,000 to develop.

Another technological innovation that terrorists will use is drones. ISIL announced the establishment of the 'Unmanned Aircraft of the Mujahideen,'⁷ a new operational unit organised to engineer and deploy drones in combat.⁸ ISIL buys drones and then engineers the machines into kamikaze drones that carry small munitions that detonate on impact. Most disconcerting is their ability to use standoff engagement systems to deliver chemical weapons. In an attempt to recapture Deir ez-Zor military airport, militants fired rockets carrying mustard gas in a powered form. Drones could potentially be used to disperse chemical weapons on civilians or for attacks targeting large venues filled with people.

The internet will remain a lifeline for ISIL propaganda while it is being decimated on the battlefield. Modern technology prevents governments controlling the spread of extremist ideas. Terrorists now act simultaneously as the actors, producers and newscasters of their acts of violence. We can no longer 'find ways to starve the terrorist of the oxygen of publicity on which they depend'⁹. Rather, they are in the driver's seat'.

Internet and smart phones have also become the preferred modus operandi to coordinate attacks since terrorists can now trust the strong encryption available. As social media has accelerated the spread of jihadist propaganda, the number of extremists who radicalised online has soared.¹⁰ The internet is a new tool for broadcasting terror in real time with live video streaming from Bangladesh, Kenya and France. Others pledge their allegiance to a terrorist group while conducting a murderous act. Bruce Jenkins maintains that in the past, a youngster who wanted

to be part of jihad was ordered to kill. Now they seek to kill in order to be part of the jihad, even if posthumously.

In the future more sophisticated forms of technology, the Internet of Things (IoT), self-driving cars and smart cities will create even greater cyber vulnerabilities that terrorists can exploit. Algorithms could also be used by terrorists for meta-exploitation of Big Data. Most recently, Facebook has implemented a machine learning algorithm that identifies depressed users based on the metadata generated from their searches, clicks, and linger time while online. Their intent was to be able to change the content displayed to alter the person's mood to positively reinforce the time spent on their platform. The goal of these technologies is to create a habitual Facebook user. Other companies have designed similar processes to sell goods. These techniques could be leveraged by extremist groups to locate potential recruits. The future of ISIL will depend on its ability to maintain its ability to recruit people.

All types of extremists have in the past turned to like-minded groups in the real world to find community and purpose. Today, extremists can turn to the internet and reach out to a global community of extremists with similar views. The lone wolf has access to a cyber pack. Lone wolves can consume hate literature and propaganda and organise cyber-attacks anonymously in the sanctity of their bedrooms. Extremists can also anonymously track these individuals and help them achieve their goals of jihad. Metadata can be leveraged to precisely target those individuals who follow extremist websites.¹¹ Extremists and groups including ISIL are increasing harnessing the popularity of online games by copying online games and action movies by producing 'Clang of Swords' videos and mimicking 'Call of Duty' and 'Grand Theft Auto' games.¹² These games aim to mimic the experience of serving in the caliphate.

New destructive hacker technology is emerging. The National Security Agency (NSA) subcontractor, Equation Group,

was recently hacked; destructive hacker tool kits were stolen, which are capable of seizing control of computers, watch and capture keystrokes and can penetrate through security firewalls. The Shadow Brokers have acquired these cyber weapons and they are selling these tools online for millions. These weapons have the potential to be bought up by terrorist groups who would be willing to use these weapons to cause widespread devastation.

In another security breach, Wikileaks published a leak called Vault 7 consisting of approximately 9,000 files that detail the activities and surveillance and cyber warfare capabilities of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Center for Cyber Intelligence. These exploits were used to launch the massive WannaCry and NotPetya ransomware attacks, which helped close the gap between the capabilities of states and those of terrorists and criminals.

PHISHING FOR VULNERABLE TEENS

ISIL has created an app for children to learn Arabic with pictures of guns, tanks and rockets and by using jihadist songs to mold young minds towards jihad. There are currently 1.8 billion youth between the ages of 10-24. In many countries of the developing world, they represent the majority of the population. Increasingly they are being targeted by violent extremists, who recruit them in refugee camps, religious institutions, universities, prison and via the internet. Currently, national counterterrorism efforts focus mostly on hard power and kinetic force. These efforts are not taking into account the importance of youth strategically tricked, bought or poached by violent extremists.

Demographics also have a role to play. When the Arab Spring swept across the Middle East in 2011, the region had the world's youngest population after sub-Saharan Africa. In 2015, the world's highest youth unemployment has been in areas where Salafi-jihadism has taken root. Statistics have shown large 'youth bulges' increase the risk of democracies

collapsing and armed conflicts breaking out. The countries facing the greatest demographic challenges are exactly the countries that currently experience the greatest levels of violence and instability: Yemen, Iraq, Palestine and Syria. This does not bode well for the future.

Abu Bakr Naji's 2004 playbook for ISIL, *The Management of Savagery* encourages followers to capture the rebelliousness of youth. Today, instability and war in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Syria and Yemen have bred a new generation of youth who have little political power, negative development indices, no real job prospects and limited futures. Thousands of these disaffected youth are vulnerable.

There are 7.6 million Syrian children in need of humanitarian assistance and more than three million children are internally displaced. Another two million Syrian children live as refugees in Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan, Egypt and Iraq. Most live in poverty and without access to education. Refugees represent one of the most vulnerable groups worldwide. They are the perfect victims to be recruited by Salafi-jihadists who need only promise them a meal a day and salvation to win their devotion. If nothing is done now to help them, they will help proliferate terrorism for years to come.

The Salafi-Jihadist's goal is to convince Muslim youth worldwide that terrorism is the only path to achieve their goals. They maintain that the growing wave of anti-Muslim sentiments and the fear of terrorist attacks in Europe and America will only get worse and that ultimately they will be segregated from the rest and put in detention facilities - so they must act now. Older generations are reacting to this rising anti-Muslim sentiment with fear but the younger ones with resentment; the result is a breeding ground for extremism. This is a mutually self-reinforcing, reflexive process that must be stopped.

CRIMINAL-TERRORIST FINANCING

The growing nexus of crime and terror will support terrorists for many years to come.

Criminal-terrorist networks are weakening states structures and undermining rule of law and creating illegitimate governments. These networks have enabled ISIS and Al-Qa'ida to broaden their scope of power by increasing their number of affiliates and partners. They survive in transregional, decentralised, and ungoverned spaces populated by people who no longer trust or even hope to receive services from any governance structure. The significant gaps in criminal justice systems help to sustain these groups. Only by closing the gaps that criminals and terrorists are exploiting can there be any real reduction of the threat.¹³

THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING OPEN SOCIETIES

In conclusion, ISIL and Al Qa'ida have discovered the Achilles heel of our societies; latent xenophobia and fear of insecurity. They stoke these fears through attacks on civilians and with chilling videos exploiting their atrocities. Modern terrorists are counting on an emotional response by both our open societies and our leaders as fear leads citizens and their leaders to begin to think and act irrationally.

Our open societies are thus always at risk from the threat posed by our response to terror and the fear that it generates. How can this trend be stopped and reversed? Abandoning the values and principles of our open societies and allowing fear to drive our domestic and foreign policies is certainly not the answer. Trying to understand the appeal of violent extremist ideologies and the path to radicalisation is a good start.

The ultimate goal is to create societies free from the appeal of violent extremist ideologies either based on racial, ethnic, sexual or religious discrimination. It will be a generational issue so it is best to start intervening as soon as a possible.

Our youth must be given opportunities where they can dream and have hope for the future. A good way to start is to give them the opportunity to help preserve the next generation from falling prey to extremism.

Another key to dealing with terrorism is to have a better understanding of cyber security and the new rapidly changing technological developments. Raising awareness about strategic communications campaigns used by terrorists, protecting critical infrastructure and ensuring that future technologies will not be instrumentalised is important. Designing and engineering security measures in the design phase of new technologies is also key. Most important is to prevent cyber exploits and cyber weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists and criminals.

Building resilience against terrorism will have to be designed and developed in both the physical and the virtual worlds. Terrorism cannot be beaten solely with firepower on the ground. It will only be defeated with leadership, greater international cooperation, and with the intrinsic knowledge that prevention holds the key to breaking the cycle of terror in the future.

MANAGING, REHABILITATING & REINTEGRATING TERRORISM OFFENDERS

Eelco Kessels, Executive Director, Global Center on Cooperative Security

As countries become better at detecting, investigating and prosecuting terrorism suspects, including returning foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), prison services across the world are faced with a growing number of terrorism offenders in their institutions. The presence of these violent extremist offenders (VEOs) in the justice system poses new challenges to prison and probation services as well as to a range of other stakeholders and intervention providers involved in their management, rehabilitation and reintegration. From a fear of violent extremist contagion and recruitment among other prisoners to concerns around former VEOs reintegrating back into communities, the perceived challenges are many and the tolerance for failure is extremely low.

First, a reality check: prisons have not generally become a 'finishing school for terrorists' where violent extremist radicalisation spreads like wildfire.¹⁴ Numbers are still relatively low with evidence of VEOs radicalising or recruiting others in detention environments and the risk of post-release recidivism often anecdotal rather than based on substantial qualitative and quantitative data.¹⁵ Mark Hamm described it best when coining the term 'the spectacular few': building on more than 25 years of prison research, he concludes that only a small minority of the inmate population is at risk of engaging in terrorist activities during or after imprisonment.¹⁶ Nevertheless, recent research analysing profiles of 79 European violent extremists with criminal pasts concluded that 45 of them had been incarcerated prior to their radicalisation with 12 of them being judged to have gone

through this process during their time in prison.¹⁷ Furthermore, violent extremism risk assessments and corresponding interventions are still in the early stages of development and testing: there is no gold standard or silver bullet, not in the least because these tools are highly context-specific, require considerable tailoring and depend on the availability of a range of resources (material, expertise, finances etc.). Lastly, there is no magic solution or quick fix to effectively reintegrating VEOs; not even when spending hundreds of millions of dollars on a very elaborate program like Saudi Arabia's Mohamed Bin Naif Center for Counseling and Care. While the Centre may claim a success rate between 80-90 percent, questions remain about the accuracy of this number¹⁸ considering recidivism rates for regular crimes are between 20-75 percent in most countries.¹⁹

Herein lies the principal problem: terrorism is considered so extraordinary that responses to it must be likewise extraordinary. Well-established management methods and intervention approaches that have proven effective with other types of offenders are often deemed insufficient, or not even considered, with politicians and the wider public demanding quick strong responses.²⁰ The fear and risk averseness that often underlie these demands further fuels the stigmatisation of VEOs, especially during re-entry, which can seriously impede their successful reintegration back into society.

GOOD PRACTICES IN MANAGING, REHABILITATING AND REINTEGRATING VEOs

Given this lack of data, prevailing

misperceptions and the limited resources available to prison and probation services – what can be done to better manage terrorism offenders, prevent radicalisation to violent extremism in prisons and facilitate the successful rehabilitation and reintegration of VEOs into society?

GET THE BASICS RIGHT FIRST

Firstly, it is key that general prison management principles and good practices are implemented. Prisons must be safe, secure and well-resourced environments in which prisoners are treated humanely and their human rights respected in accordance with international prison standards, including the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules). Staff should receive appropriate and tailored training and support, including in developing constructive and professional relationships with VEOs, regardless of differences in staff-prisoner backgrounds. It is crucial that security measures complement rather than stifle intervention efforts and that corruption is actively prevented. These basic conditions are vital for the management of all offenders, including VEOs, who often see the state as their enemy and expect to be mistreated. With many countries facing significant resource challenges that prohibit the development of more comprehensive VEO management and rehabilitation programs, improving these aspects will help create an environment less conducive to radicalisation and recruitment to violent extremism.

DEFINE POLICY AND OBJECTIVES

The management, rehabilitation and reintegration of VEOs requires a well-articulated policy framework with specific objectives, actions and actors. First, it is important to clarify whether the final aim is disengagement (a behavioral move away from a group, cause or ideology that justifies violence to bring about political or social change) or de-radicalisation (a cognitive move away from supporting the use of violence to achieve political or social change). This will inform the theory

of change behind the policy and the final desired outcome. Second, policies and related programs need to carefully consider both short-term security needs and long-term rehabilitation aims. In the short-term, the focus during detention is generally on preventing further radicalisation of terrorism offenders, the radicalisation and recruitment of other inmates and attacks inside or outside of prison. However, long-term rehabilitation interventions seek to minimise the risk of post-release re-radicalisation, prevent the radicalisation or recruitment of others and achieve low rates of recidivism. Finally, it is key that progress indicators and monitoring mechanisms are included in the program's design in order to effectively evaluate impact.

STRUCTURALLY IMPLEMENT RISK AND NEEDS ASSESSMENTS

In order to appropriately inform classification, housing, and services decisions and to tailor individualised interventions and treatment protocols (including for special categories of offenders such as youth and women),²¹ inmates should undergo comprehensive risk and needs assessments. This will help prison authorities understand what specific motives and circumstances may have contributed to an individual's offending behavior but also provide insights into potential needs and protective factors. For example, the motivations and needs of a young VEO, responsible for sharing terrorist material in their own country without fully understanding the impact, are likely to be very different and will require different responses from a battle-hardened FTF returning from a conflict zone with severe trauma. In turn, this information can help tailor management decisions and interventions, especially when risk assessments are repeated over time to help identify the impact of specific actions. Risk and needs assessment tools should be selected based on their relevance, reliability and feasibility; the use of empirically based, rationally selected risk factors; and their sensitivity to local and individual contexts. It is important that these approaches are implemented

consistently by well-trained staff and are based on effective information sharing processes between relevant agencies and good case management systems.

Several violent extremism-specific risk assessment tools have been developed over the past years, including Violent Extremism Risk Assessment Version 2 (VERA 2) and the United Kingdom's Extremism Risk Guidance 22+ (ERG 22+). Evaluations are ongoing around the validity and effectiveness of these relatively new instruments and prison services should take into account their context-specific and resource-intensive nature. Authorities should also consider the potential application of existing validated tools for assessing violence risk in youth (e.g. Structured Assessment of Violence Risk in Youth (SAVRY)) and adults (e.g. Historical Clinical Risk Management-20 (HCR-20) and Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG)) for VEOs in combination with other similarly validated psycho-social and historical risk and needs assessment approaches. However, typically these tools are not based and validated on samples including any known individuals convicted of terrorism-related offences. Therefore there is a danger in confidently applying these assessments to a group for which they are not validated. Ultimately, risk assessments must follow a case formulation approach in which the circumstances of each individual are carefully and cautiously assessed alongside emerging knowledge and evidence about the types of factors that may contribute to risk or protection.

TARGET RISK REDUCTION INTERVENTIONS

When designing and delivering interventions that reduce the risks posed by VEOs, during and after their imprisonment, more consideration should be given to the applicability of underlying doctrines and approaches of programs proven to prevent different types of reoffending.²² Key 'what-works' principles are now well-established in criminological and forensic psychological literature and practice; and first and foremost is the risk-need-responsivity model.²³ Essentially this model

dictates that 'programs should;

1. target those who are deemed of higher risk of reoffending and of committing serious harm (risk principle),
2. target factors that directly contribute to offending (need principle), and
3. be delivered in a way and style that maximizes learning for individuals (responsivity principle).²⁴

Programs based on these three principles have been found to be more effective than those that are not but their application to interventions aimed at addressing violent extremism seems to have hardly been developed or examined.²⁵

Risk reduction interventions need to be targeted through assessments, have clearly defined goals and desired outcomes and be evaluated frequently, and adjusted accordingly. They need to explicitly target factors and circumstances that directly contributed to an individual's engagement and offending and be responsive to the individual prisoner's needs, capabilities and risk profile. To this end, a range of intervention approaches should be made available where possible, including mentoring programs, psycho-social support, education, vocational training, religious counseling, arts and sports. Those providing the interventions, be it governmental practitioners or independent external providers, need to be carefully selected, vetted, trained, coordinated and supported in their intervention delivery.

MULTI-STAKEHOLDER SUPPORT TO REINTEGRATION

Finally, prison and probation services and other stakeholders need to provide continuity and consistency of interventions during and after re-entry, assisting the reintegrating individual in those areas that assessments and previous interventions have deemed most salient. Continued education, housing, job placement and other elements that facilitate successful reintegration into society should also be considered where appropriate. Resettlement plans need to be prepared prior to release and ideally with the

VEO's contributions. Appropriate and proportionate release conditions should enable opportunities for successful reintegration while maintaining security. The involvement of families, friends, and positive mentors is hugely important as they can discourage interest and involvement in violent extremist groups and provide credible voices to challenge violent extremist viewpoints. They will need to be supported throughout the reintegration process in recognising that some family and friends could also be a negative influence or carry responsibility for initial involvement and offending. Actors should also consider widening the focus of rehabilitation and reintegration efforts beyond VEOs to include all those affected by violent extremism. For example, children who were kidnapped by terrorists or born while in a conflict zone.

It is imperative that various government agencies, including prison and probation services, law enforcement, local government, social and health services and educational institutions work closely together to support the VEO's reintegration process; their roles and responsibilities should be clearly established, information should be shared regularly and engagement with the reintegrating individual should be consistent across all stakeholders. Furthermore, community organisations and other civil society actors should be involved in designing, delivering and evaluating reintegration programs and aftercare support since they often engender high levels of trust, credibility, and expertise among their local community. However, it is important that they receive the required legal and political space, policy guidance and resources. The private sector also has a role to play in terms of providing traineeships and job placements, which is especially important for reintegrating VEOs given the societal fear towards violent extremists. More generally, investments in community awareness around violent extremism, including through the media, are vital to reduce stigmatisation and socialise the public to the need to successfully reintegrate terrorism offenders.

CONCLUSION

There is a clear urgency to address radicalisation and recruitment to violent extremism in prisons and effectively reintegrate terrorism offenders. Yet the lack of understanding of the extent of the problem has led many governments to implement hasty solutions based on untested assumptions and anecdotal evidence. Much can already be done in terms of improvements to basic infrastructure, services and staff training to build on international good practices of fostering a prison environment that is less conducive to radicalisation and recruitment to violent extremism. However, to truly optimise risk reduction interventions and reintegration programs for VEOs, serious investments are needed to enhance our understanding of both the causes of and solutions to the problem at hand. This includes carefully considering how underlying principles and interventions proven to prevent different types of reoffending are also applicable to VEOs. It is important to recognise that each VEO presents different risks, needs and engagement challenges that require bespoke approaches for policies and programs to have a long-term meaningful impact.

LESSONS LEARNED IN PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM: THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT & RESILIENCE FUND

Amy E. Cunningham, Advisor; and Dr Khalid Koser, Executive Director, the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF)

During the year since the publication of the last Global Terrorism Index, the ‘preventing violent extremism’ (PVE) agenda has progressed in fits and starts. Positively, the idea that prevention is an important component in the counter-terrorism toolbox is now widely acknowledged. This further aligns PVE with the agenda of the United Nations (UN) where the new Secretary General has emphasised prevention across the entire UN system, building on the relevance of PVE for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as most explicitly expressed in SDG 16. Negatively, political support for PVE has waned among certain key donors and there have been legitimate concerns expressed that PVE may become an excuse to restrict civil society, hamper freedom of expression and suppress human rights. There is still also some skepticism among development donors and actors about the relevance of PVE.

Perhaps the best way to maintain the momentum of the PVE agenda is to demonstrate results. This short essay reviews the results of PVE interventions supported by GCERF and lessons learned; after all the credibility of PVE also depends on an objective assessment of what works and what does not. GCERF is a multi-stakeholder global fund, supporting local initiatives to build resilience against violent extremism in Bangladesh, Kenya, Kosovo, Mali, Myanmar, Nigeria and Tunisia (www.gcerf.org)

UNDERSTANDING THE DRIVERS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM

A fundamental initial step in effective programming for preventing violent extremism is to understand what is driving it. There is a general consensus that the factors are individual, contextual and locally specific. Over the last year GCERF has commissioned more than 8,500 baseline surveys of people in at-risk communities in Bangladesh, Mali and Nigeria. In all three countries, more than 90 per cent of individuals surveyed were aware of the threat of violent extremism and more than 50 per cent had already experienced it personally. Its impact was reported to include death, displacement, sexual violence, loss of livelihoods, family breakdown, trauma and mental stress.

The drivers of violent extremism identified across these communities can be broadly categorised as structural conditions, individual incentives and enabling factors. In Bangladesh, over 80 per cent of respondents cited poverty, unemployment and a lack of opportunity as the main reason for violent extremism; the same factors recurred in Mali and Nigeria (although reported in smaller percentages). Respondents in each country also highlighted material enticements by violent extremist groups; 24 per cent of college and madrasa students in Bangladesh said they had been offered money and social services, and 15 per cent said they had been

inspired by extremist groups’ criticism of the government. In Mali enabling factors were reported to include weak regulation of religious institutions, weak public administration, inefficient judicial systems and a loss of family values and solidarity.

ADDRESSING THE DRIVERS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Most communities surveyed were already responding to these drivers and GCERF has boosted these community-led responses.

Broadly, these PVE interventions fall into three categories:

1. raising awareness of violent extremism
2. promoting community engagement
3. providing positive alternatives.

In Bangladesh, GCERF grants are engaging over 150,000 students in awareness raising initiatives including youth debate competitions, youth radio listener clubs and critical thinking workshops. In Mali, GCERF grants are supporting training for 27,000 madrasa students and 180 madrasa professors on the drivers, manifestations and means of preventing violent extremism. In Nigeria, women’s groups have been established with the support of GCERF grants to develop and disseminate counter-narratives to extremist messages.

Community engagement is being fostered in Bangladesh by providing access to extracurricular activities such as sports tournaments to 37,000 adolescent youth and through the facilitation of courtyard meetings for over 100,000 women. In Mali training in active citizenship is being provided to 14,000 women and in Nigeria more than 33,000 young people are participating in community theatre and art projects to help build their confidence and communication skills.

Finally a range of interventions also prioritise providing positive alternatives to men, women and youth. In Bangladesh, GCERF grants support vocational skills training, entrepreneurship development, and business management training for more than 70,000 youth. In Mali, GCERF is helping promote the socio-economic

integration of women through training in agricultural production techniques, organisation of women's associations and access to trade finance. In Nigeria low-income and unemployed women and girls are receiving financial literacy training and life skills training, acquiring vocational skills and are being connected to financial institutions.

Across this range of interventions are several characteristics that represent the particular value proposition of GCERF and which promote its objective to strengthen community resilience against violent extremism. One is the bottom-up principle that the initiatives supported by GCERF are identified by and delivered through local communities. A second is long term engagement within communities: GCERF grants are multi-year commitments. A related third characteristic is capacity development; for example by providing PVE training to local NGOs and creating partnerships between them in communities of practice.

LESSONS LEARNED

It is too soon in the results chain for GCERF to demonstrate that the types of outputs described above are delivering the intended outcomes; specifically, achieving resilient communities characterised by social cohesion, community agency, equal access to opportunities and a sense of purpose. As GCERF has been among the first PVE programmers, by extension it is probably too early to demonstrate PVE outcomes generally. However it is not too early to be learning lessons about what works and what does not work in preventing violent extremism at the local level.

While more than 50 per cent of GCERF supported activities reach women and girls, engaging them effectively remains a programmatic challenge. This is particularly significant in light of research findings that '...a closer understanding of the roles women play in relation to violence and conflict is critical to the development of tailored strategies to strengthen resilience against violence and extremism and support victims

and survivors of terrorist attacks.²⁶ In Bangladesh for example, GCERF's partners, which are local NGOs generally display low levels of female leadership within their staff. In Mali, where a substantial proportion of GCERF programming focuses on religious leaders and Quranic schools, there is a risk that a gender bias develops as a result of low levels of female participation in these religious institutions. In Nigeria, as a result of low levels of sustained engagement by women and girls, GCERF has shifted its initial focus toward promoting gender sensitivity rather than gender transformation.

A second challenge that has arisen recently, and can be viewed through the specific context of the district of Cox's Bazar in Bangladesh, is the diversion of resources as a result of a humanitarian crisis. Over the past year GCERF grants have been supporting dialogue and tolerance between host communities and Rohingya refugees. The recent flood of hundreds of thousands more refugees has diverted GCERF's local partners to more immediate humanitarian responses. This is of course necessary and appropriate but it is also reported by our partners that the influx of refugees has resulted in rising community tensions. A challenge for GCERF, PVE and the broader prevention agenda is how to maintain focus on long term preventive action in the face of immediate humanitarian challenges such as population displacement or natural disasters.

A third related challenge experienced by GCERF is coordination. While we would insist that GCERF is a unique effort that provides neutral and sustainable funding for locally-led responses to violent extremism, it is also the case that there is a proliferation of local and international organisations that are active in PVE at the local level. In most countries where GCERF is currently operational, there are not yet effective coordination mechanisms to ensure the combined efficacy and streamlined funding of multiple PVE actors. This should be a priority for national action plans on preventing violent extremism that

are being developed in several of these and many other countries.

CONCLUSIONS

The statistics reported in this edition of the Global Terrorism Index are a stark reminder of the need for effective strategies to prevent violent extremism. PVE programming is still in its infancy and it is important to understand and share what is working and what is not. An objective assessment of results is the best way to maintain momentum on the PVE agenda. This short essay has described the experiences of GCERF in identifying drivers, supporting community-led responses and confronting challenges in PVE across a range of affected communities.

VIOLENT EXTREMISM & CVE IN ASIA

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Terror attacks began increasing in Asia in the early 2000s. According to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), South Asia was more affected than anywhere else in the world between 2008 and 2013. In 2016, South and Southeast Asia accounted for one third of terror attacks and one fourth of fatalities globally. Of the five Islamic State (ISIL) affiliated groups that scaled up their attacks significantly last year, three were in Asia; ISIL Bangladesh, the Maute Group in the Philippines and the Islamic State of Khorasan Province in Pakistan and Afghanistan.²⁷

Donors in Asia want to prevent radicalisation through countering violent extremism (CVE) but it is not obvious where to start. How should they analyse violent extremism in Asia? What should they consider when allocating their CVE budgets? This essay proceeds in three parts. First, it suggests disaggregating violent extremism to better understand it. Second, it proposes four priorities for CVE in Asia. Third, it lists several principles for smart CVE investments.

UNDERSTANDING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN ASIA

The GTD records suicide bombings in Pakistan, assaults by insurgents in Thailand and assassinations in the Philippines. In this sense, the data is more useful for understanding violent extremism than terrorism, which is more narrowly defined.²⁸ Violent extremism is a broader concept that captures most forms of ideologically motivated political violence.

Extremist violence varies widely across Asia. The GTD shows that most attacks and fatalities are in Afghanistan and Pakistan where incidents are on average deadlier and more indiscriminate than other

countries in Asia. In contrast, attacks in India, Thailand and the Philippines, which all have ranked in the top ten of the Global Terrorism Index in recent years, are less deadly and more discriminate.

What explains this? Is it possible to generalise about violent extremism in Asia if there are such stark differences? There are patterns. But it is easier to see them by disaggregating by form (insurgency vs sectarian violence), actor (nationalist, religious, separatist or communist)²⁹ and tactics (bombings in civilian areas vs targeted killings).

Take India and the Philippines, which both have active communist insurgencies. The Naxal movement in India began in the 1960s but violence escalated in 2004. The New People's Army (NPA) in the Philippines has been around for just as long with its armed strength waxing and waning over several decades. The Naxalites and the NPA wage guerilla war against the state and primarily target security forces and government officials as they perceive them as legitimate targets. They would dispute that their attacks constitute 'terrorism,' as recorded in the GTD.³⁰ Whether one agrees or not with this categorisation, it is revealing that two communist insurgencies, despite operating in different political contexts, use violence in remarkably similar ways.

Next, consider suicide attacks. The GTD recorded 153 incidents in South and Southeast Asia in 2016. Unsurprisingly, 93 per cent were in Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, when suicide attacks occurred in countries that less frequently experience attacks, groups with links to ISIL were often responsible.

In Indonesia in January 2016, ISIL affiliated group, Jamaah Anshar Khilafah exploded a suicide bomb in a Starbucks and simultaneously attacked a nearby police post in central Jakarta. The attack killed five including four of the perpetrators. In Bangladesh in July, ISIL claimed responsibility for the Holey Artisan Bakery incident in Dhaka's diplomatic quarter, which killed 27, including two police and the five attackers. In the Philippines in September, the first joint operation by ISIL-aligned local radical groups interestingly did not use a suicide attacker in their bombing of Davao's night market, which killed 15.³¹ These incidents make up a tiny share of the violence in the GTD but illuminate the tactics used by ISIL-linked groups across Asia.

Disaggregating by form, actor and tactic leads to a clearer understanding of violent extremism. This is especially true when analysing quantitative data like the GTD. But it is an equally valid approach for qualitative research. Strong analysis of violent extremism in turn leads to more effective evidence-based CVE interventions that are tailored to a local context.

FOUR PRIORITIES FOR CVE IN ASIA

CVE strategies should always be customised to the drivers of violent extremism in a country but across Asia there are four issues that deserve donor attention.

- 1. Focus on attitudes as well as violent extremist behavior.** Individuals committing violence themselves are one issue. Another is the larger pool of people raising funds for violent organisations or privately sympathising with their actions. Attitudes matter because of how they are connected to violent behavior. At the individual level, they may lead to direct participation in violence. At the societal level, they may embolden the radical fringe to use violence with impunity.

In Asia, it is not just positive perceptions of ISIL or support for

violent Islamists at home that is concerning. Chauvinist nationalism is making the lives of minorities harder in marginalising them further and curtailing their rights. Organisations championing these views may not use violence themselves but they are priming public opinion to tolerate those who will.

2. Invest in better research on recruitment to violent Islamist groups.

Historically, many of these groups in Asia drew on local grievances and networks to pull in new members. ISIL's establishment of its caliphate in 2014 and its split with al-Qaeda changed the outlook and operations of many. For groups that established links with ISIL, their drawing power to potential recruits also changed. This can be seen both in the profiles of individuals getting involved in Islamist violence and their pathways of radicalisation.

For example, Indonesian maids in Hong Kong and Singapore have been joining ISIL chat groups, raising funds for jihad and translating extremist tracts.³² Recruitment to violent Islamist groups is changing in Asia since the rise of ISIL yet it remains unevenly studied across the region.

3. Support countries where returning foreign fighters may radicalise others or attempt attacks.

Capacity and will to address the problem of returnees from Syria and Iraq is stronger in some Asian countries than others. The first challenge is knowing who is coming back, the second is assessing what risk they pose and the third is deciding what to do with them. In Asia, two countries that have little history of violent Islamist attacks are grappling with these challenges; Malaysia and the Maldives. Both have seen a startling number of their citizens travel to Iraq and Syria relative to their population.³³ In the past, violent Islamists from

Malaysia were more likely to commit violence in neighboring Indonesia and the Philippines than at home.³⁴ In June 2016, ISIL claimed a grenade attack on a nightclub near Kuala Lumpur, which injured eight. The security services have foiled multiple plots since.³⁵ In May 2017, the Malaysian Government reported that 56 Malaysians were still in Syria and Iraq while 32 had been killed and eight had returned.³⁶

Maldivians of varied backgrounds have been travelling to Iraq and Syria since 2013.³⁷ By 2015, the government had passed a new law which criminalised travelling abroad to join a terrorist group, which it is now using to press charges against individuals deported.³⁸ The country has little experience with counterterrorism and has hundreds of soft targets such as hotels perched on atolls in the Indian Ocean.³⁹

4. Engage Asian governments where possible.

The politics and actions of the state itself can be a driver of violence by non-state actors. Across Asia, legislation and policies are in place for counterterrorism and, increasingly, to CVE. In responding to security threats, policymakers have difficult choices to make between hard and soft responses. If they get the balance wrong, Asian governments may (inadvertently) make violent extremism worse.

Donors have limited space to engage Asian governments on sensitive matters like violent extremism. Often, CVE will focus on supporting civil society and small-scale community initiatives. But where it is possible, donors should engage governments directly as well. Donors could also focus on enhancing regional cooperation and provide opportunities to convene the proliferating agencies and ministries responsible for terrorism and violent extremism.

INVESTING WISELY

Donors want to make smart investments in CVE in Asia. Similar to conflict prevention, which many donors have been supporting in the region for years⁴⁰, CVE is more about how the money is spent than how much is available.

What should donors consider when allocating CVE budgets?

- Be clear about the kind of violent extremism to be addressed. Is it gang members being recruited into violent Islamist groups or is it hate crime targeting Muslims?
- Fund rigorous research to identify local drivers of violent extremism and local patterns of radicalisation, how these may be changing, and why.
- Support civil society and communities that are best positioned to reach individuals at risk of radicalisation. These may not be the usual partners for many donors.
- Ensure bilateral support for strengthened counterterrorism measures does not undermine the prevention objectives of CVE.
- Be realistic about results. CVE has not 'failed' even if extremist violence continues. Prevention is about reducing risks of radicalisation rather than eliminating them entirely.
- Measure what is achieved. This is only possible if donors specify the desired outcomes clearly, for individual projects as well as for multi-year programming strategies.

There is no template for CVE in Asia. The best way forward for donors is to keep abreast of the changing nature of violent extremism and adapt accordingly. Just like a stock portfolio, funding should be invested in long term support with some reserved for short term or higher risk projects. Not all will succeed but some will.

TERRORISM AND SUCCESSFUL COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES: THE INDIAN CHRONICLE

Lt General (Dr.) VK Ahluwalia, former Commander in Chief, Indian Army's Central Command

Terrorism today has emerged as one of the most potent threats to global peace and security. Easy access to sophisticated weapons and disruptive advances in technology, especially the cyber world masks the identity of the terrorists, facilitates real time secure communications and the flow of funds and provides access to an infinite resource of DIY kits on issues ranging from making bombs to executing beheadings. These elements have collectively made terrorism the most preferred means of waging war. Despite the grave threat, the international community is far from reaching a consensus on how to fight this menace collectively. So deep are the fissures that even adopting a common definition of terrorism and violent extremism has met stiff resistance.

India's tryst with terrorism and violent extremism can be traced back partly to the religion based partition in 1947, which ripped the sub-continent into two nations: India and Pakistan. The sub-continent remained witness to the most horrifying ethnic riots in modern history, which were marked by extreme violence and acts of terrorism. Following the partition, after a brief period of neutrality, the then Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), Hari Singh formally acceded to India; however, this act of accession has not, and continues not to be recognised by Pakistan which lays claims to the Muslim majority region. This territorial dispute lies at the core of the long standing conflict between the two nations with both nations each vehemently rejecting the other's claims. Further, India views Pakistan as perpetuating the on-going cross border conflict and for sponsoring militant activity in a bid to

destabilise the state of J&K and other parts of the country. In addition, considering the number of ongoing insurgencies⁴¹ in India, terrorism and violent extremism is also a manifestation of politico-religious violence, ethnic-sub regional nationalism, socio-economic conditions and politics of identity.

What were the causes that led to the genesis of terrorism and its drivers in India? While seeking answers to this question, we will also dwell upon the terrorist initiated incidents and terrorist groups operating in India. We will explore the complementary relationship between terrorism and insurgency, analyse various forms in which terrorism morphs and finally, establish the contours of successful counterterrorism strategies.

CAUSES OF TERRORISM AND IMPORTANT INCIDENTS

The primary causes of terrorism and insurgency in India are based on political, religious, ethnic, ideological, identity driven, linguistic or socio-economic grievances. In India, terrorism can be broadly categorised in three distinct parts:

- Cross border terrorism in J&K.
- Terrorism in the hinterland.
- Extreme violence and terrorism as an integral part of the ongoing insurgencies.

In a richly diverse society, politics of communalism and criminalisation, fanatic religious movements and irresponsible statements by political and religious leaders, human rights excesses, marginalised minority communities, high levels of youth unemployment, poverty,

illiteracy, poor governance and prolonged delays in criminal justice provide an ideal fertile ground for terrorism to take root and thrive in India. Quite often, incidents relating to a particular religious/ ethnic group act as a catalyst and an initiator to indoctrinate/ radicalise youth⁴¹ (and not necessarily only the poor and marginalised) to indulge in extreme forms of violence and terrorism. Considering the fact that intensity of violence due to religious terrorism has always been very severe, strict law should be framed expeditiously against those delivering 'hate speeches' that incite a religious/ ethnic community's passions.

India also remains highly vulnerable to terrorism by foreign terrorists, due to porous borders with all its neighbours and a long coast line. Resultantly, the terrorists and the insurgents continue to receive material support and funds - the main drivers of terrorism - from a number of sources. India has experienced almost all forms of terrorist attacks: hijacking and blowing up of aircrafts, sabotaging railway tracks, kidnapping hostages for meeting political demands, suicide attacks, the assassination of two of its Prime Ministers, attacks on places of worship, transportation systems, security forces and financial hubs, communal riots followed by extreme violence and attacks both by religious and non-religious terrorist groups. The modus operandi of terrorism has remained dynamic to achieve its goals and objectives.

TERRORIST GROUPS AND LINKAGES

In 2014, South Asian Terrorism Portal (SATP) listed 180 terrorist groups that have been operating within India or from the neighbouring South Asian countries, over the last two decades. The U.S. State Department's *Country Reports on Terrorism 2016*⁴² states, 'India continued to experience attacks, including by Maoist insurgents and Pakistan-based terrorists.'

Prominent Islamist terrorist groups focused on Kashmir that have been active in India include Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Al-

Qaeda affiliate Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HuM) and Hijbul Mujahideen (HM)⁴³. While Islamist terror groups like JeM are widely suspected of attacking the highest seat of Indian democracy; the Indian Parliament, on 13 December 2001⁴⁴, LeT exploited India's maritime approach to carry out multiple terror attacks on Mumbai⁴⁵ in November 2008. Mumbai was highly ill-prepared to respond to such attacks. An analysis of all attacks including the recent ones at Dinanagar in 2015, Pathankot in 2016, Pampore, Uri and Baramulla in J&K in 2016 and Srinagar in J&K on 4 October 2017 reinforces the ongoing trends in terrorism that are transnational in their geographical reach coupled with extreme forms of violence which are driven by religious fundamentalism.

Mumbai, the financial hub of the country and the most populous city, has been the most preferred target of the terrorists (1992, 1993, 2006, 2008) to disrupt the financial systems of the country and to kill the maximum number of people so as to cause unacceptable social disorder and communal disharmony, among others.

Complementarity between Terrorism and Insurgency

Every successful classical insurgency, by and large, has four broad phases; namely subversion, terrorism, guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare which often overlap and flow seamlessly into one and other. In India, the insurgents indulge in intermittent acts of terrorism, using force and violence, with a view to complement their grand strategy to achieve their stated goals and objectives. It has been observed that terrorism and extreme violence, as part of an insurgency's strategy, tends to vitalise the movement to sustain it for a longer duration.

North Eastern Region (NER)

It comprises of eight states, the majority of which have been inflicted with insurgencies and terrorism since the last five to six decades. NER has substantial variety in ethnicity, language, terrain,

social systems, customs and traditions which makes it a complex mosaic of diversity. Broadly, violence, terrorism and insurgencies are a result of inter-ethnic rivalries, the fight for identity, poor governance, the displacement of people, a sense of alienation and marginalisation, struggles over natural resources and a fear of demographic inversion due to illegal migrations, both from within and outside India. The Naga insurgency - the mother of all insurgencies - that commenced in 1956, is one of the oldest unresolved insurgencies in the world. However, the states of Sikkim, Mizoram and Tripura have continued to remain peaceful.

PUNJAB

While the period 1980-90 was marked by intense religion based militancy and violence in Punjab, it has remained peaceful for over two decades now.

LEFT WING EXTREMISM (LWE)

LWE refers to the activities of over 39 militant organisations, including Communist Party of India (Maoists)⁴⁶ which is the most prominent extremist party and which promotes left wing ideology due to abject poverty, deprivation, exploitation, displacement of people and social injustice. The conflict with this group, popularly called the Maoists or Naxalites, saw 4950 persons killed (security forces and civilians) from 2005 to 15 October 2017⁴⁸. An analysis of various operations suggests that the Maoists have continued to change their strategy and tactics so as to exploit the structural weaknesses in the state's counter insurgency apparatus. However, this indigenous movement's progress has progressively declined due to both the effectiveness of the state agencies, and the problems among the Maoists, like ideological differences, the splintering of the main party, leadership crisis and inadequate recruitment of new cadres.

JAMMU AND KASHMIR (J&K)

A proxy war commenced with jihadi terrorism in J&K in the late 1980s. A number of active terrorist groups, with the help of indigenous and/ or foreign

militants, carried out terrorist/ suicide attacks within and outside J&K since 1990, which peaked in terms of violent incidents, terrorism and casualties in 2001. Since July 2016, violence and terrorism has increased in Kashmir Valley after the HM Commander, Burhan Wani, was killed by the security forces in an operation. Resultantly, the number of incidents of youth pelting stones and riots had increased manifold. While the security situation is under control, the government needs to adopt a multi-dimensional approach to restore peace in the restive region. According to statistics collected by the Indian Government, militancy in J&K, has resulted in the deaths of 13,936 civilians and 5,043 security force personnel between 1990 and 2016⁴⁹.

LESSONS

On balance, while the security forces need to improve their intelligence network and secure its vulnerable targets, the government needs to analyse the centres of gravity of each region and adopt a multi-dimensional strategy to restore peace. A performance audit rather than a financial audit, with accountability, would help to implement schemes on the ground. An early resolution of the insurgencies would certainly minimise terrorism in India that is an integral part of such armed conflicts.

OTHER FORMS OF TERRORISM

As India is located at the cross roads of the Golden Crescent and Golden Triangle, narcotic drugs and trafficking are some of the sources that provide funds to the terrorist groups in India. In fact, there is close nexus between drug trafficking, narco terrorism and organised crime, wherein drugs are smuggled into India both from the North West and the East.

India has already been subjected to cyber terrorism over the years. LeT used Google maps with pinpoint accuracy to navigate and reach their chosen multiple targets in Mumbai in November 2008. Terrorist groups have also exploited the internet and social media to influence opinions, foment communal tensions, radicalise youth and recruit cadres and their cyber warriors

carry out cyber espionage, cyber-attacks and hacking.

India has a 7516km long coastline and 246 islands and off shore assets to protect. Given the earlier attacks on USS Cole at Yemen's Port of Aden in 2000, frequent incidents of piracy off the Somali coast, and following the 2008 Mumbai attack, India has initiated structural changes to improve its maritime surveillance, intelligence, coordination and reaction capability against the terrorists.

SUCCESSFUL COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES

The Indian state has woven together a number of successful strategies to challenge the scourge of terrorism and violent extremism. These strategies extend across the domains of legislative, diplomacy, socio-economic initiatives, military, intelligence, technological, cultural and civil society initiatives.

The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 was amended in 2012, with the requisite checks, to make the act more effective and potent in preventing unlawful activities and to combat money laundering and terrorism financing. As of 27 April 2017, the Indian Government has banned 40 terrorist organisations, including a few groups which have been indulging in cross border terrorism. Whenever the country's security interests warrant, the flow of funds to and networks within the terrorist organisation(s) are being disrupted and disabled by the government.

In addition, India has laid down restrictions on its citizens to prohibit the possession of explosives and certain fire arms, particularly automatic weapons, to minimise indiscriminate violence. The state is also maintaining a nationwide counterterrorism database and keeping a close eye on the activities of undesirable radical groups and institutions. However, much more needs to be done against those fomenting communal tensions in the country.

India's approach to counterterrorism has

been multi-dimensional with kinetic actions being one of the subsets of the whole of government approach. Besides hardening potential targets, securing the environment and minimising cross border terrorism, the focus has been on addressing the root causes; political, economic, social, psychological and environmental, along with skill development and creating job opportunities for the youth. However, the implementation of people-centric projects and reforms on the ground need to be accorded the highest priority by the government.

In concert, the security forces have initiated a host of measures to block infiltration routes, sources of funding, procurement of weapon systems and drugs by terrorist groups. On 8 November 2016, the government demonetised the currency to rein in illicit, counterfeit and stockpiled cash reserves, which were being used to fund illegal activities, terrorism and insurgencies. This has delivered a major blow to the terrorist and insurgent groups who are being choked due to lack of funds.

Diplomatic initiatives have also been unleashed at various international fora to prevent nuclear weapons falling in the hands of terrorist groups and rogue elements. It has also come down heavily on state sponsored terrorism in denying safe havens to terrorist groups in neighbouring countries. Both these initiatives have met with limited success. Concurrently, India has attempted at the UN's 1267 Committee to declare as a terrorist Maulana Masood Azhar - the head of terrorist group JeM, which is a banned outfit by the UN - and to impose sanctions. But this move has been blocked twice by China⁵⁰.

While the insurgency was at its peak in J&K in the early 1990s, India raised an exclusive counter insurgency force at the national level, called Rashtriya Rifles (National Rifles). It has been highly effective, due to some unique features including a light and agile force structure and a specially trained and equipped force for counter insurgency/ terrorism.

The force is deployed permanently in the counter insurgency/ terrorism grid and this continuity has resulted in the force gaining invaluable intelligence and counter insurgency experience.

The selective fencing of the line of control (LoC) over 550km along the border between India and Pakistan in J&K coupled with other innovative technology based anti-infiltration measures, has also resulted in reduced infiltration and cross border terrorism. In retaliation to terrorists' attack at Uri in September 2016, the Indian Army launched successful surgical strikes at multiple terrorists launch pads across the LoC in Pakistan.

The National Security Guard (NSG), counterterrorist and counter hijacking force with its base in Delhi has been further strengthened by establishing four additional regional hubs at Mumbai, Chennai, Kolkata and Hyderabad to ensure a timely response mechanism against the terrorists.

Certain structural changes have been made to develop an effective intelligence network at a strategic and operational level. A multi-agency centre has been set up at state and centre level to enhance intelligence gathering, sharing and coordinating all inputs. Simultaneously, the National Investigation Agency (NIA), a central organisation was established in 2008, following the Mumbai attack to effectively combat terror in India.

The setting up of 21 Counter Insurgency and Anti-Terrorist (CIAT) schools, improvements to physical infrastructure, the modernisation of police force and improvements in surveillance and actionable intelligence systems have helped to counter violent extremism in the areas affected by Maoists' violence and the NER. While security forces have been directed to deal with the terrorists and hard core rebels with an iron fist, simultaneously efforts to encourage the insurgents and terrorists to surrender has been fairly successful in areas affected by Maoists violence.

Efforts have been made to building stronger relationships between the government and madrassas in focusing on the provision of a good quality and modern education system. Simultaneously, all educational institutions are encouraged to foster greater tolerance among youth for each other's religion, community and beliefs by respecting and participating in each other's religious functions.

A whole of society approach, particularly with women's participation, has been found to be useful to counter violent extremism. A case in point is the Naga Mother's Association (NMA)⁵¹ that was formed in 1984, primarily to fight drug and alcohol abuse. With the spike in extreme violence and terrorism in Nagaland, including inter-tribal rivalry, the NMA made 'Shed No Blood' its mission. The NMA had meetings with the warring rebel groups and shared their pain and grief of mothers, and the sufferings of the Naga society as a whole. Such movements are being promoted and supported by the society at large.

The armed and predominately tribal conflict in the NER is in part identity driven⁵². In recognition of this, a few states have provided incentives to various groups to promote their local languages, culture, traditions, art, craft and music at various fora.

With a rapid increase in population, hyper urbanisation, an extremely high density population in cities with a large segment living in slums and ghettos, it is extremely difficult to monitor all clandestine anti-national activities. Each citizen, as a responsible stakeholder, should report any unusual activity to detect and prevent radicalisation, violence and terrorism. It is, therefore, important to expose senior children in schools, colleges and universities (youth power) about the rudimentary aspects of national security, growing urban terrorism, cyber terrorism and related challenges to contribute to the concept of community's responsibility.

To fight the scourge of terrorism and insurgencies effectively, it would be prudent to have an integrated whole of

government approach and the support of civil society in coordinating the application of all elements of national power coupled with close cooperation among the global community.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

GTI RANKS AND SCORES, 2017

GTI RANK	COUNTRY	2017 GTI SCORE (out of 10)	CHANGE IN SCORE (2016 to 2017)
1	Iraq	10	-0.04
2	Afghanistan	9.441	0.004
3	Nigeria	9.009	0.305
4	Syria	8.621	-0.033
5	Pakistan	8.4	0.214
6	Yemen	7.877	0.198
7	Somalia	7.654	-0.106
8	India	7.534	-0.049
9	Turkey	7.519	-0.777
10	Libya	7.256	0.027
11	Egypt	7.17	0.158
12	Philippines	7.126	-0.026
13	Democratic Republic of the Congo	6.967	-0.334
14	South Sudan	6.821	-0.324
15	Cameroon	6.787	0.215
16	Thailand	6.609	0.097
17	Ukraine	6.557	0.577
18	Sudan	6.453	0.149
19	Central African Republic	6.394	0.122
20	Niger	6.316	0.366
21	Bangladesh	6.181	0.33
22	Kenya	6.169	0.409
23	France	5.964	-0.182
24	Ethiopia	5.939	-2.485
25	Mali	5.88	0.15
26	Saudi Arabia	5.808	-0.404
27	Lebanon	5.638	0.435
28	Burundi	5.637	-0.219
29	Colombia	5.595	0.364
30	Palestine	5.551	0.104
31	China	5.543	0.566
32	United States	5.429	-0.524
33	Russia	5.329	0.101
34	Chad	5.269	0.561
35	United Kingdom	5.102	-0.032
36	Israel	5.062	0.185
37	Myanmar	4.956	-0.686
38	Germany	4.917	-0.5
39	Mozambique	4.882	-1.337

GTI RANK	COUNTRY	2017 GTI SCORE (out of 10)	CHANGE IN SCORE (2016 to 2017)
40	Belgium	4.656	-3.411
41	Tunisia	4.619	0.344
42	Indonesia	4.55	-0.048
43	Burkina Faso	4.52	-0.533
44	Nepal	4.387	0.046
45	Uganda	4.319	0.008
46	Greece	4.139	0.079
47	South Africa	4.092	-0.442
48	Congo	4.04	-3.675
49	Algeria	3.97	0.312
50	Kuwait	3.801	0.648
51	Jordan	3.788	-0.93
52	Sweden	3.756	0.228
53	Iran	3.714	0.218
54	Cote d'Ivoire	3.701	-1.524
55	Bahrain	3.668	0.541
56	Venezuela	3.632	-1.634
57	Paraguay	3.598	0.242
58	Japan	3.595	-1.148
59	Tanzania	3.413	0.419
60	Malaysia	3.334	-0.642
61	Mexico	3.292	0.458
62	Madagascar	3.287	-1.616
63	Chile	3.254	-0.555
64	Ireland	3.141	0.278
65	Australia	3.091	0.106
66	Canada	2.958	-0.437
67	Kazakhstan	2.95	-2.016
68	Sri Lanka	2.905	0.581
69	Italy	2.75	-0.387
70	Kosovo	2.548	-0.343
71	Peru	2.544	0.441
72	Tajikistan	2.427	0.66
73	Netherlands	2.412	-1.092
74	Haiti	2.4	-2.4
75	Armenia	2.374	-2.086
76	Finland	2.341	0.036
77	Georgia	2.114	-0.857
78	Bosnia and Herzegovina	2.029	0.646
79	Kyrgyzstan	1.989	-0.544

GTI RANK	COUNTRY	2017 GTI SCORE (out of 10)	CHANGE IN SCORE (2016 to 2017)
80	Laos	1.964	-1.269
81	Rwanda	1.929	0.66
82	Cyprus	1.894	0.146
83	Czech Republic	1.889	0.29
84	Senegal	1.795	0.803
85	Spain	1.701	-0.02
86	Ecuador	1.616	-0.823
87	Brazil	1.572	0.168
88	Honduras	1.562	-0.418
89	Austria	1.522	-1.34
90	Denmark	1.512	0.64
91	Albania	1.487	-0.384
92	Nicaragua	1.437	0.656
93	Macedonia	1.186	0.674
94	Bulgaria	1.178	0.453
95	Azerbaijan	1.153	-0.807
96	Djibouti	1.119	0.661
97	Dominican Republic	0.892	0.67
98	Hungary	0.835	-0.605
99	Argentina	0.807	-0.308
100	Uruguay	0.779	-0.779
101	Guinea	0.723	0.68
102	Sierra Leone	0.667	-0.667
103	New Zealand	0.611	-0.381
103	South Korea	0.611	-0.381
105	Guatemala	0.506	0.638
106	Taiwan	0.499	-0.422
107	Moldova	0.47	-0.451
108	Estonia	0.461	0.642
109	Lesotho	0.384	0.508
109	Poland	0.384	-0.384
111	Ghana	0.326	0.02
112	Switzerland	0.269	0.019
113	Trinidad and Tobago	0.25	0.249
114	Slovakia	0.23	-0.23
115	United Arab Emirates	0.211	0.211
116	Zimbabwe	0.202	0.211
117	Angola	0.154	-0.154
117	Guyana	0.154	-0.154
117	Panama	0.154	-0.154
120	Iceland	0.125	0.125
120	Liberia	0.125	0.125
122	Qatar	0.115	0.115
123	Morocco	0.077	0.815
123	Montenegro	0.077	0.077
123	Uzbekistan	0.077	0.077
126	Jamaica	0.058	0.057

GTI RANK	COUNTRY	2017 GTI SCORE (out of 10)	CHANGE IN SCORE (2016 to 2017)
127	Serbia	0.043	0.043
128	Belarus	0.038	1.319
128	Bhutan	0.038	0.077
128	Guinea-Bissau	0.038	0.039
128	Cambodia	0.038	0.039
132	Croatia	0.029	0.029
133	Bolivia	0.019	0.019
134	Norway	0	2.077
134	Eritrea	0	0.534
134	Mauritania	0	0.067
134	Portugal	0	0.058
134	Equatorial Guinea	0	0
134	Timor-Leste	0	0
134	Swaziland	0	0
134	Romania	0	0
134	Zambia	0	0
134	Benin	0	0
134	Botswana	0	0
134	Costa Rica	0	0
134	Cuba	0	0
134	Gabon	0	0
134	Gambia	0	0
134	Lithuania	0	0
134	Latvia	0	0
134	Mongolia	0	0
134	Mauritius	0	0
134	Malawi	0	0
134	Namibia	0	0
134	Oman	0	0
134	Papua New Guinea	0	0
134	North Korea	0	0
134	Singapore	0	0
134	El Salvador	0	0
134	Slovenia	0	0
134	Togo	0	0
134	Turkmenistan	0	0
134	Viet Nam	0	0

APPENDIX B

50 WORST TERRORIST ATTACKS IN 2016

RANK	COUNTRY	DATE	CITY	ORGANISATION	FATALITIES	ATTACK TYPE
1	Syria	10/12/2016	Palmyra	ISIL	433	hostage taking (kidnapping)
2	Iraq	3/7/2016	Baghdad	ISIL	383	bombing/explosion
3	Iraq	7/2/2016	Mosul	ISIL	300	hostage taking (kidnapping)
4	Iraq	21/10/2016	Mosul	ISIL	284	hostage taking (kidnapping)
5	South Sudan	19/8/2016	Pajut	SPLM-IO	283	armed assault
6	Iraq	21/4/2016	Mosul	ISIL	250	hostage taking (kidnapping)
7	Iraq	26/10/2016	Hammam al-Alil	ISIL	190	hostage taking (kidnapping)
8	Afghanistan	3/10/2016	Kunduz	Taliban	154	armed assault
9	Iraq	29/10/2016	Hammam al-Alil	ISIL	130	hostage taking (kidnapping)
10	Iraq	4/1/2016	Hadithah	ISIL	112	bombing/explosion
11	Iraq	12/9/2016	Barari	ISIL	100	bombing/explosion
12	Iraq	28/10/2016	Hammam al-Alil	ISIL	100	hostage taking (kidnapping)
13	Iraq	24/11/2016	Shomali	ISIL	98	bombing/explosion
14	Iraq	4/8/2016	Hawijah district	ISIL	97	hostage taking (kidnapping)
15	Afghanistan	11/10/2016	Chah Anjeer	Taliban	90	hostage taking (kidnapping)
16	Nigeria	30/1/2016	Dalori	Boko Haram	88	hostage taking (kidnapping)
17	France	14/7/2016	Nice	Lone actor	87	armed assault
18	Afghanistan	5/9/2016	Giro district	Taliban	85	armed assault
19	Central African Republic	23/11/2016	Bria	FPRC	85	hostage taking (kidnapping)
20	Afghanistan	23/7/2016	Kabul	Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State	83	bombing/explosion
21	Iraq	2/1/2016	Qayyarah	ISIL	83	hostage taking (kidnapping)
22	Iraq	21/10/2016	Kirkuk	ISIL	82	bombing/explosion
23	Pakistan	27/3/2016	Lahore	Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan	79	bombing/explosion
24	Pakistan	8/8/2016	Quetta	Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State	75	bombing/explosion
25	Syria	27/2/2016	Tall Abyad	ISIL	75	armed assault
26	Afghanistan	19/4/2016	Kabul	Taliban	71	bombing/explosion
27	Iraq	16/5/2016	Unknown	Unknown	71	bombing/explosion
28	Iraq	20/10/2016	Nasr	ISIL	70	unknown
29	Afghanistan	2/7/2016	Mosa Khail district	Taliban	67	armed assault
30	Pakistan	24/10/2016	Quetta	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi	67	hostage taking (barricade incident)

RANK	COUNTRY	DATE	CITY	ORGANISATION	FATALITIES	INJURIES
31	Libya	7/1/2016	Suq al-Thulatha	Tripoli Province of the Islamic State	66	bombing/explosion
32	Iraq	11/5/2016	Baghdad	ISIL	65	bombing/explosion
33	DRC	13/8/2016	Beni	Allied Democratic Forces	64	armed assault
34	Iraq	12/5/2016	Makhmur	ISIL	63	bombing/explosion
35	Iraq	6/3/2016	Hillah	ISIL	62	bombing/explosion
36	Iraq	4/5/2016	Mosul	ISIL	60	bombing/explosion
37	Iraq	28/12/2016	Bawizah	ISIL	60	bombing/explosion
38	Nigeria	9/2/2016	Dikwa	Boko Haram	60	bombing/explosion
39	Iraq	7/7/2016	Balad	ISIL	59	bombing/explosion
40	Nigeria	9/12/2016	Madagali	Boko Haram	59	bombing/explosion
41	Nigeria	18/6/2016	Logo district	Fulani extremists	59	armed assault
42	Turkey	20/8/2016	Gaziantep	ISIL	58	bombing/explosion
43	Afghanistan	20/10/2016	Azikeel	Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State	54	unknown
44	Pakistan	12/11/2016	Khuzdar district	Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State	53	bombing/explosion
45	Cameroon	6/6/2016	Darak	Boko Haram	52	hostage taking (kidnapping)
46	Nigeria	24/2/2016	Abugbe	Fulani extremists	51	armed assault
47	Iraq	23/10/2016	Mosul	ISIL	50	unknown
48	Nigeria	24/2/2016	Aila	Fulani extremists	50	armed assault
49	Nigeria	24/2/2016	Akwu	Fulani extremists	50	armed assault
50	Nigeria	24/2/2016	Ugboju	Fulani extremists	50	armed assault

APPENDIX C GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX METHODOLOGY

The GTI ranks 163 countries based on four indicators weighted over five years.¹ A country's annual GTI score is based on a unique scoring system to account for the relative impact of incidents in the year. The four factors counted in each country's yearly score are:

- total number of terrorist incidents in a given year
- total number of fatalities caused by terrorists in a given year
- total number of injuries caused by terrorists in a given year
- a measure of the total property damage from terrorist incidents in a given year.

Each of the factors is weighted between zero and three, and a five year weighted average is applied in a bid to reflect the latent psychological effect of terrorist acts over time. The weightings shown in table C.1 was determined by consultation with the GPI Expert Panel.

The greatest weighting is attributed to a fatality.

The property damage measure is further disaggregated into four bands depending on the measured scope of the property damage inflicted by one incident. These bandings are shown in table C.2; incidents causing less than US\$1 million are accorded a weighting of 1, between \$1 million and \$1 billion a 2, and more than \$1 billion a 3 weighting. It should be noted a great majority of incidents are coded in the GTD as 'unknown' thus scoring nil with 'catastrophic' events being extremely rare.

HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE OF A COUNTRY'S GTI SCORE

To assign a score to a country each incident is rated according to the four measures. The measures are then multiplied by their weighting factor and aggregated. This is done for all incidents and then all incidents for each country are aggregated to give the country score. To illustrate, Table C.3 depicts a hypothetical country's record for a given year.

TABLE C.1 INDICATOR WEIGHTS USED IN THE GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX

DIMENSION	WEIGHT
Total number of incidents	1
Total number of fatalities	3
Total number of injuries	0.5
Sum of property damages measure	Between 0 and 3 depending on severity

TABLE C.2 PROPERTY DAMAGE LEVELS AS DEFINED IN THE GTD AND WEIGHTS USED IN THE GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX

CODE/ WEIGHT	DAMAGE LEVEL
0	Unknown
1	Minor (likely < \$1 million)
2	Major (likely between \$1 million and \$1 billion)
3	Catastrophic (likely > \$1 billion)

TABLE C.3 HYPOTHETICAL COUNTRY TERRORIST ATTACKS IN A GIVEN YEAR

DIMENSION	WEIGHT	NUMBER OF INCIDENTS FOR THE GIVEN YEAR	CALCULATED RAW SCORE
Total number of incidents	1	21	21
Total number of fatalities	3	36	108
Total number of injuries	0.5	53	26.5
Sum of property damages measure	2	20	40
Total raw score			195.5

Given these indicator values, this hypothetical country for that year would be assessed as having an impact of terrorism of

$$(1 \times 21) + (3 \times 36) + (0.5 \times 53) + (2 \times 20) = 195.5.$$

FIVE-YEAR WEIGHTED AVERAGE

To account for the after effects of trauma that terrorist attacks have on a society, the GTI takes into consideration the events of previous years as having a bearing on a country's current score. For instance, the scale of the 2011 terrorist attacks in Norway will continue to have a psychological impact on the population for many years to come. To account for the lingering effects of terrorism, the prior four years are also included in the scoring with a decreasing weight each year. Table C.4 highlights the weights used for each year.

TABLE C.4 TIME WEIGHTING OF HISTORICAL SCORES

YEAR	WEIGHT	% OF SCORE
Current year	16	52
Previous year	8	26
Two years ago	4	13
Three years ago	2	6
Four years ago	1	3

LOGARITHMIC BANDING SCORES ON A SCALE OF 1-10

The impact of terrorism is not evenly distributed throughout the world. There are a handful of countries with very high levels of terrorism compared to most countries which experience only very small amounts, if not no terrorism. Hence, the GTI uses a base 10 logarithmic banding system between 0 and 10 at 0.5 intervals.

As shown in table C.5 this mapping method yields a total number of 21 bands. This maps all values to a band of size 0.5 within the scale of 0-10. In order to band these scores the following method is used:

1. Define the Minimum GTI Score across all countries as having a banded score of 0.
2. Define the Maximum GTI Score across all countries as having a banded score 10.
3. Subtract the Minimum from the Maximum GTI scores and calculate 'r' by:
 - a. $root = 2 \times (\text{Highest GTI Banded Score} - \text{Lowest GTI Banded Score}) = 20 \times (10 - 0) = 20$
 - b. $Range = 2 \times (\text{Highest Recorded GTI Raw Score} - \text{Lowest Recorded GTI Raw Score})$
 - c. $r = \sqrt[20]{range}$
4. The mapped band cut-off value for bin n is calculated by r^n .

Following this method produces mapping of GTI scores to the set bands as defined in table C.5.

TABLE C.5 BANDS USED IN THE GTI

BAND NUMBER	BANDS	BAND CUT OFF VALUES	BAND NUMBER	BANDS	BAND CUT OFF VALUES
1	0	0	12	5.5	328.44
2	0.5	1.69	13	6	556.2
3	1	2.87	14	6.5	941.88
4	1.5	4.86	15	7	1595.02
5	2	8.22	16	7.5	2701.06
6	2.5	13.93	17	8	4574.08
7	3	23.58	18	8.5	7745.91
8	3.5	39.94	19	9	13117.21
9	4	67.63	20	9.5	22213.17
10	4.5	114.53	21	10	37616.6
11	5	193.95			

APPENDIX D

THWARTED ATTACKS METHODOLOGY

A database of realised and foiled terrorist attacks in the OECD member countries was developed with 1,500 distinct attacks coded. Data was collected for the period between 1 January 2014 and 30 June 2017 and includes every OECD member country, with the exception of Israel and Turkey. Israel and Turkey were excluded as the nature of terrorism in these two countries is dissimilar to that faced by other OECD member countries. This in part is a reflection of Israel's and Turkey's geographic proximity to the Syrian conflict as well as internal political dynamics.

Attacks have been categorised by what stage they reached. This includes attacks that have been foiled, either in the preparation phase, before the attack or during the attack, as well as those that have not been foiled which are termed realised attacks.

There is a high level of confidence that the majority of attacks and foiled plots have been captured as, unlike some other events databases, terrorism events have a very high profile particularly among OECD countries. While some foiled plots may not be initially in the public domain, and hence not captured in this analysis, over time the details of many foiled plots become known especially through interactions with the relevant judicial system.

The database was constructed using open-source data. This initially built upon the GTD which is collected and collated by START. The GTD is considered to be the most comprehensive dataset on terrorist activity globally and has now codified over 170,000 terrorist incidents. As a supplement to the GTD, which only includes terrorist attacks that have been realised rather than foiled, additional data was collected through news reports using Factiva, academic articles, reports and court records.

Each terrorist attack was coded into several categories including number of victims, location, attack type, target, motivation and the stage of the attack.ⁱⁱ Stages include foiled in the preparation phase, foiled before the attack, foiled during the attack and not foiled (or realised attack).

The date refers to the day of the attack or the date when the planned attack was supposed to take place rather than when the attacker was arrested. Only actual foiled attacks are included and not unverified plots. Advocating terrorism is not included, only specific instances where a specific attack was planned. This means that hoax bomb threats were not included in the database. The deaths of perpetrators are counted as well, even if there are no other casualties.

APPENDIX E

CORRELATES OF TERRORISM

TABLE E.1 VARIABLES CORRELATED AGAINST 2017 GTI SCORE

SOURCE	DIMENSION	GLOBAL	NON-OECD	OECD
IEP	Ongoing internal and international conflict	0.73	0.81	0.39
WJP	Civil conflict is effectively limited	-0.72	-0.76	-0.57
IEP	Number and duration of internal conflicts	0.72	0.78	0.25
PEW	Religion restrictions: Social Hostilities Index	0.71	0.72	0.7
IEP	Number of deaths from organised conflict (internal)	0.7	0.76	0.32
INFORM	Uprooted people	0.67	0.67	0.64
IEP	GPI score	0.66	0.75	0.61
IEP	Level of organized conflict (internal)	0.63	0.73	0.34
CORNELL	Political stability	-0.61	-0.77	-0.55
IEP	Vulnerable groups	0.6	0.62	0.66
IEP	Political terror	0.58	0.69	0.43
IEP	Group grievance rating	0.58	0.68	0.45
PEW	How many types of crimes/malicious acts/violence for religious hatred/bias occurred?	0.57	0.57	0.66
INFORM	Risk of humanitarian crisis	0.55	0.64	0.64
PEW	Religion restrictions: Were there deaths motivated by religious bias?	0.52	0.52	0.48
PEW	Religion restrictions: Were there detentions or abductions motivated by religious bias?	0.51	0.55	0.36
PEW	Did government action or policy result in death due to religion?	0.47	0.49	0.44
INFORM	Socio-economic vulnerability	0.47	0.51	0.68
PEW	Religion restrictions: Did groups attempt to dominate public life with their perspective on religion?	0.46	0.49	0.37
WJP	Order and security	-0.46	-0.56	-0.45
IEP	Number of refugees and internally displaced people as percentage of the population	0.46	0.49	0.44
IEP	Acceptance of the rights of others	0.44	0.61	0.51
IEP	Militarisation	0.42	0.4	0.58
Gallup	Global Social Well-Being Index: gender male suffering	0.3	0.32	0.07
WJP	People can access and afford civil justice	-0.24	-0.27	-0.36
WB	Improved urban water source (% of urban population with access)	-0.24	-0.26	-0.06
WB	Public spending on education (% of GDP)	-0.24	-0.25	-0.11

IEP tested for GTI's statistical association with over 5,000 data sets, indices and attitudinal surveys to identify the factors with which GTI scores or terrorist activity is most strongly correlated.

GTI scores are strongly correlated with:

- various measures of ongoing internal and external conflict
- the number of displaced people
- overall level of peace
- political terror
- group grievances
- religiously biased violent activities
- the risk of humanitarian crises (as measured by INFORM index).

APPENDIX F

ECONOMIC COST OF TERRORISM METHODOLOGY

The economic impact of terrorism is calculated using IEP's cost of violence methodology. The model includes both the direct and indirect costs such as lost life time earnings as well as the cost of medical treatments and property destruction from incidents of terrorism. The direct costs include those borne by the victim of the terrorist act and associated expenditure such as medical costs. The indirect costs include lost productivity and earning as well as the psychological trauma to the victims, their families and friends.

IEP also uses an economic multiplier. The economic multiplier is a commonly used concept which describes the extent to which additional expenditure flows through to the wider economy. If a terrorism incident didn't occur then the costs associated with it would not occur and the money would be more productively spent such as in business development or education. For example, medical costs to treat victims of terrorist attacks or expenditure to repair and rebuild destroyed properties could have been channelled into investments with higher return. Similarly, if the lost life time earnings were included in the economy, then the individual's expenditure would have a flow on effect through the economy and this would result in additional economic production.

The study uses unit costs for homicide and injuries from McCollister et al. (2010). The unit costs are adjusted to individual countries using GDP per capita at purchasing parity level relative to the source of the estimates. In addition, to present the cost in

constant 2015 terms, average annual consumer price index data from International Monetary Fund (IMF) is used to adjust the unit costs. The adjusted unit costs are then used to estimate the cost of deaths and injuries from incidents of terrorism.

In addition, the data provides estimated dollar values of property destruction for a sample of incidents. The property destruction estimates from the GTD are then used to generate unit costs of property destroyed by various types of terrorist attacks such as bombings and explosions, armed assaults, hostage taking and assassinations. The unit costs are estimated considering the country national income level and the scale of property destruction. For example, a minor property destruction resulting from bombing is calculated using a different unit cost for high income OECD countries compared to lower income country groups.

Large scale terrorism has implications for the broader economy in countries experiencing intense conflict; therefore, IEP's model includes losses of national output which is equivalent to two per cent of GDP.

The analysis presents conservative estimates of the economic impact of terrorism and does not include variables for which detailed appropriate data was not available. For instance, the analysis does not include the impact on business, the cost of fear from terrorism or the cost of counterterrorism.

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SECTION 3

TERRORISM IN OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES

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SECTION 7 EXPERT CONTRIBUTIONS

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APPENDIX F ECONOMIC COST OF TERRORISM METHODOLOGY

- The geographical definition of Palestine for the purposes of the GTI includes the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) as well as the Gaza Strip.
- Data was not available for every category for all attacks. Thus there may be slight variation in the total number of attacks shown across the different categories.

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